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OXFORD UNION SOCIETY

INTERNATIONAL

JOURNAL OF ETHICS.

OCTOBER, 1905.

WHY ARE WE IMPERIALISTIC?

Immediately after the death of Senator Hanna a leading New York paper published an interesting editorial deploring the introduction of commercialism in politics and laying the blame at the door of this senator. It was no doubt an influence in political affairs before the campaign which Senator Hanna managed, but the exigencies of that struggle very much intensified the temptations to the illegitimate use of money. The whole campaign was avowedly a financial contest and arrayed the two classes of society against each other in a way to invoke economic as opposed to moral forces in the settlement of it, and consequently placed in power the commercial spirit which was fortunately on the side of morality at the same time. But the outcome has been the instalment of commercialism as the dominant agency in our present politics, a situation also initiated and sustained by our tariff policy. But whatever the causes, all serious thinkers are conscious of it and deplore it. The same persons and a group of malcontents are equally strenuous in their antagonism to imperialism. Commercialism and imperialism are in reality the same thing in our political condition, though the incidents of their action might be independent of each other. The antagonism which they arouse, however, comes less from a conflict of interests than from the struggle of the old with the new morality, if the new can be called morality at all. The anti-imperialists stand for the old moral ideals. They are trying to stem the tide against them by ap-

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peals to standards which are no longer effective. They are judging a new age by the ideals of an old one, and exhibit some of the pessimism consequent on such a point of view, though this is tempered and modified by the optimism of the old political ideals of democracy. But they do not realize the fundamental change that has taken place in the moral conceptions of men, involving the substitution of the economic for the religious ideal of life, if I may summarize the conflicting tendencies of the age in these terms. They imagine that society should act on moral ideals which are decadent, and do not realize that imperialism is the only saviour of what political order can be obtained from the new tendencies.

The status of civilization at any time and in any large or small community is determined by the general ideas which prevail in it. It is not always on the surface that they can be found, because they are as often unconscious as conscious. It is also quite as true that the dominant idea may not be what appears on the surface, though the surface is affected or even determined by it. What men are most conscious of is their immediate wants and tendencies, while the great instinctive and unconscious impulses determine the general tendency of communities below the surface. We think, for instance, that trusts and corporate combinations are our great danger, or some other evil which we immediately feel. But, in fact, these are mere symptoms of other and wider influences which are not generally appreciated, and for that reason cannot be directly approached. The exigencies of political interest prevent us from studying the real causes for the tendencies we deplore. There is no time to instruct the public in regard to the general ideas affecting social improvement, and they are sensible only of the more immediate agencies affecting life and action. Hence the great ideas, conscious or unconscious, do their work without the chance of regulation. It will be necessary to define these general ideas as a means of bringing them into plain recognition and to show why we are in the conflict between the old religious civilization and the new imperialism.

The primary influence in the modern movement may be dated in 1859, the year in which Darwin published the "Origin

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of Species." The tendency originated long before, but it obtained its best expression in the scientific truth assumed or established by Evolution. All social, religious, and ethical conceptions have been modified in deference to that doctrine, and none but those who have been educated in the old morality and felt the difficulties of the transition to the new can fully appreciate the nature of the change and its consequences. We have drifted away from the religious ideal of the past to that of the economical, and Evolution has been the most effective agency in relaxing the allegiance of men to the older ideal.

To make this clear and to prepare the way for understanding whither we are drifting it will be necessary to define what I mean by the moral or religious and the economic ideal. By the economic ideal I mean the pursuit of material ends of life with the sensuous pleasures most naturally associated with the attainment and expenditure of wealth. By the moral or religious ideal I mean the cultivation of those intellectual and spiritual virtues that make character independent of possessions beyond the necessities of life. This moral ideal divides itself into two general types: that which confines its operation to present incarnate duties and minimizes or neglects the consideration of the future existence of the soul, and that which makes the center and goal of human endeavor to be a life beyond the grave, and so subordinates the incarnate to a discarnate existence. Greco-Roman civilization was based upon the pursuit of the economic ideal with its adjuncts of science and art, educative of the intellect and sensuous pleasures. Christian civilization was based upon the moral or spiritual ideal with adjunctive reference either to a discarnate existence or to personal moral character, and so was educative of the will and the higher spiritual emotions. The political systems correspond to the two different ideals.

The reason for this connection is patent. If man lives for the pleasures of wealth he naturally neglects the non-sensuous experiences and accentuates the impulses which create the aristocratic society and its political methods. If he lives for another than the present life he cultivates a consciousness that is spiritual, even when it is associated with sensuous experience,

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and tends to recognize that measure of equality between men which is the antidote to aristocracy. The struggle for existence in the economic life has no mitigations, and the aspirations are for material splendor and show. The struggle in the spiritual life, when this tempers the economic, places its emphasis upon the inner development of the individual, and the material world is depreciated or subordinated to the higher. Greco-Roman civilization was purely sensuous and the passions of men had to be governed by political power equal to the emergency. Christian civilization was purely non-sensuous and the government was within. When its ideal is realized, force is not necessary, and imperialistic tendencies are modified.

The imperialistic movement in recent times is not simple in its origin. It is the fruit of very complex influences, though they can all be summarized in the decline of the religious and the rise of the economic or materialistic ideal into predominance. This imperialism has embodied itself in two tendencies, namely, in the conflict between capital and labor and in the policy of exploiting or desiring to exploit colonial resources. Both are representative of the dominance of economic ideals. They would be less intense than they are if the older religious conceptions could maintain their integrity, or the social ideals that were at least nominally the associates of these religious ideals. But with the brotherhood of man discredited by the aristocratic conceptions fostered by the doctrine of evolution, and the immortality of the soul considered an illusion, the chief moral restraints upon an undue economic struggle are dissipated, and a reaction from the mediæval conception of life becomes all the more extreme, according to the luxurious fruit of the scientific and industrial conquest of nature.

We speak to-day of the struggle between capital and labor as if it were peculiar to our own times and conditions, and as if it were unique in its nature. But the fact is that it is only more intense and massive than it has been in the past, because it is organized on both sides. It is really only another term for the conflict between the rich and the poor which is perennial. It will probably prevail as long as inequalities exist between men, but will have its intensity modified by the associated ideas

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that help to compensate for these inequalities. It will be useful to examine its nature in different civilizations in order to ascertain what it is which gives the struggle so much poignancy at present. We may then understand the influences which tend to produce the need of strong government.

The struggle between capital and labor, or between the rich and the poor, is the point at which we can best study the natural and artificial agencies that affect the course of history, whether it be one of progress or regress. The natural instincts in men are for the assumption of certain inequalities between them and their fellows; the artificial efforts, especially in the Christian system, have been for equality, at least of a certain type. The struggle between these tendencies has been that between aristocracy and democracy, the former tending to embody itself in some form of imperialism. The concentration of the problem is in the conflict between class instincts affected by economic forces rather than the spiritual. We have only to look at history to see that Greco-Roman civilization, as well as modern, was determined by the relation between capital and labor, or between the rich and poor, as it is usually expressed. But it was tempered by different moral and social considerations. Antiquity was aristocratic, imperialistic, and despotic in its feeings and political methods, whatever name we may happen to give its institutions. At no time did it place the same value upon the individual as characterizes modern civilization, in its sentiments at least. The distribution of corn in the Roman Empire was not dictated by any interest in the beneficiaries, but was a device to save power and to escape the difficulties created by the conflict between free and slave labor. There was no recognition of human rights in the question but only of power to destroy social order as then organized. Hence the struggle in Greco-Roman civilization was not one between recognized equals, but one between recognized superiors and inferiors. But this class distinction, while it was supported by economic inequalities, was primarily based upon lineage, and the rights of this distinction were conceded. No dangers would threaten such a society as long as there was no demand for social equality, or as long as the standard of living was equal to the rank

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admitted. In this order the struggle for existence was not for equality, but for the sustenation of social rank in one class and for a living in the other, with no competition, economic or otherwise, between the two classes. Its civilization was materialistic in all but its social conceptions, and these were constantly threatened by the capricious domination of the economic ideal.

But Christianity came in with its doctrine of immortality and the brotherhood of man, both conspiring to create the sense of equality between men and the hope of compensations for the poor in their sacrifice of wealth to social caste. It thus set up a new standard in the struggle for existence, and this was for social equality based upon moral as distinct from economic criteria, upon character as opposed to possession or wealth. Hence the modern struggle between capital and labor partakes of the assumption that it is between equals, between persons having the same moral and social rights, an assumption that in no way governed ancient civilization. The materialistic conceptions of antiquity offered no hope for compensation in a future life in return for patience and concession to the successful, while the recognition of social distinctions removed the motive for pressing the struggle for existence against the higher classes. But Christianity offered compensation for disappointed hopes in this world by a chance for another life with its reward for virtue, patience, and humility, while its doctrine of human brotherhood instituted a social force which tended to equalize men and to counteract the asceticism tending to associate itself with the belief in another life. The two influences together conspired to produce democratic institutions, in that the one emphasized the value of the individual and the other the social equality of men. A little later I shall note the historical development of these ideas. At present I only wish to observe the ideas which overthrew ancient civilization and initiated modern tendencies.

As Christianity placed its ideal life beyond the grave it set up a powerful motive for patience and hope against the misfortunes of the present life, and where the individual could not expect or demand social equality or attain economic success he

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could hope to be rewarded for the virtues which were practiced in submission and faith. On the other hand, the doctrine of human brotherhood set up a conception which made men jealous of artificial social distinctions, and so instated a principle to destroy aristocracy and imperialism. It took a long time for these influences to work their way out into general recognition, and it was not effected until the Church reorganized society in its ecclesiastical system which is so well called the Holy Roman Empire, wherein it sustained a strange association of imperialistic and democratic ideas, its imperialism being in its methods of government and its democracy being in human interests perfunctorily carried out in the service of personal salvation. The effect was to very greatly modify the struggle for existence. The ancient struggle was between master and servant, the relations between both being recognized as necessary, and hence between aristocrat and plebeian. The modern struggle is between recognized equals, in the estimation of the moral and religious mind, that is between those who feel that they are on the same social level, whether they are so in fact or not. In the ancient system the criterion of class distinctions was not so much wealth as it was blood or lineage. Wealth was secondary, and this still prevails in the minds of aristocratic people in continental countries. In the modern system, which is either democratic or tends to this as its ideal, the distinction cannot be blood so much as wealth, and the aristocratic sentiments in democratic communities expresses itself in materialistic forms and not in character. Wealth is the product of voluntary effort. It tends to create personal pride in successful effort, though its attainment is usually as much due to chance as to intelligence. Blood and lineage are not determined by the individual who is to take pride in them. They are inherited qualities. The individual cannot be censured for having them, nor is he the subject of moral praise for their possession. A social system based upon them cannot excite the same jealousies as one based on personal achievements. If wealth be a criterion of social standing, and the only criterion of this, it will be the prize of individual effort, unless hereditary, and even if hereditary will not enjoy any better advantages in the social scale than

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wealth personally acquired. In a democracy which cannot or will not sustain class distinctions based on blood and lineage, and inheritance of wealth by primogeniture, and which has no moral or spiritual ideal, wealth personally won must be the determinant of its civilization, and it will be easy to calculate the outcome for it under such conditions. Its social and other struggles will not be for moral qualities but for the material means to support a materialistic civilization.

Any one who is familiar with the moral and religious ideals of our colonial history will recognize its thoroughly democratic character. It was made so by the immigration of an unaristocratic population and by the religious system of the citizens. Though all who came from the old world were animated by the desire to improve their material conditions of life, the accompanying desire for religious liberty and the attachment to their religious views of life were strong enough to keep economic influences more or less in abeyance. Economic resources were as much appropriated to support the spiritual ideal of life as in support of physical existence. Christian brotherhood was the conception on which social and political institutions were regulated, whether it was accompanied by the proper feeling or not, and though the conception did not take a socialistic or communistic form. The social and religious sentiments of the community represented antagonism to the aristocratic and monarchic institutions of Europe, and hence were imbued with the idea of equality which implied brotherhood, if it did not embody its feelings and tendencies against class distinctions. The Revolution solidified these sentiments, and as a protection against their political influence our institutions were specifically based upon political equality and aristocratic distinctions excluded from them. The ideas and passions that produced the Civil War illustrate the nature of the social fabric in regard to liberty and equality. It was only in the Confederate States that aristocratic tendencies prevailed, and here the sense of inequality was associated with and fostered by slavery. Where the idea of equality was dominant and patriotism was directed to democratic sentiments slavery perished, and under the ægis of the old religious ideals class distinctions involving any-

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thing like aristocratic tendencies were either suppressed or kept in abeyance. Imperialistic tastes and proclivities found no expression. But since recent years all the conceptions fostered by colonial times have vanished.

But what are the influences that have brought about this change, this revolution of ideas and sentiments so profoundly affecting the body politic? The full answer to this question is a complex one, but the fundamental cause is an alteration in religious beliefs affecting the main tendencies of so many centuries. It is no doubt complicated with various incidental causes, which many mistake for the fundamental ones, such as the increase of population, combinations of capital and labor, invention and industry, and the growth of wealth. But these influences, however much they may be operative as social forces, are wholly dependent for their incidence upon the moral and religious ideas with which they are associated. If human equality still prevailed as an effective social force and if the present life were a probation for another or believed to be such, these agencies would still be able to direct and modify all other social influences. But both these intellectual and moral agencies have been dispossessed from control, and all by the cumulative force of those influences which were concentrated in the doctrine of Evolution, as disturbing the integrity of theological ideas and the old ideal of respect for the weak. Let us trace briefly the history and conflict between theological and scientific conceptions and its influence on social and political methods.

Christianity, whatever its essential idea and primitive impulse, in its practical development was a curious mixture of various tendencies made workable by a peculiar adjustment of the relation between the present and a future life. It could not easily or at once overthrow the existing class distinctions and hence, after the failure of its social objects, which were those of equality and fraternity, the system became a combination of moral interest in the poor and a personal interest in happiness after death bought by humanity in this life. I do not divest the system of genuine human impulses, because there were many who took a less sordid view of it than this implies. Otherwise it could not have lived and conquered civilization.

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But it had adjusted the egoistic and altruistic instincts in such a way that the egoistic enjoyments were postponed until another life and their sacrifice purchased by altruism in this. Alms, penance, poverty with patience, faith, and humility were the price of a happiness in the next world that the struggle for existence in this amidst human passion and sin would not permit. In reaching this position the system was a compromise between the social scheme of its founder and the selfishness of ancient civilization that admitted no general duty to humanity at all. It compensated the sacrifice of earthly goods by a spiritual reward. The selfish instincts remained the same in their intensity, but were diverted into a new channel and directed to a new object, so that the struggle for existence was tempered by an exaltation of the spiritual and a depreciation of the economic ideal. Social and class distinctions were left intact and the logical consequence of the primitive system in social equality and fraternity left uninforced, while the unsuccessful in life could hope, if virtuous, for an equalization of things, or even a reversal of relations, in another world.

The influence that cemented these agencies together and produced an evasion of the organization of social reforms was the philosophic system of beliefs that formed a cosmogony and theology conceived in behalf of the fundamental interest of man. All practical life is regulated by some belief, and the influence of that belief is more general and cohesive in proportion to its comprehensiveness and its organization of the primary human instincts. The comprehensiveness of the Christian scheme when developed into its cosmic conceptions involved a doctrine of creation, both of matter and its complex forms, and a providential dispensation subordinating all things to one general purpose, and that purpose was the salvation and happiness of those who properly reverenced the Creator. It appealed to the most fundamental instinct of the human mind, namely, self-preservation and the hope of immortality. This whole theological system was crowned by a doctrine of inspiration which was the intellectual equivalent of the political authority that dominated ancient ideals and out of which it arose. Agreement and unity of action had to be obtained, and this could not

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be done without invoking the spirit which had maintained them in the civilization in which the new ideas arose. Individuality of belief and sentiment were incompatible with the organization of harmonious action, and hence to give effectiveness to the whole scheme the inspiration and authority of it were invoked to protect it and make it inviolable. It is and was the pivotal doctrine on which turns and turned the cohesiveness of the system and determined the power it had over men in general. It was the only conception which could hold an uneducated democratic order under control, and the ecclesiastical system was democratic in its claims whether it was always so or not in its methods.

But the Renaissance and the intellectual tendencies represented by it marked the beginning of the end of this system. They have been long in effecting the result as a dominant factor in the present social order. But wherever they took possession of an individual or communal mind they turned it in the direction of free thought and became more or less a restoration of Greco-Roman ideals, with the retention of enough liberty to prevent the immediate reinstallation of despotism. The movement at first embodied nothing more than the admiration and imitation of Greek literature, but it soon imbibed its intellectual and scientific spirit which was animated by the ideal of naturalism as opposed to supernaturalism, a present as distinguished from a future life, human experience as contrasted with transcendental things, present actual realities as opposed to the imaginary and impossible. Protestantism was the logical outcome, and following this by the same process of development was absolute rationalism, which reduces all authority to individual judgment or nothing. This tendency was in the interest of democracy, but it has not carried with it an effective spiritual ideal that would prevent anarchy without imperialism. Old conceptions were either eradicated or transformed. The effect was the same in either case. Authority was dispossessed and men left to form their own judgments. Man became the master of what had previously mastered him. Instead of blind obedience to tradition, he either converted it into some meaning subservient to present interests or cast it into oblivion. This

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spirit creates a new tendency, or is the result of it. The life of dependence on authority is either inert and unaggressive or it is dogmatic and intolerant. It shrinks before nature instead of mastering it. It obeys and will not direct. But once question the inspiration and authority on which past civilization fed, and whether the idea be transformed or nullified, the assumption of reason to decide all matters of belief and action is a signal for independence all along the line. If we are not to passively submit we must govern, and this spirit, when it once possesses the mind, arouses a passion to conquer nature instead of serving it, and science, invention, and industry are the consequence, and with these comes the morality of struggle.

Now the doctrine of Evolution did for our conceptions of morality what science and literature did for our conception of nature as opposed to the older theological ideas. It was the climax of all the movements of thought in the direction of the natural, and turned man into an imitator of what is around him as distinguished from his mere ideals. Science would not permit him to believe in the past unless it was made intelligible in terms of present experience, and it remains agnostic of a future that cannot support its probability by evidence in this same present experience. The past ceased to awe or inspire, and the future was too doubtful to influence his motives, unless it was inferrable from the present, so that when authority was once banished from account there was nothing left but experience to guide action. Evolutionary morality offered the present order of things as a model and this is the struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest which is merciless for the weak, and in the social order represents what is euphemistically called "business," a deadly competition for economic goods and pleasures. As the spiritual virtues had no prospect of reward there was left only the worldly ambitions to satisfy. Invention gave him an astonishing mastery, almost unlimited, over nature, which he rules and subordinates to his own ends instead of obeying it for its blind fate, so that his natural comforts and conveniences have been multiplied and intensified until the idea of a future bliss as described by religion, even if certain, pales before the enjoyments of the present order. At one time future

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bliss was something to make us endure the present, which was so full of pains and disappointments, but under the modern materialistic mastery of nature heaven offers no fascination even for the imagination, and when it becomes doubtful of possible realization it exerts no power to restrain materialistic tendencies, but rather stimulates to the attainment of as much as is possible out of the present existence alone. In this situation the old moral ideals are ineffective. We have only to look about us to see that they have no more influence on national life. The Church which embodied them has succumbed to the general spirit of the age. It cannot preach as of yore the hope of heaven as a compensation for misfortune and defeat here, but accepting the conception that a divine order, if it exists, must be found in the present, either endeavors to cultivate science and art or engages in the revival of the social reforms of its founder, and in both inevitably gets involved in the materialistic accomplishments and rewards of an earthly life, all of which are well enough if tempered and spiritualized by justice and humanity. But the Church has lost the ideals for whose primary emphasis it has always stood and has to face the reinstatement of a purely materialistic civilization, and in the absence of those beliefs which made it distinctive in its nature and motives has no object which cannot be served by science and literature. Since the time of Kant it cannot argue effectively or clearly regarding either God or immortality, though it sighs for these ideals with all the inconsolability of Hecuba for her children when they cannot be restored to her. The consequence of this situation is that all it can do is to passionately reiterate, in general terms, the morality of its founder and then grope about for a spiritual ideal to justify its existence.

In the meantime Evolution teaches it that nature has no mercy for the class which Christian morality insists must be cared for at all costs, and in default of a spiritual ideal which either offers a reward for virtue or represents a credible belief in the same conservation of personal consciousness as is found in inert matter, men are left to pursue material goods and enjoyments without the traditional restraints upon the sacrifice of the weak in the struggle for existence. If nature does not

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offer permanence or respect for the highest ideals of life and action we must expect our morality to take the shape of material success. Passionately possessed of the idea of equality, on the one hand, as inherited from Christian thought, and taught the principles of aristocracy by Evolution, on the other, those demanding equality being the unsuccessful, and those with aristocratic feelings being their more fortunate rivals, in fact the exploiters of the unsuccessful in many instances, the struggle is intensified because it is hopeless of any spiritual compensation for material misfortune. The achievements of a spiritual life are subordinated to the material, and in the sacrifice the economic ideal obtains the domination with its aristocratic associations supported by the gospel of Evolution.

In the meantime economic developments involved in such achievements as the railways, the telegraph, the telephone, mechanical improvements in all departments of human activity and production, and the organization of labor and industry have given that solidarity to the incidents of wealth, both in its production and distribution, which enables the individual to exploit many with whom he never comes into contact, and thus these influences necessitate the action of strong government. The comprehension of large territories under the same economic and political institutions tends to form the same results. The demand for strong government necessitates the application of imperialism as the only means of meeting the exigencies of present civilization, and this imperialism arises in domestic conditions before it can become active in foreign or colonial affairs. This is instanced with us in the results of the Civil War, which was as much the effect of economic necessity as it was of moral allegiance to the idea of equality. The supremacy of the larger or imperialistic conception was evident in the Federal interpretation of our institutions, supported, however, by democratic sentiments, while the aristocratic sentiments of the Confederate cause were directed to the support of independent units of political organism against the unifying tendencies of the age. But the triumph of the Federal contention and the solidification of economic interests in the industrial system of to-day, governed by the struggle for existence, and without a spiritual

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ideal to temper its character or to subordinate the passions of wealth, make the principles of imperialism more or less necessary, however unideal they may be in comparison with a civilization permeated with more spiritual conceptions of human achievement and enjoyment. All opposition to it comes only from those who are trying to cling to ideals that no longer exist, or to sustain the morality of faith on a basis of doubt. Nothing but the recovery of a spiritual ideal will redeem us from the rule of imperialism.

JAMES H. HYSLOP.

NEW YORK.

THE INTELLECTUAL INFLUENCE OF WOMEN.

It is, perhaps, characteristic of all permanent progress that it has to win its way by fighting; and in no branch of progress is this more true than in the improvement in the intellectual status of woman. Tradition, custom, pseudo-science, and, if I may say so, masculine vanity, have barred the way at every step; and on one position after another has been captured, the enemy has not yielded, but has merely retreated to take up another. Moreover, it cannot be overlooked that at each point of struggle there has been so much justification in the opposition offered that nothing less than the strongest evidence of justice and of righteous expediency could suffice to overcome it. Custom and tradition are generally right, *so far as they go,* and only a larger right can prevail against them. That which has been proved by generations of experience to be in some way beneficial to humanity alone has strength to maintain itself as custom and tradition against the changes of time; but no tradition is so firmly established that the hour may not come when it must be overthrown by a more vital truth. That the process should be slow and difficult is right; for the more difficult it is the greater must be the strength of the opposing truth to which tradition yields. And this is why in the modern history of women's intellectual progress there have been no backward movements. No passing freak or fashion could have prevailed against the strong opposing tradition; and every step forward

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has been won by such overwhelming force that it has been won forever.

But it is a movement of which both friends and enemies would say that there is no finality in it. Indeed, there can be none. The march of intellect must press forward whilst the human race survives; and whether the instrument through which intellect realizes itself be the brain of man or of woman cannot affect its essential nature.

"I have often wondered that learning is not thought a proper ingredient in the education of a woman of quality or fortune. Since they have the same improvable mind as the male part of the species, why should they not be cultivated by the same method? . . . Learning and knowledge are perfections in us, not as we are men, but as we are reasonable creatures, in which order of beings the female world is upon the same level with the male. We ought to consider in this particular not what is the sex, but what is the species to which they belong." So wrote an enlightened man nearly two hundred years ago, and in his quaint language he has gone to the root of the matter. It is true we no longer limit the right of education to women of quality and fortune; but the argument that women have the "same improvable mind," and that it is a question not of sex but of species, leaves but little to be said.

For a long time the contest was fought as a battle of woman against man. The issue was a mistaken one, and the result has proved that conflict upon that ground was unnecessary. Women, argued the one side, would be happier and healthier, both in mind and body, if their improvable minds were set free to healthy exercise instead of being confined in brooding ignorance. Men, it was argued on the other side, would suffer; woman's function was to subordinate herself to him in mind and body, to spend her hours in tending him, or in waiting to tend him when he should be inclined for it, to create an atmosphere for his activities, and to be a passive receptacle for such of his thoughts and opinions as he might care to impart. The most consistent exponents of this view have been the Germans:

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"Dienen lerne bei Zeiten das Weib nach ihrer Bestimmung
Denn durch Dienen allein gelangt sie endlich zum Herrschen
Zu der verdienten Gewalt, die doch ihr im Hause gehöret.
Dienet die Schwester dem Bruder doch früh, sie dienet den Eltern,
Und ihr Leben ist immer ein ewiges Gehen und Kommen,
Oder ein Heben und Tragen, Bereiten und Schaffen für Andre.
Wohl ihr, wenn sie darum sich gewöhnt, dass kein Weg ihr zu sauer
Wird und die Stunden der Nacht ihr sind wie die Stunden des Tages,
Dass ihr niemals die Arbeit zu klein und die Nadel zu fein dünkt.
Dass sie sich ganz vergisst und leben mag nur in anderen!"

This ideal, it was thought, could no longer be maintained if once women should assert the right of independent intellect; and with it the autocratic life of the man would be shattered. There would cease to be only one will in the home, and where there are two wills, there is the possibility of conflict. Few saw what many now realize, that the old ideal with all its beauty and strength could only be cast down by one still higher and more beautiful; that the devotion of women could be greater, not less, when they had richer minds and wiser hearts to give; that the noblest harmonies of life arise when two disciplined and independent wills combine; and that the truest comradeship is found when man and woman meet on the common ground of mutual intellectual respect. Innumerable happy homes bear witness to-day to the truth of this higher ideal, and so far the battle has in principle been won forever.

But it must be admitted that in practice there are still many who hold that man can only reach his highest by making a stepping stone of woman. In Germany men, though not regardless of women's welfare, are still eager to prove to them that their true welfare lies within the four walls of the home, and that real greatness consists in the daily routine of household duties. And yet they weary of the poor *Hausfrau* who puts her trust in their teaching and faithfully confines her life within the narrow limits laid down by them. One of the most plausible and convincing of these teachers is Riehl, the sociological historian, who in his book, *Die Familie,* strenuously advocates the purely domestic theory of woman; and it is not a little amusing to find him remarking in a surprised sort of way how on the occasion of some international conference the

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English and Americans brought their wives with them. "A German of culture would rejoice on such an occasion to be free of his family, and would certainly leave his wife at home." Of course he would; no one wants to be hindered on his holidays with an epitome of household drudgery; but it does not seem to occur to him that a wife capable of intelligent comradeship might even add to the pleasures of a holiday.

Another point around which the battle has been and still is fought, is whether the education of women works for good or for evil upon the fortunes of the human race as a whole. The biologist argues that the race is strong in proportion as male and female differ in their qualities; and he is supported by the sociologist, who maintains that in the course of human evolution every forward step sees a greater differentiation between the functions of men and women. One of Riehl's arguments in favor of emphasizing the difference between the occupations of men and women is that the further back you get in the development of culture the less marked you find that difference to be. He points out that amongst the least cultivated peasants men and women share the same work, and are but slightly differentiated even in dress and appearance; it would even seem, he says, as if the curse of the Old Testament were removed from women of this class, who suffer hardly at all from the pains of childbirth. One would have thought that this undoubted fact might have made him pause in his argument, and suspect something amiss in a form of progress which involves an increasing curse upon half the human race; but the inveterate belief of the average man that it is more womanly to suffer than to do, is too strong for him, and we are left with the uncomfortable proposition that as greater womanliness involves greater suffering, and more progress involves more womanliness, therefore more progress involves greater suffering.

It is probable that much more actual experience and study of the facts is required before we can arrive at any really scientific conclusion as to the effects of women's education upon future generations; but I for one find it impossible to believe that any movement of differentiation between men and

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women which involves either a stunted mental life or greater physical suffering for the mothers of the race can really be in the right line of progress.

Still another position has been seized and held by the enemy; and it is, perhaps, the strongest against which we have to contend at the present day. It is the position that the influence of women is detrimental within the sphere of intellect itself; that it tends for superficiality and feebleness in all branches of intellectual activity, in literature, art, music, the drama, and even science itself. And this is held to be the case not only in the actual productions of women themselves; in so far as they form an increasing public for whom it is profitable to cater, men also adapt their work to suit the "feminine mind," and the reign of decadence sets in. Here again the Germans are the most sonorous in their warning note, though echoes of it may be heard in England (*e. g.*, in Courtney's "The Feminine Note in Fiction"). Riehl maintains that intellectual activity amongst women always indicates a morbid condition of the intellectual spirit of the age; and exhausts history to show how such activity becomes prominent in times of political decadence. Moreover, even as a public women are fatal in their influence upon men: Mendelssohn is pale and monotonous and dreamy, while Handel and Bach are strong and manly, because the former was subject to women's influence and worked for a feminine audience. "Publishers speculate eagerly for women's reading; a poet whom women read is a made man. Women have become 'a public' for poets, as two hundred years ago they were a college of art critics in the Hotel Rambouillet. Ultimately, indeed, they are *the* public and the public determines what its poets shall be." Even girls' schools are reprehensible as contributing to the "unerhörte Individualisierung und falsche Selbständigkeit der weiblichen Natur." "We have 'female high-schools,' women's newspapers, and lectures for ladies of all kinds. Scarcely any branch of science remains from metaphysic to engineering which has not been worked up into special handbooks for the use of women." And the sum of the whole indictment is, that what we need in the present age is not the emancipation *of* woman but the emancipation *from* woman.

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It is true that this denunciation was written some years ago, but it has recently been republished as representing the author's present view; whilst a still more striking warning has been uttered by another eminent German writer within the last twelve months. Professor Münsterberg, in his book upon America, after a tribute of praise to American women such as might satisfy their most ardent admirers, suddenly delivers himself of the crushing judgment that with all their grace, their charm, their independence and refinement, the national culture is becoming effeminate in their hands, and unless a more masculine influence makes itself felt must ultimately become powerless and unable to affect the progress of the world.

His criticism is so interesting, and, indeed, so important for our consideration, that I will reproduce it here in outline.

In the first place he points out that in America the whole principle of woman's life is different from what it is in Germany. "In Germany the fundamental principle is that woman is meant for marriage, while for man marriage is only a side issue in life, and this involves from the first an inequality which can only be slightly lessened by those new movements which approximate woman to man. In the American, fundamental equality is the starting point." Hence it comes that in America a woman's life is regarded as an end in itself; she is educated with a view to her own development and enjoyment, with the result that she no longer seeks in marriage the necessary content and completion of life. Her disinclination to marriage is often intensified by the fact that she feels herself mentally superior to the man whose education has stopped short with his entry into practical life, while she has continued her studies in school and college. Add again a growing distaste for the routine of household duties, and we have a formidable array of causes which tend to reduce women's inclination for married life, and which have doubtless something to do with the remarkable fall in the rate of increase of the native American population. But our author warns us against the theory of the unattractive blue-stocking. "Her life at college may make the average marriage less attractive to many a young American girl; but it certainly has not made her less attractive to the men."

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But it is in the influence of women upon intellectual progress that we are specially interested, and here Professor Münsterberg has much to say. In Germany it is still tacitly assumed that intellectual culture receives its characteristic stamp from man. In America, on the contrary, education and religion, literature and art, social problems and public morality, belong now to the woman. "Für die Frau wird gemalt und gedichtet, Musik gemacht und Theater gespielt, die Stadt verschönt und die Stadt sittlich gereinigt." Most significant of all, amongst American teachers 327,614 are women, as against 111,710 men. In the schools the principal intellectual influence even for boys is that of women; and though it is not so yet in the colleges and universities it is likely to become so. Moreover, even here the presence of so many women in the audience affects the whole nature of the work. The teacher and public speaker must always be prepared to find that at least two-thirds of his listeners will be women. And thus culture, and public opinion in all but political questions, become more and more dominated by women. But granted to the full the earnestness and conscientiousness with which the American woman pursues her public duties, the zeal and success with which she studies; yet this is not sufficient. Earnestness alone is not strength, zeal is not mastery, success in winning prizes signifies little; and the progress of women in America does not offer the smallest proof that they can do the same work as men.

"The intellectual life in colleges and universities which seems to speak most clearly for the intellectual equality of the woman, really proves the difference. What the best women's colleges can do is exemplary and admirable, but for that very reason their world remains a little artificial world, in which all the corners are smoothed away, and which are lighted by Bengal lights instead of sunshine. And though women often do better than men in the mixed universities it must not be forgotten that the American college system with its many examinations offers more prizes for industry, attention, and good will, than for critical acuteness and constructive logic. It must, indeed, be admitted that until a relatively short time ago the American university was altogether more careful of the spirit of learning than of research, more reproductive than productive. The newer development, which lays stress upon productive research, has shown itself especially in those leading Eastern universities, such as Harvard, Johns Hopkins, Columbia, Yale, Princeton, from which women are excluded; while the Western universities, especially those State uni-

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versities which are confined to the West, where women predominate, still represent the older type in many ways. No doubt there are American women whose scientific work is excellent, but there are rare exceptions. Among the great majority the reproductive tendency betrays itself everywhere. The work is prosecuted with exceptional zeal up to the point where critical production should enter, and there it breaks down."

The difference between men and women is even more obvious at a lower level of education. The half-educated American man abstains from judgment on matters which lie outside his sphere; but there is no sphere in which the quarter-educated American woman is not ready with her opinion, and she is responsible for the facility with which Americans fall a prey to quacks of every description.

To sum up: "The participation of woman in public life has softened and refined American culture in a thousand ways, but has neither strengthened nor deepened it. Her innate dilettantism works too often in the direction of superficiality instead of thoroughness."

This contrast between America and Germany is peculiarly instructive for England, which in this respect occupies much the same position between the two countries as she does geographically. The English woman has made good her claim to an independent intellectual life; she no longer feels bound like the German *Hausfrau* to preface all statement of opinion with "my husband thinks"; on the other hand, it certainly cannot be said that she dominates the intellectual life of the country as in America. But her influence is probably increasing, both as a teacher, as a producer, and as forming a more or less intelligent public. It is, I think, still open to us to determine whether that influence shall be in the direction of superficiality, or whether it shall go to strengthen the best influence of the best men. One safeguard lies in the fact that the energies of the men have never in England become so exclusively absorbed in business life as in America; but so far as concerns the women the same dangers await us here as there. There is no doubt a prevailing tendency to regard college life as the end instead of the beginning, to be content to accept the results of the past without endeavoring to push on further. And not only so, but to accept

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those results ready made, without obtaining that mastery of them which only comes when the student really re-discovers for himself, in the light of his own experience, the truths which can never be wholly imparted to him in the language of another mind. Is this tendency an inevitable one, due, as Münsterberg seems to think, to the innate dilettantism of the "female mind"; or is it merely incidental to the particular stage which the much vexed problem of women's education happens to have reached?

I do not think it can be seriously maintained that there is any essential difference in the nature of intellect itself, according as it appears in man or in woman. That there are differences in the degree to which it is developed, as well as differences in the degree of that physical endurance which is necessary to its development, are, of course, obvious facts; but these are differences which obtain as between man and man almost as much as between man and woman. And if, as I hold, the tendency to superficiality is merely incidental to the particular stage we have reached, the remedy ought not to be hard to find. It lies simply in pushing still further forward, in making women's education still more complete and thorough.

Perhaps the first step will be to insist on the same standard in matters of intellect for woman as for man. "Very good for a woman," is a form of approbation quite appropriate in matters of physical strength and endurance; it ought to be meaningless when applied to things of the mind. I do not mean that it is likely that women will ever rival men in the field of literary, artistic, or scientific production; their other duties and interests are too many and too absorbing; the comparative narrowness of men's functions gives them a power of concentration which will always enable them to lead easily. But women as rational beings have the right to have their work judged by the same standard, and until it *is* so judged their influence cannot be wholly for good.

Another reason why at the present stage women are backward in constructive power lies in the fact that in England, at any rate, the great majority of women who pass through college life have little or no opportunity of continuing their intellectual work independently afterwards. Some marry and become

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absorbed in household duties; many return to homes where they are expected to become socially active; still more enter at once upon the arduous task of earning a living, and have seldom time or strength to do anything beyond. A man of ability who is anxious to devote himself to intellectual work can nearly always hope to obtain the means to prolong his studies after his undergraduate days are over; for women there is at present hardly any provision of the kind, and those years which should be most fruitful in maturing her intellect and in testing her powers of independent work she is unable, through lack of means and opportunity, to utilize.

At one of the Cambridge colleges an effort has been made to institute a system of fellowships, but though enough good work has been done to prove the value of such a system, it is as yet on too small a scale and (depending on voluntary subscription) too precarious in its nature, to have its full effect in raising the standard of women's education. It is greatly to be desired that a large permanent endowment should be made to encourage and enable post-graduate work amongst women; not only for the sake of the women who will benefit by it, though they have at least as great a claim as men to such assistance, not only for the sake of the work they will do, important as this, I am confident, will prove to be, but also as a step towards the realization of that independence and thoroughness in intellectual matters which might make our influence not only harmless but useful.

HELEN BOSANQUET.

OXSHOTT, SURREY, ENGLAND.

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SOCIAL WORK: A NEW PROFESSION.*

Two things the educated man wishes to be sure of in deciding his life-work,—he wishes to fill the place to which his particular talents are adapted; he desires to touch and affect what is vital in the life of his times. Let us consider first the particular nature of the demand which one's times make upon one.

It is a truism that it is much easier to write the history of any past era than of the present. It is in particular much easier to sum up the ethical meaning of a situation in the past than of one which is now in solution.

The traditions which are imparted to us in childhood remain, consciously or unconsciously, the standards by which our whole life is likely to be affected, notwithstanding all the later enlightenment that may come to us. Three of the world's greatest geographers were once conversing together when this question arose: If you go to the bottom of your mind, where the most fixed and unalterable conceptions are, what conception do you find there of the world? The reply of all three was, that suggested by the old square Mercator's projection maps in the little text-books which they had studied in school as children. In a real sense these great geographers were, in spite of themselves, still living in a flat world.

What is it to-day to be a patriot? Being a patriot, to one's sub-conscious, if not to one's conscious thought, is being like those pictures of John Hancock and Sam Adams which we found in our earliest historical text-books. The atmosphere of patriotism is that which we inhaled as we listened to others or ourselves declaim the sentiments of the eighteenth century fathers of our country.

It is one of the most convincing lessons of history that these very patriots were patriots only through a great summoning of themselves so as to grasp with the moral imagination the immediate and prospective bearing of the facts which actually confronted them. The men of that time whose lives lacked the full

* A paper read before the Harvard Ethical Society.

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sense of urgency, those who possessed cultivation and acquired wealth, were in their turn quite content with the conceptions of public duty which came to them from the great figures of their past, the men of seventeenth century Puritan days. As the American Revolution came on,—a great struggle which was an inevitable historical development, and must have been fought out on the soil of the mother country had it not arisen in the colonies,—all the first citizens of Boston with the exception of John Hancock, and most of the first citizens of New York, were completely bewildered and baffled by the then present crisis, and could find no other recourse but to turn Tory and establish themselves in the Canadian provinces or return to England.

A certain analogy to this situation is found in connection with the French Revolution. Among the members of the French Court were some of the most cultivated people the world has ever known. Part of their intellectual pastime was the dainty discussion of the very philosophy which was at the root of the discontent with the old régime, and they continued delicately bandying about its motives up to the very moment when the mob was at the Bastille, at the news of whose fall Charles James Fox cried out in the House of Commons,—"How much is this the greatest event in history, and how much the best!"

How can one be satisfied, then, that one is not going to miss the whole point so far as the realities of the world of one's own day are concerned? To have had elaborate educational privileges, it would appear, gives no certain assurance on this point. The one indispensable way in which to understand contemporary history is to understand contemporary people. If the first citizens of Boston in Revolutionary days had been more in contact with the sturdy mechanics of the town and the yeomen farmers of the country round about, they might have appreciated much more correctly the meaning of the situation which challenged them. If the cultivated members of the French Court had carried their interest in philosophical discussion to the point of finding out what it came to in the minds of the thoughtful middle classes or even in the

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passions of the workmen, they might have added to all their other knowledge a better proportioned stock of the most important knowledge of all.

If you will pardon a personal experience or two, I can illustrate more fully. A few years ago there was an exhibition in Boston of a remarkable collection of pictures. This exhibition was very largely attended, and as on Sunday afternoons there was no charge for admission, not only a large number but a great variety of people attended. I had already seen the pictures on a weekday afternoon, but went on Sunday afternoon for the sake of seeing the combination of people and pictures. It happened fortunately that I knew personally many representative types of persons among the spectators. I talked about the pictures with the following:—

1. The caretaker of the collection,—a man who with no particular training has become the one person who is always sought for just this responsible task, and who has incidentally come to have a sagacious sense as to the merit of pictures. 2. A plain-clothes detective,—a rough-and-ready sort of a man, whom I had known in connection with his varied services in the police department. 3. A young mechanic who belonged to the classes at the Prospect Union. 4. A group of shop-girls. 5. The proprietor of a large down-town store. 6. Several artists. 7. Several owners of pictures who had loaned them for the collection. I found, of course, that I learned a great deal more about the pictures on my second visit than I could by any chance have gained upon my first visit.

Again, there was a few years ago a long and stubborn strike in a shoe-manufacturing town in Eastern Massachusetts. Among others, I was asked to go to this town and see whether I could get any light upon the situation. Here was a problem which in order to be understood in the least must be seen from the point of view of a variety of people. I had to see:—1. Several Protestant ministers. 2. The Irish Catholic and the French Catholic priest. 3. Employers and their representatives. 4. Shop foremen. 5. Storekeepers. 6. The day ended with a conference in a tenement house with six or eight men and women, representative strikers.

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The new type of effort called social work gets its distinctive quality in seeking first to understand, and secondly to affect, the problems of the community by means of direct contact with all sorts and conditions of men. Government, we now know, is not a tradition but a science, which must rely not only upon principles that were once derived from living facts in the past, and remain applicable in so far as these facts continue to be living, but upon principles got by actual wrestling with many new situations. That type of government which subsists entirely or largely upon traditions of the past is naturally much more concerned with the methods of government than with its aims. As the co-ordination of government with the developing needs of the people is imperfect and incomplete, the mere technical efficiency of administration is highly emphasized, while conditions among the people become such as to corrupt good government at its source. It goes without saying also that a government whose vision is fixed on the past is doing little to anticipate the rising issues or to be in a state of preparedness for new needs in the life of the people. In a community whose public standards become thus belated the same lack of vitality also affects its private and voluntary collective life. The institutions of industry and culture, enormously progressive as they may be within certain lines,—and perhaps on account of that very progress,—come to have but a partial and ineffectual grasp upon what is in the last analysis the only issue,—the properly proportioned and distributed welfare of the entire community.

The new social work profession has for its object to restore to its true place in the fields of politics, industry and culture this end and aim of all things in the life we are now living.

In the effort to make rapprochement with things as they now are, there are two great social forces to be understood and at first hand grappled with,—democracy and cosmopolitanism. It is probable that the knowledge of these forces to which we have as yet attained is in the relation which the prelude bears to the play. Their great developments lie not in the past, but in the present and in the future. They must be studied on the move. The old way of seeing a boat race was to sit still and

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see the race disappear in the distance. The new way is to see it by racing with it. That is the only way in which the swift and sudden movement of these great social forces can be estimated and affected.

For the future, democracy is not merely a scheme of governmental administration, but an ethical system applying to all departments of life. It involves a larger degree of public service such as to meet new and pressing common needs. It holds to the principle of equal opportunity to all for the proper development of the physical and spiritual powers. It is moving toward a more highly organized and more productive type of industry. Social work stands for an effort on the part of those who represent some type of privilege or resource to study and in experimental ways to serve the human needs and desires which are the urgent forces back of this great tendency. It aims to bring together people belonging to separated classes, and for certain purposes to organize little groups or societies in which the resources of life shall be in wider commonalty spread. It means through such experiments to lead the way toward a further and broader adjustment with the life of the people,—toward mutualization, so to speak, on the part not only of the government but of the university and the industrial corporation. Its endeavor at every point is to train the people to trust the expert; but it stands distinctly for the principle that in most cases, to say the least, the expert must be such in the application of his knowledge and capacity to the precise needs of the total constituency in whose behoof the knowledge and capacity exists. It is because so many experts know little or nothing as to the life of the masses of people that the people reject them, choosing rather from among their own number those who have this to them more important branch of expertness.

As to cosmopolitanism,—in this country that problem of the contact and conflict of racial types which faces other nations from without, we have nearly everywhere within arm's length. The cautions which have been suggested with regard to overreachings on the part of such noble national traditions as our own become tenfold more forcible when we have to do with the conglomerate social impulses of people who as a rule, by the

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very fact of their presence here, show that they have been under government encrusted with age-long despotism, inefficiency, corruption. It is their nemesis that they bring with them some of the seeds of this contagion, coming to our shores with little or no training in constructive citizenship, largely lacking even in elementary education, and having an economic standard that for the time, at least, threatens the welfare of our working classes. The social worker undertakes to see that these strangers when they arrive, are not met only by the most degrading influences in our civilization, but come in touch, as soon as possible, with what is uplifting in citizenship, in education and in industry. He lays increasing stress upon getting these new members of the community established upon an economic basis of self-respect, not only for their own sakes, but because American patriotism has to do essentially not only with certain great political ideas, but with an advanced type of material welfare.

The social worker in this connection applies the results of his study and travel toward bringing to light all the best characteristic traits and intellectual inheritances of people representing the different nationalities and races. By recognizing and protecting these qualities he is able to help the immigrant in making the proper relation between the old life and the new, and to encourage him in holding his family loyally together through the anxious time when the children are going so eagerly into all the life of the new and strange country. The result of such effort is what in the aggregate will make a contribution of the greatest importance to the variety and resource of our future national life. Politically America is a federal union. In its racial character and its type of civilization in general it must be that also. Social work has to do with the building up of a natural federation among all our different racial groups, which will in reasonable degree preserve all that is valuable in the heredity and traditions of each type, but will link all types together into a universal yet coherent and distinctively American nationality.

The social worker thus serves to unite the now scattered industrial, racial, and religious elements that are thrown to-

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gether to make up the population particularly of our great city communities. He establishes bits of neutral territory where the descendant of the Puritans may meet the chosen leaders among the immigrants from Italy, Russia, and the Levant; where the capitalist may meet the trade unionist; where the scholar may meet the ingenious practical mechanic, or perhaps the philosopher or poet of the people; where the Protestant may meet the Catholic; where the Christian may meet the Jew; and where all can by establishing friendly relations, aside from and in advance of the conflicts of social sectionalism, come to consider their common interests with regard to particular steps in political development, industrial progress, or the betterment of family life and neighborly intercourse. No mistake can be greater than to think that social work has to do merely with sporadic labors of compassion, with the drudgery of endeavoring to uplift a few individuals only out of the hopeless social residuum while the great forces of society continue all undisturbed to develop directly or as by-products their train of social evils. It has taken a considerable part in the noteworthy developments of city government toward improving social conditions among the mass of city population. It is leading in a marked way toward the development of additional opportunities of training, academic, industrial, and physical, for the eighty or ninety per cent. of our children whose education ends with the grammar school. It has been and is taking an active share in the large and growing movement both among workmen and employers and among the general public for the improvement of all the conditions of labor. There is no person who has a greater task upon his hands than the social worker, who touches more sides of life and finds himself in co-operation with a greater variety of people representing all classes in the community.

Social work is in its intention, and to an increasing degree in its results, in the nature of unofficial statesmanship. Here lies the real force of its claim upon the university man. We are told from time to time by some of our foremost public teachers and leaders that under existing conditions politics is to the educated man a duty, but can hardly be a career. We are told

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that it is incumbent upon every man to give some portion of his time to serving the best needs of the public administration, but that so long as there is so much corruption in politics the man who not having ample private means enters a political career, involves himself in the risk of having to choose between his honor and a proper living for himself and his children; a risk which the young man is explicitly advised not to take. That the political career of a man without independent means does involve a possibility of this alternative is undoubtedly true, but that for the sake of serving his country, particularly at the present crisis when it is admitted to be thus seriously threatened by internal foes, a patriot should not be willing to confront such a choice is certainly a new and strange sort of ethical doctrine. It scarcely harmonizes with the sentiments of men who pledged their lives, their fortunes, and their sacred honor to their country in its need; of women who at one time or another faced every privation to urge their husbands and brothers into their country's defence; of sons and daughters who rejoiced in hampered lives and restricted careers on account of the names they bore. Without warrant in the past, such teaching falls sadly short of the demands as well as of the actual working motives of the present.

This new type of effort stands for the fact that in times of peace the same high patriotic devotion may be as absolutely required as in times of war. It calls upon young men to enter upon a definite and absorbing career of public service at those points where the public need is greatest. It opens the way in some cases to political action and to public office. It brings men into a political activity of that sort which has to do not only with correcting the technique of government in our cities, but with humanizing them through causing them more largely to meet great collective human needs. Aside from direct contact with the government, it undertakes more and more to build up, first in local units, and then in larger federations, a kind of moral municipality and commonwealth, including all existing organizations and institutions that advance the general good, and such new enterprises as rapidly developing conditions require.

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The social work profession thus provides a distinct and inviting opportunity for those university men who feel the moral attraction of public service, but have thought that conditions being as they are, the door to such opportunity is closed. Here it is possible for such a man to lay out before himself a continuous, consecutive career, in which may be included public office so far and so long as political and ethical conditions allow; active political effort in support of good administrative policies and in opposition to bad; the development under private auspices of experiments towards social betterment which may in due time prove worthy of being made part of the public administration; the strengthening of old and the creation of new organizations designed to render that fundamental service of elevating the electorate, and so making possible through an improved citizenship entirely new standards of public administrative rectitude and efficiency. Let no man feel, therefore, that there is anything other than a wide-open opportunity for his entering permanently into what is essentially, and even to a considerable extent, technically, the work of the public administration of the community.

Social work within its wide scope includes the extension of all the older callings so as to meet new and pressing needs. The university settlement, located in the midst of a vast congested area of the great city, has been likened to the monastery of the middle ages, which centered in itself resources for every sort of productive human service. One social worker is primarily a doctor, another a lawyer, another a teacher, another a clergyman, another an artist, another a musician, another a business man, another a sanitary expert, another a politician. The only common requisites for all are human feeling, a sense of humor, and the spirit of moral adventure. In all these spheres of work the effort is not only to push out into new territory, and to bring the best training and capacity to bear upon the needs which exist among new constituencies of those who cannot seek out and command such high-grade service, but definitely to create new agencies, new institutions, new laws, which will in large ways actually shut off at their source the influences which produce great social miseries and iniquities. In social work the

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lawyer not only defends the victim of injustice, but classifies the forms of injustice which he sees about him and undertakes by appealing in one form or other to the public administration, to reduce or even abolish whole types of injustice. The doctor endeavors to provide better care in cases of illness, but is more intent upon general sanitary inspection, upon training in cookery and instruction in personal hygiene; upon the establishment of public baths, playgrounds, and gymnasiums, so as to make it more possible for the masses of children in crowded districts to grow up into healthy adult life. The teacher, while striving to secure for the people some increase of general educational opportunity, is more concerned about such industrial training as will definitely equip them for the real demands of life, and strives to overcome those economic handicaps which often prevent children of talent, or even of genius, among the working classes from realizing upon their capacities. The moral leader, perceiving that the sort of guidance and inspiration which might serve among the well-to-do has only a partial appeal where there are so many adverse moral conditions, finds himself giving a large part of his time to organizations for clearing the way for the new generation so that the hard environment can no longer so greatly restrict the free outgrowth of the spiritual nature. The business man, realizing that it is his function to provision the community, endeavors so far as may be to outdo and have done with charity, providing good housing and good food upon the most reasonable business terms, organizing thrift, seeking to better the means by which employment is found, and initiating experiments toward improving the conditions under which labor is done and raising the standard of wages.

The field of effort opened by social work offers peculiar opportunities to women, some of whom have attained the highest distinction in it. To a large extent it is a perfectly natural extension of the interests and duties of the woman in her own home and in normal neighborhood society. It may be said that this type of activity affords women the same opportunity for preëminence as does the writing of fiction and the stage, because in the same way it opens up to them an enlarged perspective of

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their hereditary and accustomed concerns. In undertaking to re-establish healthful home conditions and neighborhood relations in communities where these fundamental social units have become disintegrated, the enlightened woman is simply making new and large adaptations of the specialized capacities which she has by nature and by training. Whatever may be said about the propriety of women's entering the regular professions and public life, and of the possibility of their developing their best capacities and achieving the highest order of success in such callings, social work has provided for them a direct avenue through which by successive and inevitable steps they have permanently and indisputably expanded the scope and deepened the value of home and neighborhood reconstruction so as to make it a sort of semi-public or even public service. In those opportunities of social work which deal with public education, the improvement of industrial conditions and the better administration of social service departments of city government,—here also women are drawing deeply and with abundant good results upon interests and capacities which in earlier days found their fulfilment only in the rearing of the family, in carrying on a variety of domestic industries, and in the ordering of the material conditions and the internal and external human relations involved in the life of the household.

Not the least interesting aspect of the social work profession is in its bringing men and women together in a common work in which their coöperation is based on an unmistakably sound and real type of equality between the sexes. It is clear on the face of it to the men in such a group of workers that the women have a large range of power and a vital authority not based on any theory, but on the facts of the ages, affecting the whole scheme of tasks in hand and the largest results that can come from them. On the other hand, the women workers have that first-hand understanding of men in their distinctive activities which comes from working in essential coördination with them.

I have said that social work is intended to have a peculiar closeness of relation to the historic forces of the present. It deals, however, with advancing historical forces. It is not indeed concerned with distant Utopias, but on the other hand

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it leaves behind the ethical perspective of the past, even of the immediate past, except so far as to preserve respect for yesterday's motive in forming a postulate for the work of to-morrow. The idealism of the social worker is of the opportunist, possibilist type. He seeks to take each successive next step towards a better social order, which he dares to dream of but does not expect to see let down from the skies. So also the social worker is not primarily a builder of institutions. He seeks first of all to permeate existing institutions with a new spirit, thus gaining for his cause the driving force of the acquired momentum of this existing institutional life. Where suitable organizations do not exist to accomplish results which seem desirable and important, he creates such organizations; but as soon as may be he cuts them adrift, leaving them to go on by their inherent forces, and trusting that they will gradually gather for themselves the general support of the conservative elements in the community.

It will have been seen that though I have not specifically referred to the personal opportunity which social work offers one to find the fulfilment of one's particular tastes and capacities, yet the variety of interest and activity which it includes must have shown that nearly every sort of temperament and intellectual trait could find at one point or other a large and inviting outlet. This field of effort by its broad range offers the young man special chances in the first place in the way of discovering what are his real aptitudes. Many men, however long their course of training, do not make this discovery until they have become involved in affairs. Social work represents a kind of practical university, including the application of all sorts of sound training to comparatively new fields of life.

To the man who has become clear as to his own inclinations, there is an early opportunity to specialize and gain new and original results at least on the side of applied science and skill. He can be sure that he will be tilling a fallow field, where his labor in due time will count for large results. Along with ample material for the exercise of the technical sense, there is the constant refreshment that comes of the many-sided contact with previously little known aspects of human nature.

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In many cases the social worker finds himself in a community of practical scholars which continues for him that sort of inspiration which a man often sadly misses when he leaves the atmosphere of the university to enter upon his working life. There is often also a peculiarly happy fellowship between such a worker, attached to one of the regular professions, and many other members of his profession who are following the ordinary and usual lines of their calling, he and they finding that there is much more material for intellectual interchange than if he were not a sort of pioneer at one of the outposts of his profession. Indeed, he contributes for his part not only instructive details as to his professional experiences from day to day but brings back to the main body of his particular profession new suggestion and stimulus as to the larger field of service which that profession should render to the community as a whole. It may fairly be said that social work not only offers a special ethical opportunity to the individual but that it stands for an important group of experiments in vocational ethics, in determining the new and broader lines of social service which the different professions and occupations must be called upon to fill in order to advance the welfare of the nation and the progress of civilization.

I want just to touch upon the personal economic problem which nearly every man has to face in considering his future career. This type of work had its beginning in England where there is so strong a tradition as to the dignity of public service that it is almost taken for granted that every man of independent means will devote at least part of his time to the interests of the community. Social work, looked at as not being distinct from public service, has thus drawn in a considerable number of the younger generation of men of this type, some of whom have already entered public office, and have distinguished themselves in municipal councils, in Parliament, and in Colonial administration.

In this country, unfortunately, the tradition as to public service has been rather the reverse of that in England, although sentiment on this point is fast changing. But we have a smaller proportion of young men with independent resources, and even

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in such cases there are very often special business responsibilities or family claims, which, in the absence of such a social sentiment as exists in England, in many cases deter these men from giving their time to new forms of social service. The point has already been reached, however, in the development of social work in this country where it is seen that definite financial provision must be made so that as far as possible men who have the inclination and capacity for such work shall not be hindered of their opportunity on account of lack of financial resources. It is not to be supposed that the time will ever come when there will be large incomes in the social work profession; but the time is already reached when in many cases in all our chief cities, incomes are provided which at an average are on a par with those of the clerical and educational professions.

Aside from those who undertake to make a permanent career of such work, much valuable service can be rendered by men who enter it for a time, intending to go into some of the regular professions later on, or by men who enter one of the regular professions but give a certain amount of their spare time in social work allied to that of their professions. There is sufficient data to prove that these temporary or voluntary social workers not only render valuable service as such, but acquire peculiarly important experience as bearing upon many of the new problems that are pressing upon their professions as a whole. To give a single illustration,—a constantly increasing amount of legal practice is concerned with difficulties between employer and employé. There are already men who have attained distinction as lawyers partly on account of their trained ability in handling such questions, and this trained ability is to a considerable extent owing to the practical experience in social work which they had after leaving the law school.

It is of course a most vital fact with regard to social work that it had its origin in the universities. It is an old maxim that the courageous man who has two tasks to perform chooses first the more difficult. Some one has well said that it is of the essence of indolence to be industriously doing easy and obvious things while arduous duties go undone. The university never

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does a higher or more appropriate service than when it takes some great task which seems only a dreary, desperate burden, and illuminates it with interest and hope. Every such achievement marks a new epoch in the ethical evolution of the human race. Once again by a propaganda not of word but of deed, the university sets forth the sublimest of all ethical conceptions; the life of service,—furnishing the utmost fulfilment of human faculty, carrying the self out into the widest and most vital universe,—as the one transcendent opportunity. Professor James has suggested that the religious feeling at its best seems to depend upon some sort of fresh ethical discovery. There is a certain recognized spiritual light that lies over all the many different sorts of human effort that make up this present day historical movement toward a higher social system and a nobler type of personality.

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GREEK THOUGHT-MOVEMENTS AND THEIR ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS.

It is instructive and pathetic to trace the development of man's ideas of himself and of the world. The entire process is a forging of fetters and a breaking of them. All the beliefs which man has at any time held he himself made, and the advance which he has secured he gained at the cost of bitter suffering in the overthrow of these same beliefs. Out of his own mind he projected a world-view, and, like the king of old, compelled all to worship the golden statue, then the statue must be broken and man himself must pull it down and shatter it in pieces.

The zeal of the persecutors has doubtless, at all times, derived its bitter intensity from the fact that heresy was, in reality, an attack of man upon himself. What he had believed and loved he had come to disbelieve and to hate. Reflect upon the inexorableness of this work. The Emperor Julian made the most amazing attempt in recorded history when he sought to restore the ancient world-view, to open once more the temples and to call the people to the worship of the gods. The gods were dead—and man, who made them, had also slain them; never again could one "have sight of Proteus rising from the sea, or hear old Triton blow his wreathed horn."

We call attention, at the outset, to a most important fact. The development we are to consider was impelled to its unfolding by reason and conscience. Herein lies the immense instructiveness of the study. Man is coming to himself in the destruction of the works of his hands.

The pathos of the entire movement is relieved and the movement itself dignified by a fact not yet mentioned, but a fact that is most significant. The destruction of beliefs, their breaking in pieces, disclosed always a remainder in them—a truth whose permanence and value first came to recognition when history was seized as an evolution of the human spirit, a coming of man to himself. All the works of man from the beginning were so far forth his works as to have in them an indestructible

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element, and the delight of history is the discernment of the unfolding of this eternal.

This thought of a movement, a process, an activity, leads to some brief statement about philosophy, for it is of much moment that we have a clear and just conception of the reality covered by that term.

First, negatively—philosophy is not static, not stationary, not fixed. A system of philosophy as a finality, a complete and rounded whole of truth, would mean the death and burial of reason. This is equally true of the reality covered by the word science. Science is progressive because the world is not static, but is a living, throbbing, developing world.

In times not long past it has been the custom to decry philosophy as a mass of conflicting speculations that come to nothing. Philosophy is a philosophizing as science is a generalizing. Philosophy will offer no final system, neither will science. Both work together upon the problem of reality—the problem of existence. One seeks for laws, causes, the other for reasons. The one is content to seek and declare the uniform modes or ways in which things act, the other searches after some reason for it all, some end worthy of existence, some wherefore, some whence, some world-view.

It is essential to the review of Greek thought-movement that I call attention to a difference between science and philosophy which, though genuine, need not be antagonism or opposition. This is a difference of method, and concerns itself with the kind of explanation offered. The method of science is genetic and the explanation offered by it consists in a resolution of a subject into its elements. Water, for instance, is explained by science when resolved into oxygen and hydrogen in definite proportions. In like manner the human brain is explained by science when resolved into its chemical constituents and separated into areas with more or less distinctive functions, such as speech centers, visual centers, motor centers, and the like.

There is, I have no hesitation in saying, a serious fallacy in the way in which science has sometimes used this genetic method. The fallacy consists in the assertion that these earlier stages of a process, these elements, are more real than the later

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stages, have more value, offer the true and only explanation. Water is understood by its oxygen and hydrogen, the brain by its cerebrin, and by this alone. The earlier stages have explanatory value.

Contrast now the insistence of philosophy with its reflective method. The explanation of water, its meaning, its wherefore, is found in the marvelous properties it exhibits, its life-sustaining value, and in its myriad beauty forms. The meaning of the brain is the consciousness it makes possible as the meaning of the acorn is the oak.

I have said that this distinction is necessary for our review of Greek thought-movements. The distinction is very old, and no more impressive exhibition of it is anywhere to be found than in the conversation of Socrates with his friends while awaiting the return of the ship that the poison might be taken. Socrates had heard of a book written by Anaxagoras, a book that promised to give the causes of things—better still, a book that would show the causes of things to be mind, intellect; and Socrates was filled with high hopes, hopes he would not have surrendered for any consideration. He bought the book and read. How bitter his disappointment! He was told that he remained in prison awaiting the fatal draught, because of a certain combination of bones and muscles. Imagine such an explanation given to such a man! Was there not within him a feeling of duty? was there not a self-respect, a loyalty to his country's law? Bones and muscles over against these as to the wherefore of his awaiting death!

It is the old, old story of the inward and the outward, the thought and the thing, the cause and the reason. A life-long cripple, its cause a careless nurse who let a baby fall; its reason —who answers?

Shall we consider that it is within this small compass, the outward and the inward, that everything moves? Within this small compass lies your destiny and mine—in the proper adjustment of the outward and inward our defeat or our victory. Behold here the innermost of human history and of the history of each individual.

There was a time when God walked with man in the cool of

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the day. This was the time of a differenceless unity between God, man, and the world. God was simply man's larger self and the world was filled with him. Between the outer and the inner there was harmony. But observe it was an unconscious harmony. Man did not know the meaning of himself or of his God. Exactly so is it with the individual, with each one of us. Our youth, if healthy, vigorous, was an unconscious harmony with our world. We ate when hungry, slept when tired, rose refreshed and climbed the mountain-top where we bathed in light and knew the joys of living. Children we and nothing else. The break must come and be overcome or there could follow no attainment in thought or in character. That world out there must be a hard world, a resisting world, a defeating world. Your God must be an angry God, a punishing God; your own soul must render up its other self, its baser self, its destroying self; you must contend, you must fight with mind and heart and utmost will that a harmony, a peace, an atonement may be consciously had. You must know whom you have believed, and why you have believed.

This is the thought-movement I wish to present in its course among the Greeks. I shall attempt to sketch only its broadest outlines, thankful if, in any respect, I can show them to be more than lines, even the thoughts and feelings of our brothers who have gone before.

Brothers differ from one another though brothers still. What of the Greeks as Greeks? They have been our masters in many things and will remain so. What is this Greek mind in its very self?

I am not concerned to say anything about the art-productivity of the Greek as exhibited in temple, statue, or drama. My purpose is to seize upon that mental trait, that distinctive feature of the Greek consciousness, which is the source of all its productivity and which gives to it the excellence known as classical. The Greeks are properly called the most intellectual of all peoples.

What is it to be intellectual? It is to be gifted with the *outward vision.* It is to look without and to see what is beyond and apart. As an original possession in race or individual, it

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is a spontaneous looking without. Someone may ask where else can one look? The answer is—look within. Within what? Within one's self. An individual or a people may spontaneously look *within*. The thoughts of men, their plans, may be looked at. Observe a most important truth in this connection. One may look at one's thoughts as though they were apart from one's self, outside one's self, as though they stood over against one like trees or stars. This is by no means easy, but it can be done, indeed is done, noticeably by Goethe; wherein he also is classic.

What is the natural consequence of this outward look? It is a vision of things as they are and in their relations to one another. No feeling blurs the vision. It is not what you want to see that you see, as is the case with so many of us moderns. The vision being outward, sees things as they are and in their relations to one another. Hence came truth and beauty, hence the Greek statue, temple, drama—beautiful and true for all time.

Let me now apply this teaching. The entire Greek thought-movement is outward. It is classical. It is as clear-cut as the temples and statues of the Acropolis. There is complete absence of all that could be called morbid, no feeling judgments are uttered, and even with Plato, the idealist, the supreme philosopher artist, all truth is *there outside*, and knowledge is a face-to-face vision of the eternal.

Such being the general character of Greek thought-movement as Greek, let us observe that its first problem was concerned with the physical world, the earth, the universe. Greek thinking began with an attempt to find a cause for the world. And observe some other cause was desired than the God. As I have said, the fact that made this beginning of philosophy so momentous was its breaking the harmony, the unconscious harmony between God, man, and nature. To ask questions about anything is to show that something is the matter, there is something not understood, there is a break somewhere. The mythical world-view of the Greek was passing, and the evidence of this is the circles of questioners appearing in the larger colony cities like Miletus.

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Aside from this inner significance of the first stage in Greek thought-movement, it has other features which are most interesting and instructive. These men went to their task with a naïve confidence in their ability to accomplish it. That most terrible of all questions, viz.: what is it to know? gave them not the least trouble. They had but to search to find. Again, these men were without any knowledge of a distinction between mind and matter. Everything was matter. We have, therefore, in this entire period to watch for the evidences of that dread separation which thinking was sure to bring. Such evidences are clear and unmistakable. I shall endeavor to point them out and to make plain in what way they prepared for Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle.

Looking out upon the world, seeing its infinite variety of manifestation, these men asked for a cause. Now observe this very asking for one cause introduces a distinction between the many and the one—not a distinction in kind but a distinction. Here the varieties, flowers, rivers, trees, animals, men; *in* them, their cause, the one, the central reality—the underlying. Said Thales, the cause of all things is water. How great the difference between water and solid rock. Thought had certainly begun its fearful activity.

These things seem so different, the one from the other. Granted, but their *cause* is *one*. Here is the import of the work of these very first men. Not in the causes they as matter-of-fact selected. We care not whether they selected water or earth or air or an infinite stuff, we care very much that they selected at all. The import of their doing so is the distinction they drew, the marvelous distinction between that which appears and that which does not appear.

These men had commenced a movement which must culminate under Plato in the divorcement of the world of sense from the world of thought, the world of opinion from the world of idea, soul from body, heaven from hell, man from God.

We are now, perhaps, in condition to see somewhat clearly the beginnings and the course of this astounding thought-movement. One school had said the cause is water, another air, another unlimited stuff. So they might have continued, nam-

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ing this or that physical thing as the primal cause; but so they did not continue because of two men—Heracleitus and Parmenides. These were great men and each of them seized a fact not before considered and gave it striking emphasis. "Do you not know," said Heracleitus, "that there is no one fixed single thing? Find it, lay your hand upon it. You cannot step twice into the same stream. What is plainer than that all things change? What is plainer than that nothing abides, nothing save this change? Change alone is real. Change and fire, as the perfect embodiment of change, is the changing cause of all."

Parmenides listened to this teaching and it seemed to him extreme folly. "I hold thee back from this way of inquiry upon which mortals knowing naught wander in two minds. Undiscerning crowds in whose eyes the same thing and not the the same is and is not, and all things travel in opposite directions. As though a thing could be and not be. It is this change that is a delusion. I shall not allow thee to say or think that it came from what is not. Wherefore Justice does not loose her fetters and let anything come into being or pass away, but holds it fast. Heracleitus, you are wrong—altogether wrong. It is, it was, it will be. By nothing was it increased or diminished, from what should it come and to what shall it go? Neither has it parts, for between them there would needs be nothing, and nothing is not. There is no nothing. Why is there no nothing? Because you cannot think it—you cannot make a picture of nothing. I tell you, Heracleitus, Being is, not was, not will be—Being is. Time is the figment. What does Being know of time?"

Translate this great truth into religion and we have the words, God, the same, yesterday, to-day, and forever. In these men, Heracleitus and Parmenides, we have two extremes of thought-movement—two opposed world-views, each extreme states a truth and errs, as does every extreme, by its exclusiveness. There is change and there is permanence, all things are ceaselessly moving, and being remains from everlasting to everlasting.

I have said that in this entire pre-Socratic thought-movement

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of the Greeks there was no distinction made between mind and matter. Everything was matter. Until, therefore, such distinction appeared only one course seemed open and that was to have many physical causes for all that exists. Exactly this course was taken and gave us as its most remarkable expression the world-view of Democritus. Atoms differing only in size and weight caused all things. Uncreated, indestructible, invisible, these atoms knowing no whence or whither, brought about the world and all things.

In modern dress, this ancient world-view is materialism, and, perhaps, some there be who hold it, but for all foremost minds, in whatever department of activity, it is long since *ein ueberwundener Standpunkt*—a position overcome and abandoned.

Let us not fail to observe how completely these men, without knowing it, had gotten beyond the things that could be seen and handled. The break was coming—discord, disagreement. Here what you see—the single perishable thing; there its cause—the atom—unlike it in all respects, an uncreated, eternal reality. More than this, these men had found such a distinction between soul and body as called for recognition. Since everything was matter this distinction could not be one of kind. Soul and body alike were made out of atoms, but the soul atoms were the finest, smoothest, most mobile of all atoms, they were inhaled and exhaled by breathing, and when fewer were taken in than were given out, sleep and death followed.

Now was coming a momentous change. Thought was to move in newer lines and to altogether different issues; the path lay through skepticism as such path always does and must. Consider the natural provision for this event.

A great alteration in Greek life resulted from victory in the Persian wars. All phases of social activity were broadened and made more intense. Philosophy, science, for these were one and the same at the time, came out of the schools into daily life. Consider what this meant. This was an *aufklärung*—a period of enlightenment, but it came to mean the pursuit of knowledge for whatever advantage could be gotten out of it. Knowledge was seen to be a power, by knowledge one could gain wealth and position. Commercialism and the sophists

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appeared together; both are still with us. Philosophy became the art of persuasion, and paid teachers of this art flourished. Now persuasion is one thing; truth is often a very different thing. Pay me and I will show you how to gain a victory. This means an attitude of easy indifference to the truth. Truth is very well in its way, but victory is better. Victory means cakes and ale; truth sometimes means the draught that Socrates drained.

So much for the skepticism that arose in this way—the natural way of poor human nature. There was another skepticism, genuine and honest, for which we have only respect. This lay in the very thought-movements I have outlined. These men who had thought the universe into physical atoms were very much interested and not a little puzzled by the question as to how we come to see or hear things outside ourselves. For instance we see a rose. How is this done? The rose appears to stay out there quite apart from our eyes. What happens when we see it? These men answered—material particles come from it and material particles pass from us, when these unite we see the rose. What shall we say of truth in this affair? Truth must be exactly what each man makes it at the time. "Therefore," said Protagoras, the Sophist, "man is the measure of all things. What he at a given time believes to be true, is true for him at that time." Most thoroughgoing and honest skepticism. So then, as the outcome of it all, this early Greek philosophy, indifference and commercialism on the one hand, on the other a conviction that truth is what each man at any time believes.

I am confident that no one can fail to see the imperative need of this period of skepticism in Greek thought-movement. On the one hand commercialism with its withering indifference, on the other an honest abandonment of all endeavor.

With the hour came the man, himself a sophist in his matchless skill of argument—sophist also in his quibblings and diversions, far more than sophist in his unconquerable moral earnestness and his immovable convictions. Socrates said there is truth, there is knowledge, there is virtue.

Now we all know that it is not enough to say such things in

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times of crises. You must send the utterances home. If you are among as intellectual a people as were those Greeks, you must match the keenest of them in their intellects and be their superior in your character.

Such was Socrates; not a man to be desired, unlovely in form, in habit, in speech—the outward man a fit subject for caricature, ridicule, sarcasm. But who shall rightly apprise the transcendent reality of that inner man, that character? Great men have had impressive monuments erected to their memory. Look down upon that porphyry sarcophagus, splendid in its simplicity, and bearing only one name—Napoleon. Look upon this trilogy of dialogues, not a sarcophagus, indeed, but a man—a living, breathing, talking, dying man; ever living, ever talking, ever dying, never dead—Socrates.

We know how Napoleon used power and how Socrates. The one died broken and defeated in St. Helena. The other died also in prison but of his own choice, freely, calmly, as one falls asleep. Defeated? Were it not well for history and philosophy in our day to remember that men have been determining forces in human affairs and will be to the end? Shall history, shall philosophy, teach no more by examples?

I have said that the entire Greek thought-movement was outward in its character. Socrates looked out of himself at the actions of man. He saw that the success of the Greeks in the Persian wars was due to knowledge, insight, discernment. Here is something that abides, men may come and men may go, but insight, knowledge, abides. Therefore, let every man have knowledge for his task whatever that may be. Here is the real occasion for the death of Socrates. He insisted that the rulers, those who attempted to govern, should know something about government. Looking then directly beyond himself he found the real, the true, the abiding, in the conduct of men. To know this was virtue because to know the truth was to do it. The Greeks found it impossible to believe that any one could actually know the truth and choose falsehood; if any man chose the false he did not really know what he was doing.

Socrates had no philosophy but he was the occasion of a wonderful philosophy, the philosophy of Plato. Socrates was

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a teacher and as such an inspiration; against skepticism he held up one unassailable reality, the universal, the good, in the conduct of men; for this he lived and died.

In such wise way came the new Greek thought-movement: the ideaism of Plato. Let me endeavor to make plain the living connections here. For a considerable time Plato simply proclaimed and enforced the Socratic teaching, he refuted the sophists and brought them to confusion. In all this was no world-view, no advance beyond his teacher. Presently, however, Plato passed beyond the Socratic period of his development and asked a fundamental question.

Since there is such a reality as virtue, universal, immutable, applicable as a standard to all the actions of men, how about other universal ideas—justice, beauty, strength? If we understand why Plato answered this question as he did, we shall understand his ideaism, which is the world-view.

Looking out of themselves, Socrates and Plato alike saw the truth that could be known—the truth that, when known, was virtue. Observe they found this without, not within. That feature of the Greek mind as Greek, to which I called attention, viz.: its outward look, is again determinative. Justice is there, behold it. Behold it in the actions of men. They as individual men pass, but justice remains the same yesterday, to-day, and forever.

Most natural that Plato should ask his fundamental question —how is it with other general ideas such as beauty, strength, tree, animal? We have these ideas; universal, for all have them, necessary, for all must have them. Whence came they? What are they? They must come from without. They must be without. To say that men made their ideas never occurred to the Greek thinker. If you are to know anything, plainly that which you are to know must stand over against you, must be given to you. How can you know a tree if there is no tree there for you to know? How are you to know the *idea* tree, unless the idea is there for you to know? It must exist outside your mind or your mind could never know it. Here is the origin of Plato's idea-world. He saw in our knowledge something that could not be there except a reality corresponded to it.

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Now has the separation fully come? The differenceless unity between God, man, and nature has been broken. Plato is un-Greek in this separation between the world of idea and the world of thing. He is Greek to the core in the clearness of vision with which he sees the eternal ideas standing over against him outlined in the pure air of his thought. Plato is no visionary—no speculator, he is a moral reformer. His world-view, natural and inevitable as I have endeavored to show, makes it possible for him to become the Greek preacher of righteousness to the world forever more.

Observe in what way my statement is true. They that be whole, need not a physician, but they that are sick. These words of our modern castigator, Carlyle, set out the situation in that ancient Greek world.

Behold there, said Plato, the eternal kingdom—the kingdom of ideas, true and changeless; behold here in time the world of sense, the world of opinion, imperfect, perishable. Man has share in both worlds and this means that he is sick, not whole, this means that a physician is needed. Plato's masterpiece, "The Republic," is a consecration of his genius to the salvation of men—their atonement.

As will be recognized, it has lain all along in the heart of my presentation that this Greek thought-movement has far more than historical significance. It exhibits a necessity, a stern, inexorable necessity. Character, intellectual, moral, spiritual, comes only out of conflict. How shall there be conflict where there is no enemy? Plato found an enemy. There the idea—perfect, eternal. Here the thing—faint copy of that idea—the thing obscuring, misleading, perishable, base. Man, once face to face with the idea in the kingdom of truth, now a prisoner in the world of flesh and of opinion.

In reminiscence the idea is faintly seen again, and if man would live and not die let him cherish the vision. Here is the never-dying truth of Plato's world-view—let man cherish the vision. And this cherishing of the vision—how shall it be accomplished except by struggle? How shall it be accomplished except by putting the body under? When we would see, passion blinds us or the chill fog of our conceit shuts out

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the light and all things. No, it is not easy to cherish the vision; yet that way alone lies our salvation.

It is an evil in our modern educational endeavor that we suppress feeling and decry inspirational teaching. We are strictly matter-of-fact, cold fact; as though a cold fact were anything better than a cold potato. One of the best things that could be done in our colleges, where culture may be supposed to find recognition, would be a reading out loud, by some one who could read, of Plato's masterpieces—this as offset to our deadly commercialism.

In perfect sympathy with my thought is Dante, who, in that incomparable journey says, "We came to a meadow of fresh verdure. People were there with eyes slow and grave, of great authority in their looks; they spoke seldom and with soft voices. Thus we drew apart, on one side, into a place open, luminous, and high, so that they all could be seen. There opposite upon the green enamel were shown to me the great spirits, whom to have seen I inwardly exalt myself." "When I raised my brow a little more, I saw the master of those who know seated amid the philosophic family; all regard him, all do him honor. Here I saw both Socrates and Plato who, before the others, stand nearest to him."

On the green sward were shown to Dante the great spirits, whom to have seen he inwardly exalted himself. It is possible, nay, it is true, that if the teachers would but show the great spirits to their scholars they, too, would inwardly exalt themselves.

Dante saw there him whom he rightly named the master of them that know. Nothing before Dante or since has abated in the least this ranking of Aristotle. It was Aristotle's to know with a quantity and quality of knowledge unsurpassed by any man of whom we have record. In Aristotle were united two characteristics of the human intellect which seldom appear together in any one mind; they never appear together as fully as they did in him.

These characteristics I may name, in untechnical language, the interpreting and the inferring. To illustrate: Some one makes a statement. To interpret the statement you take it to

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pieces and show every consequence it involves. This is the work of analysis or exposition—a great work. Here Aristotle was supremely great. No consequence escaped him, he exhausted the subject. Consider now the other activity—the inferring activity. Here you have a number of separate facts before you, and you conclude beyond the facts to the law they exhibit. This is going from what you see to what you do not see, and is the inductive method of science. It is plain that before you can infer you must have the facts. There is only one way to secure these facts and that is by painstaking effort. For this reason the mental qualities I now consider seldom come together in one mind. He who interprets is impatient of the slow process of fact-gathering, while he who gathers the facts and states their law leaves to another the exposition of the consequences. In Aristotle, as in no one before or since, these opposed qualities were present in fullest measure. He was avid of facts and he exhausted the meaning of their laws.

Aristotle spoke the word, development, and solved the problem of Greek philospohy. He criticised and corrected his teacher's central doctrine. Plato separated idea and thing, Aristotle taught their indissoluble union. Plato had a world beyond, a world changeless, eternal, Aristotle had a developing world in which, by which, the idea—the true—was progressively realizing itself. Here Aristotle is thoroughly Greek and at the same time thoroughly modern. That differenceless unity of the early Greek world is restored, but with this momentous addition—it is a conscious unity, an attained unity, a unity pregnant with meaning.

Some simple illustrations may serve to make this great thought-movement concrete and so intelligible. Go to the forest and select its monarch, the oak. Many splendid examples stand about you; each one of them is oak, not maple, not beech, not pine—oak, always oak. Here, then, is your universal, your idea, your permanent. And where do you find it? Where must you find it? In the single, separate tree. Not there in the eternal world; here in this changing world. The ideal is in the real. More than this, far more than this, the real is real because of the ideal that is in it. A formative energy has

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shaped matter to its own purpose. Nature is doing something. This conception, as I have said, is modern. Hegel is one of its latest philosophic representatives, as Kant, with a method entirely his own, taught again the idea-world of Plato. But that is another story.

Aristotle himself confirmed the truth of his teaching as he made plain its applications in psychology, ethics, political science, rhetoric, and poetry. Permit me an illustrative sentence or two from his Psychology and his Ethics. "Soul," he tells us, "is the perfect realization of a natural organic body." And then adds, "The definition we have just given should make it evident that we must no more ask whether the soul and the body are one than ask whether the wax and the figure impressed upon it are one, or generally inquire whether the material and that of which it is the material are one, for though unity and being are used in a variety of senses, their most distinctive sense is that of perfect realization."

The soul is the perfect realization of a natural organic body. This means, to give it modern significance, that your soul, with its consciousness, its conscience, its hopes, affections, courage, and resolute will is the realization of your body. Matter has come to itself by your soul. What then is the meaning of matter? It is your soul at its best estate. What then is the meaning of the brain, this brain which the scientist himself tells us is matter in its most highly developed state? Its meaning is the consciousness it makes possible. Is it not true that we are parts of this universe, parts, I mean, of its substance? Do we not live by and in this universe? What then is the meaning of the universe? Its meaning is its loftiest expressions. Where any one loves and still loves, though the night grows darker, where any one is true with a rectitude that abides amid the bitterest testing, such a one has explained this universe. For observe, the universe brought such a one into being and made the victory possible.

It is in the moral life of man that the contrast between the world-view of Aristotle and that of his teacher becomes most significant. Plato, speaking of this same body which Aristotle tells us is realized by the soul, says, "The body draws the soul

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down into the region of the changeable where it wanders and is confused, the world spins around her and she is like a drunkard when under her influence. For the body is a source of endless trouble to us, . . . by filling us so full of loves and fears and fancies and idols and every sort of folly, it prevents our ever having so much as thought. For whence come wars and fightings and factions? From the body and the lust of the body."

How shall we be delivered from the body of this death?

Consider Plato's answer: " When, returning into herself, the soul *reflects* then she passes into the realm of purity and eternity and immortality and unchangeableness which are her kindred, and with them she ever lives and is not hindered. Then she ceases from her erring ways, and, being in communion with the unchanging, is unchanging."

By contrast hear these words of Aristotle: "A man becomes just by doing what is just, he becomes temperate by doing what is temperate, and if a man did not so act he would not so much as have a chance of becoming good. But most people, instead of doing such actions, take refuge in theorizing. They imagine that they are philosophers and that philosophy will make them virtuous; in fact they behave like people who listen attentively to their doctors but never do anything that their doctors tell them. But it is as improbable that a healthy state of the soul will be produced by this kind of philosophizing as that a healthy state of the body will be produced by this kind of medical treatment." A man acting morally "should know what he is doing—then he should deliberately choose to do it and to do it for its own sake, and lastly he should do it as an instance of a settled and immutable moral state." "Deeds are just and temperate when they are such as a just or temperate person would do, and a just and temperate person is not merely one who does these deeds, but one who does them in the spirit of the just and temperate."

In these words Aristotle grips us. We have no chance left us to reply, as we might to Plato, that is too hard, your idea-world is too far away. Aristotle says, get to business, be just, be temperate, stop philosophizing, do your duty, attend to your

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business. If you ask Aristotle, What is my business? he will answer once for all—I mean for all time—Your business as a human being "is an activity of the soul in accordance with reason." And then, lest you misunderstand him, he tells you exactly what he does not mean. Your business is not life, "for life you share with the plants." It is something peculiar to you that we are looking for. Your business is not to gratify your senses, for horses, cattle, and all other animals have senses. They lead the sensation life. What is peculiar to you is your rational part. This marks you out. Therefore, your business, as I have said, is an "activity of the soul in accordance with reason."

I have purposely emphasized and enlarged the differences between the world-view of Plato and the world-view of Aristotle. I have done this for very definite reasons. Chief among these is the fact that the influence of Plato's thought at the outset and for many years was exactly the influence of his doctrine of another world, a world apart, a Kingdom of Heaven. Plato himself felt the difficulty inherent in his world-view, and, if we may believe that he wrote the dialogue named "Parmenides," we meet a fact as unusual as it is interesting. This is the fact of an author criticising his own work, a thinker recognizing the radical defects of his own thought. Plato in this dialogue objects to himself, *i. e.*, to his world-view, as searchingly as and much more clearly than did Aristotle in his criticism of his teacher.

Plato believed, without any shadow of a doubt, that the single objects which our senses recognize derived their characteristics from the ideas, and the very height of his endeavor is reached in his attempt to show how this was accomplished. It is certain that he did not succeed in the undertaking, so succeed, I mean, as to prevent the influence of the idea of another world, a world apart. He betakes himself to imagery, using such words as the original, the archetype, the image, the copy. He introduces the picture of a middle being fashioning things in keeping with the eternal examples. It is at once plain that all this mode of handling the problem results simply in showing how small an amount of reality the corporeal world has when compared with the eternal kingdom of ideas.

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Meanwhile another wonderful people with a *genius* for religion was preparing its contribution to civilization. The Jews began their development with a differenceless unity between themselves, the world, and God. God walked with Adam in the cool of the day, and the Jews, too, because they were human, fell from this first estate. Most profound in its philosophical significance is the simple story of the fall of man. The subsequent history of the people to the coming of Christ was a widening and a deepening of the separation thus graphically described. "Nature," said Philo, "possesses in itself nothing good. It is unordered, lifeless, full of unrest and confusion." And this man takes from Plato the idea of a mediator. Before the creation of his visible world, God formed first the ideal *Urbild,* original image, and then after this, the physical world.

I have insisted that Aristotle solved the problem of Greek philosophy as completely as it could then be solved. I have said that he gave us a new conception, viz.: that of a developing world, contrasted with the static world of Plato—and this is essentially true.

We all know, however, that truth is the child of time. We know also that no man, however great, stands altogether apart from his environment. It seems absurd to say that Aristotle, who gave logic a concrete shaping, did not have the logic of his own central doctrine. Yet this is to a great extent true. When he told us that the soul is the perfect realization of a natural organized body, he did not fail to mar that splendid conception by insisting that the reason in man, the active reason, came to him from without, and that immortality did not exist for the particular man.

Again, at the end of his world-view, he fell back into the very dualism, separation, he objected to in Plato. He reached the conception of a self-conscious God—but alas! this God was as removed from the world as Plato's idea-world.

I might show many more points of resemblance between Aristotle and his teacher, and dwell at length upon his conception of virtue as a mean between extremes; being thus entirely Greek as virtue became the beautiful, the proportioned, over against the wrong, as the ugly, the ill-proportioned.

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As the outcome of it all, what remains? This from Plato—over against all individualism of sophists or skeptics, and over against materialism of whatever kind:—The truth of our world lies in its meaning, it lies in the idea, it lies in the Good.

This from Aristotle:—Our experience is a unity, a unity having two aspects—the outward which we call matter, and the inward which we call spirit. These do not exist apart from each other; they are a unity, not an antagonism.

This also from Aristotle:—The meaning of this universe is the consciousness and the conscience it displays.

This from Robert Browning:—

> "And from the grand result
> A supplementary reflux of light,
> Illustrates all the inferior grades, explains
> Each back step in the circle."

> "New glory mixes with the heaven
> And earth; man, once descried, imprints forever
> His presence on all lifeless things: the winds
> Are henceforth voices, . . .
> Never a senseless gust now man is born."

> "The herded pines commune and have deep thoughts
> A secret they assemble to discuss
> When the sun drops behind their trunks."

> "The morn has enterprise, deep quiet droops
> With evening, triumph takes the sunset hour,
> Voluptuous transport ripens with the corn
> Beneath a warm moon like a happy face:—
> And this to fill us with regard for man,
> With apprehension of his passing worth,
> Desire to work his proper nature out,
> For these things tend still upward, progress is
> The law of life."

W. R. Benedict.

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EVOLUTION AND ETHICAL METHOD.

Moralists are generally agreed concerning two elementary requirements, which any ethical method now suggested, must satisfy. In the first place, an acceptable theory in this field must provide for the truth contained in the opposing positions of Hedonism and Intuitionism. The arguments of Hedonism have taught us that moral ideals are based upon the desires and impulses of the individual. The Hedonist has shown that the demands of conscience depend upon human needs, and are influenced by circumstances of race and environment. On the other hand, Intuitionism has convinced us that the Good possesses an element of authority. Few would accept the explanation which the Intuitionist offers of this authority. Some moralists base it upon the immutable attributes of human nature, others on universal reason, and others upon the necessary sequence of history. But, however explained, an authority is attributed to the principles of morality which relieves them from entire subservience to time and circumstance.

In the second place, a method which is to fulfill the demands of present-day Ethics must make adequate use of the concept of evolution. In addition to the many other advantages which the application of this idea secures, the evolutionary procedure promises to be helpful in reconciling the conflicting claims of Hedonism and Intuitionism. For evolution postulates continuous change; and, when applied to morality, will account for the transitory and relative character of moral ideals. But this change is governed by uniform law whose immutable character may serve to explain the necessity which attaches to certain features in moral development.

In the statement of these two requirements I have indicated the trend of my thought. I wish to suggest an evolutionary interpretation of morality which shall account for the dependence of moral ideals upon human needs, and, at the same time, explain the authority which attaches to their content.

Evolution is a process of organization. Hence the preliminary step in its application to morality is to note the operation in moral development of the two general laws which

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characterize such a process. For organization involves both an increase in the differences or distinctions within a given field, and a growing interdependence among these different parts, or,—in the conventional formula,—both *differentiation* and *integration*. A mere glance at the facts of moral development discloses the presence and action of these two laws. A literal process of differentiation occurs within the experience of the individual in that the various activities of human life become more clearly distinguished by being assigned as definite duties and responsibilities to different persons. But since these different activities are performed by individuals in co-operation, a corresponding integration of the interest of the individual into the larger welfare of society takes place.

So much, therefore, we can affirm as a general premise,—that there is an evolution in the moral life, governed by the two laws of differentiation and integration. Such a statement would scarce be contested. It is, in fact, so obvious as to be almost a commonplace. But this understanding of morality has important implications which are generally overlooked. I desire to bring out as clearly as possible certain consequences which follow from this conception of moral development as a process of organization. To make my meaning plain I shall refer briefly to the use that has been made of the concept of evolution in a field closely allied to Ethics, that is, *Epistemology*.

In Epistemology as well as in Ethics there has been a conflict between two historic positions. On the one side Empiricism, like Hedonism, has laid exclusive emphasis upon individual experience. According to this theory knowledge is, *in toto*, a combination of the particular facts of sense-experience. On the other side Rationalism, like Intuitionism, has dwelt almost exclusively upon the necessity of general principles or fundamental laws. From this point of view, the authority of Truth depends solely upon the necessary validity of a number of categories.

The Epistemology of our day, adopting Kant's conception of the unity of experience and applying Hegel's theory of thought-development, is able to effect a synthesis of these opposing positions which includes the truth of each. The resulting con-

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ception of the thought-process is thoroughly evolutionary. Experience is treated as a living unity with a continuous development. In this development, subject and object coöperate functionally; and the direction of the process is toward the unfolding of more distinctions within the whole, and a closer correlating of these different elements. The unity of thought is expressed in a central activity, *judgment*, which is present in various forms throughout the entire process. But as thought proceeds, judgment, despite its underlying identity, is bound to exhibit different forms in accordance with the kind of connection demanded in the successive stages through which experience must inevitably pass in its development. As a result of this illuminating interpretation of knowledge the conflicting claims of Empiricism and Rationalism are finally adjusted. All truth, even to the most fundamental principle, has its origin in experience; yet certain categories possess especial authority because they discharge necessary functions in the development of the aforesaid experience.

The foregoing theory of knowledge is an instructive example of a complete and consistent application of the law of evolution to a field of human activity. These achievements of Epistemology, particularly the synthesis of its historic opposition, are deeply significant for ethical philosophy whose internal strife has been suggestively analogous to that between Empiricism and Rationalism. Epistemology has not been content with noting different facts *about* the genesis of knowledge, or with showing how biological factors have contributed to the development of our reasoning faculties. Instead, the problem has been attacked at its center and a direct application made of the fundamental ideas of evolution. These ideas are familiar to us all, involving insistence upon the organic unity of a field of conduct, its continuous development, and the functional relation of its parts. Now we may contrast this direct and thorough application of evolution with a so-called evolutionary method in Ethics which is limited to a psychological analysis of the moral consciousness, and an attempt to trace the origin of this or that element back to some animal trait or instinct. This method is based upon a mechanical conception of the whole

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as an aggregate of disparate parts rather than the idea of evolution. The alternative has only to be presented between such a procedure and a method which insists upon the vital unity of the field of conduct its continuous development and functional correlation, to make it quite clear which of the two is a genuine evolutionary interpretation and which in the light of present thought promises to be the more fruitful.

But if these results gained in another field are to assist us in an evolutionary interpretation of morality, we must take pains to distinguish those features which depend upon the specific character of thought from others which are involved in the application of evolution to any intelligent activity like conduct. Several such features may be distinguished which, it appears, do not depend upon the peculiar content of Epistemology. Rather they follow from those characteristics of thought which are possessed equally by conduct as an intelligent activity. Let me mention three of these points. (1) The activity in question is regarded as a living unity whose development is governed by the laws of differentiation and integration. (2) The unity of the field is recognized in a central activity,—judgment in the case of thought,—which remains identical throughout, despite its change of form. (3) Different forms of the central activity which arise in the course of the process and depend on it for their existence, are nevertheless seen to be *necessary* because, in their orderly sequence, they are conditions of the continuance of the development in which they arise.

Is not the recognition of these three features a plain consequence of the application of evolution to any sphere of human activity, especially that of conduct? Concerning the fundamental unity of the field, we have already answered in the affirmative. The moral life, from the evolutionary standpoint, appears as a living unity governed by the laws of differentiation and integration. But this insight, barely conceived, gives us little assistance in explaining the facts of morality. We need to see the idea realized in concrete detail. Our hopes of enlightenment, therefore,—as well as our doubts in the matter,—center upon the other two points just stated. Does the application of evolution to morality compel us to recognize a central

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activity present throughout the entire field of conduct? This demand is, it would seem, a direct consequence of understanding the unity of such a sphere of action. We assert that an identity pervades the whole course of conduct. If this identity is real it must manifest itself in some manner characteristic of the field. Hence it is reasonable to anticipate that the unity of the moral life will show itself in some typical form or feature of conduct, which preserves its identity throughout all the changes of process. In this way we give due recognition to the unity of moral development. But into the identity of any field evolution introduces continuous difference. This brings us to the other point. The differences cannot be wholly irregular. They will make their appearance, not at haphazard, but at the time and place and in the degree determined by the definite character of the evolution as the process whereby a particular field is organized. Thus, in the case of moral evolution, certain of the changes which the central activity undergoes will be determined by the nature of conduct. Hence, in moral development we may expect to find leading forms of conduct which are necessary because they are stages through which conduct must certainly pass in its evolution.

Suppose that we admit that it is part of an evolutionary conception of morality to recognize a central activity in the moral life and, also, several different forms of this activity which are necessary in moral development. The next question is, can we actually distinguish these features in morality? With reference to a "central activity" there is no need to hesitate. *Purposive* or *voluntary activity* fulfills all the requirements of a central activity in the moral life. In the first place, since the field of conduct is properly the field of self-conscious or voluntary activity, the sphere of purposive activity is coextensive with that of morality. Hence purposive activity is present as a mark of identity through all the changes of moral development. In the second place, purposive activity comprehends in its unity all the fundamental elements of the moral consciousness. This consciousness involves aspects of cognition, feeling, and action. All three elements are united in purposive activity,—an object is understood, a feeling impels, and an effort is put forth. In

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the third place, purposive activity represents in itself the essential nature of the whole development as a process of organization; for each purposive act is a complete step in organization. When the individual chooses an object for deliberate pursuit, he introduces differentiation and tension into his consciousness. The attainment of the object effects a corresponding integration; since a new element is adjusted into the complex unity of his life.

After defining the central activity of the moral life as purposive or voluntary and thus giving due recognition to the *unity* of the field of conduct, it will be easier to recognize that antithetical element of *difference* involved in the evolution of morality. Our aim is now to discover different forms of purposive activity which are necessary moments in moral development. Are there, then, different forms of purposive activity which are necessary to morality in the sense that they are required stages in moral development? The answer suggests itself at once that the several virtues or duties essential to morality correspond to this description. These virtues are undoubtedly forms of purposive action. Moreover, they are invested with a certain dignity and necessity in moral experience, —however their authority may be explained. The concept of evolution offers, one ventures to assert, a very satisfactory explanation of this authority. The principal virtues are necessary in their existence and sequence, because they represent different stages through which conduct must pass in the course of its evolution.

Many questions arise at this point concerning the necessity ascribed to the commonly admitted virtues. If the several virtues are thus necessary, by what is their necessity determined? Is it an empirical necessity, based upon the fact that the different virtues have actually appeared in a definite order of succession? Or is it an *a priori* necessity that is meant, a proposal to deduce the virtues in accordance with some formal law like that of organization? I reply that it is a necessity both of fact and of reason. As a fact in the history of morality, these approved types of action have appeared in orderly succession. But, more important than this, their ap-

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pearance and relation is in a large measure pre-determined by the nature of the factors involved in moral development. For moral development is change of a specific kind, *i. e.*, increase in organization. Furthermore, the organizing process works with a specific material, *i. e.*, primitive or undeveloped conduct. Suppose, now, that the original material in moral development consists of a number of impulses, some of them social in their reference and existing in connection with an elementary form of tribal association. The nature of this, the material of moral development, determines on broad lines the course of its evolution. An organization of primitive conduct must effect an adjustment of the conflicting impulses of the individual and an integration of his conduct into the reciprocal activity of society. Since the general trend of moral development is thus necessarily determined,—from the chaos of savage impulse toward the highly organized conduct of the member of civilized society,—it is clear that those forms of action which are already involved as required steps in this general direction will share in the necessity of the whole movement. Such is the necessity which we mean to ascribe to the several virtues, grounded in the form and content of moral evolution, which together prescribe for it a definite direction. The fundamental virtues of morality are necessary because without the interposition of these types of action primitive conduct could not have been organized. The virtues derive their authority from their place in moral development. Yet moral development is rendered possible by the functions discharged by the different virtues. Not every form of action which has a place in the actual evolution or has been recognized as virtuous will possess this necessity, however. For we have discovered a criterion whereby we can test the claims of any type of action to necessity or authority. Only those forms of action which are required steps in the organization of conduct can claim to be necessary.

The conception of moral development just outlined solves the problem which, as we noted at the beginning, confronts any ethical method which would prove itself useful in this field. This view justifies in a measure the contentions of both Hedonism and Intuitionism, and explains those two features of

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morality whose apparent incompatibility has been accentuated by the long controversy between the two schools. According to the method proposed, the recognized principles of conduct are understood as depending upon the natural impulses of man, yet at the same time as possessing absolute authority over all individuals. For moral development is seen to be an organization of actual impulses, and hence the most authoritative demand of conscience appears as a means to the complete satisfaction of human desires. Yet, since this process of organization has a definite material and a prescribed direction, certain leading principles of conduct acquire an absolute authority because they are necessary to the existence and continuance of the process.

The practicability of the proposed method can be ascertained only by applying it to the facts of morality. Can we in fact distinguish types of purposive action which are necessary stages in the evolution of conduct? In conclusion I wish to give a mere hint of how this criterion may be successfully applied.

It is obvious at the start that we cannot construct any complicated or finely-wrought scheme of virtues by this method. Necessity attaches solely to those activities which are absolutely essential to the nature and direction of moral evolution. Hence these activities must be of a fundamental character,—not particular acts prompted by specific occasions, but general activities relating to the universal conditions of human life.

Furthermore, purposive activity, as instrumental in moral evolution, has two distinct aspects. We have seen how such activity can be regarded as a process of organization in so far as it adjusts a new element into the systematic unity of individual life, in the form of an object achieved. Now all organization involves the two features, or laws, of *differentiation* and *integration*. Therefore, we are not surprised to find two corresponding aspects in purposive activity when conceived as an organizing agency. On the one hand this activity exhibits the negative aspect of differentiation inasmuch as it introduces a new end or object for earnest pursuit and thus destroys the unity and equilibrium of individual life. On the other hand, it possesses also the positive aspect of integration; for the

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attainment of the object restores the original unity with a richer and more varied content. These familiar features of purposive action exist in essential unity; and, ordinarily, there is no reason for separating them. But when we regard purposive activity as instrumental in organization they assume considerable importance. Hence, in the case of the fundamental activities of moral development, it is not strange that these two aspects have been separately recognized in different virtues.

In accordance with the premises stated, it is possible to mention at least three types of purposive endeavor which are necessary factors in moral evolution. I can give but a bare outline of these fundamental forms of conduct.

(1) *That activity in which the individual attains a single object of desire.* This action is, of course, the most elementary, and is rather the presupposed basis of conduct than a recognized factor in the moral life. On its negative side it implies the overcoming of natural inertia and involves that *energy* which is the first condition of any achievement. Mere "strenuousness," although it represents the very lowest grade of moral attainment, is nevertheless indispensable to any further development. In the aspect of positive accomplishment this type of action appears as the *efficiency* which is the basis of all successful endeavor. Unless a man has the ability in some degree to accomplish the ends which he pursues, he can never achieve any of the higher aims of morality.

(2) *That activity in which total individual welfare is pursued in distinction from the single object of desire.* The individual disregards the demand of momentary impulse, which originally controlled his conduct, in order to pursue some object connected with his general welfare. In its negative significance, indicating the suppression of the single desire for the sake of a larger good, this activity corresponds to the virtue of *Temperance.* On the positive side, since it involves the proper subordination of single impulses to the complete interest of the individual, this second form of action is identical with the virtue of *Prudence.* The virtues of Temperance and Prudence have, to be sure, important social significance; since certain of the orig-

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inal impulses of the individual are social in character, and these are adjusted along with the other impulses. Yet the two virtues in question are concerned primarily with the individual rather than society.

(3) *That activity in which the individual promotes the welfare of society in distinction from his own narrower interests.* After the emergence of individuality through the organization of the various impulses, the next step necessary in moral development is the adjustment of this newly-created individuality into the larger unity of society. Negatively, this adjustment implies the yielding of selfish interest to the equal rights of others, or *Justice*. In its positive bearing, it represents the identification of individual interest with the good of humanity,—the highest virtue, *Benevolence*.

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THE DEVELOPMENT OF ETHICAL SENTIMENT IN THE CHILD.

The absence of the feeling of OUGHT *in infancy.*

It is a matter of general belief that the infant reveals no true feeling of duty, no sense of "the ought" in his conduct. Whatever action will bring him food and relief from distress is right, and may be freely performed; and for several weeks—eight or ten at any rate, I think—this is without question the only criterion of the rightness of acts. When he is inclined to squall, either in protest or in supplication, he does so without self-restraint; I can discover no evidence that he has any realization of the necessity of checking himself for the good of others. There is nothing, personal or otherwise, in the world without, the well-being of which should be taken into account in determining what should be done. Of course, every act implies an *instinctive* appreciation at least of an environment to be dealt with in some way and for some end; but the point is that at

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the outset this end is concerned solely with self-gratification without regard to the alter, except as he can serve the self.

But as we follow the child in his development we can observe by the twelfth week, perhaps, the beginnings of the sense of a personal environment. At first this sense is revealed in the simple pleasure which is manifested in personal presence, shown in the smile especially. Running on, we see that by the end of the first year certainly, the child restrains his teasing or crying on certain occasions, to mention a typical form of self-restraint. Again, when he is moved to strike his brothers or sisters he will often make an effort to inhibit the impulse, and with some measure of success. So he will go a little way at least in sharing his candy and playthings with the members of the family; while at the sixth month he did not show the slightest disposition to do this. Passing on to his second birthday, we find that, even when he is alone, he will sometimes refrain from touching things that he has been instructed not to disturb, whereas in the first months such instructions would exert no influence upon his conduct a few moments after they were given. He will now apparently struggle to control the impulse to interrupt his mother when she is talking; he will strive to keep his food from falling on the floor; he will show signs of distress when he soils his clothing, and so on *ad libitum*. I mention these instances merely as typical examples of the awakening in the child of a consciousness that he must direct his actions with reference to the wishes or commands or needs of the people about him. There are persons besides himself to be reckoned with now. We see him here at the very birth, perhaps, of the sense, in its crudest, most elemental form, of oughtness, of duty, and it may be of ethical feeling.

The genesis of the child's self-restraints.

We must now inquire why the child of a year old will frequently make an effort of his own volition to check himself in his crying, or in any other forbidden action. To begin with, the earliest experience which tends to develop inhibition is the displeasure expressed by the mother or nurse in one way or another over the child's excesses. She may deny him his food

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when he cries; or she may show disapproval in her face or voice or manner; or she may refuse to assist him in any way; or in the last resort she may whip him. In some way she makes him realize that crying, say, is not acceptable, and this gives him a basis for determining the legitimacy of this action. The outcome of any act, in terms of pleasure and pain, is the only guide the child has for determining whether or not it may be performed. In the social sphere, what passes with others is right; that is, it may be performed without restraint. But what is resented by others is wrong; that is, it may not be performed without peril. Thus the child comes gradually to realize that he will in the long run get on most satisfactorily if he restrains himself in some of his actions instead of giving way to his impulsions. At first it is a matter of very simple, direct association. The mother as a disapproving or punishing individual becomes associated with certain of the child's acts, and it happens in time that when the suggestion to perform these acts appears, the prohibiting factor rushes into consciousness and arrests their progress.

Until the inhibition or performance of an action becomes facile, so that it will occur more or less mechanically, there will always be something of a struggle between impulsions and restraining or importuning ideals, and this is felt as strain or tension which we call the sense of duty in its simplest, roughest form. It is the beginning of the conflict, which is destined to become ever more involved and serious, between the demands of the social environment and primordial impulses. It is the very beginning of the elaboration of an *ideal* self which reflects the feelings, the needs, the desires of the alter; and it is ordered that this ideal self, once born, shall, in most cases at any rate, wage ceaseless warfare upon the lower and more "ego-centric" self.

The discovery that it pays to be helpful and generous and the results.

Looking now at another aspect of our subject, we see that the child of a year old readily discovers that when he shares his goods with his fellows he is repaid richly in his mother's

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approval, which is manifested in various tangible ways, alike in deed and by word of mouth; and he may also receive gifts and gratifying expressions from those with whom he has shared. Thus it is in time made obvious to him—and without doubt his natural endowment helps him to attain this realization quite readily—that he can get more pleasure from what turns out to be a social rather than a narrow, egoistic act. While he is learning this lesson one can observe the struggle taking place between an original, self-referring impulse and a not-yet-very-clearly-perceived or definitely established social one. Now at this moment one sort of action gains the right of way, and at the next another sort becomes supreme. But the child's experiences all tend to make what we might call his altruistic action seem to him best suited to promote his interests, though of course from his own standpoint there is not yet either selfish or altruistric conduct as we understand the terms;—there are simply actions, some of which turn out well, and are performed by people generally, while others turn out poorly, and are as generally avoided. When he is mean, the persons affected make him suffer for it. His brothers and sisters tell him they will not share with him; father, mother, and teacher make him feel unhappy through avoiding or shaming him, and so it goes. Or they may direct his attention to some child who is generous, and praise him. Now every child craves approval; and so the learner of social lessons is greatly stimulated to imitate the persons whom his father and mother reward with their flattering words and approving smiles. So these forces are at work every moment of the child's social life, teaching him what actions will be endorsed and what ones resented by the social environment, and in this way he gets started in the making of discriminations which in due course may be entitled ethical. In the beginning they relate to particular concrete situations; but as development proceeds and experiences of a social character increase, generalizations gradually become established, and these give the adult his principles for ethical judgment and conduct, a point which must be elaborated presently.

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The genesis of the sense of ought.

It has been suggested that as a result of increasing social experience the child discovers that others have rights which he for his own welfare must respect. Their possessions first *must* and later *ought* to be let alone. Without doubt, in the beginning they must not be disturbed because, if they are, direct physical pain will follow; but with broadening experience it is probable that the consciousness of direct punishment for abrogation of the rights of others grows less and less prominent, and in its place arises a more or less definite feeling that anti-social conduct, as revealed by the child's experience and education, is wrong, and the only way to secure peace of mind is to act in harmony with the promptings of this social, or I may say, ethical feeling. Action is, in the early years, largely unreflective; the question of reasonableness in the broad sense is not asked. An action is executed in a certain way because it has been found to be expedient; no ulterior reasons are sought or needed. But as the reflective tendency develops (we cannot stop to trace its course here) there appears a disposition to consider the wider relations of actions, their outcome, and their justification; and as a result it is seen that in both a positive and a negative way certain kinds of conduct must be required of all for the welfare of all. Then when this period is reached the child can assimilate the ethical instruction he receives from parent, teacher, minister, and books in which social ideals are constantly inculcated, in some cases purposively, in others incidentally. The teacher and parent are saying frequently: You ought not to do this or that, and the child is asking why. On the whole, the reasons given him are those which have become apparent through ages of social evolution, and which he can appreciate. Out of such experience is developed the sense of the inherent rightness or wrongness of actions because they have universal validity; expediency, in the narrow sense, is no longer the prominent motive it was originally. The alter in his tendencies and needs comes often to occupy as important a place in consciousness as the ego; and an act to be approved must

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work no harm to the former for the advantage of the latter; and the reverse is equally true. Conduct that will meet this test is right; any other kind is wrong.

The genesis of conscience.

Perhaps we have gone far enough now so that we may say that the child's conscience grows by easy stages right out of his social experiences wherein he is made aware that it pays to respect the rights of others, and to share his possessions with them. In the beginning, the mother's disapproval revealed in a variety of very concrete ways was the principal spur to inhibition; and the child had actually to see her face in order that it should control him. However, in the course of maturing, as the imaging power develops, the mother can continue to exert an influence over her child's conduct, even when she is far removed from him. She really lives in her boy's springs of conduct when he is tempted to perform the actions she has forbidden, or when he fails to perform those she has urged upon him. She is there in greater or less vividness of detail, looking on, and approving or disapproving, and thus she directs him much as if she were really present in the flesh. As development proceeds, though, the mother, in her concrete, distinct personality, gradually subsides, so to speak, and there is left only the appreciation of her general attitudes in the special sorts of situations in which she has determined the child's actions in the past. And what is true of the influence of the mother is equally true of every person who instructs the child regarding his social relationships.

If one should work out the natural history of any act subject to the operations of conscience, he would find it conforming to this general type. There must first be very definite concrete experience,—disapproving persons, punishment, and so on; then in time these may operate through imagination, as we say; and finally the concrete factors are eliminated wholly or in part, but their import is still felt, and is sufficient to enforce conduct in harmony therewith. Until ethical action in any situation becomes quite definitely established the concrete personalities who demanded it originally tend to remain as foci of attention,

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as it were, and so as determinants of behavior. It should be impressed that when the concrete personalities have dropped into subconsciousness the individual remains responsive to their influence; he feels he must act in the present as these personalities bade him to act in similar situations in the past. He feels there is something wrong if on any occasion he goes against his habitual action, and he will be ill-at-ease until he comes back into line. Conscience then is really the effect of lack of harmony between the individual's present action, which is narrowly egoistic, and the more broadly social, more ideal action which is urged upon him in the manner which has been sketched above. I say *ideal* action, and I mean by this action which is generally endorsed and taught by the people about the individual, but which he has not yet adopted in his own conduct. As soon as one's action is brought into harmony with these social ideals, conscience approves; there is a feeling of satisfaction; and if the act be repeated without struggle, conscience gradually ceases to manifest itself at all; there is no further need for it. Its function is to make the individual restless, unhappy, wretched as long as his conduct is not consonant with that which he has come to believe his social environment rightfully demands of him. It may be added that in all likelihood no one ever reaches the point where absolutely every action is felt to be in accord with his highest ideals. This is to say that conscience must be active in the breasts of all men to a greater or less extent. I except, of course, pathological cases wherein ideals have become inoperative as a result of degeneration, and imbecile cases wherein ideals never gain any controlling force over original impulses.

The way in which the demands of the social environment get represented in consciousness.

Thus consciousness on the social side is a sort of theatre in which one's friends and acquaintances and the public in general, so far as it has become a matter of experience, constitute the audience whose function it is to pass judgment upon the actor's performances. Every act is scrutinized by them, and one cannot escape praise or blame, except in respect of those activities

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that have often been performed and appraised in the same way, so that they have become automatic. This it is that causes the child distress when he performs a mean deed, even if he knows it will not be actually detected. These ideal spectators know of it, and they are condemning or shaming him, and he is not fit to be seen by his fellows. If a person should be so constructed (as idiots probably are) that consciousness could entertain no ideal personages who would commend or condemn him for his conduct, then we cannot conceive that in such a case there would be any way for him to determine whether deeds were right or wrong, except by their immediate outcome. Right is, then, what our models endorse, wrong is what they condemn.

I use the term models, of course, in a broad sense. Some of Shakespeare's characters may become my models in a very real and vital way. Plato and Aristotle are living personages for me, and they determine my conduct in some respects; they live in my consciousness in a real manner, and act as counselors in moments of doubt. So the great men of all times, whose lives I am familiar with, and the great characters depicted in fiction, as well as the persons now living whom I have met, all dwell close to the springs of conduct, and play a part in approving or disapproving my conduct. When I am perplexed I try to discover how these persons would act under similar circumstances, and when I see what they would do I see what I may do.

The first requirement for the development of ethical sentiment.

It follows from what has been said that for the development of the highest ethical sentiment the child must be brought into contact with persons, both in concrete life and in literature and art, who embody it in their daily lives and exhibit it in a great variety of situations. The broader the child's experience with people, the more cosmopolitan he is, the more likely he will be to touch persons who exhibit the highest ethical qualities in all the situations in which he will ever be placed. It may be asked at this point why there is not as great likelihood of his choosing evil as virtuous models; and logically this is possible. Practically we recognize this, for we hesitate to permit our children

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to form associations with all sorts and conditions of men. We often keep them out of the public schools because they may see bad models. But after all is said, it is still probable that in the frank and open intercourse of many individuals, in give-and-take relations, that which is ethical will predominate over that which is evil; or at least it will be relatively easy under such conditions to make ethical ideals most prominent through educational training. One who knows children at all intimately realizes that certain kinds of conduct when seen in public may be severely dealt with, while at the same time it will be tolerated or practiced when there are only two or three together. When activities are brought to the public test the ethical vision seems to be clearer; the lower egoistic motives are checked by the higher and social ones.[1]

Solitude favors ego-centric actions of every sort, while publicity, in the sense in which the term has been used, stimulates the development of the virtues which men in general recognize ought to prevail, even though in their own private life they may not practice them freely. They may find some excuse for their own actions, but they cannot find any for the alter who is an offender. Of course, in the child's associations there must be some method of causing him to esteem most highly the most ethical persons. How this is to be done in detail cannot be worked out here; but it will be appropriate, perhaps, to close with the suggestion that the child, especially as he approaches maturity, will tend inevitably, under ordinary circumstances, to approve what is best in the conduct about him, because he will see that it is after all most in accord with his experience of what will be best for everyone concerned; and, what is of most consequence, it is publicly commended, and is recognized as the ideal which every one should embody in his own demeanor.

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[1] It will doubtless occur to some readers that this statement is in opposition to the current theory of the lawlessness of the mob. But the mob temper is pathological. A group of men is not always a mob, though under certain conditions it may become one. It may be an easy passage from a deliberative assembly to an unreasoning mob; but psychologically they are a polar distance apart.

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THE ETHICS OF CORPORAL PUNISHMENT.

The subject of corporal punishment is one which, though often discussed, is usually discussed in vain, for its real issue lies too deep for purposes of controversy. The mere utility of flogging, as a deterrent from evil-doing, may, indeed, be matter for argument, and its advocates may be rashly content to take their stand on its efficacy; but to its opponents this method of reasoning can never be fully conclusive, for however clearly they may grasp the proofs that history gives of the uselessness of flogging, they must feel that, even if it *were* effective, there are other and higher reasons for condemning it: whatever its success might be, its cost would be deemed too great. In so far, then, as the practical failure of corporal punishment is urged by humanitarians, as in Mr. Collinson's recently published treatise on "Facts about Flogging," [1] such argument is merely auxiliary to the main one; it is fatal to the claims of corporal punishment, if it be established, but the counter-argument is not fatal to the humanitarian view. I would therefore briefly refer the reader to Mr. Collinson's pamphlet for the most thorough exposure of the futility of flogging that has ever been written, and pass on to the proper subject of this article—the immorality of flogging as a means of punishing offenders.

In all civilized, or to speak more correctly, semi-civilized races, like our own, a question arises as to the continuance or discontinuance of certain ancient customs that have descended from a barbarous past, and are repellent to the more refined modern feeling. Corporal punishment is one of these immemorial customs, once widely practiced and accepted as a matter of course, now the subject of very acute controversy in several departments of life, and regarded with the strongest detestation and abhorrence by an increasing number of social reformers. What is the origin of this intense dislike of a practice which is still lauded, in some quarters, as wholesome and irre-

[1] "Facts about Flogging." Revised Edition, 1905. A. C. Fifield, 44 Fleet Street, W. C.

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proachable, and what can account for so marked a diversity of opinion?

Doubtless the hatred of corporal punishment is, in its origin, instinctive. We feel that there is something of a degradation in its infliction—degrading alike to those who inflict it and to those who suffer—and this sentiment is confirmed, on further reflection, by the teachings of history and experience. For flogging, when we give careful thought to it, is seen to be the very sum and substance of personal tyranny—the quintessence of all that is opposed to the growth of human freedom. It is an epitome of that love of dominion, mental and physical, which is the mortal foe of the natural movement; and we find accordingly that the protest against the lash, like the protest against slavery, has grown up, step by step, with the modern enfranchisement of thought. This aspect of corporal punishment was well expressed, more than a century ago, in that once overrated but now much underrated work, the "Political Justice" of William Godwin.

"Corporal punishment is an expeditious mode of proceeding, which has been invented in order to compress the effect of much reasoning and long confinement, that might otherwise have been necessary, into a very short compass. In another view it is difficult to express the abhorrence it ought to create. The genuine propensity of man is to venerate mind in his fellow-man. With what delight do we contemplate the progress of intellect, its effort for the discovery of truth, the harvest of virtue that springs up under the genial influence of instruction, the wisdom that is generated through the medium of unrestricted communication! How completely do violence and corporal infliction reverse the scene! From this moment all the wholesome avenues of the mind are closed, and on every side we see them guarded with a train of disgraceful passion, hatred, revenge, despotism, cruelty, hypocrisy, conspiracy, and cowardice. With what feelings must an enlightened observer contemplate the furrow of a lash imprinted upon the body of a man!"

In this, as in so many other matters, Godwin was a true pioneer of modern ideas; but if his judgment be suspected, as that of a revolutionary "doctrinaire," let me refer the reader to the similar opinion of that high old Tory, De Quincey, who certainly cannot be charged with any lack of respect for constitutional authority.

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"All corporal punishments whatsoever," says De Quincey, "and upon whomsoever inflicted, are hateful and an indignity to our common nature, which (with or without our consent is enshrined in the person of the sufferer. Degrading *him* they degrade *us*. . . . Thanks be to God, in this point at least, for the dignity of human nature, that amongst the many, many cases of reform destined eventually to turn out chimerical, this one, at least, never can be defeated, injured, or eclipsed. As man grows more intellectual, the power of managing him by his intellect and his moral nature, in utter contempt of all appeals to his mere animal instincts of pain, must go on *pari passu*."

Here, then, I think, is the true ethical objection to corporal punishment: it is the supreme negation of free thinking; the symbol of the slavery of the mind. I do not, of course, mean to say that it is equally detestable in all its forms; for in practice there is, no doubt, a vast difference between its degrees, and the sense of proportion which Horace long ago advocated in the infliction of the lash,

"Ne scuticâ dignum horribili sectere flagello,"

must equally be observed by humanitarians in their denunciation of corporal punishment itself. But the principle is the same throughout, from the flogging of Russian "intellectuals" by brainless Cossacks and police-agents, to the flogging of ignorant children, and even of the lower animals, by those who are their guardians and keepers—whatever the authority that prescribes the act, legitimate or illegitimate, established or usurped, the act itself is always repugnant to a refined moral sense, is always apprehended as being of itself an evil, and only to be justified as "the lesser of two evils" under the faulty social conditions in which we live.

What, then, is the origin of this widespread repugnance, and of the passionate detestation in which the practice of corporal punishment is held by not a few men and women who are no more liable than their fellows to the charge of "sentimentality"? It were hard to say; but in this connection the psychopathic, as well as the ethical, side of the question must not be wholly overlooked, for there is no doubt that there is such a mental disease as "flagellomania," and police-court records have frequently shown that the cry for flagellation has

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its vicious, as well as its cruel, aspect. It is not, of course, to be supposed that the well-meaning persons who clamor in the press for "more flogging" are conscious of this fact, but the fact remains, and has to be faced; nor is it merely fanciful to suggest that the hatred of flogging in every shape and form may be partly due to a recoil from such sensual craving for the infliction of pain on others. There are well-known instances of suicide, or attempted suicide, on the part of those whose self-respect has been outraged by the lash; and De Quincey has pointed out that as many women have rightly preferred to die than to be dishonored, so in the case of the other sex, where corporal punishment "is its peculiar and sexual degradation," there is nothing blameworthy in such self-vindication. At any rate, the term "morbid," so often applied to those who act or think in defiance of the vulgar opinion in this matter, is an absurd misnomer, for the morbid tendency is altogether on the other side.

But why, it will be asked, if there is this disreputable element in flogging, is the practice approved and advocated by so many healthy-minded persons? The answer is to be found in the fact that the prevalence of corporal punishment in English schools is responsible for a tone of mind, at once tyrannical and servile, which prompts our public-school men to applaud the infliction on others of what they have themselves undergone. It is the old story of the fox who has lost his tail. How unreasonable it is of the lower orders, so runs the complaint of the well-educated pro-flogger, to object to *their* children being birched by a burly policeman or schoolmaster, when *his* sons are "swished" at Eton and do not feel it to be a disgrace; and he often goes on to state, with the utmost complacency, that he himself—whose present condition, mental and moral, can obviously leave nothing to be desired—was several times birched in his youth! The conclusion is irresistible. The country is going to ruin, morally and intellectually, for want of a more general application of the birch!

And what is the precise nature of this sound and ennobling discipline? In one of the standard books about the greatest of English public schools, Mr. Brinsley Richards' "Seven Years

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at Eton," there is a graphic account of the flogging system by one who had personal experience of it, and whose evidence cannot be ignored as that of a mere faddist and "outsider." Here is an extract which may, perhaps, serve to explain why so many good people can see nothing indecent in a practice into which they were themselves initiated as boys:

"When I first came to the school, and was told how culprits were dealt with, I fancied I was being hoaxed. I never quite believed the stories I heard until I actually saw a boy flogged, and I can never forget the impression which the sight produced upon me. . . . Several dozens of fellows clambered upon forms and desks to see N. corrected, and I got a front place, my heart thumping and seeming to make great leaps within me. Next moment, when he knelt on the step of the block, and when the Lower Master inflicted upon his person six cuts that sounded like the splashings of so many buckets of water, I turned almost faint. I felt as I have never felt but once since, and that was when seeing a man hanged. It is true that the eyes and nerves soon get accustomed to cruel sights. I gradually came to witness the executions in the Lower School not only with indifference, but with amusement."

Let us further quote a sentence in which Mr. Brinsley Richards describes his own state of mind, when he too had been to the block: "I rose from my knees completely hardened as to any sense of shame either in the punishment I had undergone, or in others of the same kind which I might have to suffer thereafter."

It is not surprising that men who have themselves been "hardened" in this way, or who live in a society which accepts and extols such "discipline," should be untrustworthy judges of the morality of subjecting other persons to such punishments; for just as tattooed savages are eager to induce every stranger to submit himself to their rites, so it is with these well-bred brethren of the birch, on whose minds a belief in the necessity of flagellation has been stamped by schoolboy tradition. What else could account for the revelations that take place from time to time of the "ragging" scandals in the army and navy, where, except in the rarest cases, young English officers have tamely submitted to humiliations which any foreign officer would have died rather than endure? Naturally these flagellated gentlemen do not see anything indecent

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in corporal punishment, for the very sense of decency (in that particular relation) has been birched out of them in their youth.

In this matter, as in not a few others, the instinct of the English working classes, which regard corporal punishment as a personal disgrace, is far truer and less morbid than that of their so-called superiors. Working men have at least never submitted their *minds* to these gross indignities, but have rightly regarded such punishments as forcibly imposed on them and their children by alien laws which they had no share in making. The poor lads, in the Royal Navy and elsewhere, who have attempted suicide rather than undergo such outrage, have proved themselves to be possessed of far more dignity and self-respect than the young aristocrats of the Guards. To acquiesce in such things is a sign not of manliness, but of callousness—of a lower, not higher, state of moral development.

I lay stress on this question of the corporal punishment of the young, not only because it seems to furnish a clue to a right understanding of the ethics of corporal punishment as a whole, but also because I would protest against the common assumption that while the flogging of men is at least a grave responsibility, and the flogging of women is an abomination, the flogging of children, the weakest and most helpless class of all, is a wholesome and meritorious practice, which needs no more serious justification than to quote—and quote incorrectly—a dubious saying attributed to Solomon many ages ago. Humanitarians maintain that *all* flogging is an abomination, whether its victim be a man, a woman, or a child; but that it is perhaps most injurious in the case of a child, because at that age the ethical sense is more liable to be permanently confused and distorted by a lesson in personal violence as a substitute for moral persuasion. To beat the feeble and defenceless is an act which, in every other relation, is seen at once to be unspeakably cowardly and mean; it is also extremely likely to implant in the mind of the child who suffers it a tendency to act in a similar manner when the conditions are reversed, and when the slave is grown into the tyrant. Who shall say how much of the cruelty of adult life is due to the object-lessons of childhood?

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It is an unpleasant fact that, in spite of the general and gradual decrease of corporal punishment in England, there has been a reactionary attempt in several quarters, during the past few years, to increase the flogging of the young. For example, the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children made the deplorable mistake, in 1900, of promoting a bill (fortunately defeated) for the wholesale whipping of juvenile offenders at the discretion of magistrates; and the National Union of Teachers has made every effort to retain for its members the privilege—for it is regarded a privilege rather than a disgrace—of being empowered to thrash the ill-fed children in board schools. In schools, in reformatories, in police-courts, in the Royal Navy—everywhere there is the same craze for rod and cane as heaven-sent implements of education, and the same complete forgetfulness of those wise words of Sir Benjamin Richardson, which every teacher should know by heart:

"To me, as a physician, nothing is more tainted with injurious iniquity than the corporal punishment of children, which proceeds to teach what is believed to be wrong by the instant infliction of physical pain. To the punished and punisher alike the system is as mischievous as it is barbarous. On the punished it brands hate, or servility, or palpitating fear. On the punisher it brands coward, tyrant, hasty adjudicator of rights and wrongs; while it so perverts the judgment that he who would scorn himself if he struck a woman will think the act right if a child be the object of its infliction."

When we turn to the case of adult offenders against the law, we find the same insensate cry for a recourse to bodily pain, regardless of the fact that such punishments have been "tried" *ad nauseam* in the past, and have merely succeeded in brutalizing the people who imposed them, without deterring the criminals against whom they were aimed. During recent years the correspondence columns of the "yellow" press have teemed with letters demanding the lash as the sole adequate penalty for Hooligans, wife-beaters, dynamiters, train-wreckers, burglars, ill-users of children or of animals, and various other types; and the latent or open ferocity which many of the writers betray is quite as hideous and appalling as the crimes which

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they seek to avenge. Take for example the plea deliberately made by the Rev. Raymond Blathwayt for the punishment of certain violent forms of crime—"that when a powerful brute beat a poor, inoffensive woman whom he had never seen before, and beat her in such a way that she sank dead at his feet, such a man should himself be officially flogged to death." It is undoubtedly a terrible blot on our civilization that violent crimes should be perpetrated by brutal and unthinking ruffians; but is it a less sinister fact that a man of culture and education should desire to repay violence with torture? I purposely use the word "torture," because it is absurd to pretend that torture has been abolished in a society which defends itself with the cat-o'-nine-tails, which is in the most literal sense as much an engine of torture as the rack, or the boot, or the thumb-screw. Witness the following description, taken from the *Sydney Bulletin,* of a flogging with the "cat":

"As they bared the prisoner's back the officials spoke in half whispers, but as soon as the subject was strapped to the frame, with arms and feet spread wide, one called out with startling loudness, 'Fifteen lashes!' Immediately the flagellator stepped forward, whirled the knotted thongs once around his head and brought them whistling down across the white shoulders. The stroke was dealt with the precision of long practice, and the victim, taken by surprise, caught his breath with a gasp and strained desperately at the unreleasing bonds, the muscles of his shoulders and arms quivering convulsively in the effort to free his limbs and get one solacing writhe under the sudden, unavoidable, tormenting sting. Failing this the wretch threw back his head and screeched forth the pent and raging resentment of his body, with an intonation hideous, heart-piercing, and unforgettable. The sound was comparable to nothing else in nature; it expressed all that is meant by despair and mortal agony.

"The other strokes followed in orderly mechanical sequence, and I watched them every one. At each stripe the tortured wretch howled anew, but above his screams could be heard the shouts of the man whose duty it was to count the strokes and, between, the vicious 'sing' of the lash and its gruesome 'splash' upon the wealed flesh. At the ninth stroke the doctor ordered the hangman to vary the direction of his blows. He did so, after staying to run his fingers through the clotted lashes and to flick the gouted blood from them upon the floor. The five last strokes were punctuated only by deep, rhythmic sobs from the victim, who now seemed to be numbed and stupefied by pain.

"When it was finished, they covered up his face and body and took him quickly away to the hospital."

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Less inhuman, no doubt, than the cat-o'-nine-tails, but perhaps even more degrading in its effects, is the prison birch, which some English judges have of late shown a tendency to prescribe for the punishment of adults, especially of those convicted of being "rogues and vagabonds" under the infamous Vagrancy Acts, once nearly obsolete, but now revived again in this enlightened age. It is difficult to imagine anything more loathesome, or insulting to our common manhood, even in the case of a criminal tramp, than this abominable judicial practice of inflicting the birch on men.

But it is said that we cannot degrade these scoundrels who are already so deeply degraded in crime. The statement itself is untrue, and even if it were true the argument founded on it would be false. There is no living being who is so sunk as to be beyond the reach of human sympathy and aid—not even the gentlemen who think and speak so vilely of their fellows—but even if it were so, if there were a criminal who had reached the lowest conceivable depth of bestial shame, it would none the less be a bestial act to subject him to the lash, because of the insult thereby offered to the general dignity of mankind. Here again the words of De Quincey are full of significance:

"Corporal punishment is usually argued with a single reference to the case of him who suffers it; and *so* argued, God knows that it is worthy of all abhorrence; but the weightiest argument against it is the foul indignity which is offered to our common nature lodged in the person of him on whom it is inflicted. *His* nature is our nature; and supposing it possible that *he* were so far degraded as to be unsusceptible of any influences but those which address him through the brutal part of his nature, yet for the sake of ourselves—no, not merely for ourselves, or for the human race now existing, but for the sake of human nature, which transcends all existing participators of that nature—we should remember that the evil of corporal punishment is not to be measured by the poor transitory criminal, whose memory and offence are soon to perish; these, in the sum of things, are as nothing; the injury which can be done him, and the injury which he can do, have so momentary an existence that they may be safely neglected; but the abiding injury is to the most august interest which for the mind of man can have any existence—viz., to his own nature; to raise and dignify which, I am persuaded, is the first, last, and holiest command which the conscience imposes on the philosophic moralist."

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It is amusing, in so far as anything can be amusing in so painful a subject, to observe the various futile arguments that are again and again put forward in defence of the brutalities of the lash. One of the silliest of these fallacies is to charge the opponents of corporal punishment with being more concerned to protect the criminal than the victim of the crime, and to ask them whether *they* would not desire the wrong-doer to be flogged if they themselves had been the sufferers by his deed. Yet presumably the reason why civilized societies have abandoned the use of the rack is not that they sympathize unduly with the criminal, but that they have come to regard the rack as an improper form of punishment; and so, in like manner, it will be with the use of the lash—it will be abolished, not from mere pity for the offender, but because it is a vicious method of correcting him. And what could be more comical than the assertion made by the advocates of flogging Hooligans to death, that the relatives of the Hooligan's victim would readily say "yea" to such a course? "You can only treat a brute as a brute," says the Rev. Raymond Blathwayt, "and I am quite sure that the husband, brother, or father of a woman so murdered, whether he were a peer from Mayfair or an artisan from Battersea, would heartily agree with me in so arguing." Perhaps so. But it is also possible that the relatives of the murdered woman would agree as heartily to the use of boiling oil or melted lead for the "brute's" extinction; though in that case the Rev. Raymond Blathwayt—curiously enough—would be grievously shocked! The theory that the nature of the punishment to be inflicted on a criminal should be fixed to gratify the exasperation of his victims is one that will hardly commend itself to modern jurisprudence. We see how that system works in some of the Southern States of America, where, under lynch law, an offending negro is said to have been tied to a tree, drenched in paraffin, and burned alive.[2]

[2] Nor is this remarkable principle of justice unknown in the British Empire, for the *Times of Ceylon* (March 14th, 1905) recorded the following case:—

"Mr. E. Gordon Grinlinton, of Yalta, charged a Sinhalese youth before Mr. Carbery to-day with criminal trespass. The accused was convicted.

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But of the many sophisms urged in favor of corporal punishment the most plausible (and the most impudent) is that which contrasts the undoubted evils of imprisonment with the pretended beneficence of the lash, and then assumes that flogging is the more humane alternative. "What else are we to do with him?" asks the philanthropic flagellant, who, unable to bear the thought of sending a law-breaker to prison, is eager to score his back with the rod. Now, in the first place, imprisonment, even in the present state of our prisons, is less barbarous than flogging; it does not so utterly break a man's spirit and destroy his self-respect. And secondly, it is the very persons who oppose corporal punishment who have been foremost also in working for the amelioration of the prison system; so that they, at any rate, are not responsible for what barbarity it may still retain. It is the obvious duty of the State to turn its prisons into reformatories, instead of drawing from their present unsatisfactory condition disingenuous excuses for inflicting yet another form of torture on those who are convicted of crime. The true alternative lies not between the lash and the cell, but between the brutal old methods of which the pro-floggers are the champions and the newer, more rational methods to which humanitarians appeal.

There is one thing, and one only, that can be truly said in favor of flogging. It "saves time"—that is, it saves time at the beginning to lose it at the end. It is a "short cut"; and, like many other short cuts, it aptly illustrates the proverb, "More haste, less speed." For a society which will not spend labor on reclaiming and reforming its offenders, it is no doubt "economical" to flog them; but the economy is of the penny-wise, pound-foolish order which re-creates the evil it would destroy. It *may,* under present faulty conditions, and in certain rare cases, be the lesser evil to flog some man or boy who has offended (and why not equally some woman or girl?) in the absence of any more rational plan of procedure; but it will

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The magistrate *referred the mode of punishment to the complainant* [!], and, Mr. E. Gordon Grinlinton electing in favor of lashes as against imprisonment, twelve cuts with a cane were ordered and administered after the court rose."

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probably not deter that particular offender, and it will certainly not deter other offenders, from repeating the offence. The lash is, in fact, a mere fictitious makeshift for genuine correction; it attempts by the hasty, slipshod method of bodily pain-giving what can only be effected by mature reason and thought.

To conclude, then: Corporal punishment, as the very antithesis of moral suasion and the compact embodiment of brute force, is an outrage on what should, above all things, be held sacred—the supremacy of the human mind and the dignity of the human body. It would be quixotic to hope that all use of physical violence, odious though it is, could be at present dispensed with, in a society which is but half emerged from barbarism; but *this* form of it, at least, the most barbarous, because the grossest and most sensual, must be uprooted and abandoned, before any true measure of civilization can be attained.

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SIN AND SACRIFICE.

The most striking fact about the Old Testament conception of sin is the absence of reference to the suggestive myth in the third chapter of Genesis. The nearest approach to the idea of the race as involved in Adam's transgression is in the passages where sin is represented as universal; but such passages nowhere teach that man's sinfulness is derived from Adam. Hence the story of the Fall may be disregarded until we consider the apostle Paul's doctrine of sin.

The true starting point for our enquiry is to be sought in those records of early Israel, where custom is the controlling force in morals. The stories of the patriarchs give the truest reflection of the manners and morals of that period. The patriarchs are represented as being arbitrarily elected to Jahweh's favor and a covenant is established between them. The great crime is revolt against Jahweh's choice—the selling

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of the birthright. Even lying, lust, and violence are not denounced as sinful. Under the Mosaic covenant custom remained the dominant social factor. Sin was neglect of ceremonial regulations rather than moral transgression. Such ceremonial transgression was punishable with death because the nation was felt to be involved in the individual's guilt. "What Holiness required was not to do good, but to avoid sin." The prophetic reformation was of the utmost importance because it raised Israel above mere customary morality. A great conception of Jahweh as righteous, and therefore impartial, and even universal in His relations, dawns in Amos, and is developed by his successors. To the prophets sin was the denial or disregard of Jahweh's righteous character; it took the form of idolatrous worship and was frequently associated with foul rites. Powerful and persistent attempts were made to combine the worship of Jahweh with that of other gods in heathen fashion. Against such practices and tendencies the Hebrew prophets hurled indignant protests, moved not by mere jealousy for the honor of Jahweh, but by a profound conception of His moral character.

How far the prophets had departed from customary morality is seen in their insistence upon the need and possibility of repentance. Repentance was a new aspect of sin. Hitherto the whole nation had felt itself involved in the individual's sin. The standard was external, conformity to it was possible to all and obligatory upon all. The prophets discriminated between ritual and righteousness, and declared the former to be vain apart from the latter. Their deeper insight discerned in the new class consciousness the real peril of the nation. The exploiting of the poor by the rich, the defrauding of the widow and the orphan, the buying and selling of justice impressed the prophets as graver wrongs than breaches of ritual observance. And as these wrongs were perpetrated by one section of the community against the other the ancient solidarity was felt to have been finally dissolved. Thus the attack upon the ruling and commercial classes in Amos and Hosea gradually developed into the doctrine of Jeremiah and Ezekiel that every man was responsible for his own sin. A correlative of

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this movement was the deepening of the sense of alienation between the Israelite and Jahweh. The sinfulness and littleness of man were placed in striking contrast to the holiness and greatness of his Maker.

The sense of personal responsibility and the conception of Jahweh's holiness, combined with the terrible suffering of the captivity and exile, deeply influenced Israel's view of sin. Suffering had long been regarded as due to sin, but when even the righteous were overwhelmed in ruin and grief the mind of the people was confused with doubt. The conjectures of the book of Job reflect the new mood. Its anxious questionings turn restlessly from one point of view to another, with the result that the view of sin it presents is closely related to the inwardness of the New Testament; *e. g.*, the thirty-first chapter dwells upon the sinfulness of evil thoughts and desires. But with respect to the relation between sin and suffering the book of Job does little more than challenge the traditional view that the latter is the inevitable consequence of the former. It remained for Deutero-Isaiah to boldly present a positive view by his noble conception of Israel as the suffering servant of Jahweh.

The pressure of suffering produced in Israel not only a period of doubt, but also one of deep conviction of sin and assurance of forgiveness. The voice of psalmists was heard in plaintive, poignant confession of sin. The conceptions of God and man in psalmists and prophets are similar, but the attitude is very different. The prophets spoke as representing Jahweh and their demands were high and stern. Deep was calling unto deep. The heart of Israel was pierced and the psalmists uttered its cry. They represented Israel as loving Jahweh because of His wonderful love shown in the great acts of the nation's history. Unhappily sin broke the happy relationship, and they gave this new, deep sense of sin undying expression. It is the sinner's view of sin. Its profoundest utterance is in the fifty-first psalm. There is nothing mean or ignoble in the confession, nothing but a burning hatred of sin for its own sake, accompanied by a wistful hope of forgiveness and renewal.

That hope of forgiveness found its happiest fulfillment in the

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teaching of Jesus. There was a long interval between the great psalmists and Jesus during which scribism received its full development. The scribes added little to the Old Testament doctrine of sin save in the direction of legalism and casuistry. Their teaching was attacked by Jesus as tending to hypocrisy. It reëstablished externalism in religion and was a departure from the great teachers of Israel. But Jesus did not stop at criticism, what is striking and important is His new attitude toward sin. As denunciation and confession of sin had been the respective notes of prophets and psalmists, so forgiveness of sin was the insistent note of Jesus. He declared that this is God's attitude towards sin and He gave point to the declaration by His wonderful gentleness when dealing with individual sinners. Christ's gospel of forgiveness gave a new character to sin. It became opposition to the kingdom of God—a persistent and willful denial of goodness, even when the goodness is recognized and understood.

Of special importance in the New Testament is the apostle Paul's conception of sin. St. Paul combined a wonderfully vivid religious experience with profound interest in theological speculation. He felt what he taught in a degree given to few. He believed that humanity was tainted, disordered, disunited from God by sin. The story of the Fall had hitherto been strangely disregarded. St. Paul found it helpful because of its representative character; it enabled him to think of humanity as a whole in its relations to sin and redemption. He taught that through Adam's transgression sin entered into the race, enslaving and paralyzing man's higher nature. The flesh became the seat of sin. Physical death was a result of it. How are we to be emancipated from the body of this death? How are we to be justified before a righteous God? Is death to sin possible? It is with these problems that the apostle grapples.

It would be difficult to overestimate the influence of St. Paul's philosophy of sin upon subsequent religious thought and experience. It became allied with philosophic and ascetic ideas of the body as sinful, the spirit being a divine element imprisoned in alien matter. The cruelties to the body, self-in-

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flicted in the name of religion; the morbid longing for death as a release from the disease of earthly existence; the injury to human society which has followed the train of monastic ideals; the neglect of higher duties and indifference to grave wrongs: these things and more make a dark and depressing chapter in the history of Christianity. Yet while protesting against false and morbid views of sin it would be a shallow conception that ignored its reality and importance as a stage in human history and individual experience.

Estranged from God by sin how can man become reconciled to the Highest? This question involves some consideration of the biblical conception of sacrifice. The Scriptures seem to point to a childlike time when, in festive spirit, worshipers entertained God at their feasts or under the gloom of threatened calamity sought to propitiate Him by gifts of burnt offering and the like. The fragrant essence distilled from food by fire seems to have been the divine share. These rudimentary conceptions were refined by a progressive civilization, and eventually were subjected to searching criticism by the eighth century prophets. The standard of criticism was the nobler conception of Jahweh they gave to Israel. The gift theory was ridiculed: were not the cattle upon a thousand hills already His? Did they regard their religious ordinances as the grand means of pleasing Him? He was weary of them: away with iniquity and the solemn meeting. Count by count the great indictment developed culminating in the demand: "What doth the Lord require of thee but to do justly and love mercy and walk humbly with thy God?"

Some of the prophets were impatient of the dumb show of sacrifice. The value of sacrifice lay in its aspiration, and such aspiration could find a nobler expression in language. "Take with you words," urges Hosea, "and turn to the Lord, say unto Him, Forgive all iniquity, and receive us graciously: so will we render the fruit of our lips." When tracing the development of the Old Testament conception of sin we saw that the stern teaching of the prophets about the holiness of Jahweh and the heinousness of sin against Him, followed by the national calamities which ended in ruin and exile, gave rise to

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psalms in which the pent-up emotions of Israel found expression in contrition and confession. But this literary movement was too spiritual to satisfy the age. During the gloom of Exile the consciousness of sin weighed heavily upon the heart of Israel. Jahweh seemed so far away and so high in His holiness that the people lost confidence in mere confession and repentance. There was a revival of the ancient spirit which sought to appease Jahweh by material oblation. To approach Him without some costly offering seemed useless. Jahweh had been provoked by their sins, and the penalty of sin was death. Their traditional cultus was pervaded with ideas of sacrificial offering. The slain victim suffered the penalty of sin for others. They had been driven from the land which Jahweh's might had conquered for them. Their enemies were mere instruments, the rod of His anger.

Again, they had little hope of a restored monarchy. Israel had been a mere "buffer" state between powerful kingdoms, and there seemed little prospect of restoration of former conditions. By the destruction of the outer order of the monarchy there had disappeared all that symbolized the nation's strength and beauty. Hence the Jewish exiles were led to dream of restoring the ancient worship in a second temple at Jerusalem. Jahweh should be their king. The temple services should rival in magnificence the splendors of a court.

Amidst such influences no religious forms could rival the claims of sacrifice. Its imposing ceremonial, its costly gifts, its immemorial antiquity were irresistible in that strange historical situation. At the Restoration, under Ezra, 444 B. C., the elaborate system of sacrifice embodied in the priestly code became the authoritative feature of the Jewish religion.

When we come to the New Testament we find that the hold of sacrifice upon the Jewish mind had again been loosened. The attitude of Jesus towards sacrifice was very similar to that of the prophets. He quotes with approval the saying, I will have mercy and not sacrifice. But it would also appear that he conformed to the contemporary ritual. His ultimate attitude to Jewish ritual is seen in His founding of a new covenant with the implied abolition of the ancient system of worship and its sacrifices. In establishing the new covenant Jesus is repre-

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sented as speaking of His blood being shed for many for the remission of sins. He elsewhere declared that the Son of man came not to be ministered unto, but to minister, and to give His life a ransom for many.

Whilst it is clear that Jesus intended His followers to abandon the traditional sacrifices, it is far from clear what was meant by His own sacrifice. It is also impossible to tell what was the precise significance of sacrifice to contemporary thought. Neither Christ's teaching nor practice would lead us to conclude that the salvation of the sinner depended upon His sufferings and death. As we have seen, His attitude towards the sinner was one of gentleness, His message one of forgiveness. He called upon men to repent and have confidence in God, and nowhere taught that the temple sacrifices had a temporary efficacy until His own efficacious offering had been made.

It is in the writings of the apostles that we must look for the fullest statements of Christ's death as a literal objective sacrifice. Forever estranged from the ecclesiastical authorities at Jerusalem by the crucifixion of their Master the apostles were confronted by the task of proclaiming and explaining a new religion to the world. They had been trained to observe the ritual of the priestly code. But the time was ripe for a change in religious conceptions. Sacrificial worship was being slowly undermined by many influences. The shambles and the sanctuary must have been felt to be incongruous as æsthetic feeling developed. The noble conceptions of God, taught by the greatest Jewish teachers as well as those contained in Greek philosophy, must have made burnt offerings seem incongruous when presented to a spiritual deity. On the other hand, idolatry and sacrificial worship prevailed in every contemporary religion. A religion with no external ground of approach to God would have been inconceivable. Certainly a missionary religion, such as Christianity, which sought to win men of every nation and clime, of every rank and condition, must have objective elements or be doomed to failure. The necessities of the time determined the form of Christian doctrine. The necessity was not only in their contemporaries, it was shared by the apostles themselves. Objective elements were necessary to

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their faith, and yet they were sufficiently possessed by the spirit of Jesus as to rise above the crude, coarse objectivity in which prevailing worship found expression. Their doctrine of the cross, interpreted as a literal, objective sacrifice, may have seemed to some Greeks foolishness, but it would come as a welcome intellectual relief to many who were weary of obsolescent ritual but were not ready for an entirely spiritual religion. That the doctrine of the cross was a great advance towards a spiritual religion finds striking confirmation throughout Christian history since apostolic times.

"In Christian as in pre-Christian temples, clouds of incense rise as of old. Above all, though the ceremony of sacrifice did not form an original part of Christian worship, its prominent place in the ritual was obtained in early centuries. In that Christianity was recruited among nations to whom the conception of sacrifice was among the deepest of religious ideas, and the ceremony of sacrifice among the sincerest efforts of worship, there arose an observance suited to supply the vacant place. This result was obtained not by new introduction but by transmutation. The solemn eucharistic meal of the primitive Christians in time assumed the name of the sacrifice of the mass, and was adapted to a ceremonial in which an offering of food and drink is set out by a priest on an altar in a temple, and consumed by priest and worshipers. The natural conclusion of an ethnographic survey of sacrifice, is to point to the controversy between Protestants and Catholics, for centuries past one of the keenest which have divided the Christian world, on this express question whether sacrifice is or is not a Christian rite." [1]

To return to the New Testament. It would be a mistake to suppose that the writers were unanimous in their teaching on the atonement. St. Paul taught that sin is punishable with death, but that Christ, representing the race, exchanged parts with man and by his death satisfied Divine justice. Therefore, the old order under which sin in the flesh held our nobler life in bondage would gradually pass away and a new Humanity would appear.

[1] "Primitive Culture," Tylor, vol. ii, p. 409.

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In the Epistle to the Hebrews another view is presented. It is the idea of a perfect obedience manifested in the whole life and ministry of Jesus; which obedience unto death brought humanity into a new relation to God and constituted an offering with which He was well pleased. "The idea of a chastisement falling by substitution upon Him, the idea of the innocent enduring the sufferings merited by the guilty, is wholly absent from the Epistle to Hebrews, because it is entirely foreign to the Levitical ritual which the Christian writer adopts and scrupulously follows. . . . If the Epistle to Hebrews alludes to the sufferings endured by Christ on earth they are only considered as serving to perfect Him in obedience and holiness, and to make Him feel compassion for our own trials; but they are never taken into account to explain the expiatory virtue of His sacrifice." [2]

In the fourth gospel the moral view of the atonement is accentuated. "I have many things to say and to judge of you: but He that sent me is true; and I speak to the world those things which I have heard of Him. They understood not that He spake to them of the Father. Then said Jesus unto them, When ye have lifted up the Son of man, then shall ye know that I am He, and that I do nothing of myself; but as my Father hath taught me, I speak these things" (John viii, 26-28). "Pilate therefore said unto Him, Art thou a king then? Jesus answered, Thou sayest that I am a king. To this end was I born, and for this cause came I into the world, that I should bear witness unto the truth. Every one that is of the truth heareth my voice" (ibid., xviii, 37). "And I, if I be lifted up from the earth, will draw all men unto me" (ibid., xii, 32). It is true that the same gospel contains the Baptist's testimony: "Behold the Lamb of God which taketh away the sin of the world" (ibid., i, 29). It is difficult, however, to reconcile such a passage with those in which Jesus is represented as declaring His mission to be that of a witness to the truth whose testimony is sealed by his death.

This divergence of view in the New Testament as to what

[2] "The Atonement and Modern Culture," Auguste Sabatier, p. 52.

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constitutes the atonement is most instructive. It points to the conclusion that the writers felt free to interpret the meaning of Christ's work by institutions and ideas which lay close to their hands, and by the exercise of this freedom were led to results which involve conflicting theories of the atonement. Is not a feeling of the New Testament differences as to what constitutes the atonement reflected in the fact that "no church has made belief in any particular theory of the atonement an article of faith"? Theologians in succeeding ages have formulated different theories which upon examination reveal the influence of contemporary thought and practice. Just as in New Testament times various theories of sacrifice influenced the development of the doctrine, so conceptions derived from Feudalism, Jurisprudence, Chivalry, and Honor have determined its further growth. It cannot be otherwise in our time. The great advances in religious thought have always had their rise in truer conceptions of God. The symbol of the cross represented a great advance to an age that had begun to feel that animal sacrifices were incongruous offerings to a spiritual God. But even in that age when the cross symbolized the sacrifice for sin, there underlay the teaching the ideas of Jewish Deism and Greek Dualism, God was regarded as a Being external to His world; but an idea of the true relation between man and God is shown in the thought that the distance between them was due on the one hand to God's holiness and on the other to man's sinfulness, hence the yearning for reconciliation and the resort to methods of atonement. This sense of alienation has always been the strength of theories of the atonement, and to ignore it is to do injustice to the profoundest element in the religious life of to-day. The failure of the traditional doctrine lies not in its emphasis on the sense of sin and consequent alienation from God, but in its pre-supposition as to the nature of God. Conceiving of God as standing high above human life it is driven to represent the atonement as a transaction between two wills externally related to each other. To this view God is a Judge, a Ruler, a Visitor to the earth at stated times, to certain places. This view also prevents the recognition of sin not only as a break with the natural order

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but as a stage in the process by which man attains to self-consciousness and self-realization. Instead of being an act which must be externally atoned for, sin is a sense of condemnation of our lower self. But sin is not negative merely, it has another aspect which may be described as a dying to live: a process by which the will becomes conscious of reconciliation with its own divine and infinite nature as a partaker of the Divine Life. The suffering involved in dying to live is symbolized by the cross of Christ. Freed from all suggestion of externality the cross is seen to be the manifestation of complete surrender to the highest within man. It represents a stage in the process by which man passes from alienation and consequent despair to the divine source of strength in which he lives and moves and has his being. The spiritual struggle that culminated in the cross called forth all the powers of lower ideals and revealed their impotence by the completeness of Christ's self-sacrifice. It revealed the divinity of humanity. It showed how high the spirit within man can rise, and has done more to convince men of sin and lead them to forsake it than any other event in human history. This interpretation is made possible by what may be termed the modern movement. The influence of modern science, philosophy, poetry, has been most marked upon our religious beliefs. It is not that modern conceptions destroy what Christianity gave us, but that the deeper elements in Christianity are made more intelligible. Modern thought is enabling us to apprehend the pure, spiritual conception of God taught by Jesus, a conception containing principles of criticism before which all externals in religion were and are bound to pass. "This idea of the immanence of God underlies the Christian conception; and if we look below the surface we can see that it is an idea involved in all modern philosophy and theology. We may reject religion or we may accept it, but we cannot accept it except in this form; and even where we reject it, the ground of our rejection will generally lie in the difficulties that seem to exist in *this* form of it." [3]

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[3] "Evolution of Religion," E. Caird, vol i, p. 196.

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BOOK REVIEWS.

SHAKESPEAREAN TRAGEDY: LECTURES ON HAMLET, OTHELLO, KING LEAR, MACBETH. By A. C. Bradley, LL.D., Litt. D., Professor of Poetry in the University of Oxford. London: Macmillan & Co.

Mr. Bradley describes accurately in the opening sentences of his lectures the aim which he set before himself. It is "to apprehend the action and some of the personages of each of the four principal tragedies of Shakespeare with a somewhat greater truth and certainty, so that they may assume in our imaginations a shape a little less unlike the shape they wore in the imagination of their creator." He does not deny the uses of scholarship for this purpose. But he does not consider them so indispensable for his object as "that close familiarity with the plays, that native strength and justice of perception, and that habit of reading with an eager mind, which make many an unscholarly lover of Shakespeare a far better critic than many a Shakespeare scholar."

These words, in a general way, describe the qualities which Mr. Bradley himself has brought to his task, as well as those upon which he relies in his reader. For amongst several deep impressions which the book leaves, is that of a close, long, loving intimacy with the mind of Shakespeare: an intimacy so close, so devoted, so full of sympathetic insight, that Mr. Bradley seems to have become sensitive to all the movements of the poet's spirit. One cannot say that nothing has been missed; it probably requires a Shakespeare to interpret a Shakespeare. But there has been little missed which another critic can point out as significant; certainly no whole phase, or entire mood—from the most gentle, sweet, and delicate, to the thunderous roar of the elemental powers at war. And somehow all these moods have all found utterance in his simple, strong, straightforward style.

It is this strong simplicity, this straightforward dealing both with the poet and the reader that I should mark as the greatest quality in a book, which is great in many ways. I have never read a more sincere book. The author has aimed at being simply and merely a medium for the poet's mind. He has sought to be impersonal, transparent—not with the transparency of a passive medium, but with that of a mind which has experienced in itself and lived over again the life and experience of the dramatist.

Theories, of course, a commentator must have; for who can

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explain without a theory? But Mr. Bradley's theories are not made first, and then applied to the facts. They spring from the facts, and they are tested by the facts—tested experimentally, one may say, line by line, throughout the play, just as a scientific man tests his hypothesis. And we are told at once and quite clearly what facts they fail to explain or explain inadequately. The author's sincerity of aim expresses itself in an impersonal dispassionateness that makes his thought objective, as if the facts themselves used his voice for utterance; and makes the author watchful of himself lest at any moment he should be anything other than an instrument for the great musician to play upon. There is an impressive lesson for commentators in Mr. Bradley's very way of working, and quite apart from the results he gains.

It would not be true, however, to say that Mr. Bradley's own predilections do not show themselves. On the contrary one can see the marks of his birth and upbringing. The defects he finds in the theories of other commentators—I mean in those that are not stupid or insane, such as that Hamlet was a woman in love with Horatio, or that he "faked" the ghost in order to oust his innocent uncle from the throne—are uniformly the defects of onesidedness or abstraction. The theories are false not because they do not contain truth, but because they make a partial truth stand for the whole. And his correction of them comes, not by compromise, but by means of some ampler view or deeper principle that leaves room for and combines them all. He moves to his own view through the *truth* of the views of others, testing all alike by the facts. No one who is not ignorant of philosophy will fail to understand at whose feet Mr. Bradley has learned this great and generous and patient method, and no reader of his lectures on Hamlet will fail to recognize how powerful it can be in strong hands.

But his predilections show themselves in other ways: in the choice of the aspect of the poet's work, for instance, in preference to other aspects which Mr. Bradley himself would recognize as necessary for a complete interpretation of the dramas. They show themselves most particularly in the stress he lays upon an element in the plays to which some commentators upon the poets, and even upon dramatic poets, give a somewhat grudging recognition. The æsthetic critic's hair would stand on end if he were told that Mr. Bradley dwells most, and most impressively upon the tragedies as *moral* tragedies; and this were to put the truth

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in a false way. But still it *is* the truth, so far as this,—that no reader can rise from Mr. Bradley's book without the feeling that Shakespeare in placing his great creations upon the tragic stage showed them as torn asunder with the conflict of moral passions. The moral interests seem to overtop all others.

But I confess that I cannot regard this as a defect in Mr. Bradley's interpretation; for the moral element is in the *facts* and at the heart of them. I am not forgetting the difference between a moral treatise and a poem, or even between a "morality play" and a tragedy. I admit that it is obviously true that art is not morality, nor morality art. But it does not follow by any means that these exclude one another. On the contrary they can possess each the other, and possess it completely. And they can do this without any of that obnoxious mingling of art and morals which ruins both. The subject of art is beauty, and nothing else—except perhaps its opposite, namely the ugly. Art ceases when it forgets this; it goes out extinguished when it begins to moralize. Nevertheless it is possible, nay it is the fact, that there is no beauty in this world of ours so marvelous as beauty of soul, no sublimity so terrible as the conflict of right and wrong within the soul, and no theme that gives to the greatest of all the forms of the poetic art so full a scope. The drama is nothing if it be not the representation of living men and women. If it be tragic and worthy of its aim, it represents their life as in the power of contending forces, whether "personal passion or impersonal principle: doubts, desires, scruples, ideas—whatever can animate, shake, possess, and drive a man's soul;" and when we have said this, we have said that the forces are "spiritual forces," and we are looking at the moral world. But we are looking at the moral world as it is imaged in the poet's mind.

But Mr. Bradley has not forgotten that a drama is meant to be acted, or that it is meant to "succeed on the boards." The experiences of the personages of the play are intended, for the time being, to become the experience of those who see and hear. Mr. Bradley has consistently examined the four tragedies from the point of view of the intelligent playgoer. The result is that he brings to view aspects of Shakespeare's art, of his art *as a dramatist*, which are as fresh as they are subtle—subtle not in the sense of being intricate or artificial, but as the beauty of a natural object is subtle, and the more subtle and marvelous the further we press our analysis of it with lancet and lens. Every tone, look, casual phrase, ex-

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clamation, seems to be brought before us with a meaning; so that we can recognize Shakespeare's characters, as we can recognize our friends, not merely by their larger moods and most constant purposes, but by trifles, in themselves as light as air.

Mr. Bradley's attention to this, the acting aspect of the drama, has led him to give his readers a chapter on "Construction in Shakespeare's Tragedies." The English reader has, as a rule, paid little attention to this matter, and he will find this chapter full of suggestions of things new. Mr. Bradley points out the alternation of scenes of low and high tension from the spectators' point of view; the rise, the growth, the crisis, the decay and the solution of the tragic situation; the interplay of main and subordinate plot, of prose and verse, pathos and humor, terror and comedy. And there comes into view something not only of the inspired genius of Shakespeare but of his technical skill and of his care, when at his best, for things apparently little. We also see his inconsistencies, which of them matter and which of them do not, and even his carelessnesses; and we conclude with regard to them that "nine-tenths of Shakespeare's defects are not the errors of an inspired genius, ignorant of art, but the sins of a great but negligent artist."

Critics will probably find this chapter less convincing than any other in the book; and in doing so they would be partly just and partly unjust to Mr. Bradley. They would be just in thinking that no analysis of this kind will give the actual process of the production of the drama. Anatomy cannot give us back the living thing; and the instinct, even of genius, ceases to be instinctive when analyzed into tangible purposes. But they would be unjust in thinking that the instinct of genius has no laws or methods, or that we cannot gain by attempting to discover them. The fact is that the very attempt to represent the machinery of the method of a great artist has something contradictory in it. It *must* be inadequate; and the inadequacy brings falsehood. It is so in the case of Shakespeare, and Mr. Bradley is perfectly aware of it. "Where his power or art is fully exerted it really does resemble that of nature. It organizes and vitalizes its product from the centre outward to the minutest markings on the surface, so that when you turn upon it the most searching light you can command, when you dissect it and apply to it the test of a microscope, still you find in it nothing formless, general or vague, but everywhere structure, character, individuality." Science and its appli-

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ances must fail in such a case; and yet who would wish to forego their help?

From this same point of view of the spectator of the dramatic performance, Mr. Bradley deals in great part with "King Lear." He regards this drama as "Shakespeare's greatest achievement," and yet he considers it "not his best play." But in discussing this distinction Mr. Bradley finds himself free and in a large space; and his writing is wonderful. Here he finds scenes that "make words helpless," "such poetry as cannot be transferred to the space behind the foot-lights, but has its being only in the imagination." (P. 270.) "For imagination the explosions of Lear's passion, and the bursts of rain and thunder, are not, what for the senses they must be, two things, but manifestations of one thing. It is the powers of the tormented soul that we hear and see in the 'groans of roaring wind and rain' and the 'sheets of fire;' and they that, at intervals almost more overwhelming, sink back into darkness and silence. Nor yet is even this all; but, as those incessant references to wolf and tiger make us see humanity 'reeling back into the beast' and ravening against itself, so in the storm we seem to see nature herself convulsed by the same horrible passions; the 'common mother,'

> "'Whose womb immeasurable and infinite breast
> Teems and feeds all,'

turning on her children, to complete the ruin they have wrought upon themselves."

To endeavor to give the results which Mr. Bradley reaches by the method, and from the points of view I have tried to describe, is worse than useless. They are the outcome of a process which the reader must follow himself, and which he cannot follow without feeling that he is being brought nearer at each step to the centre of Shakespeare's mind. Let him notice, for instance, how the exposition of the "*substance of Shakespearean tragedy*" does this, or the gradual development of the character of Hamlet—perhaps the greatest piece of constructive work in the book—culminating in making this drama the "tragedy of moral idealism."

And yet Mr. Bradley can give us a character in a phrase or two, and move along the trackless path of the immediate insight of intuition, as well as that of philosophic analysis and reconstruction.

"The Queen in Hamlet was not a bad-hearted woman, not at

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all the woman to think little of murder. But she had a soft animal nature, and was very dull and very shallow. She loved to be happy, like a sheep in the sun; and, to do her justice, it pleased her to see others happy, like more sheep in the sun."

Or take this quite preliminary and preparatory hint of Othello's character, by which Mr. Bradley places the reader at the true point of view and creates in him the fitting mood of mind. "There is in most of the later heroes something colossal, something which reminds us of Michael Angelo's figures. They are not merely exceptional men, they are huge men; as it were, survivors of the heroic age living in a later and smaller world. . . . Othello is the first of these men, a being essentially large and grand, towering above his fellows, holding a volume of force which in repose ensures preeminence without an effort, and in commotion reminds us rather of the fury of the elements than of the tumult of common passion."

The same gift appears in Mr. Bradley's rendering of that impalpable and yet most real and important fact which we call "the atmosphere" of a play. Contrasting Othello with King Lear, he says, "From the moment when the temptation of the hero begins, the reader's heart and mind are held in a vice, experiencing the extremes of pity and fear, sympathy and repulsion, sickening hope and dreadful expectation. Evil is displayed before him, not indeed with the profusion found in 'King Lear,' but forming, as it were, the soul of a single character, and united with an intellectual superiority so great that he watches its advance fascinated and appalled. He sees it, in itself almost irresistible, aided at every step by fortunate accidents and the innocent mistakes of its victims. He seems to breathe an atmosphere as fateful as that of 'King Lear,' but more confined and oppressive, the darkness not of night, but of a close-shut, murderous room."

Later on, in illustration of the imperfections of "King Lear" as an acting play, he says:

"But (not to speak of defects due to mere carelessness) that which makes the *peculiar* greatness of 'King Lear'—the immense scope of the work; the mass and variety of intense experience which it contains; the interpretations of sublime imagination, piercing pathos, and humor almost as moving as the pathos; the vastness of the convulsion both of nature and of human passion; the vagueness of the scene in which the action takes place, and of the movements of the figures which cross this scene; the strange atmosphere, cold and dark, which strikes on us as we enter this

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scene, enfolding these figures and magnifying their dim outlines like a winter mist; the half-realized suggestions of vast universal powers working in the area of individual fates and passions—all this interferes with dramatic clearness even when the play is read, and in the theatre not only refuses to reveal itself fully through the senses, but seems to be almost in contradiction with their reports."

It would be interesting to place alongside of such passages as these, which indicate Mr. Bradley's sense of the scope and magnitude of human life, other passages in which there appears not less clearly his sense of its complexity and subtlety. He is sensitive to the "small touches which at the moment may be little noticed, but still leave their mark on the imagination." Then, too, he realizes the extraordinary inconsequence and apparent contradictoriness of human character: how in the same man there may dwell attributes that are not only different but opposite and apparently incompatible. A commentator has indeed to be a bold and strong swimmer in these strange waters of the human soul, who finds "Iago better than his creed," or who relates his "egoism" to his "social conscience."

"This book," says a great scholar who is himself a poet and dramatist, "will be a source not only of pleasure but of lasting happiness for those who can exercise the completer thought that brings the remedy to the thought that destroys a good thing. For it surely is a lasting happiness to be led deeper into the mind of a great poet in his greatest moments." The analysis which dissects here goes hand in hand with the imaginative intuition which reconstructs, and poetry and philosophy combine in the interpretation of the tragedies. The book is worthy of its theme; and it will carry the reader deep into the mind of Shakespeare—deeper, I believe, than that of any other commentator.

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IDEALS OF SCIENCE AND FAITH. Essays by various authors. Edited by Rev. J. E. Hand. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1904. Pp. xix, 333.

This interesting volume is put forward as a proclamation of peace after the long warfare between science and faith. What led the editor to collect the several papers that constitute it was the belief that there are many ideals common to scientist and theo-

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logian, that these common ideals are precisely the ones which the nobler spirits in both camps care most about, and that a clearer definition of the aims and ideals of science and religion will help to restore harmony and substitute coöperation for conflict.

The approach to a common ground is described by ten different writers, six of them speaking from the standpoint of science, four from that of faith. Sir Oliver Lodge describes "A Physicist's Approach"; Professor J. Arthur Thomson and Professor Patrick Geddes, "A Biological Approach"; Professor J. H. Muirhead, "A Psychological Approach"; Mr. Victor V. Branford, "A Sociological Approach"; Hon. Bertrand Russell, "An Ethical Approach"; and Professor Patrick Geddes, "An Educational Approach." And, from the side of faith, the Rev. John Kelman describes "A Presbyterian Approach"; the Rev. Ronald Bayne, "A Church of England Approach"; Mr. Wilfred Ward, "A Church of Rome Approach," while the Rev. Philip Napier Waggett's contribution bears the somewhat misleading title: "The Church as Seen from the Outside." His contribution is, in fact, an exposition of the *inside* view of the church, prefaced by the claim that one who views the church from the outside is not really viewing *the church* unless he takes the inside view.

The essays were written independently of one another, and from as many points of view as there are writers; so it would be too much to expect any organic unity in the work, or any close agreement between the different writers as to the common ground. It is, however, a significant evidence not only of a growing toleration on both sides but also of an earnest desire for some better mutual understanding, that such men can meet in friendliness between the covers of a single book, each undertaking to present the larger bearings of the problem in his special field. And yet the results reached by the several writers are not only different; they are, some of them, in irreconcilable conflict. It is, and should be, a war to the death between them. The editor's optimism seems hardly justified in the results; the proclamation of peace is at best a temporary, and perhaps not wholly wise, armistice. One cannot refrain from quoting in this connection the words of the Rev. Ronald Bayne (used by him in reference to differences among Christians): "But what is the moral value to us of our toleration? It may mean, it very largely does mean, merely that we think more of comfort and less of duty than our forefathers did. Cruelty is a detestable vice; but pain is not the worst evil;

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and if we have left off burning each other only or mainly because it hurts, we are not therefore stronger or braver. Softness, not holiness, is our achievement" (p. 263).

Sir Oliver Lodge, after noting the apparently irrepressible conflict between science and faith, suggests that possibly philosophical idealism might solve the difficulty were it not for the unfortunate fact that philosophy is merely poetry. One thing, however, he holds to be certain: influences from the spiritual realm, if they act ever, act now. Telepathy and similar phenomena seem to imply such action now. And all facts must be included in reality, the so-called spiritual, and the vital which refuse to be reduced to the physical, quite as legitimately as the physical. Science cannot, in the very nature of the case, negative the beliefs which are the foundation of religion. Men of religion are beyond the pale of science but inside the universe of fact, and "so long as this region is ignored dogmatic science should be silent" (p. 37). The view that he reaches, as faintly hinted by science, is a sort of anthropomorphic pantheism tolerant of faith rather than of the theologian. It is the saint and the prophet that humanity trusts rather than the theologian (p. 35). They and their experiences are facts, whatever be the fate of the theologian's logic, and, that being the case, "the region of religion and the region of a completer science are one" (p. 48).

The conclusions reached by Professors Thomson and Geddes in their most interesting paper on the "Biological Approach," may also be characterized as, in the main, a hopeful negative. The bulk of this paper is devoted to a consideration of "some biological problems the provisional solutions of which tend to be at variance with theological doctrines." *Biological analysis,* it is true, "works and must work in a direction the very opposite of that of theological interpretation." Yet even if this analysis were complete it would not reduce all to the level of dead matter, but would rather indicate that there is no such thing as "dead matter" anywhere (p. 53 ff). The biological view of *heredity* does not, as is sometimes supposed, commit one to fatalism, for "each living creature is born a new creature—an individuality." "Some freedom is born with it just because it is something new." And we must not overlook the fact that "there is variation as well as continuity" (pp. 59, 60). The *evolution theory* is not necessarily at variance with a religious interpretation of experience, for "the process reads like a story of growth, like the working out of a big

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idea" (p. 64). *The biological doctrine of man,* making him simply "part and parcel with the rest of creation," is admitted to present grave difficulties. But if the theologian, instead of repeating the phraseology of the past, will only restate his doctrine of man in the idiom of our own time, there is room for hope that harmony may be restored even here. And as for the *ethical aspect* of biological science, there is no such conflict as Huxley supposed to exist, for it is possible, within the limits of science, to view nature as a "materialized ethical process."

The upshot of the matter is that the divergence is "needlessly exaggerated by forgetting essential differences in aims and methods, 'faith' and 'science' being expressions of quite distinct moods" (p. 73). Yet it is idle, the authors hold, to pretend that the biological doctrine of man squares with its theological analogue. And, moreover, the differences are partly due to a disagreement in regard to the "facts of the case." "At present there are a number of conclusions on both sides which cannot be hurriedly abandoned, which cannot, however, be mutually accepted. There is no use crying 'peace, peace,' when there is no peace" (p. 74). Something, however, the authors think may be done toward reaching the desired higher synthesis by recognizing "what is common in the ideals at least of the two outlooks": *Intellectually,* the biologist is striving to establish inductively the "Unity of Nature," and is thus "approaching one aspect of the theologian's idea of God." *Emotionally,* the general result and ideal of biology is to deepen our wonder in the world, our love of beauty, our joy in living," and thus we approach another aspect of the theologian's idea of God. *Practically,* biology reveals possibilities of betterment, of saving, strengthening, and regenerating men, and thus approaches a third aspect of the theologian's idea of God (pp. 75 ff). The paper closes with the suggestion that the "development of the theologian, and of theology itself, may be recognized as the continual endeavor to express and symbolize, for the individual and for the race, the mystery, the process, the ecstasy, the agony, the progress, and the ideals of life." The end, after all, is action, life; and when the theologian, become again at once symbolist and thinker, can offer biology the interpretation of life, biology must again become the handmaid of religion (p. 80).

Professor Muirhead, in his discussion of the "Psychological Approach," contributes an admirably lucid and condensed state-

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ment of the present attitude of psychology with regard to the relation of mind and matter, and the limited application of mechanical principles of interpretation. Modern developments of psychology show that the door is open to a more spiritual view of the world than, a generation ago, seemed possible, and removes "the difficulty that comes from the opposition of the physical and the mental, and from the apparent secondariness of the latter in the order of creation" (p. 101).

Mr. Bertrand Russell's discussion of the "Ethical Approach" presents the sharpest contrast with the somewhat facile optimism of the preceding papers. His view, put forth with exceptional brilliancy, is sombre and paradoxical. The universe, according to him, cares nothing for man's hopes and fears. "That man is the product of causes which had no prevision of the end they were achieving; that his origin, his growth, his hopes and fears, his loves and his beliefs, are but the outcome of accidental collocations of atoms; that no fire, no heroism, no intensity of thought and feeling, can preserve an individual life beyond the grave; that all the labors of the ages, all the devotion, all the inspiration, all the noonday brightness of human genius, are destined to extinction in the vast death of the solar system, and that the whole temple of man's achievement must inevitably be buried beneath the *débris* of a universe in ruins—all these things, if not quite beyond dispute, are yet so nearly certain, that no philosophy which rejects them can hope to stand. Only within the scaffolding of these truths, only on the firm foundation of unyielding despair, can the soul's habitation henceforth be safely built" (pp. 158, 159). Our ideals of truth, beauty, and perfection do not meet with the approval of the unconscious universe. Fact and ideal are in hopeless opposition. Man's life is brief and powerless, a long march through the night, whereas, "blind to good and evil, reckless of destruction, omnipotent matter rolls on its relentless way" (p. 169). Surely we had a right to expect from one who knows as well as Mr. Russell does how science is made something better than this outburst of dogmatic materialism in the name of science. However, it is on this very platform of despair that religion, according to Mr. Russell, emerges with the "great renunciation." Submit to the power that is omnipotent, cast off the load of eager and fretful desires, yield up the self, and lo! the stoic freedom of the mind is yours, the forces of fate are conquered, and your brief day may be brightened while it lasts by the unconquerable vision of lofty

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thoughts. Mr. Russell's view is a sort of idealization of Nietsche. The *Uebermensch* is not a physical but an intellectual Titan who from the free and cold mountain tops of contemplation views the supreme tragedy that nature presents with calm enjoyment and dæmonic aloofness. The god of such a religion is frankly a man-made god, and, moreover, it is a god fashioned rather in the epicurean than the stoic likeness,—considering its ineffectualness in this "petty planet on which our bodies impotently crawl," and in the material and unconscious universe generally. And, in truth, lacking the stoic's *Logos*, Mr. Russell's intellectual stoicism is left without any logical foundation, the mere illogical reaction of an individual temperament confronting a desperate situation.

Professor Patrick Geddes' discussion of the "Educational Approach" defends the thesis that technical education tends to develop the homely virtues that constitute the substance of the ethical code of all religions; and that, in the liberal education, if the advocates of the " new" and the "old," free school and church school, would each eliminate the "dry rot" in their teaching, the vital remnants might unite and form a better system of education in which the claims of science would be respected and those of religion would not be ignored.

As to Mr. Branford's paper on the "Sociological Approach," the present reviewer must confess that he found it too diagrammatic to be clear; and he is unable to see how it can contribute to bring science and faith together except in a most formal and external manner.

Coming to the theologians, the Rev. John Kelman, speaking for the Presbyterians, contents himself with showing that where Presbyterians in former days have been in collision with science the hostility has been due to a misunderstanding. The only warfare is that between reason and superstition. For the rest, science, he holds, like religion, rests ultimately upon faith. The thought of the uniformity of nature which science demands finds its basis in the belief in the "absolute dependence of all things upon God both for their origin and in their endurance" (p. 224). Tracing in briefest outline the course of Presbyterianism from Calvin to the higher critics, he finds in "Presbyterian faith the basal principle of all true science—the demand for unity and order, and the assertion of the rights of intellect" (p. 245).

One may, indeed, ask for further argument than this essay offers in support of these positions somewhat dogmatically af-

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firmed, and one could wish that the author had undertaken to show how the intellect reaches a rational theology of more positive content than that which is contained in the above meagre statement of the common bond between science and faith; but we are still within the limits of the general discussion, as its purpose is defined by the editor in his preface. Theologian and scientist are endeavoring to get together. But in passing to the remaining three articles in this volume we enter an entirely different atmosphere. These papers are characterized by a certain complacent deafness to the din of the battle. The writers simply take for granted all those religious beliefs which modern scientific deliverances make difficult of acceptance. They have "different data," a "richer experience," and seem to think that when ideals of faith are being considered the appearance of doubts and difficulties suggested by science is an irrelevant intrusion, as well as a tiresome nuisance (cf. pp. 273 ff).[1] In this respect the scientists make a better showing for candor than the theologians. It may be true that there are certain facts of religious experience which lie outside the pale of any and every science, and which compel a final religious interpretation of the world. We have found the scientists in this work admitting as much. But if this is true it would be more to the point, in such a symposium as this, to show that the ideals of faith grounded in these religious facts give a view of reality which is not in opposition to the actual results and valid ideals of science—though it may well enough be in hopeless opposition to certain current scientific dogmas, and to certain popular, but over-hasty generalizations of scientific conclusions. We should like to have these theologians describe the ideals of faith, having explicitly in view such troublesome and disturbing conclusions of modern science as, for example, those referred to in the present volume by Mr. Russell, and by Professors Thomson and Geddes. When, instead of this, such difficulties are lightly brushed aside by the treacherous doctrine of the incommensurability of spiritual and natural truth, have we not, with thin disguise, merely a revival of the doctrine of "two truths" on which the mediæval church went to shipwreck?

The last three papers are written by, and for, those who are

[1] This position is most definitely stated in the paper contributed by the Rev. Mr. Waggett, but it is clearly implied in the discussion of the Rev. Mr. Bayne, and, though less fundamentally, in that of Mr. Ward.

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untroubled by the recent trend of science, whose belief in the reality of spirit is by nature bomb-proof, and who are, moreover, "in the particular condition of obedience, of conversion." And we cannot see how they justify the editor's hope that this volume will show that the ideals common to scientist and theologian are precisely the ideals which the nobler spirits in both camps care most about. These writers are rather concerned in showing that, and how, the Christian ideal involves Christian unity. All three agree that the Christian is *ipso facto* Churchman; that the church is not a mere piece of machinery in itself unessential, but is rather part of the essence of the gospel. It is needless to add that writers of such ability do not confuse "the Church" with any mere outward embodiment of form and ceremonial. They mean the spiritual organism, the kingdom of God, the "holy catholic Church." But they differ among themselves as to the relation of the Church of England and the Church of Rome to this spiritual kingdom.

The Rev. Ronald Bayne especially deprecates the civil war of religions. The one fatal error of the non-conformist is his desertion of mother church, and his establishment of the so-called free churches. "When the spiritual tide of national life is low," he writes, "the national church will find her schools of thought and temperament inclined to fall apart, and to split into 'free' churches, each trying to isolate itself and refusing to add to its own stature by the hearty vitality of its union with the whole body." His paper is a plea for a national church, and for a return to the Elizabethan ideal where church and state are one, and where spiritual religion controls the forms of political life.

Mr. Wilfred Ward regards the Roman Church as the appointed depositary and jealous guardian of the ideals of faith, and holds that it serves a beneficent purpose in being "a drag upon scientific advance"; it thus prevents over-great hastiness in the reconstruction of one's views of the universe on the basis of a science with religion left out; while, at the same time, it gradually assimilates the assured results of science.

But it is not conceivable that the ideal of religious unity in the bond of a genuine spiritual organism may be upheld in a broader and more truly catholic spirit than that in which these writers conceive their churchmanship? Underneath their efforts lies the ineradicable belief that complete rationalism is anti-religious. There is no hope of bringing into harmony the ideals

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of science and faith as long as miraculism is interposed as a barrier to create the doctrine of "two truths." What is needed is a fearless return on the part of our religious teachers to the point of view that made the true theology one with the true philosophy. And then, in order to meet the modern situation and effect the genuine synthesis desired, there is further need of the master mind of another St. Thomas, who, without mistaking for facts of religious experience the reputed happenings of a particular religious tradition, shall restate, and in the idiom of our day, the ideals of faith.

CHARLES M. BAKEWELL.

YALE UNIVERSITY.

THE PRINCIPLES OF EDUCATION. By T. Raymont, M. A., Professor of Education in the University College of South. Wales and Monmouthshire, Cardiff, London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1904.

Professor Raymont has given us what is, within its limits, a valuable and very useful book. Those limits would be better indicated by the title "Principles of *School* Education." For it is with the actual work of the school that the whole book deals. "The teacher" is, says Mr. Raymont, "the typical educator." To this we do not yield unqualified assent, and we fear such a limitation is likely to encourage that identification of education with schooling which is none the less mischievous for being common. It is mischievous in that it obscures, even if it does not deny, the essentially educative functions of the family, the church, and the community as a whole. However, in dealing with the work of the school Mr. Raymont is decidedly helpful. The main quality of his book we should describe as common-sense. There is a refreshing absence of gush, of fads, and of uncritical laudation of the novel and fashionable.

After introductory chapters on the aim of education, its machinery, and the nature of the development of the young, Mr. Raymont devotes the larger part of his book to teaching, and discourses on the choice of subjects, methods, procedure, and school organization. He then ends with a briefer treatment of what is commonly denoted by "discipline."

Of course, when so wide a range of subject-matter is covered, there is little room for any profound discussion of ultimate principles, and, equally, of course, there are points of detail

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in which the author cannot expect to win universal assent. But we find singularly little with which we profoundly disagree, and the judicial attitude of mind in which Mr. Raymont discusses his topics is itself a training of no small value to the young and inexperienced teachers for whom he primarily writes.

Mr. Raymont rejects that main thesis of the Herbartians that will is an oftshoot from the "circle of thought" (pp. 232-3), yet he has been, we think, unduly influenced by Herbart. He seems to us to regard the "Formal Steps" as of greater value and of more general application than we believe to be the case; he takes up a somewhat extreme position of antagonism to "formal" studies; and he accepts the Herbartian dictum that the formation of character is the "ultimate aim of education." Now, of course, much depends on the sense of the term "ultimate"; but if it means that every educative means is to be judged by its direct effect on character then it seems to us that either "character" and "morality" are so stretched in application that they cease to have any distinctive meaning, or else that the function of education is unduly contracted. On page 116, Mr. Raymont says, "Viewed objectively, the aim of teaching is to bring the child into helpful relation with that environment amid which his life is to be lived, his character to mature, and his work to be done," and it seems to us that this is a more satisfactory statement of the aim, not of teaching merely but, of education in its widest sense than that which selects one of these relations, albeit the most important, as "ultimate." Modern thinkers have too often tended to regard education from too individualistic a standpoint, and this holding up of character as the goal fails to avoid that pitfall.

With much that Mr. Raymont says on "formal" studies and mental "discipline" we agree. But we think he takes too extreme a view, for he would apparently banish such subjects altogether except in so far as the value of their content demands their inclusion. "The so-called formal studies must, like the others, stand or fall on the merits of the ideas they contain" (p. 108). Now it may granted that no subject which is destitute of ideas valuable for some life purpose should be taught; yet does it not remain true that some subjects should be chosen mainly because of the training in certain mental processes they give to pupils at certain stages of advancement? Is not the value of the process analogous to that of finding a definition which

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Mr. Raymont quotes with approval from the late Professor H. Sidgwick (p. 4)? In much of this current controversy about mental training it seems to us that the formation of general habits of concentration, exact statement, and rigid reasoning is lost sight of, and that it is this which is true in the claims urged for those formal studies which are comparatively empty of attractive ideas.

But we do not wish our notice of Mr. Raymont's work to be filled with points on which we do not altogether agree with him, and which, indeed, occupy but a small portion of his book. On the whole we cordially commend it as a sane and straightforward account of the *axiomata media* of school work.

J. WELTON.

THE UNIVERSITY, LEEDS, ENGLAND.

POSITIVISCHE BEGRÜNDUNG DES PHILOSOPHISCHEN STRAFRECHTS. By Bruno Stern. Berlin: Hermann Walther Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1905. Pp. 97.

This work contains much of interest to ethical readers. The author's aim is to effect a reconciliation, in the sphere of penal law, between the historic school of right and speculative philosophy. His work belongs to the realm of philosophy, taken in the positive scientific sense which, in rejection of all metaphysics, founds on experience. German-wise, it begins with an excellent paper on the universal basis or foundation of penal law. It touches first on the work of Lombroso, head of the Italian positivistic school of penal law, whose method was, by anatomical, physiological, and psychologic data, inductively to explain the appearance of crime. The service of Lombroso to the science of criminal investigation, as having set it on the path of empiric method, is acknowledged, while his theoretic positions are held to have been overpassed. They were too narrowly taken, and did not expand to take a really empiric view of philosophical problems.

The second great influence to which Herr Stern attributes the introduction of positive moments in the science of penal law was the comprehensive work of H. Gross. Our author thinks the positive inquiry advocated in this work was furthered by Kant's critical idealism much more than by the positivism of Comte. With Kant, setting out from psychic occurrences to reach the conclusions of "Kritizismus," he connects Du Bois-Reymond, as having reached the same goal, with the material problems of

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natural science as his starting point. Later, La Mettrie is mentioned as having already recognized the double impossibility of knowing the essence of matter and of consciousness, and, in the same line of intellectual descent, Haeckel and Strauss. The author concludes that any dogmatic or speculative philosophy must overstep the limits of science, in respect of these matters, and land us in the dreaded sphere of the transcendent. And so he falls back upon his positivistic foundation for universal penal law.

He takes the Historic School of the Science of Right, as represented by Hugo and Savigny, to have been of great influence and significance, but touches on grounds of opposition offered to it by Bruns, Geyer, and others. Here, as earlier, the ethical relations of the matters discussed are distinctly kept in view, ethics being frankly taken by Stern as positive science, shaped after natural science methods. Ethics he regards as an independent science, inductive and genetic in method, free of every religious and metaphysical presupposition, and founded upon evolution and experience. In the gounding of ethics he lays chief stress on the empiric proof of the rise of morality. Thus does he, in his first chapter, lay the general basis for his special treatment of the penal law problem in the chapters that follow. Stern's standpoint is sometimes other, even in leading positions, than that which carries for the present reviewer greatest sympathy, but criticism has been deemed less needful than to give some idea of the clearness, scope, and powers of the author.

Chapter second is on the essence of crime, which, as proceeding usually from the person of the individual, is contrastive to penalty, whose right and task belong to the social community. A good and interesting chapter it is, dealing with crime as anti-ethical action—action egoistic in opposition to action flowing from moral impulse. Moral crime or anti-ethical action is distinguished from legal crime, which is punishable anti-ethical conduct. Having elucidated crime on its anthropological-social side, the author passes on to deal with the essence of punishment in the third chapter.

There the absolute and relative theories of punishment are first treated, the latter being related to rightful end or purpose to be furthered thereby. The positions of Kant, Hegel, and Herbart, as chief defenders of the absolute theories, are discussed, and the great part played by the relative theories of Feuerbach and others is acknowledged. Among those whose positions are touched

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upon in this connection are Bentham, Krause, Ahrens, Martin, and Welcker. To the two classes of theory already specified must be added theories of union as a third class. But none of these classes can claim the distinction, our author thinks, of having a universally valid natural grounding of philosophical penal law, such as we have foreshadowed in Spinoza, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Fichte, and Beccaria. But we must pass from his discussion of the place here of ethics as positive science, that we may speak of the fourth chapter. It is on the freedom of the will, as significant for the positivistic grounding of philosophical penal law. Stern takes three positions to have obtained as to freedom of the will. First, those who deny it in general, like Spinoza, and make man's action the result of the necessary compulsion of Nature, not of self-determination. But the outer world, says our author rightly, lays no irresistible compulsion upon the soul—a fact which is confirmed by the very possibility of the culture of character. He thinks the denial of freewill must be rejected, shutting out, as it does, all responsibility in the ethical, and corresponding penal law, sense. The second position, that of indeterminism, our author also rejects, because it is a perfectly irregular play of will, free from causal and determinate laws in contradiction to everyday observation and experience. On which one may be allowed to remark that the author must surely know that reasonable indeterminists—his own countryman, Gutberlet, for example—would not at all admit the adequacy or correctness of his account of indeterminism. The third position is that of transcendental freedom—midway between freedom and necessity—as seen in Kant and Schopenhauer. But this also would, in our author's view, exclude all moral and penal law responsibility. Stern goes on to seek an empirically grounded freedom of the will, which he finds first in Herbart and Beneke. But space limits forbid my following him in detail.

The last chapter is on culture and morality in their relations to penal law. The work, as a whole, is ably and interestingly written, and may be recommended to the attention of all specially interested in its problems. There is a useful bibliography at its close.

JAMES LINDSAY.

KILMARNOCK, SCOTLAND.

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DIE REFORM DES STRAFRECHTS UND DIE ETHIK DES CHRISTENTUMS. Von Paul Drews. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1905.

This book is one of a series which aims at winning for liberal Christianity its due share of influence upon German moral ideals and social institutions; and we must welcome such attempts as the present to kindle the interest of a wider public in a subject which is, except by "specialists," little considered, but is, nevertheless, of the utmost social importance. We can praise very heartily the pains which the author has taken to acquaint himself with the best German works on this subject; the acuteness and clearness with which he criticises and chooses, and apportions approval or disapproval; and the spirit of intelligent sympathy and charity displayed on every page of his book. He maintains that existing criminal law shows but little trace of the influence of the higher moral ideals of the ages, in particular of the ideals proper to the Christian religion. Between the older school of German jurists, which maintains the more or less exclusive retention of the notion of vengeance or punishment in the popular sense, and the newer or sociological school, at the head of which stands Franz von Liszt, the author chooses his course with great judgment and discrimination. Adopting in the main the practical conclusions of the new school, as being the more Christian and humane, he avoids its extravagances, and pleads for the recognition of normative moral ideals as against the mere maintenance of existing social institutions; which last is all that many typical advocates of the new doctrines are willing to recognize as the proper purpose of criminal law. From the older school he accepts the principle of punishment, in the proper sense, as a necessary element in our moral consciousness; maintaining, however, that the purpose of punishment should not be opposed to that of improvement and education, but should be regulated by these ends. With great justice he maintains that humane theories of punishment do not stand and fall respectively with the denial and recognition of true moral freedom and responsibility; a contention which is most easily established by the fact that determinists and indeterminists are to be found in both camps.

On one point an Englishman may perhaps speak with some little authority; and that is the enthusiasm which the author shows for solitary confinement as indispensable to the reform of the criminal. This system has for many years prevailed in England

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with the result that well-informed students of prison administration are far from being so completely satisfied with it. The dangers of the opposite method must be recognized and carefully considered; but I can hardly think that solitary confinement will prove to be the final solution of the problem.

W. J. ROBERTS.

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, CARDIFF.

GEISTIGE STRÖMUNGEN DER GEGENWART. Von Rudolf Eucken. Leipzig: Veit und Co.

Judging from this eloquent work by Professor Eucken, of Jena, I should suppose him to be one of the most elevating and inspiring university teachers not only of Germany, but of the whole learned world. He has spent laborious days in communion with the spiritual giants and heroes of the past, and his work breathes a unique comprehensiveness, earnestness, depth, and a certain grandeur which those who have experienced them can never again forget or ignore. A rare combination of humility with conscious choice of high ideals and whole-hearted devotion to them raises this book to a height inexpressibly transcending that of the mere one-sided *Tüchtigkeit* or of intellectual acuteness and minuteness, which characterize the general mass of philosophic literature.

Professor Eucken is known as a historian of philosophy in the highest sense of that term: he combines the faculty of thinking over again the thoughts of great thinkers with a rare sense of the general movement of life and thought during long periods, and of what is everywhere most excellent and important. No part of this work is, in its own way, more charming than his treatment of the history of certain philosophic terms and conceptions, and the philosophic issues which changes in their meanings reflect and exemplify. Yet by this weight of learning often laboriously acquired the author's main purpose is never for a moment obscured or overwhelmed. The standpoint adopted in this work may be briefly described as philosophically religious. Nowhere is the author more at home than in the appreciation of the religious movements and constructions of the past; and no writer feels or makes his author feel more intensely the absence from our modern life of the sense of laboring for common ends which only a religious synthesis can supply. The world presents itself to the author not as a rounded system answering in every part to the categories of an inexorable logic, but as an ever-abiding problem

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which the supra-human spirit in man must continually overcome and transform. A new ethics, a new logic—primarily, indeed, a new ethics—must be the issue of every great spiritual movement; and every such spiritual advance finds its complete expression in a new metaphysics, without which man's inner and outer activities remain aimless and unsatisfying. The affinity of this view with the tendency known in England as pragmatism is at once evident; and Professor Eucken allows that his approximation to this view may be greater than may at first sight appear. He claims, however, that the tendency of current voluntarist philosophy is too psychological and merely human, lacking in recognition of ultimate spiritual values, and in the formulation of the spirit's ultimate demands. True freedom of choice or of will is admirably defended as not only a primary datum of our moral consciousness, but as an essential element in any final view of the world-process. Some important matters are left practically undiscussed, the reader being referred to the author's work, "Der Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion."

Most of the chapters of this book take the form of representations of the conflict between two opposing tendencies, which have more or less continuously divided the thoughts of men, and divide them with peculiarly devastating force at the present time. Naturalistic tendencies, for example, are shown by the author to arise intelligibly out of the increasing preoccupation of man with his outward environment and his increasing mastery over it; but the activities which such theories sanction are aptly described as peripheral, leaving out of account the need for spiritual concentration and conscious mastering activity from within outwards. The situation is only rendered tolerable by the survival, in mutilated and rapidly disappearing form, of the spiritual syntheses of the past.

It is evident that a work conceived on so grand a scale should contain some utterances and express some preferences which must appear to one reader or the other misguided and extravagant. To me at least the glorification of Luther and the statement that the humane and enlightened Erasmus sinks by his side to pigmy proportions is intolerable. Against certain forces which work powerfully in Germany to check moral and spiritual independence the whole book is, however, a protest, and contains many an outspoken and honest warning. The treatment of political movements, particularly of the German social democratic

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movement, is serious and kindly, but somewhat abstract and patronizing, and suggests that Professor Eucken is not quite at home in this field.

But I commend this book with all my heart to all whose ideal of philosophy is that of liberating, elevating, and ennobling discourse, bringing new tidings of great joy to distracted and way-worn humanity.

W. J. ROBERTS.

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, CARDIFF.

LA DOTTRINA DELLE DUE ETICHE DI H. SPENCER. V. Erminio Juvalta. Pavia: Bizzoni, 1904.

This acute, thoughtful, and admirably written work cannot but be gratifying to all who are concerned for the prevalence of clear and accurate thinking on moral questions; and it will afford peculiar satisfaction to those who would fain bestow special attention upon the advance of rational and humane culture in Italy. It is notorious, and not difficult to understand, that the importance of Herbert Spencer is far more amply recognized on the continent than in his own country; and this little book bears gratifying witness to the stimulus imparted to the liberal thought of Italy by the massive work of a great English thinker. This book presents, at first sight, the appearance of a slight academic dissertation; but closer acquaintance shows it to be the work of a mind of singular clearness, long accustomed to systematic meditation on moral questions. In the properly moral or practical sense, we are glad to recognize that this book ranks with the best humane and liberating thought of our age.

Signore Juvalta emphasizes the decisive predominance in Spencer's whole mental career of the moral and political interest; and regards his whole work as the classical expression of the optimism of early English liberalism. As a critical appreciation of Spencer's ethical system, from what is, as near as can be, Spencer's own point of view, this book leaves little to be desired. He adopts the distinction between Absolute and Relative Ethics, suggesting, as better expressing the relation between the two, the terms: Pure and Applied Ethics. That is, the distinction in ethics corresponds to the necessary procedure of every science: first, abstraction and hypothetical deduction, and then, application of the general principles thus obtained to the complex course of events. The notion that a system of scientific ethics can straight-

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way be constructed out of the inchoate and often contradictory codes recognized in existing societies is refuted by the author with convincing force. Equally emphatic and crushing is his repudiation of the attempts which are made, from such diverse points of view, to found ethics on the history of human societies and institutions.

Against Spencer, the author objects that his system of pure ethics is not (1) in fact pure, in the properly scientific sense; and (2) free from notions which are psychologically untenable. I will confine myself to the first point. Justice and sympathy are shown in Spencer's absolute ethics as operating in a society the institutions of which are themselves full of inequality and injustice. Spencer's ideal society is admirably described as "an unjust society of perfectly sympathetic men." He instances Spencer's acquiescence in the exclusion of the children of the poor from all the benefits of education; and aptly illustrates the defects of Spencer's construction by comparing it with the case of two men, one of whom is being carried on the other's shoulders; they consent, however, so to adjust the burden that, with a minimum of inconvenience and friction, the carrying may go on as before.

Rightly insisting on the primacy of justice, the absence of which poisons remedial sympathy at its source, the author proceeds to formulate his first principle of pure ethics: it is, that every member of society should be admitted in the fullest degree to the opportunities for the development of his natural powers; or, in Kantian terms, that the individual should be viewed always as an end, never merely as a means. This principle may demand the reform or destruction of many existing social institutions; but so long as adverse conditions exist, that conduct is relatively good which conforms as nearly as possible to the ideal norm, or which tends to bring about the conditions which it prescribes.

The formal character of the end will already have reminded the reader of Kant's categorical imperative; and it is very interesting to note that our author, too, considers it impossible to base a system of ethics on self-evident axioms: *i. e.,* to become operative, his principle must be accepted as an underived categorical imperative. He despairs, however, of finding a support in metaphysics for his ethical postulate, founding his belief, I should suppose, rather on an examination of previous metaphysical systems than on an independent attempt of his own. Those who feel a complete ethics to be impossible without meta-

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physics will be gratified to find that Signore Juvalta also recognizes the limitations of his method, and they will be thankful to him for having conducted them thus far, to what he considers to be the limits of human reason, so considerately and so wisely.

W. J. ROBERTS.

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, CARDIFF.

THE HERBERT SPENCER LECTURE, delivered at Oxford March 9, 1905, by Frederick Harrison, M. A., Hon. Fellow, Wadham College. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1905. Pp. 30.

It was in accordance with the fitness of things that the first of the Herbert Spencer lectures should be delivered by a friend and admirer of Mr. Spencer, one who is, moreover, a thinker thoroughly qualified by philosophical equipment and sympathy to justly appreciate his work. Mr. Harrison tells us that he enjoyed the philosopher's friendship for forty years. And he devotes the first pages of his lecture to personal reminiscences. He expresses the admiration which he felt for Spencer's "grand intelligence, for his tenacious devotion to duty, and his truly marvelous perseverance," and his belief that at Spencer's death Britain lost its most "prominent" philosopher—a philosopher who, in spite of difficulties of all kinds, succeeded in achieving "all that he purposed, and perhaps all that he was capable of doing."

His purpose, what he deliberately set before himself, was a "Synthesis of Knowledge—a Science of the Sciences—a System whereby all human ideas, scientific, moral, and social, could be harmonized in one dominant concatenation or correlation." It was a splendid ideal, and Mr. Harrison pays a tribute to the "magnificent vision," although sceptical regarding the possibility of its realization. He points out that there are serious gaps in Spencer's work. There is no systematic treatment nor even a sketch of the Inorganic Sciences—Mechanics, Astronomy, Physics, Chemistry—nor is there a continuous theory of general history. The continuous history of human civilization was to him a sealed book; and he "so misread such pages as he ever opened that we can hardly wish it had been otherwise."

But the lecturer finds in the Synthetic System a still more serious defect. He doubts whether its very basis is on sound philosophical lines. Its fundamental conception is evolution, the final definition of which ran thus: "Evolution is an integration of matter

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and concomitant dissipation of motion, during which the matter passes from a relatively indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a relatively definite, coherent heterogeneity, and during which the retained motion undergoes a parallel transformation."

In the first place, Mr. Harrison urges, if science is concerned only with evolution, it is "simply the law of the processes of Change. But the laws of *stability*, of permanence, are equally essential and dominant; indeed, they come prior to laws of change. Using the terms in their true philosophic breadth, *Order* precedes *Progress*, determines it, and regulates it. *Progress is evolution out of Order.* That is to say, the course of every development is irrevocably determined when the primordial type is constituted."

In the second place, is any one set of principles adequate to the task of explaining phenomena and coördinating all the sciences? Can a formula which explains "the evolution of the Horse and of Man in terms of the evolution of the Milky Way and the Nebula of Orion be a fertile organum of thought"? Does it advance us much to be furnished with "a set of formulas which profess equally to explain the rotation of the earth and the French Revolution, the pressure of the atmosphere and the growth of the moral sense"? Comte is nearer the truth in holding that each general science has its own logic and its own generalization. And, in fact, Spencer never succeeds in applying his formula. Like Hobbes, he abandons his "materialistic" basis when he comes to discuss ethics and sociology. The proposition, "Throughout the universe, in general and in detail, there is an unceasing redistribution of matter and motion," is a mere assertion. And it appears paradoxical that it should be made by one "who is so keen a believer in the relativity of knowledge, so ruthless an antagonist of all dogmatizing about the Absolute or Unconditional Existence." Mr. Harrison finds no fault with Spencer for ignoring the work of metaphysicians and theologians. Yet surely, in a "knowledge completely unified," their experiences claim a place.

It would be interesting to apply the principles of the Spencerian system to itself as a body of knowledge. For example: all growth, it maintains, is towards a definite, coherent heterogeneity; but the final conception of the Synthetic Philosophy is an indefinite, incoherent abstraction.

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SOCIETY

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JANUARY, 1906.

THE DANGERS OF DEMOCRACY.*

It is hardly open to doubt, I suppose, that the general tendency expressed by the term "Democracy" is increasingly prevalent at the present time. Some may think that what is called "Imperialism" is a strong counteracting force; but even this is at least ostensibly based upon the general will, and in any case can hardly be regarded as more than a slight and temporary check upon the democratic movement. In these circumstances it is surely important that we should try to understand the significance of this general movement and to take note of any special dangers that are incident to it. This is what I propose in the present lecture to attempt, though of course I do not aim at anything like an exhaustive treatment.

Within such limits as are here at my disposal, it will probably be wise not to attempt any precise definition of the term "Democracy." It has been used in various senses, wider and narrower, looser and more exact; but for our present purpose it is perhaps enough to connect it with its common popular description, and to regard it as covering any movement that tends to secure "Government of the people, by the people, for the people." This is what our modern Democracy is generally understood to be aiming at; and what we have here to inquire is whether there are any special dangers that are inseparable from this aim. Before we refer to its dangers, however, we ought, I think, to endeavor to be clear about its attractions. The first

* A lecture to Ethical and similar societies delivered at various places in South Wales.

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question to be asked, accordingly is—What are the special advantages that are claimed for Democracy, and that lead to its increasing prevalence?

Now there are some who would at once demur to the form in which this question is expressed. It is not, they would say, properly a question of use or advantage at all, but rather of an essential and imperious demand of human nature. It is in this spirit, for instance, that a bright journalist has recently claimed that Democracy is an end in itself—that, even if all its results could be shown to be prejudicial, we must still value it infinitely on its own account. A writer in the INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, a few years ago, went even further than this, by inditing an eloquent article on "American Democracy as a Religion." And of course the utterances of Walt Whitman on this subject are even more remarkable and memorable. Such claims may seem to others to be extravagantly overstrained; and yet I believe we can never hope to understand the power that modern Democracy has wielded if we do not bear in mind that for some—perhaps I might even say for many—it has been far more than a mere political expedient, and might almost be characterized as a religion, a passion, an end of inestimable worth. It may of course be urged that, when Democracy is spoken of in this fashion, it is not simply a particular form of government that men have in their minds. What they are thinking of is rather the autonomy of the individual man, the "glorious privilege of being independent" in the general conduct of his life and management of his affairs. And it may be urged that this independence of the individual life has no particular connection with any form of political rule—that it might be secured by a Marcus Aurelius in the imperial purple or by a Tolstoy under the Russian autocracy, as well as by a Socrates or a Thoreau under systems avowedly more democratic. But it seems clear that this would only be to some extent true. Inner freedom cannot be wholly divorced from external freedom. The autonomy of the individual must at least be harder to achieve and more exceptional in its realization when the right of self government is not in any degree recognized in public affairs. If a Tolstoy can grow in Russia, he must at

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least be something of a revolutionist there. If, then, we recognize the supreme importance of inner freedom in human life, we can hardly fail to be opposed to all forms of slavery, at least as permanent institutions in human society; and it is but a step from this to maintain that no government which is not in its essence democratic can in the end be regarded as tolerable. In this sense, then, it scarcely seems an exaggeration to say that Democracy may really be regarded as an end in itself, and something to be valued with an almost religious fervor. It is on this high ground that Democracy has been defended by such men as Mazzini, and, indeed, I suppose no one could really be described as a thorough democrat who did not, in some degree, feel the truth of this contention.

In comparison with this transcendent claim, any other advantages that can be ascribed to Democracy must appear trivial and scarcely worthy of enumeration. But I believe its supporters generally value it also on some subordinate grounds. It is believed to be more truly educative for the citizen than any other form of government, to give a more complete guarantee of justice and general welfare, and to be less subject to the vagaries of individual caprice. On the other hand, it is sometimes admitted to be a little lacking in unity and inner coherence, to be distracted by party spirit, and to be somewhat inefficient in great emergencies. I do not intend to make any effort to deal exhaustively with these various advantages and defects, but will rather try to direct your attention to what appear to me to be the main points. We may perhaps be led most directly to these by considering some of the most remarkable criticisms to which the principle of Democracy has been subjected. And here we are at once confronted by a circumstance that can hardly fail to strike us, at least on a first view, as somewhat astonishing. For, if Democracy can justly put forward those high claims that have just been indicated, we should naturally expect to find among its most ardent supporters those who have felt most deeply the importance of man's moral development. It comes, therefore, as something of a surprise to find among the severest critics of Democracy the two writers in ancient Greece who did most to establish a

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systematic theory of the moral life, and the two writers in modern England who have probably impressed men most by their moral enthusiasm, the two whom one can hardly help characterizing as "prophets." I mean of course Plato, Aristotle, Carlyle and Ruskin. All of these may be said broadly to regard an aristocracy of talent as the ideal form of government; and all would appear to regard Democracy as one of the least desirable forms. It is noteworthy also, in this connection, that the first two write on the assumption of the existence of a society in which slavery has a place; while one at least of the other two has explicitly defended slavery. Yet they were all face to face with governments that were to a large extent democratic; and, in most cases, it is not easy to point to any circumstances that might be supposed to have given them a personal bias against it. Hence it can hardly fail to be a profitable inquiry to ask ourselves what were the chief grounds that led these writers to distrust Democracy. This inquiry cannot here be attempted in any exhaustive form; but I may sum up what appear to me to be the main points.

I think the main dangers that are in the minds of these writers may be conveniently considered in connection with the general popular description of Democracy to which I referred at the outset. What they maintain is, in effect, that in practice Democracy fails to be what it purports to aim at being, that it is not really a government of the people, by the people, and for the people. If I am right in thinking that this is the gist of what they have to say, then I believe it will appear, upon reflection, that their criticisms are not so much attacks on *Democracy* as on *Democracies,* and that they attack these by trying to show that they fail to realize the essential principles of Democracy itself. Perhaps we may hope that some consideration of these attacks may help us to realize more fully what Democracy really is and aims at, and how it may best succeed in realizing its aims.

The first danger, then, that is apprehended in Democracy is that it may fail to be a "Government of the people"—in other words that it may only be a kind of Anarchy. This is the danger that is specially emphasized by Plato in the "Republic." "First of all," he says, "Are they not free, and does not liberty

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of act and speech abound in the city, and has not a man license therein to do what he will?" Again—"It will be, in all likelihood, an agreeable, lawless, particolored commonwealth, dealing with all alike on a footing of equality, whether they be really equal or not." Again, speaking of the type of man who tends to be bred in a Democracy, he goes on—"He lives from day to day to the end, in the gratification of the casual appetite—now drinking himself drunk to the sound of music, and presently putting himself under training;—sometimes idling and neglecting everything, and then living like a student of philosophy. . . . And there is no order or constraining rule in his life; but he calls this life of his pleasant, and liberal, and happy, and follows it out to the end." Such, he says, is the life of "a man whose motto is liberty and equality." ("Republic," Book VIII, Davies and Vaughan's translation.) And he goes on to add further characteristics of the same sort. Now, it is to a large extent the same dangers that are constantly emphasized by Carlyle and Ruskin. They consider that, if you disregard the qualitative differences among men, and treat all as having a right to share in the rule of the State, you are destroying the very basis of the State. This is what Ruskin means when he says that he is "a Tory of the old school—the school of Homer and Scott," the school that believes in qualitative differences and the rule of the best, or, in Shakespeare's language, in the importance of "degree." [1]

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[1] "The heavens themselves, the planets, and this centre,
Observe degree, priority and place.
* * * * * * * * *
Take but degree away, untune that string,
And, hark, what discord follows!
* * * * * * * * *
Force should be right; or rather, right and wrong—
Between whose endless jar justice resides—
Should lose their names, and so should justice too.
Then everything includes itself in power,
Power into will, will into appetite;
And appetite, an universal wolf,
So doubly seconded with will and power,
Must make perforce an universal prey,
And last eat up himself."

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The experience of modern Democracies, however, does not seem altogether to bear out this view of their anarchical tendencies. The evidence of Professor Bryce is worth noticing on this point. "Plato," says Bryce, "indulges his fancy so far as to describe the very mules and asses of a Democracy as prancing along the roads, scarcely deigning to bear their burdens. The passion for unrestrained license, for novelty, for variety, is to him the note of Democracy, whereas monotony and ever obstinate conservatism are the faults which the latest European critics bid us expect." ("American Commonwealth," Part VI, ch. cvii.) Again—"Of the uniformity of political institutions over the whole United States I have spoken already. Everywhere the same system of State governments, everywhere the same municipal governments, and almost uniformly bad or good in proportion to the greater or smaller population of the city. . . . The schools are practically identical in organization, in the subjects taught, in the methods of teaching, though the administration of them is as completely decentralized as can be imagined, even the State commissioner having no right to do more than suggest or report. So it is with the charitable institutions, with the libraries, the lecture courses, the public amusements. . . . It is the same with social habits and usages. . . . Travel where you will, you feel that what you have found in one place that you will find in another. The thing which hath been, will be; you can no more escape from it than you can quit the land to live in the sea." (Chap. cxiii.)

Are we then to conclude that Plato was completely at fault in his estimate of the tendencies of Democracy? Not, I think, entirely. Bryce himself doubts whether the uniformity which he noted in America has much connection with Democracy. "Democracy," he says, "has in reality not much to do with it, except in so far as such a government helps to induce that deference of individuals to the mass which strengthens a dominant type, whether of ideas, of institutions, or of manners." Still, this does, at any rate, throw doubt on Plato's view of the general tendency of democratic institutions. But what we must remember is that the Democracy of which Plato was thinking was in reality something widely different from that which

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Bryce was observing in America, or indeed from any kind of Democracy that can be observed at the present time. He was thinking of a Democracy in which every one is actually ruler as well as subject—taking his turn of office, perhaps, by lot—whereas we practically always understand by Democracy in modern times some form of representative government. Sometimes this is thought of only as a matter of practical convenience, it being impossible for everyone to take an active part in public affairs, while yet the method of representation is more truly Democratic than election by lot would be. But it seems clear that representative government involves a considerable modification in the idea of pure Democracy. It involves the recognition that the rule is not directly that of all, but rather that of typical members; and, further, it practically always involves the tacit, if not explicit, recognition that some are better fitted than others to rule. There is thus an element of aristocracy in all modern Democracies; and even a Democratic leader like Gladstone was able to gratify Ruskin (he would not, I suppose, have gratified Tolstoy) by describing himself as an "inequalitarian." (Morley's "Life of Gladstone," Book VIII, chap. v.) And an aristocracy that represents the "general will" can hardly fail to have a more pervading influence than one that rests upon a more arbitrary basis. What we may say, then, is that modern Democracy has to a large extent succeeded in avoiding this particular danger that Plato had in mind, by the device of representative government, whereby it is able to incorporate in itself an element of aristocracy, *i.e.* of what Shakespeare calls "Degree."

Here, indeed, I cannot but think that Democracy has "builded better than it knew." Often we find that those who represent modern Democracy have very little consciousness of the value of the element of aristocracy which it thus contains. They think of it simply as the rule of the majority, and regard it as little more than an accident, or a merely mechanical device, that the will of this majority expresses itself through selected representatives. Probably it would be quite as true to regard the selection of representatives as the essential point, and the fact that they are chosen by majorities as the mere mechanical de-

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vice; though this also would be a one-sided view. It can hardly be doubted that there has been a tendency to pay an exaggerated deference to majorities, and sometimes almost to think of the expression of their will as if it were in truth "the voice of God." I think Carlyle was to a large extent right in connecting this tendency with those mechanical views of the world that have been fostered by modern physical science. The natural sciences, especially in their more exact and abstract forms, tend to eliminate the qualitative aspects of experience, and to concentrate attention on those things that can be weighed, measured, and counted. The growth of the biological sciences in recent years has once more brought the qualitative aspect of experience into prominence; and we begin to see the results of this, not only in such fantastic conceptions as those of Nietzsche, but also in more rational attempts to determine what is meant by superiority of type, and so once more to give "quality" or "degree" a real place in human life. This, however, is a very large subject—perhaps the most important of all subjects for thinking men, or at least for thinking politicians, at the present time—and here I can only hint at it. All that it is necessary to note at present is that modern Democracy seems to have partly escaped from the main danger that was feared by Plato, through declining to take its stand upon equality, and leaving open a place for the recognition of qualitative difference.

But this leads us to notice the second great danger of Democracy—viz.: that it may fail to realize the second element in its ideal, that of being a government "by the people." It may be said that modern Democracy is not really government by the people, but rather government by the representatives of an organized majority, who may not give by any means a true expression of the general will. Even the majority itself may not be properly represented. The organization of it may really have been in the hands of some skilful demagogue or influential plutocrat.[2] And the minority, at any rate, may be hopelessly

[2] Sir Henry Maine even urges (in his "Essay on Popular Government") that government by the people inevitably comes to mean government by wire-pullers.

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ineffective. Yet the minority also is part of the people; and, from the point of view of quality, to which we have just referred, it may even be the most important part. On this point, reference may again be made to Professor Bryce. "Where a majority has erred," he says, "the only remedy against the prolongation or repetition of its error is in the continued protests and agitation of the majority, an agitation which ought to be peaceably conducted, carried on by voice and pen, but which must be vehement enough to rouse the people and deliver them from the consequences of their blunders. But the more complete the sway of marjorities is, so much the less disposed is a minority to maintain the contest. It loses faith in its cause and in itself, and allows its voice to be silenced by the triumphant cries of its opponents. "(Part IV, chap. lxxvii.) Again—"The belief in the rights of the majority lies very near to the belief that the majority must be right. As self-government is based on the idea that each man is more likely to be right than to be wrong, and that one man's opinion must be treated as equally good with another's, there is a presumption that when twenty thousand vote one way and twenty-one thousand another, the view of the greater number is the better view. . . . A conscientious citizen feels that he ought to obey the determination of the majority, and naturally prefers to think that which he obeys to be right. A citizen languidly interested in the question at issue finds it easier to comply with and adopt the view of the majority than to hold out against it." (Chap. lxxxiv.) Thus the minority tends gradually to be silenced altogether, a tendency which Bryce describes as "the Fatalism of the Multitude."

It is perhaps this, more than anything else, that Carlyle has in view in his denunciations of Democracy. He has confidence in nothing but his Heroes, or supremely wise men; and they of course are very few. Hence he is horrified by the tendency to a constant silencing of their voices by the shouts of the majority, and is inclined to believe that Democracy, even in its most modern form, provides no machinery at all for securing that what is worthiest in the people shall have any chance of ruling. "The notion," as he scornfully puts it, "that a man's

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liberty consists in giving his vote at election-hustings, and saying, 'Behold, now I too have my twenty-thousandth part of a Talker in our National Palaver; will not all the gods be good to me,' is one of the pleasantest!" ("Past and Present," Book III, chap. xiii.) Obviously Democracy, in this sense, does not go far to secure the ideal of self-government for its citizens. And, indeed, this way of looking at it almost forces us to ask, What do we really mean by the self-government of a people? If we mean that every individual among the people is to exercise the right of government, then it seems clear that to secure (or, it may even be, to fail to secure) the twenty-thousandth part of a representative in what is, after all, only one part of the machinery of government, is not a very satisfactory way of realizing this ideal. But perhaps this is not what we really mean.

When we speak of the self-government of a people, we are, I fancy, thinking of the people as a whole, as if it had almost an individual life. And I think we are to a large extent justified in doing this. Any people, worthy of the name, is a real unity, capable of acting, thinking, and feeling together. And what is meant by the self-government of such a people is that the ruling principle lies within itself, that it is, somehow, contained within the life of the whole. This does not mean that each individual rules, nor even that each individual has any considerable share in ruling. What it means is rather, on the one hand, that there is no sovereign who controls the system in a purely external way; and, on the other hand, that there is no subject who is controlled by it in a purely external way. All are real members in a living whole.[3] But if that is what we properly mean by self-government or Democracy, we may accept it as an end in itself, a thing of supreme worth, and yet regard representative systems and the reckoning of majorities as little better than mechanical devices, whose only value lies in their contributing to the possibility that each one may share, to some extent, in the life of the whole. If this is what Democracy means, it really involves

[3] I should like to refer, in connection with this point, to Bosanquet's treatment of the "General Will" in his "Philosophical Theory of the State."

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in itself a considerable element of what is commonly called Aristocracy. Perhaps the ideal Republic of Plato would, in this sense, be more truly Democratic than many modern states that lay claim to the designation. For what could be more truly Democratic—in the sense of the real self-government of the whole—than Plato's principle of ideal justice, that every one is to fill the place and perform the work for which he is best qualified? If his Republic falls short of the true Democratic spirit, it is only in so far as the rulers are conceived as dealing with those whom they govern too purely from above, while no adequate provision is made for the cultivation of the spirit of citizenship in the lowest class of the people. This no doubt is foreign to Democracy; and, as Aristotle was well aware, it was also this, more than anything else, that made Plato's ideal unworkable. A real Democracy, in short, must be aristocratic —it must aim at government by the best; and there can be no practical realization of aristocracy except through the cultivation of the Democratic spirit—the spirit that is ready to recognize that to be governed by its best is to be governed by itself.

We are often told that what stands in the way of our advancement in Great Britain is our suspicion of the expert; and it is sometimes thought that this is largely due to the growth of the spirit of Democracy among us. I doubt whether it has much connection with Democracy. The Americans appear to have largely outgrown it. Nor is it entirely my meaning that we should learn to trust to the expert. The expert is often narrow-minded and conservative. What I mean is rather that we must learn to put our confidence in those who are interested in particular things, in those who know about them and care about them; and must recognize that it is an essential part of the true Democratic spirit to be ready to follow where such men lead. Democracy does not mean trusting important matters to the care of "the man in the street;" it rather means finding for everything the man who is best fitted to take care of it, and leaving him to manage it. This, however, is probably the lesson that Democracies are in general most slow to learn. Louis XIV has been much laughed at for saying, "The State, I am the State;" but each of us is rather apt in practice to say,

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"Self-government of the people: that means that I govern." Yet in small matters we all learn that it is not so. If we want to go to America, we do not consider how we are to navigate ourselves across: we choose a suitable steamer, and trust to the captain and crew. If we are sick, we do not collect the votes of our acquaintances as to the most suitable treatment: we rather take the advice, as a rule, of some expert physician. And this is surely a quite democratic method of procedure. We rule over the captain and the physician. We tell the one to take us to America, and the other to make us well. But they rule over us in the process. We choose the end that we think desirable: there we are very probably the best judges. But we trust to men of special skill to show us how we are to get what we want. If this principle were carried all through life, every one would be ruling in that which he knows about, and submitting to rule in that about which he is ignorant; and I cannot but think that a people in which this was the practice would be most truly a self-governing people, a people in which the true principle of Democracy was realized.

On the whole, then, I admit that a Democracy is often liable to this particular danger; that it may fail to be, in any true sense, a government "by the people." Democracy is not, in Carlyle's phrase a "Morrison's Pill." It is not something that is sure to put us right, whether we think about it or not. If Democracy is to mean anything really great and desirable for us, we must see to it that it is what we intend it to be. Self-government, in fact, means mainly this, that every one of us is trying to coöperate in securing that the rule is the best possible. But we are not really coöperating if we are interfering with some one who knows better than we do. Sometimes we may even coöperate best by standing aside:—"They also serve who only stand and wait." But generally our best service will lie in finding something that we can do—something, if possible, that we can do better, at the moment, than anyone else. If we succeed in doing this, we are, I think, in that act realizing the best meaning of Democracy and Aristocracy in one. It is the rule of the people, and it is the rule of the best. But this, you may say, is a mere ideal. Yes, and everything that is worth

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anything in human life is or contains an ideal. The important thing is that the ideal we have before us should be something that has real value. Now, if we mean by Democracy only ballot-boxes and majorities, there cannot be much value in that, whether we realize it or not. But if we mean by Democracy a real self-government of the people, each one being allowed to do, and trusted to do, that for which he is best fitted, then I believe we mean something which has a considerable value for us, even if we do not wholly succeed in achieving it. Even only to aim at it, is to realize its spirit; and to realize its spirit is to go a long way towards its complete achievement.

And this leads me naturally to notice the third great danger of Democracy—that it may fail to be a government "for the people." It was chiefly, I think, on this account that Democracy was condemned by Aristotle. Aristotle divided forms of government into bad and good, according as they existed for their own sakes or for the sake of those who are governed; and he placed Democracy among the bad ones. To most modern readers this is a paradox, because they naturally think of Democracy as being government "for the people." But it is intelligible enough when we bear in mind the distinction between the people as a whole and the people as a mere collection of units. If each one is fighting for himself, you may say, in a sense, that all are fighting for all; but, if so, you are using the word "all" in a rather peculiar and sophistical fashion. At any rate, there can be no true harmony unless each is fighting for all. Now, a Democracy is too often conceived as meaning simply a state in which one has an eye to his own interest; and it is sometimes supposed that in this way the interests of all will be served. I think Aristotle was right in regarding a Democracy of this sort as intrinsically bad. The mere struggle of competing interests cannot reasonably be expected to lead to the good of the whole. In economics this is now, I believe, pretty generally recognized: pure *laisser faire* is a discredited principle. But is it any more reliable in general politics? Few, I fancy, would seriously, on calm reflection, maintain that it is. But if not, then we must recognize that this is a real danger confronting our modern democratic states; and it is one of the

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dangers that was much in the minds of Carlyle and Ruskin, as well as in that of Aristotle. Can we hope that our modern Democracies will guard against it?

So far as I can see, the only real way of guarding against it is by the cultivation of the spirit of citizenship. The citizen must be taught to think of himself, not as an isolated individual with private interests of his own, but as a member of a great system, in which he has a definite place and function. This is perhaps most readily learned through the gradual discipline of smaller unities. The man who has learned to be loyal to his family, his school, or his club, is at least on the way to learn loyalty to the larger social unity, of which these are parts; and I believe it would be difficult to overestimate the value of this element in education. The Americans are, I believe, much in advance of Great Britain in the application of this idea; and so probably are the French, and certainly the Japanese. The essential principles of self-government may easily be acquired in schools. Interesting—and apparently successful—experiments have been made, especially in America, in the way of conducting schools on purely self-governing principles; but, without even going so far as this, it is easy to see that much may be done to make the spirit of citizenship a reality; and I am convinced that, if Democracy is ever to be a real success among us, it can only be through the cultivation of such a spirit. No one can be a genuine democrat unless he is also an enthusiast for the welfare of the society to which he belongs. We must learn, as Mazzini so constantly insisted, to concentrate our attention upon our duties as citizens, rather than upon our rights as individuals.

There are no doubt other dangers of Democracy besides those to which I have now alluded. A Democracy is commonly said to be somewhat inefficient, especially in great emergencies that call for our united action: but this is extremely doubtful; it seems to depend entirely upon the exent to which the society has become a real unity. The American government is probably as efficient as that of Russia. Again, it is sometimes said that in a Democracy there is apt to be a certain lack of an adequate sense of responsibility on the part of public

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officials. There seems to be some truth in this. Bryce, for instance, notes that in America "the tone of public life is lower than one expects to find it in so great a nation. . . . In Europe, where the traditions of aristocracy survive, everybody condemns as mean and unworthy acts done or language held by a great official which would pass unnoticed in a private citizen. It is the principle of *noblesse oblige*. . . . Such a sentiment is comparatively weak in America. A cabinet minister, or senator, or governor of a state, sometimes even a President, hardly feels himself more bound by it than the director of a railway company or the mayor of a town does in Europe. Not assuming himself to be individually wiser, stronger, or better than his fellow-citizens, he acts and speaks as if he were still simply one of them, and so far from magnifying his office and making it honorable, seems anxious to show that he is the mere creature of the popular vote, so filled by the sense that it is the people and not he who governs as to fear that he should be deemed to have forgotten his personal insignificance." (Chap. xcv.) I am afraid there are some signs of such a lowering of the tone of public life in this country, as well as in America; and it appears to be a real danger of Democracy. But I need not emphasize it further, as it appears to be simply one illustration of the danger to which I have already alluded, of a misinterpretation of what is meant by government "by the people." It can only be remedied by the gradual recognition that in a true Democracy, no less than in an aristocracy, each one has his own definite place and function, his own work to do, his own responsibility to bear; that democratic rule does not mean the rule of "the man in the street," but the rule of those who know and are prepared to do. Let the man who knows control the thing that he knows about—that is the essence of good government: provided always that he is subject to the criticism of others upon the results of his work.

There may be still other dangers in Democracy. It may be apt to be fickle and commonplace and deficient in length of view.

But I have not thought it desirable to dwell upon such subordinate dangers. What I have sought to emphasize in this

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paper, and what I believe to be true, is that the one great danger of Democracy—the only danger that it need ultimately fear—is that it may fail to be true to itself, that it may forget its own ideals.

I may sum up the results of the view to which I am led, and which I have been trying to bring before you, in this way. Democracy, in the best sense of the word, means the self-government of a people; and this is the highest possible conception of government. But there is a constant danger that it may be misinterpreted in practice, and become only the rule of the majority, which is certainly not in itself a high conception of government. I do not mean that we can set aside the method of estimating majorities. What I mean is that that is not the essence of Democracy, in the best meaning of the term. Democracy, in the best sense, means the rule of the people as a living whole, by the people as a living whole, and for the sake of the people as a living whole; and this ought to mean, in practice, that everything is done by him who is best fitted to do it, and under the guidance of those who know most about it. I do not believe in Plato's philosopher-king. If a real philosopher were made king, his first act would probably be to abdicate his office, or a least to secure, as rapidly as possible, that the real work of government was distributed among the competent citizens of the State. Human capacity is practically always departmental: there is no one who is fitted to be a ruler in everything; and there is hardly anyone who is not fitted to be in charge of something, and to be responsible for seeing that it is done. The truest Democracy—and the truest aristocracy as well—is a state in which everyone exercises rule, just so far as he is fitted to do so. If we constantly remember that this is what Democracy aims at, and that ballot-boxes and other instruments of government are only the machinery by which we seek to bring this about,[4] then I think there is some chance that our modern Democracy may gradually come to live in its own proper spirit, and to realize, through constant effort,

[4] I may refer, in connection with this, to the excellent discussion of popular government contained in MacCunn's "Ethics of Citizenship."

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that form of a well ordered state, at once truly democratic and truly aristocratic, of which Plato and Carlyle could only vaguely dream.

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ETHICAL INFLUENCES IN UNIVERSITY LIFE.*

PRACTICAL ethics is the outcome and formulation of human experience in the sphere of conduct. All societies fall upon certain customs of intercourse that become moral rules, out of which by reflection, emerge ideals. Ideals are never perfect, being determined and limited by the experience and thought of their creators; they are never attained or attainable, else they would not be ideals. But they are morally effective because uplifting and stimulating.

The value of an ethical system depends on the character of the community that creates it. The size of the community is one factor in the result; the degree of general culture is another. The advantage is not always with the majority; a small community, favorably situated, may reach an ethical height impossible for the mass.

If, indeed, the world were socially a unit, we should have an ethical ideal and ethical laws superior to anything that now exists; such ideal and laws would be for the moment universal, and would exhibit the highest possibilities of the moral thought of the time. But the world is far from being a social unit. Barriers of mutual ignorance separate continent from continent, nation from nation, and within every large community there are many groups, determined by various occupations and beliefs, and each with its separate code of morals. Thus we hear of the ethics of war, of politics, of commerce, of the pulpit, of the legal and medical professions, and of thieves. The influence of such special ethical circles is great by reason of the intimate relations and the sense of common interests that exist among the

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members of any one circle. To them we owe some excellent maxims, and also certain ignoble popular aphorisms, such as: All is fair in love and war; my country right or wrong; business is business; and we may add the maxim that has been described as an ethical construction of the doctrine of the survival of the fittest—the maxim that enjoins on every man to look out for himself, and consigns the unfortunate hindmost man to perdition. These and others of like and unlike character express the moral position of a large part of the world, and students of ethics have of late given special attention to the ethical conceptions of various social groups, in order to determine the moral peculiarities of each group, and the special ethical field it represents. The university group, while of importance for the whole community, has special interest for university students and teachers, and I invite you to join me in considering some familiar facts touching the university as a source of moral training.

In respect of the development of moral life the university, like all other communities, has its peculiar advantages and disadvantages. Isolation is always to a certain extent a hindrance to progress—it commonly means ignorance and onesidedness in certain regards; sects and parties are apt to foster selfishness, prejudice, blindness. Now a university community is peculiarly isolated, shut out from the interests of the great world, immersed in its own pursuits, steadfastly laboring for its own aims, which are not those of society at large. It is not wholly without reason that university circles are termed by the outside world "provincial." London looks on Oxford and New York on Cambridge with a certain half-contemptuous pity; these great commercial and political communities, struggling with the hard facts of life, look on the peaceful brotherhoods of students, safely shut up within college walls, as a weatherbeaten tar looks on a spruce and dapper midshipman who has never tried the dangers of the sea, or as Hotspur regarded the perfumed knightling who came to demand his prisoners. This contempt is doubtless often carried beyond bounds; but the alleged ignorance of life, so far as it exists, is

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morally an evil—it makes symmetry and proper perspective difficult.

One fundamental ethical evil of college isolation is its tendency to relax the sense of obligation to the outside world. Not unnaturally the student comes to regard his social position as unique—he is emancipated from the restraints of boyhood and not yet subjected to the authority of general society. Tradition and custom make him a privileged person—in his little world he may assume to be a law unto himself. It is not very long since he habitually looked on the "Philistine" civil authorities as his natural enemies—there are still echoes of the war-cry of "town and gown," though happily the more barbarous features of this internecine strife have passed away. He is still, by common consent, entitled to a certain degree of license—the survival from the time when the Lord of Misrule was a recognized personage in popular festivities. At Oxford the sometime riotous proceedings of the Encaenia have subsided into a delicious fusillade of wit and humor in the gallery. The student body formerly had its own tribunals independent of the law of the land; at Berlin it is only recently that student offences against order have been relegated to the city officials; in Paris, the University students, numbered by thousands, ensconced in the strongholds of the Latin Quarter, still form a distinct community, capable of becoming formidable in times of political and other excitement. Such organizations are gradually ceasing to exist, but there still lurks the feeling of separateness and antagonism to society, wherein are seeds of lawlessness and anarchy. The deeper moral evil is the possible insensibility to principles and laws that are sanctioned by the consent of society. Granting that offences in this direction are often momentary and harmless, still it is not easy to say how far a habit thus formed may color feeling and action in after life.

Within the university community there may be antagonism, imagined difference of interests, between students and officers of instruction and government. There should be perfect sympathy and perfect unity of action. Where these do not exist this fact is attributable to two causes: the natural human ob-

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jection to restraint, and defect of imagination. The relation between governors and governed is always a delicate one—it cannot be both potent and happy without a considerable exercise of moral imagination, without the capacity in each party to put itself in the place of the other. Failing this capacity, there is apt to result undue severity on one side and rebellion and fraud on the other. We may hope that the harsher aspects of the relation no longer exist among us, but there must be unfortunate results so long as there is not social and scholarly unity. Everything that fosters separation in this regard is morally injurious to all concerned—everything that promotes sympathetic and hearty coöperation is morally beneficial. Lapses from truth, for example, cease to occur, or become exceptional and infrequent, when there is a distinct sense of personal responsibility on the part of officers toward students and on the part of students toward officers.

Another species of isolation arises from the unavoidable specialization of study in university teachers, which tends to withdraw every instructor from the larger society of his colleagues, to shut him up within the circle of his immediate departmental fellow-workers, or even to force him into a life of academic monastic seclusion. It is true, of course, that on the intellectual side this rigid adherence to a single line of thought may have high value—it means a concentration that may carry with it creative power, and is sometimes a quality or accompaniment of genius. At the same time it may involve restriction of intellectual sympathy, which is always a disadvantage to the individual man as well as to the university as a whole. The ethical effect of such limitation of sympathy and the consequent seclusion of the man is necessarily bad—it abridges community of interests and oneness of life in the university. Doubtless there is excuse for hard-worked instructors who have all they can do to meet the requirements of their individual positions, and can with difficulty find time for other interests. But if such a condition of things be a necessity, it is none the less regrettable—it is an evil when the virtue of scientific devotion carries with it the vice of social and academic seclusion; the recluse is not the ideal type of the scholar. That, how-

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ever, the danger is not unavoidable is evident from examples in this university and elsewhere. There are extreme cases where a student becomes unfit for other society than that of his own library; but the more rational view of life fostered by the university may make its scholars hospitable to all studies and accessible to all personalities.

Such possible dangers from the unavoidable isolation of college life must be taken into consideration. But it is also true that this isolation has its good side in the repose and concentration it ensures. The university as is remarked above, is in a measure taken out of the hurry of the world, detached from its multifarious interests. True, it can never be wholly shut out, for its students and its teachers are human beings and citizens more or less alive to the questions of the day and not devoid of a sense of responsibility to society—in certain respects, indeed, very keenly alive to all that is going on. Still, it remains true that they constitute a community organized for a special end, and necessarily absorbed in a certain line of work. In much that exhausts the energies of the outside world they cannot take an active part. They are perforce spectators, critics from without, judging men and things by standards created in their own circle. This circle is unique in the world in the respect that it is a cloistered company of scholars devoted to the pursuit of truth. There are other companies of scholars, such as learned societies, though these are composed mainly of university men, and carry into their work the university spirit. There are also other seekers after truth, not college men—the university is not the only school of thought. But among all schools it has the advantage that it is a detached association with a single end in view. Of a multitude of details it remains unconscious, and this unconsciousness, when the details are unessential, makes it easier to take a larger view of life, and is so far favorable to the formation of ideals. The university man is not unlikely to be a dreamer; but the dreamer is often a seer, and a seer may be a creator of the best things. The ideals set up by a college group are not necessarily perfect or practical, but they represent a conception of life based on the recognition of fundamental human tendencies, and looking to what is



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conceived to be the final goal of the individual and of society. Though not always distinctly formulated, they have a definite form, and they color all thought. It is this universality of content that distinguishes them from the ideals of most poets and moralists—they cover the whole of life. They are absorbed by instructors and students alike in the daily intercourse of academic life; assimilated half unconsciously, they become a part of the texture of the mind, and modify the man's after career. Let it be repeated that the university is not the only idealizing force in the world—it is only one of a number; but its influence in this regard has been great. A cursory review of history would show what the moral life of the world owes to men bred and passing their lives in the cloisters of the academy. From the great school of Athens, that finest conception of a university—a body of thinkers addressing a body of thinkers—came ideas that have guided the world ever since directly or indirectly. Even into Palestine these ideas penetrated, and under their influence, it is probable, the ethical conceptions of the Founder of Christianity were fashioned in part. When barbarian Europe emerged into civilization it was in her universities that the larger ideals of life were nourished. Under the Moslem rule in Spain the academies of Cordova were a centre of ethical impulse for both Moslems and Christians. Later centuries have witnessed a vast extension of university life—even a superficial examination of its actual ethical outcome would require more space than can here be given. Two features of this life are obvious: its variety and its cosmopolitan character. From Japan westward to California the world is encircled by a chain of High Schools. Every nation, every community, has its homes of higher learning, fostered by the State and the people, and these, taken together, embody the social conceptions of all human groups, representing the various ideas of life that spring out of the diversities of human conditions, thus, it may be hoped, permitting an approach to completeness that would not be possible under other circumstances. And the harmful disintegration of experience that might naturally result from this variety of academic institutions is counteracted, to some extent, by the practical association and coördination of modern

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life. In Germany professors and students have long been in the habit of migrating from one university to another, thus effecting an interchange of ideas and ideals. Such migration is now coming to be the rule between different countries of the world. Modern appliances have broken down the barriers of space and time—a thought originating in one land quickly becomes known in all other lands. The exchange of lectures between this country and Europe, now so happily begun, is an indication of a general movement of the age. Asia, once so remote, has entered into intellectual relations with the West, largely through associations of scholars. There exists now, in a sense never before true, a commonwealth of universities. Formerly the student had to go abroad in search of knowledge (only two centuries ago Voltaire went to England and brought the Newtonian philosophy thence to France)—the wandering scholar travelled in foreign lands to gather up, by personal intercourse, the newest products of research; now these are brought to every man's door not only by books, but also by men who represent the ideals, ethical and other, of their countries. The university of to-day is not a solitary worker—it knows itself to be a member of a great fraternity, and is sure that its work will be sympathetically recognized by its brethren all over the world. This enlargement of experience makes for the perfecting of ideals, and the university shares its influence along with the rest of the world.

The more general question of the relation between intellectual and moral cultivation has been largely discussed by philosophers. Some, like Socrates and the sages of the Book of Proverbs, have identified virtue with knowledge; others have held that there is no close connection between the two. From different points of view both may be right or wrong. If knowledge be a mere statistical acquaintance with facts, it will not affect conduct; if it be a genuine comprehension of the basis of happiness, and a clear apprehension of the consequences of acts, it will incite to a life of ethical purity. A knowledge of bookkeeping will not of itself deter a cashier from malversation, but he may be restrained and guided by a sense of the indestructible bond between the individual and society. There

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have been men who combined splendid intellectual powers with a total disregard of ethical considerations, and others deficient in mental endowments but morally true and firm. The moral conduct of the majority of men depends more on habit than on philosophy, more on a conviction of the comfortableness of virtue than on devotion to its supreme celestial authority. But, leaving aside extreme cases, of moral idiocy and moral exaltation, nobility of life is furthered by knowledge in two ways: by creating love for high and pure pursuits, and by making it clear that virtue ministers to the common good. All the work of the university tends to turn the mind away from the baser things of life, to allure the man to noble effort, and to make it evident that society rests on virtue. Many of the temptations of the great world are unfelt by a college community, and this diminution of total experience, while it may so far tend to produce a mental attitude of infantile innocence, not of the robust sort that is capable of resisting the hostile influences of life, also simplifies and clarifies thought, and makes the man sympathetic toward those general principles of conduct that are often obscured by seeming facts.

Let us turn now to consider how far in certain special directions the atmosphere of the university is likely to be ethically effective. Take, for example, the cultivation of honesty of thought—intellectual honesty, as it may be termed—a different thing from what is ordinarily understood by the term sincerity. One may be sincere, yet self-deceived; the deeper honesty guards against self-deception. The popular view regards a man as honest when he gives what law and custom require; if he goes beyond this and gives what his sense of justice requires, his conduct will often be considered exaggerated, fantastic, sensational, foolish. For the thinker there are various inducements to dishonesty, such as indolence, love of novelty, love of a theory, fear of the consequences of the results of investigation. It is easy to rest in traditional or current opinion, to rely on the authority of great names of the past or of the present; it requires an effort to shake one's self free from the fetters of such apathy, and examine a question for one's self. There may

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be, as has been said of Hume, a voluntary superficiality[1]. In the opposite direction the desire to do something new—especially where there is competition—may blind the eyes to obvious facts, distort the vision, lead to vicious exaggeration and minimization. The world has been often warned against theories. There is nothing of which a sincere man with a theory is not capable: he can see white as black and black as white; he can insert or elide a negative; however formidable a fact, he can assimilate it or explain it away. True, "facts" are sometimes wrong and have to be revised; but right or wrong, if they stand in the way of the determined theorizer they are doomed. And, if they appear to involve the subversion of cherished opinions and schemes of life, it is hard for them to obtain entrance into the mind; many a man is stopped at the threshold of an investigation by the reflection that the probable conclusion will unsettle popular beliefs or make his own position impossible. In all these cases the outcome for the man is dishonesty—he is guilty of a great moral offence. Sometimes he knows that he has committed a crime; sometimes his false methods have so subtly interwoven themselves into the texture of his thought that the conviction of dishonesty either never rises into consciousness, or else shows itself intermittently and feebly and is easily crushed by the mass of complacent opinion to which the man's fictitious argumentation has brought him. In either case there is defect of will and sacrifice of truth to desire. The university, of course, is not wholly free from the power of these moral idola; but there are in its constitution certain things that tend to safeguard its purity. The atmosphere of unworldliness, referred to above, while on one side narrowing, is on another side preservative—it is a defence against an excessive influence of outside opinion. The *libertas docendi*, first enunciated, it is said, nearly two hundred years ago, at the foundation of the University of Göttingen, and now widely recognized, is a charter of freedom and a fosterer of honesty. Freedom is sometimes dangerous—it may degenerate into intellectual license—a university teacher may become an apostle

[1] G. Santayana, "The Life of Reason," i. p. 94.

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of error. But it is better, in the interests of truth, to suffer a momentary error than to restrict liberty of teaching. A free school of thought has the power of automatic readjustment—error dies of inanition. Freedom to say precisely and fully what one thinks removes a great part of the temptation to prevarication and concealment. It increases the sense of personal responsibility, and thus ministers to the growth of that deep inward truthfulness which is the glory of a university teacher. The habit of independent research may itself be regarded as a moral force, since, when not perverted by prejudice, it gives a momentum and a glow to thought that carry one above selfish considerations. This habit is naturally created and fostered by university work, which has for its prime object not the acquisition of facts but the excitation and training of thought. The university apparatus of investigation—libraries and laboratories—is not a mere luxury—it is a constituent of the moral atmosphere of the place.

We must note also the ethical value of discussions carried on by students among themselves. The free interchange of ideas by thoughtful and enthusiastic young men is a power in the university and in the world. The history of culture shows how many great lines of thought have had their origin in debates and talks among college youth who were broadened and stimulated by university influences and not yet hampered and hardened by conventions and theories. Students have sometimes thought it possible that more can be got out of walks and talks than out of lectures and theses. On the other hand a certain professor is reported to have expressed the opinion that the ideal university would be one in which there were no students. However, without going to either extreme, not abolishing either professors or students, but accepting both classes as desirable parts of a university, the fact is to be recognized that students are an independent centre of thought not only intellectual but also moral. Ethical questions have a peculiar charm for young men, entering, as they do, into the very heart of life, perennially fresh, tantalizing, stimulating, inviting new solutions and offering vistas of a golden age. So far as free

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converse can advance the theory and practice of ethics, the university is favorable to the cultivation of the moral life.

The preservative power of what may be called intramural criticism must be taken into consideration. A writer throws down his challenge to the world and is subjected to a wide and general criticism. But the intimate association of men within the walls of a university permits and produces a mutual control of a peculiarly delicate character, an unveiling of one's private intellectual morality. Unfounded statement, borrowing with insufficient acknowledgment, inaccuracy in details or any other deviation from truthfulness, by teacher or student, is sure to be known and commented on. One's little sins are brought out into the light—there is a healthy publicity in one's private academic life. And the tone of this surveillance need not be other than friendly; we may and do note one another's shortcomings not with sneers or bitterness but with the kindliness of brethren—not damning for a single fault, but freely recognizing what is good and doing what we can to remedy or remove what is bad.

The university takes the young man at a critical point in his career, at the moment when he is escaping from the control of instinct and custom and entering on the perilous path of self-guidance by reflection. In many cases, perhaps in most cases, this step involves a psychological upheaval, a reconstruction of inward life, the grasping of a revolutionizing point of view, the introduction into a new world of thought. In the seemingly aimless irrational struggles of the young student it is often the birth of a soul that is going on. Such a situation has a certain sacredness; to the university it brings a great opportunity and a heavy responsibility. It cannot be said that the resulting problem has been solved; in the academic life, as far as the moral interests of students are concerned, there is much that is unformed and inadequate. Still, the university supplies some influences that look to the creation of ethical maturity. The atmosphere of scientific thought incites the student to the highest possible development of his own individuality, while at the same time his membership in the great university body, with its power and prestige and its unity, trains him to see his larger

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self in the circle to which he belongs. Thus he learns the double lesson of self-assertion and self-subordination. In this process it is inevitable, also, that he come to some knowledge of himself—a point of fundamental importance for moral growth. He cannot avoid introspection and the comparison of himself with others. Worthy figures, among his fellow-students and his teachers, confront him day by day. His studies bring him into contact with great personalities of the present and of the past—he is allured to a wholesome hero-worship. The greatest personages of the world, ancient and modern, become for him models, intellectual and moral. One may, indeed, be depressed by the contemplation of great excellence, but more often one is excited and stimulated. There is a certain calming influence in the presence of great persons: we are awed by them as by the great physical objects of nature, but we are also lifted into an atmosphere of repose, and placed at a point of view at which we may better understand both the littleness and the greatness of life.

Knowledge of the work of our fellows has a definite ethical value. The intention of the university, as has already been observed, is to cover the whole field of human knowledge—nothing that pertains to intellectual life is alien to it—and he who imbibes its spirit will not turn his back on any field of thought. The intimate relation existing between all branches of knowledge and the constant association among the various specialists tend naturally to enlarge the view, to broaden sympathy and to quicken insight. In the march of learning the philosopher moves shoulder to shoulder with the biologist, the historian and the economist with the mathematician, the student of art with the student of language—every one with every other. Each comes to know something of what the others are doing. Such knowledge furthers that accurate estimate of others which is one of the bases of our practical moral life. It promotes modesty and a respectful attitude toward men and life. Ignorance of the aims and the achievements of others is a fruitful source of imperfect moral judgment and feeling.

It is true that universities, like the world at large, have often been slow to recognize merit and to accept new ideas. A cer-

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tain conservatism in this regard is inevitable and not undesirable in great institutions and societies of learning—their decisions are more important for the progress of thought than are the approvals or disapprovals of individual scholars. The reserve that the French Institute, for example, has sometimes maintained toward alleged discoveries is to a certain extent justifiable. Such conservatism may be excessive and injurious, and universities are not without sin in this point. On the other hand, as far as the moral aspect of the question is concerned, there is something in the air of the university that is favorable to a just estimate of the character and work of its own men and of others. Breadth of knowledge, largeness of outlook, consciousness of one's own limitations conspire to produce honesty and delicacy in one's judgments of men. True learning fortifies sympathy, and avoids the disintegrating effects of selfish indifference.

Whether or how far the university promotes virtue in public life is a question too large for discussion here. The "scholar in politics" has afforded amusement to a certain class of minds. The virtue of the scholar, the seeds of which are sown, as the dramatist Webster says,[2] in the wakeful study, is esteemed by these persons to be whimsical and inefficient. We need not go far abroad, however—we need not go beyond the rolls of this university—to find men who have shown themselves capable of high efficiency in public affairs without disloyalty to the best principles of civic conduct. If the university standard of public virtue is not that of the governing classes of the world—if it means scrupulous truthfulness, honesty, justice—it does not follow that it is bizarre and unpractical. A government by philosophers is not a new suggestion; but it has never been tried. Now, not all university students, teachers and graduates are philosophers in Plato's sense; yet the tendency of university life is to make honest cultivated gentlemen, and the experience of mankind must determine how far such men are to be entrusted with the direction of public affairs.

CRAWFORD HOWELL TOY.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

[2] In "The Devil's law-case," Act i. Sc. i.

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TEN YEARS OF WAR AND THE HAGUE TREATY.

THE failure of The Hague "convention for the peaceful adjustment of international differences," which is the official title, to prevent, or even delay by a single hour, the recent war between Russia and Japan seems to have surprised no one. From the beginning of the dispute between those powers this great treaty of arbitration and conciliation was absolutely ignored not only by the principals to the quarrel, but by all other governments as well. The initiative having been graciously yielded by President Roosevelt, the Czar has called another international conference at The Hague for the consideration of questions relating to war and peace. The real significance of the coming conference will not be known until its sessions are ended and its results are announced to the world. For the moment, we may profitably contemplate the existing situation in the light of the salient facts which recent experience has revealed. It is a good time to face the truth regarding war and the influence upon it of the arbitration and conciliation treaty already in existence. That this treaty proved of no value in averting the great war in the far East is the first fact to be faced. The second fact is that, judging the world by the past ten years, wars are by no means tending to disappear.

Anxious as we are for the permanent reign of peace, let us not indulge too freely in the "illusions of hope." It is not in the published proceedings of the Lake Mohonk conferences on international arbitration that one may discern events in their true perspective. Some of us have become peace agitators (the word is used in no uncomplimentary sense), and it is the business of agitators to interpret things as favorably as possible to their cause. It is not surprising to find in the platform of the Lake Mohonk conference of 1905 an expression of "gratification over the advance made in the cause of the pacific settlement of disputes between nations during the past year," nor in the address of the general secretary of the American Peace Society the statement that "the year has been one of gratifying progress for the cause in whose interests we gather here." Doubt-

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less there was some basis for these expressions, but it is impossible to forget that the same year was made memorable by battles on a larger scale than ever before were fought in history. The echoes of the guns of Mukden could almost be heard at Lake Mohonk when those utterances were made.

This reminder helps to bring us to the essential phase of the general situation. There were arbitrations and peaceful adjustments of international differences, literally by the hundred, during the century before The Hague treaty was made. The vital question is not how many international disputes of greater or less importance are settled by peaceful methods; it is rather how many wars does the world continue to wage? For the great ultimate of civilization, in this particular movement, is the abolition of murderous collisions between nations.

The most practical test of the tendencies of our own time is the amount of warfare in the world during the past ten years. It is staggering to contemplate. In 1894-1895, Japan and China fought; in 1897, Turkey and Greece; in 1898, the United States and Spain; in 1899-1903, Great Britain and the two South African republics; in 1904-1905, Russia and Japan, in a conflict whose scale brought the decade of strife to a mighty culmination. In this decade there were drawn into war nations Christian and pagan, occidental and oriental, and as well both monarchies and republics, both democracies and absolutisms. As death is no respector of persons, so the scourge of war was no respector of forms of religion or government or of varieties of civilization. The world-wide sweep of the struggles of ten years has furnished an extraordinary demonstration that none are yet immune from this primeval contagion. Into what other ten years since Waterloo has more war been crowded? Arrange the decades as we may; you will find that since the close of the Napoleonic era there has been none in which the drumbeat has been oftener heard. Notwithstanding peace and arbitration movements, war is one of the chief facts of our time; and we know this not merely because the armaments of land and sea, maintained as a preparation for hostilities, were never so large and costly as now, but because the decade we have just lived has been one continual trumpeting.

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Grand as The Hague treaty is in conception and useful as it is bound to be in practice, it was a sore disappointment in offering no barrier to the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war. The Hon. Oscar S. Straus, former United States Minister to Turkey and a member of the high tribunal of The Hague, asserted in his address at the last Lake Mohonk conference on international arbitration, that "The Hague tribunal .... stands behind the diplomacy of the world as an ever-widening wedge between a diplomatic ultimatum and the clash of arms. For the first time in the history of nations when diplomacy is at an end, we have a great system interposed between that ultimatum and the beginning of hostilities; that is an enormous gain." The truth is that the "system interposed" by The Hague convention failed to work when its first opportunity for preventing or delaying war was presented in the winter of 1903—1904. That failure merits careful attention inasmuch as study of the defects of the system, as shown by actual experience, may suggest desirable improvements in its make-up and mode of working. Nothing could be more profitable than such a study, since the main desideratum is always to prevent a conflagration from starting. Once a great war between first-class powers has begun, it is useless to try to stop it until the arbitral voice of the cannon has definitely spoken.

An excellent illustration of this was afforded after the recent war had broken out. The general secretary of the American peace society has informed us that "the friends of arbitration," in Europe and America, "made repeated efforts to bring to an end the sanguinary conflict in the far East through the employment of the means provided by The Hague convention. They have so far failed in their efforts." [1] Soon after that statement was made came President Roosevelt's friendly interposition, which was crowned with success in the peace treaty of Portsmouth, but the President, before acting, deliberately waited until after such decisive battles as Mukden and the Sea of Japan, and then he made no direct appeal to the sanction of The Hague convention.[2]

[1] Address by Mr. Trueblood at Lake Mohonk, May 31, 1905.

[2] See President Roosevelt's invitation to Czar and Mikado.

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Recent experience has proved conspicuously that Mr. Straus was not quite accurate in the remarks quoted from his address. Even The Hague treaty interposes no system of conciliation between a diplomatic rupture and the beginning of hostilities. Japan struck at Russia both at Chemulpo and at Port Arthur, without a declaration of war, and with scarcely a perceptible interval between the recall of her minister at St. Petersburg and the signal to Admiral Togo to spring at the foe. And this action was sustained by international lawyers, publicists and diplomats as not in violation of the law of nations. The defence of such a practice—that a formal declaration of war in these days of electric communication throughout the world has become unnecessary either for belligerents or neutrals—is feeble, especially in its moral aspects. International law at this point has certainly degenerated. And it is perfectly clear that legitimatizing the practice of beginning war immediately after a diplomatic rupture, is alone sufficient to render futile the entire system of conciliation created by The Hague convention. The system, in the recent case of Japan and Russia, not only failed to work; it had no chance to work. And it will be shown that it never will work without certain changes in The Hague convention designed to insure a hiatus of definite duration between a diplomatic rupture and the resort to arms.

The articles of The Hague treaty that invited action by neutral powers for purposes of mediation or conciliation, in the weeks prior to the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war, were particularly these:

ART. 2. In case of serious disagreement or conflict, before an appeal to arms, the signatory powers agree to have resource, as far as circumstances will allow, to the good offices or mediation of one or more friendly powers.

ART. 3. Independently of this resource, the signatory powers consider it useful that one or more powers, strangers to the dispute, should, on their own initiative, and as far as circumstances may allow, offer their good offices or mediation to the states at variance.

ART. 8. The signatory powers are agreed in recommending the application, when circumstances allow, of special mediation in the following form:—

In case of a serious difference endangering the peace, the states at variance shall each choose a power, to whom they intrust the mission of entering

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into direct communication with the power chosen on the other side, with the object of preventing the rupture of pacific relations.

During the period of this mandate, the term of which, unless otherwise stipulated, cannot exceed thirty days, the states in conflict shall cease from all direct communication on the subject of the dispute, which is regarded as having been referred exclusively to the mediating powers, who shall use their best efforts to settle the controversy.

In case of a definite rupture of pacific relations, these powers remain charged with the joint duty of taking advantage of every opportunity to restore peace.

Article 2 is excellent, as a pious and academic promise to be good, but its efficacy as a barrier to war may be fixed at zero. It can become vitalized only by leading to some method of conciliation that will actually do work. Article 3, it is apparent, merely approaches the subject from the opposite direction and is equally futile because it gets no farther ahead. Both these articles were dead letters in the disagreement between Russia and Japan, and with good reason. Neither of these powers wanted mediation, and that fact alone killed article 2. And as for article 3, no other power would offer its good offices as a mediator, knowing that its good offices were not desired. Besides, how was it possible for a neutral power of influence, that might have been willing even to bear the diplomatic mortification of a snub for the sake of peace, to know just when to offer its good offices? So long as diplomatic discussion between the powers at variance continued, so long as their diplomatic notes passed back and forth, could another power assume that the contestants were necessarily in need of outside help to compose their differences? The natural point for an offer of good offices, under article 3, would be when diplomacy had apparently exhausted itself. In the case of Japan and Russia, that moment was not apparent to the world until the Japanese minister had been recalled from St. Petersburg. But—following the case of a neutral power ready to dare a rebuff for the sake of peace—even that opportunity was destroyed by Japan's instantaneous resort to war without sending an ultimatum or making any formal declaration of her hostile purpose. The precedent Japan has made in this respect has evidently struck a heavy blow to the working efficiency of article 3, in so far as it was designed to prevent war from breaking out.

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The greater complexity of article 8 and its peculiar method of conciliation must already have impressed the reader. The failure of this article to make itself felt in the ante-bellum period of the recent war was no less complete than that of the other articles referred to. It might as well have been employed to prevent the Chicago fire as to prevent the far eastern conflict. Yet this is the article which seems to afford the most hope for a practical advance toward making wars less frequent in the immediate future. Obviously, it was ignored by the governments at Tokio and St. Petersburg because they were not in the least bound by its terms. The general method suggested for delaying a military collision, which may appear imminent, is excellent; but the recent experience demonstrated that it will never come into use by great powers on the verge of war, so long as its application is merely "recommended," "when circumstances allow," to governments at variance. But if this method of conciliation could be made a solemn *obligation*, resting upon every signatory of The Hague treaty, the good it would do might be beyond one's power to estimate. With a hiatus of even thirty days between a diplomatic rupture and a resort to arms, imposed by treaty upon possible or probable belligerents, during which period seconds should seek a basis for a friendly understanding, we could be indifferent whether or not the practice of sending formal ultimatums and making formal declarations of war disappeared from the customs of nations.

It is to the credit of Dr. Frederick W. Holls, one of the American delegates to The Hague conference of 1899, that article 8 was made a part of The Hague convention. Dr. Holls, in his authoritative work on "The Peace Conference at The Hague," (pp. 188-203) has given an interesting account of the history of the article, whose germinal idea, he says, had been before the public for years and had originated no one knows where. That the article made a strong impression upon the members of the conference is clear from the fact that they adopted it by a unanimous vote. The method of calling in seconds at a critical point in a controversy is drawn from the duelling code, but as here applied the seconds are presumed not to foment the quarrel but to do all in their power to end it

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peaceably. The great advantage of the article comes, of course, from the thirty days' clause, which provides for a period of reflection among the peoples of the antagonistic nations and affords also a last chance for the friends of peace to make an earnest effort to prevent hostilities. Dr. Holls, on this point, writes in his book:

"On behalf of the military experts of several of the great powers it was stated that the article has one feature which would prove an agency for peace perhaps more effective than any other, and which was least objectionable of all, from the military and naval point of view. This is the interval of thirty days, which is provided for in the absence of a different stipulation, and which affords sufficient time to bring home directly to the peoples concerned the stupendous consequences of the impending conflict while it is yet time to retire with honor."

The great desirability of having article 8 made mandatory upon the signatories to the treaty cannot be successfully controverted. As the treaty stands, the article merely offers a suggestion. That it should be made an obligation of the most solemn character upon all powers within the pale of international law was evidently the conviction of M. de Nelidoff, the eminent Russian diplomatist, recently Russian embassador at Paris. Dr. Holls quotes M. de Nelidoff, in developing the idea, as having once said with great impressiveness:

"What should be done is to insist that before beginning hostilities, the contending parties should intrust the settlement of the affair to representatives in whom they can have absolute confidence; who will act according to instructions and who will each defend the honor of his principal as he would his own. Everything should then be left to these seconds. . . . If in the end the seconds decide that there was nothing to do but to have them 'fight it out,' they would do so. But if they resorted to arms without having had recourse to these preventive measures, and a catastrophe resulted, the winner should be treated, not as a duellist, but as an assassin. This should also be the rule in the case of an international war."

The only way to "insist" upon nations adopting the procedure of article 8, before setting their armies and navies in motion, is to make it mandatory. The amendments necessary to execute this purpose are especially a task for international lawyers and those expert in the phraseology of treaties, but the necessary stiffening of the article would be effected if the first paragraph were made to read like this:

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ART. 8. The signatory powers *shall* accept special mediation in the following form:

In case of a serious difference endangering peace, *before a resort to arms,* the states at variance shall choose, etc.

Such an article in a treaty signed by all the governments within the pale of international law, would have a decided influence for peace. The nation that ignored it and precipitated war, whether in a passion or with cool deliberation, would have had its moral position undermined in the court of the world's opinion. How solicitous in our time are belligerents, or intending belligerents, to win the sympathy of neutral nations has been shown with fresh emphasis in the immediate past. It was highly important to Japan to have the moral support of the people of America, and there was nothing more interesting in Count Witte's conduct, while engaged in the Portsmouth peace negotiations, than his skillful courting of American public opinion in support of his diplomatic attitude toward the Japanese peace terms. World sentiment is a growing power; attempts to cajole, mislead or deceive it are tributes to its enormous influence. Japan even stationed unofficial embassadors in England and America during the late war to devote themselves particularly, among other things, to the study of popular sentiment and to educating it in harmony with Japanese interests. With article 8 made mandatory, could the powers on the verge of war safely defy the moral sentiment of mankind by ignoring it? It may be said that as this article was ignored, as it now stands, without exciting the slightest animadversion, the ignoring of the amended article might be equally successful. It is to be considered, however, that no one before could have regarded article 8 as a serious obstacle to war; the world understood that no power had covenanted most solemnly to follow this very definite procedure. The procedure had merely been "recommended" to the distinguished consideration of quarreling governments. But say "shall" to them, in this connection, and have the word sustained by that moral influence with which mankind even in its most barbarous stages has always sanctioned solemn treaty obligations—could powers in controversy then defy this article with impunity? Cer-

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tainly not, if we can trust at all to the development of ethical sensitiveness in international relations as the outcome of the modern interplay of national consciences.

Article 8 in the "shall" form would not insure us against wars. By no means. At the end of the thirty days, the foes could strike their blows to their hearts' content, in strict conformity with the code. Even then there would be a gain for civilization, if nothing more were accomplished than the nullifying of the present practice of suddenly precipitating hostilities without a formal declaration. It is of interest, however, to observe the effect which the article, as amended, would probably have had upon the outbreak of some of the wars in the past generation, had it been in force during that period.

The Franco-Prussian war of 1870 could not have been declared when it was, by France, had this article 8, amended, confronted the governments of Paris and Berlin. To be sure, Bismarck desired war with France. He felt "convinced that the gulf" between north and south Germany "could not be more effectually bridged over than by a joint national war against the neighbor who had been aggressive for centuries."[3] A statesman with such a purpose might sooner or later have brought on war in spite of all obstacles. But he could not have brought it on, as he did, by his garbling of the Ems telegram and the deliberate inflaming of the French people by faked press dispatches concerning the personal relations between the King of Prussia and the French embassador, Benedetti. Bismarck's calculating purpose in garbling the Ems telegram was to incite the French to declare war. It (the garbled version) "will have the effect of a red rag upon the Gallic bull. . . . It is important that we should be the ones attacked, and this Gallic overweening and touchiness will make us, if we announce in the face of Europe, so far as we can without the speaking tube of the Reichstag, that we fearlessly meet the public threats of France."[4] How well he succeeded in his design, the French people know to their bitter cost. The Ems dispatch, garbled,

[3] Bismarck's Autobiography, vol, 2, page 99.
[4] Ibid, vol. II, page 101.

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was published early July 14, 1870. At midnight the French government decided to make war; on the 15th, war was declared and the French army mobilized. The French government and *Corps Legislatif* had acted in a moment of incredible passion and folly and had gone into hostilities with so little soberness and for an object so little worthy of the life of a single guardsman that a period of reflection prior to the resort to arms could scarcely have failed to demonstrate to them the fatuity of their course.[5]

A period of thirty days injected into the situation at that critical point, to be used in accordance with the procedure of article 8 of The Hague treaty, would have allowed time for the truth to become known and for reason to assert itself. Indeed, Bismarck would not have used the tricky expedient that he did, had he confronted such a system of postponement of hostilities as we are now contemplating. And the probability is that, if war had finally come between France and Prussia, it would not have been fought on such a wretched pretext as the Hohenzollern candidature for the crown of Spain.

Scarcely less impressive as an illustration of the possible effect of article 8 of The Hague treaty, as amended, is the story of the rupture between Russia and Japan. The St. Petersburg correspondent of the *London Times* last summer reported at a considerable length the account given by the *Slovo*, a well-known St. Petersburg paper, of the final diplomatic rupture between the two governments. It will be recalled that in the last hours of the negotiations, in January-February, 1904, the vital issue was narrowed down to the question whether Russia would abandon her demand for a buffer territory between Manchuria and Korea. The world remembers that a certain belated dispatch was sent from St. Petersburg to Tokio, by way of Viceroy Alexieff, containing the last Russian reply, and that before this dispatch finally reached Tokio the Japanese minister had been recalled from St. Petersburg and the die had been cast for war. Now, in that dispatch the Czar abandoned his demand for a buffer between Manchuria and Korea. How

[5] Fyffe's History of Modern Europe, popular edition, pages 979-985.

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Japan happened to recall her minister, without having received the dispatch in question, is thus explained in the St. Petersburg correspondence of the *Times*:

"The *Slovo* goes further, and shows why Japanese patience, after enduring repeated vexatious delays during six months of negotiations, suddenly failed at the moment when an agreement seemed assured. Here is the explanation, which is illustrative of Russian bureaucratic methods. It will be remembered that the terms of Russia's final reply were drafted at a meeting held on January 28, under the Grand Duke Alexis, at which Count Lamsdorff, General Sakharoff and Admirals Avellen and Abasa were present. All, with the exception of Admiral Abasa, agreed to waive Russia's demand for a buffer state. Admiral Abasa presented a minority report, which, together with the draft approved by his colleagues, was submitted to the Emperor four days later. Meanwhile Count Lamsdorff, not knowing whether the Emperor would approve the opinion of Admiral Abasa or that of the majority, declined to give Mr. Kurino any information. On the other hand, Admiral Abasa entered into communication with Mr. Kurino, and, before the Emperor could decide, gave the Japanese minister his own version of the reply, and Mr. Kurino promptly communicated it to Tokio. Admiral Abasa's position as manager of affairs on the committee of the far East, and as a person enjoying great influence at court, satisfied the Japanese that he rightly interpreted the views of his government, and that Russia's reply was a refusal. Nevertheless, the Japanese waited two or three days more before breaking off negotiations."

It was, then, according to this account, the false impression given to Minister Kurino by Admiral Abasa of the Czar's decision concerning the buffer state that convinced the Japanese government of the uselessness of further negotiations, and impelled it to strike without awaiting the official Russian reply at Tokio. It was a critical moment. Special mediation at that point by friendly neutral governments, with the compulsory thirty days' period of delay, might have deferred the Russo-Japanese war, if it had not rendered it impossible.

If article 8 cannot be made mandatory, it is difficult to conceive how immediate progress can be made, on practical lines, toward the lessening of the chances of war, through the system created by The Hague treaty. Compulsory arbitration, except within a restricted range, is too remote to be seriously considered at present by practical statesmen. Not one of them is ready to tolerate the idea with reference to issues that affect "national honor," "national integrity" or "vital" national interests. "No nation represented at The Hague in the past, or

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likely to be represented there in the future, will ever adopt universal obligatory arbitration on all questions." Such is the matured opinion of the chairman of the American delegation to The Hague conference of 1899,[6] than whom no one strikes a truer balance in these matters between facts and ideals. Equally futile is it now to urge upon the great powers the general acceptance of the principle that distinguishes the new treaty of separation between Norway and Sweden, to the effect that when a question arises as to whether a certain dispute comes within the jurisdiction of The Hague tribunal, as defined in the limited arbitration treaties, that question shall itself be submitted to The Hague tribunal for final decision. The United States government, probably, could not accept such a principle, in practice, without tearing out the present constitutional basis of our relations with foreign nations.

Compulsory arbitration being unattainable, except possibly in a certain class of questions which by facile agreement do not affect "vital interests[7] or the national honor of the contracting states," the strengthening of article 8 of The Hague convention by the approaching international congress becomes the next practical step in the development of the peace idea, and in support of it the friends of the peace and arbitration movements might well concentrate their labors and influence. This much may be achieved because it is practical; and it is worth achieving because it marks a distinct, tangible advance toward the goal whither civilization is ever struggling.

Not even the limitation of armaments by international agreement would be so uncompromising an advance toward peace. In support of limitation there are strong arguments, especially those of a financial nature which impress upon us the burden of modern taxation for military purposes—a burden that becomes heavier decade by decade, owing to the competition in arma-

[6] Dr. Andrew D. White's letter to the Lake Mohonk international arbitration conference, dated May 24, 1905.

[7] See original Russian proposal for compulsory international arbitration of a certain class of disputes, and comments thereon, in Holls's "The Peace Conference at the Hague," pages 227-231; also Dr. A. D. White's letter to Lake Mohonk Conference, referred to above.

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ments between the great powers and to the rapid progress of mechanical invention and the chemistry of explosives.

Nor ought we to ignore a certain excitation to war, akin to hypnotic suggestion, which the endless rivalry in armaments causes in the popular mind. Yet the limitation of armaments would not bring an end to wars. If all nations were as inadequately prepared for hostilities as were the North and South in 1861, and were kept in that condition by treaty agreements, wars would continue to be waged whenever national pride, national interests, national passion, became uncontrolable. The limitation of armaments would not strike at the heart of the problem, which is nothing else than the firm establishment of peace as the inviolate relation between the nations of the earth. The mere limitation of armaments on a proportionate basis, therefore, is not to be compared in efficacy, as a measure of peace, with the mandatory interposition of a buffer period between the stage of ultimatums and the stage of hostilities.

While it is futile to attempt the immediate establishment of an ideal, public opinion will not outrun practical possibilities if it demands from the next peace conference at The Hague something besides discussions of and agreements upon questions which are merely the by-product of war itself. Nothing would be done by that congress to lessen wars in the future if it should be content to consider only such questions as the rights of neutrals, the exemption from capture at sea of private property not contraband of war, the rules concerning the treatment and care of the wounded in battles, the use of wireless telegraphy, the privileges of belligerent ships at neutral ports, the use of marine mines in the defence of blockaded harbors and the precise nature and application of the doctrine of contraband—all of them questions of much importance in international law yet, with scarcely an exception, pertaining to the proper conduct of the wars that break out. Nor would the world make much progress toward the abolition of war, by the establishment of compulsory arbitration within the narrow limits to which compulsory arbitration has thus far been consigned. We should note the distinction that while compulsory arbitration, within the limitations and qualifications always in-

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sisted upon, would diminish the possible *pretexts* for war, available to the hands of belligerent-minded statesmen, still pretexts would never be lacking to statesmen, who were not indifferent to the possible advantages of the war policy.

In the last resort, public sentiment must ever be responsible for the peace of mankind. No amount of elaborate machinery can shift the final responsibility otherwhere. If, at critical points, provision can be made for the possible cooling of the war spirit, if the moral sense of the world can impose upon the disputants a substantial pause for reflection and the critical examination of facts and tendencies, before they take the dread leap into the "alembic of hell" the responsible public opinion may perhaps be pierced through and through by the conscience of humanity and transformed into an overwhelming force for peace. It is such a pause—and surely it could never be for ill—that can now be imposed upon the whole family of nations by making article 8 of The Hague convention say the imperious "Thou shalt," instead of the impotent "We recommend to thee."

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THE RETAIL METHOD IN REFORM.

There are many ways of being a reformer, but, in this attempted defense of the retail method, it will be convenient roughly to divide all the ways into "wholesale" and "retail," and to describe, at the very outset, four kinds of reformers who practice one or the other of these two methods of reform.

1. There are those who bury themselves in particulars. Given a certain spiritual fervor and capacity for self-sacrifice, these make up a majority of the noble army of saints and martyrs; given a certain defect of social imagination, they constitute the rank and file of those who, in our day, are described vaguely as trying "to do good."

The sins of this class are obvious enough. They will care tenderly for the fever-stricken without seeking to remove the cause of the fever. They will raise funds to assist in

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keeping immigrants in large cities that do not need their labor; they will supplement wages by charitable relief and wonder why workers are not better paid; they will connive at placing young children at work long before they have developed either the physical or the mental capacity to succeed in industry; they will support the drunken and diseased father of a rapidly increasing family in idleness because they "cannot let his children suffer." But it is unnecessary to enlarge upon defects that have made this particular class of retailers the easy mark not only of the economist but of the charity organizationist and of the social agitator; they have had to hear the truth about themselves from all three, and are driven, at last, into a fairly apologetic attitude.

2. Then there are those whose temperament sends them to the other extreme, who are buried in generalizations. Given a certain degree of spiritual or imaginative fervor, these make up a majority of the world's poets and prophets; given a certain vagueness and inability to deal with the concrete, they constitute the rank and file of our reformers with a hobby.[1] Agreed in little else, they usually may be identified by their fine contempt for the retail method. Members of one of the State Women Suffrage Associations illustrated this condition of mind neatly when they replied to a request for some particular service made by a Consumer's League that they must decline to coöperate because, if women only had the suffrage, there would be no need for Consumers' Leagues.

3. Again, there are those who, while constitutionally inclined to the general, are led by the depth of their interest to overcome a certain repugnance toward the concrete. There are few finer tests of sincerity than this, that a man deliberately turns his life athwart its natural bent to deepen the reality of his conviction; and these reformers of large vision content to toil at relatively small tasks are indeed the very salt of the earth.

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[1] Recent eruptions in the literature of social reform would seem to prove that "yellow" statisticians belong to this group.

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4. But the order of march for most minds is from the particular to the general. Beginning with just the obvious human interest in A and B, and the impulse to help these two unfortunates out of their troubles with such means as lie readily at hand, the inadequacy of these means should become apparent, and, where it does, the larger issues involved press themselves one by one upon our attention.

This is the natural order for most of us, but the natural order goes a step further. Pushed upward by our interest in some retail task toward a wholesale remedy for evils of the same class, we are pulled back, our remedy once secured, into the particular again, to complete the work there begun. The healthy and well-rounded reform movement usually begins in the retail method and returns to it again, forming in the two curves of its upward push and downward pull a complete circle.

This double movement bears so important a part in the justification of the retail method that it may be worth while to turn aside and illustrate it in some detail by two reforms, by the Anti-Slavery and by the Child Labor movement—the one having its rise in America more than a hundred years ago, the other a very recent development on this side of the water. And it is necessary, in the limits of this paper, to consider no more than the conscious effort of individuals, ignoring those economic forces that, in their titanic play, have thrown their weight now for and now against slavery, now for and now against the exploitation of childhood.

To one who had been accustomed to think of anti-slavery sentiment in the North as manufactured by the Boston Anti-Slavery Society and by "Uncle Tom's Cabin," an elderly friend gave a new view not long ago, when she told of the pride and deep interest with which, as a child, she shared the secret that there were runaway slaves in the barn, and was permitted to see the frightened creatures. The risk taken by her brother, who drove them after dark to Benjamin Lundy's, the next station on the Underground Railroad, and their own pitiful plight, appealed to everything that was loyal and compassionate in her nature; and the experience, repeated

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many times in those years long before the Civil War, must account very largely for her own lifelong interest and the interest of her descendants in the negro race.

Professor Siebert, the most trustworthy historian of the Underground Railroad,[2] traces to this particular retail method the widest social and political consequences. He claims, and makes good his case, that, from small and tentative beginnings this method of rescue grew to a large secret system by which thousands of slaves yearly were passed on to freedom, and, both in their passage and pursuit, created a sentiment that finally destroyed slavery. Men may have said, and probably did say that such rescuing was futile, that it was saving the South from a slave-insurrection by withdrawing the most desperate and enterprising element; and that at best those rescued were only a few compared with the many that remained. But Siebert shows a very direct connection between the rescues and the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850, and between that law and the Civil War. One biographer of Lincoln declares that, during the days immediately preceding the Emancipation Proclamation, the auction block and whip-lash of the old New Orleans slave market, which he had visited as a lad, were ever before the great President's eyes.

But neither the Emancipation Proclamation nor the Fifteenth Amendment could make of the negro a free man; his initiation into freedom has been a slow retail process—still far from completed—in the working out of which many devoted people have borne a part, though none, in these later years, so wise and statesman-like a part as Mr. Booker Washington. "Up from Slavery" is a study in the retail method.

The writer of this paper has had a minor share in the Child Labor campaign so recently closed in Pennsylvania. Prohibition has been extended from factory work to many other occupations; the age limit has been raised from thirteen to fourteen; the old premium upon false swearing

[2] "The Underground Railroad," by Wilbur H. Siebert.

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which accepted the parent's statement of age as final has been replaced by careful evidence requirements; and night work is regulated under the age of sixteen for the first time, though with certain important and disgraceful exceptions forced into the law by the politically powerful glass industry.

The campaign was an instructive one. For seven months before the new bill was drafted, schedules of individual working children had been gathered in from those who knew them in clubs, classes, homes and reformatories. At one stage the movement was nearly wrecked by a group of reformers who tried to foist upon it a separate reform, though an important one—the movement for a shorter working day. Enthusiasm for raising the age one year was easily aroused; it was warmly advocated by those who opposed all effective enforcement features. They were prepared to say, in effect, make the age anything you please, provided you do not worry us with these tiresome details about birth and baptismal certificates, about evidence of the school attendance and all the rest.

The bill became a law, but let no one imagine that child labor reforms have been secured in Pennsylvania; they have been made possible, but their securing must be by a tedious retail process upon which the friends of the law have just entered. The movement drew its best life from an interest in individual children, and it returns to them again, watching and safeguarding their interests, explaining the law and its enforcement to their employers, teachers, and parents, coöperating with the factory inspectors and with the school authorities who now issue employment certificates, seeking out any individual cases of undue hardship caused by the sudden change and making it possible for the children to remain in school without causing suffering in the family, enlisting a larger corps of friends and intelligent supporters for the schools to which the children are sent back, informing the public about the iniquity of night work—all of these retail tasks are opening up before a committee some of whose members were innocent enough to suppose that their task was one of a few months at most.

Is it not possible to trace through these two movements

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the method of development in a vital process? First, you begin to care for a small group of burden-bearers, and then, before you know it, you have acquired definite convictions as to the means of their emancipation and are committed to a program. Your generalization grows upon you, you begin to see its larger bearings and ally yourself with others who are like-minded. You secure a new law or a new interpretation of an old one; you make some impression upon public opinion; and then, if you are in earnest, you do not stop there, you are pushed onward by the force of your convictions back into the retail method again, to see that your generalization does its full work, that it is effectively and completely applied. Your experience has swept you around in a circle, but your return is a return with a difference; your minor key of doubt and restless searching is changed to the major of assured conviction, and to the working out of that conviction quietly and persistently. It is possible, of course, to join the ranks of reform at any station along the road, but the man who has taken the whole journey, be it on a great mission or a small one, has had a genuine experience; he has allied himself with a world process, has brought forth "new good, new beauty, from the old."

But why insist upon what is, perhaps, an undisputed thing? Why not dwell upon the other and equally obvious truth that there are still a great many people in this world who are so buried in pottering details that they need to be driven out of them by some sort of intellectual explosive? The writer is content to leave that task to the many who are now publishing books, articles and broadsides about social questions, for we find twenty of them who are ready to tell us what to do about everything for one who can tell us clearly what to do about anything. And there are several good reasons for believing that America's great need to-day is a new respect for small tasks and small beginnings. We are wasteful consumers and bad administrators, and if ever a nation needed to be put to school to retail processes, it is ours.

Our two greatest failures are not unaccounted for. The

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century behind us has been one of vast improvement in the processes of production—even the campaign orator cannot exaggerate the facts—but economists are beginning to point out that this ratio of improvement in production cannot continue, that our people must begin to perfect the processes of consumption in which they have been so notoriously wasteful and inept. Production, infinitely divided in process, has become more and more wholesale; consumption, not thus divisible, is in the nature of things a retail process.

Then, the century behind us has been a century of law making. We have been too busy building up, in our new communities, a system of legal enactments to develop an equally elaborate system of enforcement. On the side of administration, especially in our larger centers of population, we are confessedly weak. But the enactment of law is a wholesale process, its enforcement is a retail process; and into this particular retail process—the process of administration, we shall need to throw all the strength and virtue there is in us for many years to come.

As one practical suggestion, growing out of these considerations, the time has arrived more deliberately and systematically than ever before to put our young people to school at such retail methods of social service as shall lead to fruitful generalizations later on and so back to their retail working out. The process must be got into their muscles early; it must include a thorough drill in doing small things well, for our present generation is drunk with big figures, and their instructors must understand the relation of small things to large, must believe, moreover, that good volunteer service is a most important part of good government in a democracy.

During this last decade more especially, our national habit of thought has exalted the expert and the professional at the expense of the volunteer. By those who hold the extreme of this view, it is assumed that only officials should be permitted to be charitable. The idea is essentially undemocratic and false, and there are some signs of a healthy reaction. The new School for Social Workers in Boston had an

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enrollment last year in which two-thirds of the regular students were volunteers. Mrs. Herbert Parsons is pleading for a more intelligent use of young women of leisure as volunteer workers in our educational system and in children's institutions.[3] An English visitor has just pointed out[4] the great advantages in the use of volunteer probation officers, and it would seem, if Miss Bartlett is reporting the Indianapolis experience accurately, that a juvenile court having not only 113 men (lawyers, doctors, ministers, men of business) as its volunteer probation officers, but a judge and chief probation officer capable of guiding and interpreting their work, was indeed building for the future. Plans for the further development of child-saving in Indianapolis will knit themselves into the community life and be modified by that life in a wholesome way that no expert handling of things in remote corners could ever accomplish.

It has been the writer's privilege to see the beginnings of successful municipal reform movements in several cities, but their success has been their ending wherever the ground has not been well prepared beforehand by the careful organization of smaller social tasks. When Seth Low was elected Mayor of New York, he selected for his private secretary a man who had lived for many years in a settlement on the East Side; he selected for his Commissioner of Public Charities one who had served his apprenticeship in a voluntary organization interested in visiting public institutions; he selected for the new Tenement House Department two men who had served long and faithfully, the one as a volunteer the other as a paid worker in the Charity Organization Society; and he selected for important posts in other departments men who, like these, had "run with the footmen" without becoming weary, and so were prepared to "contend with horses." It is true that Tammany returned to power in two years' time, and that some of the good work accom-

[3] "A Plan for Girls with Nothing to Do." Elsie Clews Parsons, in *Charities* for March 4, 1905.

[4] "The Value of Volunteers in Probation Work." Lucy C. Bartlett, in *Charities*, July 29, 1905.

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plished by these officials was undone, but Tammany is a rebuked and chastened Tammany, at present, and a new use has been discovered for our voluntary organizations. They furnish in our boss-ridden cities some continuity of policy and effort, and establish a very useful sort of endless chain when to them return the efficient officials turned out by ungrateful municipalities. In office or out these men are, in this way, given an opportunity to use the experience they have gained for the public good. The retail method of these social service agencies that try to provide good leadership for volunteers must seem to such officials, in its slow unfolding, the only way of establishing a broader basis for administrative efficiency.

"Stick to the individual case," said a wise charity organization leader to one about to assume leadership. "Let nothing drive you away from it, for, rightly handled, there's the whole of social reform in it." The whole of social reform is in the retail method, when we follow faithfully wherever its careful working out may lead.

MARY E. RICHMOND.

PHILADELPHIA.

SUICIDE: SOME OF ITS CAUSES AND PREVENTIVES.

"IT brought me to the verge of desperation, and well nigh made me put an end to my life. Art! Art alone deterred me. Ah! how could I quit the world before bringing forth all that I felt that it was my vocation to produce!" These grand words of Beethoven's, when recalling the agony he endured on finding that the harmonies amid which he had lived a charmed life were gradually becoming to him mere memories show how a suicidal tendency can be arrested by the saving power of an ideal of duty.

The increase of suicide is one of the most urgent problems of the day, among us English as well as elsewhere. Is it because we are losing the ideal of duty from want of religious

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faith, from the struggle for existence, from self-indulgence, or from too great pressure of brain-power?

In all ages suicide has been a possible factor to be dealt with by many who have greatly suffered either physically or mentally. In pre-Christian times it did not need great agony to tempt a man to put an end to his life. It seemed a natural finality, though perhaps not the highest form of heroism. His friends, trying to dissuade Cato from killing himself, showed their belief that he displayed weakness of soul in preferring death to hardship. The conduct of Regulus would have been considered far nobler, as he preferred all the horrors of captivity among the Carthaginians to undergoing a voluntary death. Cicero compares a man and his life to a sentinel placed in his station, which he ought not to leave till relieved by his commander who placed him there—a simile that has been used in more modern days by Sir Philip Sydney [1] and Massinger.[2]

Virgil places in hell those—

"Who prodigally threw their souls away;
Fools, who repining at their wretched state
And loathing anxious life, suborned their fate.
With late repentance now they would retrieve
The bodies they forsook, and wish to live;
Their pains and poverty desire to bear
To view the light of heaven and breathe the vital air.
But Fate forbids; the Stygian floods oppose
And with nine circling streams, the captive souls enclose."

Dante, following his most constant tutor, places suicides in the seventh circle, and speaks of the eternal divorce of soul and body.

". . . . . for what a man
Takes from himself, it is not just he have."

In the early Christian Church suicide was permitted to women to preserve chastity, but St. Augustine differed on this point

[1] "Arcadia."
[2] "Virgin Martyr."

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from St. Jerome and St. Chrysostom, as he held a woman may be still chaste in spite of forced pollution. "Were it right to commit suicide in order to escape danger of future guilt," he says, "it were best for the Christian to kill himself immediately after baptism—but to maintain such a doctrine were sheer madness." Deliberate suicide nearly ceased for a time in most countries with the establishment of Christianity, and very generally continued in abeyance till the eighteenth century, the time of philosophic doubt—"the age of Light, Light without Love."[3] When, however, we say that suicide became almost a negative quantity after the introduction of Christianity, it is melancholy to reflect that wholesale outbreaks of suicide were induced at various times by the cruelty which so-called Christians inflicted upon the Jews. What happened during the raging of the Black Death in the Rhenish towns in 1348-50, was by no means a solitary instance of this, when the unfortunate Jews were blindly accused of causing the pestilence by poisoning the wells, that common accusation formerly brought against any unpopular party at the time of any epidemic. To escape the fury roused by the spread of this delusion numbers burned themselves to death in their synagogues, and others massacred themselves in their houses. We know from "Ivanhoe" that the Norman barons thought no cruelty too long or severe to practice on the Jews, though Front de Boeuf's meditated tortures to extract money from Isaac of York were happily frustrated. York had many Jewish inhabitants, and has been the scene in olden days of many a sickening tragedy. On *one single occasion* five hundred Jews died by their own hands in that city! A great number of suicides *among Christians* took place in the eleventh century throughout the Western Church when Gregory VII decreed the celibacy of the clergy, and many of the discarded wives killed themselves some from grief and poverty, some very probably from the morbid belief that they had led evil lives.

Forms and ceremonies to inculcate horror at the act among the survivors have existed more or less in all civilized coun-

[3] Keble.

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tries. Burning the dead body, dragging the body out of the house through a hole in the door, (else it was believed the next person who stepped across the threshold would also commit suicide) or burying at cross-roads, were all forms in common use in most countries.

The last person who was subjected to burial at a cross-road, in England, was the parricide-suicide, Griffiths, who was interred June 1823, at the intersection of Grosvenor Place and the King's Road. Some authorities hold that a cross-road was selected for such a burial because it was a place where a cross, or crucifix sometimes stood, which made the spot only second in sanctity to the church-yard, and prayers could be offered up by wayfarers for mercy on the soul of the sinner. Another view, less charitable, is that the earth generally, and roads individually, rejected such a burden, and by burial at a cross-way, the roads divided the shame of it. The stake through the body was perhaps at first intended not as an insult, but to deter the ghost of the departed from walking on the earth again.

Religious, social and economic circumstances, education, hygienic conditions, all are factors in the increase and decrease of suicide. So far as regards education, a higher standard of general culture is always accompanied by a larger number of suicides, partly because a highly developed brain is more sensitive and feels more keenly. When considered from the point of view of the Christian religion in different European countries, the numbers are lowest where the Greek Church is the established form, and highest among Protestants. That the number in Paris is enormous as compared with those in all France points to the irreligious city in a partially religious country. Italy and Spain are examples of less suicide in countries where Roman Catholicism yet holds her own, but Italy has begun to think while Spain remains priest-trammeled, and therefore the Italian average is twice as high. Germany and Switzerland having very high numbers may indicate the mental unrest in countries where two religions clash. Protestantism a term here inclusive of Lutheran, Calvinist, and other forms—invariably has a high number as compared to Greek and Roman Catholic churches; this probably points to the dark and hope-

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less Calvinistic principle of predestination, and also to the need of guidance in mental disquietude, the divine touch of human sympathy of which every soul at some time is in need, being met, more or less well, by the system of confession.

Statistics of special causes are however almost impossible to draw up; who can disentangle the cause and causer of the cause of grief, drink, or insanity? Mrs. Bosanquet in "The Strength of the People," places character as the strength of the nation, and it is the building up of character to which we must look as one of the barriers to suicide. The outcome of character, the doing of duty and forgetfulness of self, is shown to be a safeguard by the fact that in time of war suicide numbers are at a minimum, both among those in the field and those who stay at home. For then *everyone has interests outside himself.* During 1870-71 the time of the Franco-German War, the upward movement of suicide and madness was stopped in France. Of madness as well as suicide, because as is well known, the causes which tell on suicide are influences also on insanity. In England it has been the same, as regards those at home and in South Africa, but unhappily in France as well as Great Britain the immediate years following the war is usually a suicidal time owing to scarcity of work, much sickness, and, on first return, sometimes too much drink.

The general proportion of sex in most civilized countries of those who commit suicide is three men to one woman, but in England and Wales the average is two men to one woman, and in Denmark four to one. Child-suicides are more in number than would be commonly believed, and Dr. O'Dea has a heart-breaking list of them comprising, among several others, five who killed themselves from fear of punishment, one from cruel treatment, one from aversion to school. Like their elders, the majority of those who so die, would do so from some cause of misery; but in Harriet Martineau's autobiography we learn how she, as a child of seven years old, made serious preparations to cut her throat with a big carving knife, simply because she imagined Paradise full of flowers, "gay with yellow and lilac crocus," and wished to hasten thither! Naturally children do not realize what is involved in surrender of life; they have

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no horror of death unless it has been instilled into them by unwise elders. The case of a child made miserable by ill-treatment at school, or home, is peculiarly sad, as the few round them usually compose their world, and the sensitiveness of youth sometimes drives them into a morbid belief of the whole, or a part of the accusations brought. The acute misery of a neglected or tormented boy or girl can never be the same in later life, as years bring a wider outlook and different standards. Youth is, no doubt, a time of hope, but not on the part of the young, only of their elders concerning them. Being sent to Coventry by his school-fellows, for a prolonged time, and through fear or hopelessness neither claiming nor receiving help from any in authority, has been known to make a boy hang himself, and in other cases bodily, added to mental, misery, has been the cause.

Suicide for love disappointments came into fashion with the "Sorrows of Werther." "We were speaking of suicide which you compare with great actions, when it is impossible to regard it as anything but a weakness. It is much easier to die than to bear a life of misery with fortitude." Unluckily these words of the wise Albert did not touch sentimental young people as much as did the actions of the love-lorn Werther. Goethe assures us that at one time he had himself a decided *penchant* for suicide, and that among his collection of weapons he set great value on an ornamental dagger, which he kept close to his bed-side and essayed occasionally to see if he could stick the point into his breast, a feat which he candidly acknowledged he never was able to perform!

Worry and unrest drive many a woman to desperation, where she could endure even worse troubles if enabled to meet them in quietness. About 1870, in the war time, the Jewish ladies in Paris petitioned their spiritual heads to keep the synagogue opened all the day long, alleging the practice of the Roman Catholic Churches in that particular, and declaring that many a person driven to despair might be saved by a time for solitude and prayer.

The suicides through purely physical sufferings occur in a greater number among the upper ranks than among the lower.

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Perhaps the passive endurance of a life of material hardship has been a better training than a course of possibly unconscious and fairly innocent self-indulgence and softer living. Neuralgia, cancer, *angina pectoris,* (complaint indeed fulfilling its name!) and *ilnesses allied with remorse* lead to many self-inflicted deaths. Consumption, however, seldom does, unless at the same time the patient suffers from some abdominal complaint, which creates a depression, such as more than discounts the hopeful nature of normal phthisis.

We hear of a man shooting himself, or of a woman taking an over-dose of chloral, in the agony of a fit of neuralgia. We may not judge, but in some cases it is an indication of lack of character and training; the suicide has probably had the pain before, though in a less degree, and if the idea of self-murder came to him or her, and was entertained, instead of being driven away as an entire impossibility, it would naturally come again some time with overwhelming force. People are not sufficiently trained in the dogma that self-murder is a breach of the sixth commandment. They think with Blount, the Deist, "I myself am King of Me, and may change one country for another." It is belief in the right to power of choice that makes self-will assert its claim in opposition to the lawful authority of Church and State. It is self-will and the want of dogmatic training that is at the bottom of many self-inflicted deaths. Purely moral principle, without the aid of religious conviction, may be a sufficient deterrent in a strong character, as for instance, in that of Napoleon Bonaparte. He said once, referring to English newspapers, "In one of them I am described as a coward, which I did not really expect; but it turned out, after all, that the writer did not accuse me of avoiding danger, or of flying from the enemy. I wanted courage, it seems, because I did not coolly take a dose of poison, or throw myself into the sea, or blow out my brains. The editor most certainly misunderstands me: I have, at least, too much courage for *that.* Suicide is a crime the most revolting to my feelings; nor does any reason suggest itself to my understanding by which it can be justified. It certainly originates in that species of fear, which we term *poltronnerie.* For what claim can that man

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have to courage who trembles at the frowns of Fortune? True heroism consists in being superior to the ills of life, in what shape they may challenge him to the combat." Napoleon had a right to speak, for a weaker man, probably, in his place would have ended his life, which then consisted of overthrown ambitions, great physical sufferings, hopeless imprisonment, and was without the sustaining power of any specially religious faith.

A great preacher of the present day[4] says that "the terrible prevalence of suicide is more than a passing phenomenon; it means souls snapping here and there under God's correction."

That there *are* cases of self-killing which is not murder, few would deny: where the brain is affected by hereditary or other insanity, by physical or mental suffering, by starvation, anxiety and hopelessness. Loneliness is a great factor and the unmarried far outnumber the married in suicide statistics; where there are children, the widowers outnumber the widows; perhaps this shows a woman can struggle through almost any troubles as long as someone is dependent on her. Where there are no children, as a rule, suicides of widows are far more numerous than those of widowers.

It was loneliness and disappointed ambitions that caused the death of that "marvellous boy," Chatterton. He was only eighteen when in desolate London lodgings he took the fatal arsenic, and yet for many months he had already pondered over the idea of suicide, and the year before had written:

> "Since we can die but once, what matters it
> If rope or garter, poison, pistol, sword,
> Slow wasting sickness or the sudden burst
> Of valve arterial in the noble parts
> Curtail the miseries of human life?
> Tho' varied in the cause, the effect's the same
> All to one common dissolution tends."

Had but his sense of duty been as great as his genius, he would have lived for his mother's sake. He was an only son,

[4] Canon Newbolt.

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and born after his father's death. By Chatterton's act his mother endured many years of privation, dying at last of a lingering disease brought on by her troubles. Chatterton still had original manuscripts with him, some written under his own name (besides spurious copies of old books), which would have brought him money, but in a fit of anger against the world which neglected him, at the last moment he destroyed them. It was but a passing phase through which a sense of duty or a wise friend might have borne him safely, and his genius would have been too triumphant not to be speedily acknowledged.

The English gaolers of the type Charles Reade showed up in "Never too late to Mend" induced much suicide from condemning a prisoner to darkness in addition to solitude, which the nerves of few men could stand.[5] That old novel which happily helped to work a change in prison life was brought to our mind some time since, when the papers mentioned the death in prime old age of the original "Evans," Charles Reade's humane gaoler. He was drawn as true to life as was poor Josephs, the boy of fifteen who hanged himself in his cell to save himself from further tortures.

The lesson to be drawn in some cases of suicide is the innate need of brain power being balanced by manual labor or active exercise. Too much reverie has at all times inspired a disgust for labor, and led to suicide, mostly through morbidity. We see the results of a preponderance of thought and speech over action, together with indecision of will in Hamlet, as evidenced especially in his argument "To be, or not to be." A strong, well-balanced character is armed against suicide. Clive was an example of how one who does not on principle drive away the idea of self-destruction, is, even if prevented from putting it into execution at one time, likely to be unable to resist it at a later period. As a boy of seventeen he had a writership given him by the old East India Company, and went to Madras. He was shy and haughty, homesick and lonely, wretchedly lodged, and miserably paid, so much so that in common with the other

[5] We believe that the original of the heroic chaplain whom Charles Reade described was Rev. G. Hamilton, Archdeacon of Northumberland, who died Sept., 1905.

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junior clerks he could hardly subsist without incurring debt. Twice while residing in the Writer's Buildings he attempted to destroy himself, and twice the pistol which he snapped at his own head failed to go off. This circumstance, it is said, affected him as a similar escape affected Wallenstein. After satisfying himself that the pistol was really well loaded he burst forth into an exclamation that surely he was reserved for something great. Public affairs, work, excitement of life, wealth and rank, all buoyed him up for many years, but in the end, his health again failing, and once more depressed by loneliness and the feeling that the world was against him, the old idea, which had *not been rooted out,* recurred to him: he again attempted his life, and this time he was not saved.

> "Man errs not that he deems
> His welfare his true aim
> He errs because he dreams
> The world does but exist that welfare to bestow." [6]

A morbid wish about self-destruction can sometimes be counteracted by treatment as for a bodily disease. Solitude and a sedentary life being the worst foes to mental health, remedies can be sought in active exercise, attention to diet, disuse of alcohol, and above all in confidence in a friend, or perhaps if unmarried, in marriage. Alcohol has always a special effect on the brain: it upsets the balance of the mind, and the pendulum swings with too great force between the present effect of forgetfulness or ease, and the after one of depression. During the three terrible months of the siege of Lucknow, there were several suicides; but nearly all happened quite early in the seige, when the soldiers still had dealt out to them drink as well as eatables. "With reduced diet and plain water the conduct of the men became more exemplary. The instances of cowardice and shirking were very few, those of fortitude, courage and brave endurance very many."[7] And what heroic endurance it was; constant discomfort from heat, flies and dirt, chronic expectation of death, the common sight or news of persons mor-

[6] Matthew Arnold.

[7] "The siege of Lucknow." Lady Inglis.

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tally wounded, or having to undergo amputations without chloroform, added to the agonizing dread and ignorance of what might be happening to those in Cawnpore and elsewhere. Surely it is wonderful that suicides were not many more. But at Lucknow it was again a case of the saving power of an ideal of duty.

One wonders if Church or State cannot lift up their voice more on this question of suicide. The worst possible lesson to teach any citizen is contempt for law. And yet what can we call it but contempt when, partly from sympathy for the family, and partly from the mistaken feeling that to lean on the side of mercy is kinder and quite harmless,—the coroner and jury at an inquest for *felo de se* almost invariably bring in a verdict of "unsound mind," a verdict which leaves a man's will in force, and allows the burial service to be read. But as the Duke of Wellington said, misplaced leniency is often the greatest cruelty. It has been suggested that it would be an extra deterrent if coroner's juries, on sufficient evidence to show the sanity of the suicide, could incorporate in their verdict a clause denunciatory of self-murder. It would certainly greatly influence the majority of people as to the question of suicide being a crime, if the burial were always at night in solemn silence. The difficulty in England of divorced persons re-marrying in Church, has awakened some few people to regarding the marriage of a divorcé as a sin: cannot the Church show that she also recognizes the responsibility of sometimes withholding the funeral service?

C. F. YONGE.

LONDON.

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THE INDUSTRIAL MILLENNIUM.

THE industrial millennium, by which is meant, of course, the industrial ideal, is easily conceived in outline, and not difficult to describe in general terms. It is an industrial condition, in which life is the end of labor and labor is the means of life. Every man is at work in the best way at what he can do best, for the good of all and not for private profit. Labor and capital are at peace, for all are laborers for a common end, and capital is but the means of making the common labor effective. Material resources are husbanded, and labor is employed and directed with but one end in view, the attainment of the maximum quantity and quality of human life.

Is it worth while, however, to consider an industrial ideal so remote as this? What possible interest can the practical man of to-day have in the industrial millennium? A little reflection ought to show that it is not merely worth while but that it is of the utmost importance for us to try to conceive what industrial society ought to be, and what it must become if progress is to continue, and to realize that a rational industrial ideal is one of the most practical things that can engage our thought. The ideal is always practical. It implies a plan. Its attractive power is no less dynamic than the propelling power of circumstances. There are few who do not recognize this in relation to individual action—for instance, in education and in business. Without some ideal there is no aim, and nothing to serve as a standard of comparison. But social ideals are even more practical than individual ideals, since they involve a larger control and direction of energy. The criterion, by which existing social conditions and institutions and every proposed method of social amelioration and reform are to be tested, is some conception of a social ideal. The precision and finality of the test depend upon the scientific accuracy of this conception. Science has therefore no higher or more important function than the formulation, on the basis of existing facts and conditions, of social ideals involving the highest possibilities of life,

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and which may be progressively realized. This is especially true, owing to the importance of the economic factor in social development, with respect to industry.

Industrial science, however, has been slow to recognize the legitimacy and importance of this function. Industrial ideals, it is said, are chimerical, Utopian; science should have nothing to do with ideals. But it is just because industrial and social ideals have hitherto been fantastic that science should rescue them from the region of fancy and establish them in the region of fact. Such ideals will always appear and will influence the actions of men. Whether they shall be *ignes fatui,* leading us astray, or beacons set up with care and foresight, science alone can determine. It is folly to say that industrial science should have nothing to do with ideals. What may be industrially is one of the most important objects of thought. It gives the highest significance and consequence to every discovery of what has been. Until an industrial ideal, which from its scientific character will compel general acceptance is formulated, political economy will deserve to some extent the accusation of sterility.

It is then a deplorable fact, due in part to this conception of the limits of science, that as yet we have no generally acceptable and accepted industrial ideal. This lack is the source of inestimable mental perplexity and political and industrial friction. We have so-called individualists and collectivists, anarchists and socialists, with every shade of intermediate opinion, and a consequent confusion of tongues. The dominant political party, for instance, cries "stand pat," "let well enough alone," implying that the majority of voters have no industrial ideal at all, or that the ideal has been already attained. The other great party harks back to an antiquated and now impossible era of free competition. The socialist party, which, whatever we may think of its doctrines, is the only party with anything like a scientific program, has an ideal, to be sure, but it is as yet the ideal of comparatively a few. It may be said, too, that many of the socialists are themselves so enamored of their ideal, that they seem unwilling to take the intervening steps necessary to attain it. We are, in fact, a nation, practically without

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an industrial ideal. This fact should awaken anxious solicitude. "Where there is no vision the people perish."

We are, then, wholly within the realms of science, and engaged in a most practical undertaking, when we endeavor to forecast certain broad features of the industrial world as it ought to be. We may begin by asking: What are the hints that may be gathered from industrial evolution and present conditions in regard to the industrial goal towards which conscious efforts at industrial reform should be directed? What is the industrial ideal?

In the first place, it seems indisputable that perfect conditions of industry imply perfect rationality in industrial activities and relations. An industrial condition, in which the end of labor is not the highest conceivable, or in which means are imperfectly adapted to ends, or results disproportionate to efforts, would at once be recognized as a condition capable of improvement, hence not ideal. The industrial ideal must therefore be a rational industrial order. It must be the embodiment of reason.

Reason, however, can manifest itself on the industrial plane only in the character of the objects to be pursued, and in the relation of means to ends. If the ends of industry are not the highest, or if the industrial means for attaining them are not the best, there is *pro tanto* an absence of perfect reason. Reason in industry spells economy. The industrial ideal must perfectly illustrate the principle of the economy of force.

We have now the central idea from which must radiate all true conceptions of industrial relations. It is the idea of economy. The word economy is here used, of course, in the broadest sense. As popularly understood, economy is not always a praiseworthy end. This is because popular thought runs on financial economy. This sometimes becomes niggardliness, penuriousness, stinginess—a false economy. It defeats its highest end. "There is that scattereth and yet increaseth; and there is that withholdeth more than is meet, but it tendeth to poverty." In the broader sense—the social sense—economy means the most effective use of all available resources in the interest of human life. The practical question with reference

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to any industrial practice or policy is: What is or will be its effect in the matter of promoting industrial economy? remembering always that the chief element in this economy is not material wealth, but the lives and happiness of men.

Not to make this discussion altogether ideological, however, let us approach the subject from the standpoint of industrial tendencies.

To determine whither the industrial world is tending it is necessary to examine the principles underlying industrial evolution, and to determine which of these principles give promise of becoming dominant. Waste or economy, competitive strife or coöperation, egoism or altruism, love or hate, individualism or collectivism—which of these are the abiding elements in our industrial life? This being ascertained, the industrial ideal ought to be found by tracing these elements or principles to their ultimate effects.

Now, when we look into the evolution of industry or into the business of to-day, the first feature which strikes the eye is the effort of individuals to promote individual economy. Improvement in industry has always been in this direction. Progress in industry has, from one point of view, been the gradual release of human energy from industry. The business man of to-day, for instance, improves his organization, perfects his machinery, utilizes waste products, etc., all for the purpose of promoting economy from the standpoint of his financial interest. The principle of his action is maximum return for minimum expenditure, and that is but the principle of the economy of force. The corporation and the trust illustrate exactly the same thing. Economy is the law of business.

The principle, however, is capable of wider application. It runs through all forms of human activity, all social evolution. Intelligence always seeks the highest return in happiness for energy expended. The evolution of intelligence, individual or social, is characterized by increasing economy. Economy is the law of mind.

As society becomes more conscious and intelligent, then, the more will it demand that individual economies conform to social economy, the complete elimination of industrial waste.

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The industrial millennium implies the complete absence of industrial friction, the reduction of labor to that which is socially necessary, and the performance of that labor with the minimum expenditure of energy, that is, perfect industrial economy. This is the goal of industrial evolution.

Such economy, however, is inconceivable without coöperation, for with out the coöperation of men perfect industrial efficiency is manifestly impossible. Moreover, this coöperation must be voluntary. Compulsion would involve a loss of energy in supervision and in the potential service of those who labor under it. Forced labor is never as efficient as free labor.

The industrial millennium, then, can never come until we have the coöperative type of man—the man who can combine with his fellows to promote the common life, the man who will submit to be organized, subordinated and disciplined for the sake of humanity, just as a member of an orchestra, as Amiel has suggested, submits himself to be organized, subordinated and disciplined for the sake of his art and for the sake of producing a masterpiece.

Now we have a ground of hope that such a type of man is coming. The unconscious coöperation of modern industry is gradually developing it. The education of the family, the school and the church tend in the same direction. The trades unions, with all their faults, are developing the spirit of coöperation through their collective efforts for mutual benefit. The spirit of coöperation is the inevitable outcome of friendly association. The man of the future, providing always that progress continues, is not the "Blonde Beast" of Nietzsche, the man of blood and iron, but the man who is wise enough to be simple, strong enough to be inoffensive, and great enough to be humble. "Blessed are the meek, for they shall inherit the earth."

Voluntary coöperation implies fellowship, brotherhood, love. The industrial millennium is an ethical, as well as an industrial organization. It must be ethical to be economic, in the real sense of that word. Love is both cause and effect of coöperation. Whatever promotes the one encourages the other. It would be sheer cowardice to avoid the apparent sentimentality

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involved in declaring that love is the chief ingredient of the solvent of all industrial problems. There is nothing else that will bring employer and employee together, nothing else that will produce a harmonious industrial order. An industrial millennium cannot be conceived without it. "He that loveth another hath fulfilled the law."

But coöperation in the spirit of love is not all that is essential to industrial economy. There must be direction of industrial forces. This direction must be by self-chosen, and consequently irresponsible individuals, or by society itself, acting through elected agents. The former method, the method of to-day, is capable of producing a high economy, but it is not ideal, owing to the multiplicity of ends to be served. The ends of industry must be unified. They must become public instead of private. Ideal economy can come, therefore, only through the application of the democratic principle in the industrial world, as it has already been applied in the political world. The application of the principle, however, is not alone sufficient. Democracy is not an end, but a means. If industry were wholly democratized, economy would still depend upon the degree of administrative capacity shown by popular representatives. A society that will elect boodlers to office, and wink at corruption and graft, imagines a vain thing, if it supposes that the extension of democracy to industry would bring immediate relief from industrial difficulties. The success of democracy, political or industrial, must depend upon the spirit and administrative capacity of men chosen by a majority vote. Education and a high sense of civic responsibility are therefore necessary to make industrial democracy effective.

The drift of industry, then, is toward an ideal economy in which coöperative labor under democratic direction is necessarily implied. This drift, obvious enough now even to the casual observer, will become more and more pronounced as men grasp the ideal here suggested and begin to ask themselves: How shall we act individually and collectively, so as best to forward the realization of this ideal?

Let me condense the argument. The industrial millennium must be a perfectly rational order, otherwise it would not be a

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millennium at all. A rational industrial order must manifest itself in industrial economy, which is but the manifestation of reason on the industrial plane. Perfect industrial economy, however, is impossible without voluntary coöperation, which in turn is dependent on the coöperative spirit or love. Finally, the effectiveness, that is, the economy of voluntary coöperative effort depends upon intelligent and unselfish direction of industry, which can be secured ideally only by means of intelligent democratic control. Hence the industrial millennium is a perfected industrial democracy.

The social regulation of industry, then—its progressive socialization, if you please,—is in accord with the principles of evolution, biological and social. It reveals itself in the history of industrial progress. It is demanded by the human spirit which, as it evolves in intelligence and purpose, will more and more seek release from the toil and moil of present industry by humanizing the machine, by doing away with unnecessary labor and by transforming necessary industry into art. This means social organization for the economy of time and energy, and social control for effectiveness. It may mean also a certain sacrifice of initiative by the individual. But what if it does? Industry is not life. If it were, men would do well to resist any movement which might tend to destroy, or even to restrict, individual initiative in the field of toil. Industry is but a phase of life, and by no means the highest phase. It consists of those activities of mind and muscle that are necessary to provide the material means, the physical basis of life. If it can ever be made to assume right relations to life men will gladly surrender individual initiative there, if need be, for the far more necessary and desirable initiative in the higher realms of life.

But before industrial democracy can come, in anything but form, the spirit of democracy must grow. External changes in the industrial environment are necessary. They can do much. But no external change can be permanently effective without moral and psychological changes in men. The industrial millenium implies the principle "all for each and each for all." In how many of us is the spirit of coöperation sufficiently developed to make that the working principle of our

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lives? It implies universal brotherhood. How many of us are, in our hearts, a brother to men of all degree and of all color? Sometimes when I hear men advocating, in a spirit of hate, an industrial and social order founded upon love, I wonder if they ever reflect upon their own unfitness for the conditions they seek to promote. The words of Jesus have here a certain application: "Not every one that sayeth Lord, Lord, shall enter into the kingdom; . . . but he that doeth the will." . . . "Many will say in that day: Have we not prophesied in Thy name; and in Thy name done many wonderful works; then will I profess unto them, I never knew you; depart from me, ye that work iniquity." The industrial millennium is spirit as well as form.

But if the content of the industrial millennium is dependent upon the spirit of men, the spirit is also dependent upon the form. The form must come to give freedom to the spirit, and unless all signs fail, the form is coming. "The great development of industrialism," says President Roosevelt, "means that there must be an increase in the supervision exercised by the government over business enterprises." Where is this supervision to cease? That depends upon your theory of government. If government is an external and a paternal institution higher than the people, then we may well be jealous of its encroachments in the field of industry. But if the people are supreme and government but the agency through which the will of the people is manifested, and accomplished, then a hard and fast line cannot be drawn. For industry, after all, is a social function, and there is no limit to the right of the people to regulate their own activities, and manage their own affairs, except the limit of expediency, and this will vary from time to time. It will gradually extend as popular intelligence and administrative capacity extend. It will extend by leaps and bounds if the greed and insolence of corporations and trusts are not restrained.

At all events the form of industrial democracy is coming. If violently, then woe worth the day! It will mean a reaction that will hurl us backward down the steep declivity up which the race has so slowly and so painfully climbed. But if grad-

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ually and peacefully, as men are prepared for it in spirit, intelligence and administrative capacity, it will mean the dawn of a day of progress beyond anything which has entered into our imaginations to conceive. The unresting spirit of man aspiring to become a god, will have broken and cast off the chrysalis if industrial materialism in which work is the end of life, to soar with unfettered wings in the glorious realms of art, where life is the end of work. "Bliss will it be in that dawn to be alive, but to be young will be very heaven."

Ira Woods Howerth.

The University of Chicago.

ETHICAL FORCES IN THE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE.*

What forces are there in the profession of medicine that tend to bring out the best that is in men? I shall mention five:

1. The sense of an obvious utility to others.
2. The inspiration of taking part in the progress of sciences.
3. The call for manual and mental dexterity.
4. The interest of the community in the profession and its aims.
5. The friendly contact with men, women and children.

1. The business of medicine is to get people out of difficulties through the application of science and of dexterity, manual and pyschical. This task appeals at once to some of the strongest of our natural impulses. When we see a man fall in the street we naturally want to help him up. To lend a hand in unharnessing the horse who has slipped down, to lift the baby onto the electric car, to direct the stranger to his destination, are impulses which spring up spontaneously, as soon as we see the need. No sense of duty has to be appealed to.

Now the tasks of medicine are often of this sort. We see an obvious and crying need. The power to help is in our pos-

* A paper read before the Harvard Ethical Society.

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session. The two pull at each other like magnet and armature, and when we have yielded to the impulse which tugs to be set free, we turn out to have done something for which the community thanks us, something that brings us new power and satisfaction, new friendship and increase of knowledge.

2. This opportunity issues, as I have said, in increase of knowledge. Every case the doctor sees teaches him something new. It is true that he does not notice these opportunities to replenish his knowledge unless he has a goodly stock already, but in medicine I believe it is peculiarly easy to acquire this preliminary outfit.

In most sciences the difficulty is to get started. A moderate working capital will quickly breed more, but it is hard, dry work to acquire that working capital. To get past the dead point where most men stick because there is no impulse to go farther and no immediate visible return for one's exertion, that is the still unsolved problem of undergraduate pedagogics.

But in medicine we find ourselves in the way of learning something, almost before we know it, because we see the use of it and have the power to follow it up. The average medical student as I see him has been as half-hearted as his class-mates in his under-graduate work. At college he goes through the forms of study as if it were someone else's business in which he has no personal stake. But in the medical school he braces up because he begins to feel the pressure of a real need for him, a real use for his knowledge, a real application for his power. As fast as he gets any knowledge in a laboratory he has a chance to use it in a hospital and so to feel its power and to increase it.

Then after getting, through familiarity, a keen desire for the immediate, short-range usefulness of knowledge, he may develop the capacity to work for knowledge whose application is further off, dependent on months or years of work and waiting before the fruition comes. Larger schemes of research, needing patience, faith and imagination, as the first transcontinental railroad did, begin to develop in his mind. He begins to feel the fellowship of others who are working at similar problems, to exchange plans and technique with them, to co-

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öperate with them in research and thus to get friendships that cross the barriers of distance and of race, and lend dignity and zest to his work.

3. But as the physician is kept by his profession in touch with actual human needs, his science is kept from wandering off into scholasticism, pedantry, and over-specialism. He must distinguish the important from the unimportant. He must apply his knowledge, a part of it at least, and for this he needs common-sense skill and dexterity. Many persons do not realize how vitally important manual dexterity is in medicine in the diagnosis as well as in the surgical treatment of disease. To find out what ails your patient you need not merely science but art, not merely knowledge but a trained and delicate ear, a power to recognize slight differences by sight and touch, a power to use various instruments of precision, the microscope, the stethoscope and others. I think it is no exaggeration to say that the training of a physician requires as much time, knack and practice as the training of a musician. Indeed there are many students in every class who do not acquire in four years the skill necessary to use the outfit of an up-to-date physician; they hobble along through their professional life handicapped not by lack of brains or of good will but of deftness in the application of their knowledge in practice.

No less essential than manual dexterity is psychical skill. Both in the investigation and in the treatment of the mental element which is recognized to-day in every disease, there is an art which only long practice can give and which even long practice often fails to bring to efficiency. The art of the cross examiner, the art of the promoter, the art of the translator are familiar examples of psychic dexterity in other professions. Something similar to each of these arts must be practiced and applied by the physician. Three students writing down independently a patient's account of his troubles will get amazingly different stories, containing each of them a liberal proportion of unintended fiction. So to frame one's questions as to bring out the truth and to avoid putting into the patient's mind ideas which he then gives back to you as his own experience, is an art so difficult that some physicians live and die without being able

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to acquire it, yet on this kind of psychic dexterity depends much of the patient's welfare. I have compared this power to the art of the cross examiner, although there are obvious differences. There are similar differences between the art of the promoter (the honest promoter) and the art whereby the physician gains his patient's confidence, but the two have also a good deal in common. Both rest upon ability and integrity, but both call for skill in making that ability and integrity felt, skill in the process of getting into touch. It is good for a man to have to acquire such skill.

The art of the translator is the art of efficient sympathy. It is the power to put one's self in another's place, to get at the meaning behind his words, and then to express that meaning afresh. This most difficult art the successful physician must acquire, and all physicians labor, more or less blindly, to acquire it. No literal translation is a good translation. No literal transcript of what the patient suffers, thinks and wishes is true. He does not express himself in your language. You have to translate him, and it is often a delicate and difficult process, involving sympathy, imagination and understanding.

To understand all is to forgive all. More than that, it is I think to find one's self wholly unable to avoid affection for the person so understood. Hence friendship springs up almost inevitably in any relation which forces us to translate another's meaning sympathetically. In just this relationship the physician again and again finds himself and so in the natural course of his work he is sure to make friends, and to have the best of him developed in the process.

4. I have said that the business of the physician is to get people out of their troubles through the application of science in manual and mental dexterity. Obviously then medicine exercises some of the powers which a man of just our day and generation loves to develop. Science, human helpfulness, manual and mental dexterity are characteristic interests of the modern American. Into them goes some of the best strength of the spirit of our time. Contrast medicine in this respect with other professions. A man who sets himself in this age and in this country to the practice of literature, of painting or of the

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ministry must feel, I think, that he has to succeed in spite of the spirit of his environment rather than by its aid. But the physician has the sympathy and the encouragement of almost everyone whom he meets. Few business men, farmers or laborers are interested in the artist or the priest, but many of them are interested in the physician, and are glad by their sympathy or by their donations to help on his work.

Americans like medical work because its returns are obvious and swift and also because it has in it the *spirit of progress.* Few professional men enjoy as physicians do the stimulus of reading almost every month an account of recent progress in their calling. The artist does not find that discoveries like the use of pastels, like Monet's coloring, like Strauss' orchestration, crowd one another so fast that it is difficult, as it is in medicine, to keep abreast of them. Law and theology are not making many discoveries which interest the general public. But in medicine the demand for an up-to-date man is one which we must obey or fall behind and in the effort to meet this demand we are kept alive and awake.

5. There are few other professions which bring one as medicine does into friendly relation with men, women and children, with rich and poor, with Jew and Gentile. A business man's working hours are usually passed in the society of grown-up men. He sees very little of women or of children. A school teacher lives mostly among children, and a clergyman on the other hand sees lamentably little of men, while an artist or a student may see but few of either sex; but the physician naturally meets a wonderfully rich collection of human beings. Moreover he meets them without any of the conditions of suspicion or antagonism which make friendship difficult. In the houses of the poor he never has to fear (as the charity visitor must) that he will be regarded as an intruder. His business is clear and no one stops to think of him or of their differences from him. There is too much real need to be attended to. The labor leader who inveighs against the villainy of the plutocratic and parasitic classes, finds no difficulty in being on excellent terms with his doctor. Antagonisms and suspicions are for the time laid aside and the simple human nature of doctor and patient can meet and fraternize.

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The doctor carries with him a flag of truce to all the wars that divide us man from man. He enjoys the fruits of perpetual peace and if he has in him any spark of human kindness it can hardly help being fanned into warm friendliness by the events and the deeds that make up the routine of his day's work.

To a man of a certain type of mind there is a wonderful *security* about the life one leads as a physician. For it is possible and not difficult so to arrange one's plans and ambitions that whatever happens you win. Science as one meets it in medicine, friendship as one gains it through medicine, are achievements so precious that it is not at all rare to see men glad of their own failures because through these failures science or friendship moves on a peg. A man may spend his life in the search of a cure for cancer, trying out one possibility after another, and at the end he may be left with empty hands,—no cure found. That would seem to be failure enough to satisfy the most convinced pessimist. But if one has really got into the game and felt the team spirit of it, he is glad of his failures because each of them advances the ball. The possible cures were likely looking; each of them had to be tried out. The work had to be done by some one and now that it is done, now that those possibilities are excluded and the field thus narrowed, other men are set free for more positive advances, as in foot-ball the runner is set free by those who block off for him.

The general practitioner who does little experimental research in pure medicine, is constantly failing to obtain his immediate object, the cure of his patients, but he is practically certain to gain, if he genuinely wants it, the friendship of the people for whom he works, or at any rate an increase in his knowledge of human nature in health and in disease. Rather vague and abstract objects these, you may think. But my experience is that the peculiar opportunities of the practice of medicine and the sympathy of the age in which we work makes these great achievements—skill, science, friendship,—objects to love, as one loves a woman. And this not to the genius or the saint only, but to the average, hard-working man, because it brings out the best that is in him.

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THE PRACTICAL DEDUCTIONS OF THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE.

In this paper a criticism is offered of the most important of the practical deductions of the modern theory of knowledge. The statement of and argument for this deduction are taken mainly from Professor Ward's "Naturalism and Agnosticism," since this exposition has commanded more attention than any other.

The theory of knowledge itself is not here under discussion, but its main position may be recalled. That is summed up in the substitution of the "duality of matter and spirit" for the "dualism" of science and common sense. By this duality it is implied that matter and spirit have neither reality nor meaning apart: that they exist only in union, and constitute the twin factors of a reality composed of both. They penetrate each other right through, even the material world being spiritual, since every relation and category that belongs to it is applied by mind, the only source of relation. This spirituality of the world is, first, a *general* one, since matter cannot be thought of as existing at all in separation from mind; second, a *special* one, since neither can the particular modes in which the world shapes itself be interpreted except anthropomorphically, through experience of the modes of spiritual existence.

A theory of knowledge which shows the world to be throughout spiritual leads naturally to optimism in practical inferences from itself. In this case, the inference is made that, since there is a harmony between the world and our thought, the whole of reality is purposeful in the sense that it is conformable to thought, observes in its processes that uniformity which is the postulate of thinking, and without whose response thought would never have been at home in its world. This is a teleology whose foundations are deeply laid in the structure of knowledge, and which enables us to view with comparative unconcern the battle for natural purposiveness when fought on the lower level of particular adaptation of organism to

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organism, fact to fact, or system to system. It has been called, because of its general aspect, "formal" teleology.

I.

There are many cases in which the discussion of an idea affects really only a part of it. Very few philosophical notions are invalid altogether; but the scope of each is continually being altered by the disputes of the schools. These disputes are, at any particular time, concerned with new aspects or further developments of the notion; there being a fundamental agreement about other aspects. But that which is under discussion is thrust into prominence and is likely, when polemics are heated, to be regarded as the whole idea.

It is historical study which chiefly reminds us of the hidden implications of an idea, and which prevents us from forgetting our agreements in our differences. Because history shows that the common ground of to-day was only gained by contention in a previous time, and that what is now taken for granted was then the new claim that was fighting for sanction. As we approach earlier periods of speculation we come to more simple and essential parts of each notion. The order of time draws out, as it were, those ideas which we carry about in telescoped form, and shows the centre round which the various shells are fastened.

It is thus with the notion of cosmic purpose. In recent times, the influence of the theory of evolution has brought about a fierce battle regarding the evidence granted by the convergence of phenomena to a useful end. Do these facts warrant the assumption that they were designedly pre-arranged, or must they have taken place in any case as ordinary natural results? To all intents and purposes this has been for a long time the argument concerning design. But this discussion has been carried on on the common understanding that the world as a whole was so far adapted to thought that its processes could be discoursed about. This has been assumed, while the appeal on behalf of teleology was being made, not to general features of the world, but to the evidence of numerous specific details.

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But history shows that this foundation of all argument had itself to be laboriously laid. Philosophy began to exist as an apology for the uniformity of natural events. In contra-distinction to the extreme Deism of the early poets, the followers of Thales had to protest for the fact that orderliness and justice were more godlike attributes than caprice. Their speculations concerning "nature," the presence of the one God in the variety of processes, the law of justice, are tantamount to this protest. The poets to whom their thought is chiefly opposed had harped on the supremacy of a divine will whose privilege it was to mingle good and evil, harmony and strife, reward and punishment, in arbitrary disorder. A defiant submission to this dominion was the sum of human virtue. Their verses are voices crying in the wilderness against the strange hazard of creation. There is a famous passage in Archilochus where an eclipse at noon-day calls from him an expression of Promethean sullenness; for if the light of the sun can be hid in the daytime, there is no fancy too wild to be credible. The same ideas, on the ethical side, drew the tears of Simonides. We may hope, according to Pindar, for gifts from "Fate, who giveth all things" (αἶσα πανδώρος), but not count on them. In the dramatic poets this divine caprice is conceived as overruled by necessity, to which even Zeus must bend. But it was left to the early philosophers to bring down divinity from the skies into the world, and to attribute to it constancy instead of varying moods. Greek thought was always religious, but it gained confidence as it stood longer in the presence of the gods.

Before, then, Plato could argue the question between natural uniformity and design, the former concept had to be vindicated. From this point Greek and early modern systems went forward without looking back. But there are moments when men get weary of fighting advanced positions, and strengthen their jaded forces by reflecting on what ground they certainly hold. In the endeavor to push their conquests, they may forget the land behind them; but their memory is sharpened if the fight is a losing one and the enemy exultant. This is what is beginning to happen now. We have begun to look back

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for support to the work of even the pre-Socratics. Against evolution, the teleologist and the natural theologian have fought at least a doubtful battle. And therefore we are beginning to see their flag raised in defiance over positions on which no attack has been declared, and which the enemy regards as neutral and indifferent. Modern idealism is claiming that, whether or not there is design within nature, at least the conformity of nature to thought means that the general scheme of things is teleological. The old evidence is dispensed with, and a new start is made. It is represented, on one side, that this carries the war right into the heart of the enemy's country; while others regard it as a distinct falling back on old issues, a despairing exposition of the obvious, a confession that the attack can no longer be sustained, and an endeavor to cover the retreat. It will here be considered on its merits as a teleological argument especially with a view to the system within which it has been expounded.

II.

Whenever the argument for design is based upon a relation between things, its force lies in the demonstration of some degree of contingency or coincidence. Things have come to be related in a certain way, which so far as we know might have been related quite otherwise. There was no inherent necessity compelling their adjustment. But teleology further implies that the coincidence makes for good, whatever be our standard of the good; and it implies therefore a psychical factor somewhere. In the case of analogy from particular phenomena, the coincidence is between natural products and human ideas of contrivance; and the teleological interpretation is based upon the pleasureable outcome of the phenomena. The strength of evolution is that it makes this no coincidence at all, but shows that, looking to the factors, things could not have fallen out otherwise.

The meaning of this can best be illustrated by taking for a moment the opposite point of view. If we could arrive at any standpoint from which we could deduce with perfect cogency all the aspects of nature and of thought—of goodness, truth,

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and beauty—so that never at any point was there room for an alternative, then we could have no place for the conception of teleology at all. Nothing would be in any way contingent; all would be completely deducible from a necessary concept. Spinoza's vision of the world is the most splendid instance of this. Even although his universe was embraced by the all-inclusive mind and love of the Deity, yet these in their turn were enveloped by the destined fore-ordination of mathematical law. The world followed from the conception of God as the equality of its angles to two right angles followed from the conception of a triangle; and the idea of God was assumed as necessary and as implying existence. Not only every concept of the mind, but every disposition of matter, were bound up in a single and absolutely necessary system. In spite, therefore, of his magnificent view of Divine love, Spinoza was bound to give up the notion of teleology altogether, and he did so in no uncertain way. There can be no coincidence or contingency if everything is the fated outcome of everything else. There must be convergence of lines which are either causally distinct within the same kind, or belong to different kinds of reality. Different organisms or different parts of the same organism may coincide without any apparent physical cause of coincidence; natural phenomena may coincide with intellectual ideals, or ethical standards; and thus we have "adaptation," or "contrivance," or "purpose." What is essential is that there be in some measure difference, independence, absence of necessary relation; that there shall still be adaptation or coincidence; and that this shall be for good. So far as we show dependence or necessary relation, adaptation ceases to be purposeful.

Idealism does not seek to condition reality; it is debarred from this by its own objection to transcendent arguments. But it asserts that within reality it finds a contingent relation between two kinds of processes—the order of facts and the order of thought. These two orders are found to be adapted to each other in such a way as to yield the happy result that the world is thinkable, that thought can find itself therein. Here, it is said, is a broad and comprehensive outlook, lying athwart all particular instances of analogy, and yet based on the same

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reasoning, which allows an optimistic assertion as to the inner nature and working of the whole soul of reality.

This argument, however, must cause some questioning in the minds of those who remember what the theory of idealism is. In order that there may be a teleological interpretation, processes must coincide which are inherently distinct. But idealism does not grant the distinctness of thought and nature. According to it, these two in inseparable union constitute reality. But we may not condition reality. Nor can we suppose that its factors ever had to be multiplied together. Their union is co-eternal with reality or is reality itself. Whence, then, the teleological idea in this reference?

III.

"Universal and necessary knowledge of nature presupposes thought; here the conditions are in us, and necessary; the result is contingent on things conforming. If they do conform, we are entitled to say that nature herself is in this respect teleological." [1]

"Will the things conform, will they be intelligible? As with the social compact, we can only trust and try; it must be this way, if at all; the conditions are necessary; actual realization is contingent; in this wise the whole notion of universal and necessary laws of nature is, then, essentially a postulate." [2]

Here the writer treats as a contingency a relation of thought to nature. A pre-established harmony is said to obtain between facts which might have been mutually discordant. Mind makes an hypothesis about nature which succeeds, but which had the alternative of failing. It goes on succeeding, and those who have trusted in it have never been confounded. There might have been, instead of order and constancy, only diversity and caprice; instead of the power to predict, only perpetual surprise and rebuff. This possibility has been clearly stated by Mill where he asserts that our reason might necessarily have believed one thing, while our senses testified to another.

[1] "Naturalism and Agnosticism," ch. XIX, Summary.

[2] Ibid. p. 250.

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Our right to regard this harmony as teleological depends very greatly upon our view of the relation of mind to nature. There are three ways of regarding this relation. Mind and nature may be essentially quite independent of each other; or one of them may be independent, but the other dependent upon it; or neither may be independent, each essentially requiring the other.

The first of these views is in the best position for a teleological inference based on the relation of knowledge. It would imply either that the relation of knowledge was a contingent one, not one that was essential to the existence of either term; or that it did not involve any interaction between the terms at all, but obtained merely for some third person who in his own mind compared the terms together. Leibniz's view was similar to the latter of these. His monads took no notice of each other, and yet each unwittingly knew all about the others. They "mirrored" each other without entering into a real relation. And therefore the pre-established harmony was bound to be a teleological interpretation. Nothing else could account for the infinite coincidences of his monadology. If again we take the view that knowledge is a relation implying some interaction, but one that is not necessary to the existence of either term, then again there would be strong ground for teleology in the reflection that so great a good was accidentally though continually realized.

The second attitude, that mind and nature are not essentially independent, but that one has priority over the other, is more difficult to consider in this reference. Mind may, in the first place, be made dependent upon nature. If this means that mind in its origin is thus dependent, it might still be left to consider whether it had not some relative independence after it originated; and, so far as this was allowed, knowledge might be regarded as a coincidence. But if it means what is called the "epi-phenomenal" view of psychical life, whereby thought is a sort of melody flowing from the chords of matter, then obviously the adaptation of the two, so far as it has meaning, has no teleological meaning. On the whole, the tendency of those who make matter the independent term is against all

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teleological views; they incline to the latter attitude. But, in the second place, the independent factor may be said to be mind; and the greatest of the empiricists come under this rubric. If their theory is pressed so that the full meaning of their premisses is kept on the surface, it is thoughts which constitute reality, and the adaptation of reality to the requirements of mind is less a truism than it is without any meaning. The sensationalists are very rarely consistent. David Hume is worth them all, because he followed out his principles to the full. And there is not much optimism in his philosophy. Sensationalism means either that mind is creative, in which case *cadit quæstio;* or that there is neither mind nor matter, only thought, in which case again the adaptation we are considering must fail.

But if there are possibilities of teleological attitudes in some of the aspects of these two views, they are removed entirely by the assumptions of the third view. Its validity is not here in point; but if this is provisionally allowed, it seems impossible to maintain the idea that knowledge is a teleological fact. Idealism does not merely say that mind and nature are mutually dependent; it says further that this dependence penetrates to the core of each of them. They enter into the soul of each other's existence, and are the very breath of each other's life. Reality is experience—the laws and relations of knowledge. Mind and nature are locked together in this relation, from which either term is an abstraction that has no reality. And not only no reality, but no meaning either.

There is scarcely one of the hard and fast distinctions of the old schools which idealists do not take pleasure either in rendering provisional, or in utterly confounding. They have abolished the line and rule within the theory of knowledge. They have substituted the notion of commixture and interpenetration for that of exclusion and division. And the most important by far of the results of continuity is their demonstration of the essential one-ness of nature and thought. They regard these as fused and inseparable and eternal aspects of the one reality, meaningless apart, co-extensive in scope, and

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related with the intimacy of the twin poles of a magnet,[3] or the convex and concave of a curve. Knowledge is the magnet or the curve. It never came to be between them. It has held them together for all time. The old Cartesian notion of two entities is compromised into the new notion of the duality in unity of experience. There is logical, but no real, distinction or dismemberment possible. Nature and thought are each other's obverse, the same synthesis looked at in two ways. The unity of nature is the reflex of the unity of apperception, and the uniformity of nature the reflex of the uniformity of thought. That the relations of knowledge are the marriage bond of these two is the proposition whose iteration is the main characteristic of the most popular modern philosophy.[4]

Whatever we gain by this notable theory, we certainly lose the argument for design in the form under discussion. It is, indeed, remarkable that the same book which seeks to demonstrate the spirituality of the whole world as a necessary prius of further theistic discussion, should ground its teleology on the consideration that the conformity of nature to thought is contingent. The greater the success which attends the former view, the more difficult, or even inconsistent, becomes the latter. If these factors of reality are eternal, we must not condition them, nor step in between them. There is probably no fallacy for which idealism has a keener eye than the endeavor to bring in a causal relation between the two. At once it steps in with the reminder that this is transcendent argument; that reality is reality, and its factors have to be taken as they stand; that all categories, existence, cause, and purpose, hold within the duality of nature—thought; and cannot hold between them. Any notion of "connection between the two" is at once scouted as, if not fallacious, at least very dangerous. Let us, for example, take such a quotation from the late Professor Ferrier as the following: "The question concerning the nature of the connection between the subjective and the objective comes to be . . . What is the nature of the connection between one

[3] "Naturalism and Agnosticism," Vol. II, p. 198.

[4] *Cf.* especially Haldane's "Pathway to Reality," Lect. I-IV.

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thing, one thing which no effort of thought can construe as really two?"—a question which "no one but an Irishman would think of asking, or expecting an answer to."[5]

We are entitled, therefore, when we see the demonstration of this unity by the idealists, to take them at their word; and, since the twin poles of a magnet are quoted as analogous to the relation of thought and nature, to ask whether it would be allowable to treat the positive and the negative poles as teleologically adapted. It belongs to the nature of the case. They could not exist otherwise than as they do. There is no contingency, but inherent and thorough-going inter-dependence between them.

If knowledge is what locks the two together, and belongs to neither of them alone, then the relations of experience constitute reality, and to apply a category to knowledge itself is transcendent reasoning. This cannot be emphasized with better effect than by quoting what is almost a *locus classicus* of modern idealism; the more so since Professor Ferrier's general views meet with the highest approval of the chief exponent of "formal" teleology.[6]

Professor Ferrier says:

"Unless we are able to think two things as two, and separated from each other, it is vain and unreasonable to ask how they can become one. Unless we are able to hold the subjective and the objective apart in thought, we cannot be in a position to inquire into the nature of their connection. But we have shown that it is not possible for us, by any effort of thought, to hold the subjective and the objective apart; that the moment the subjective is thought, it becomes both the subjective and the objective in one; and that the moment the objective is thought it becomes both the subjective and the objective in one; and that, however often we repeat the attempts to separate them, the result is invariably the same; each of the terms, mistakenly supposed to be but a member of one whole, is again found to be itself that very whole. Therefore we see that it is impossible for us to get ourselves into a position from which we might inquire into the nature of the connection between mind and matter, because it is not possible for thought to construe, intelligibly to itself, the ideal disconnection which must necessarily be presupposed as preceding such an inquiry."[7]

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[5] "Crisis of Modern Speculation."

[6] "Naturalism and Agnosticism," Vol. II, p. 199.

[7] Op. cit.

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To say that mind and matter are designedly adapted is, surely, to "inquire into the nature of their connection," and to "get ourselves into a position" which is declared by Ferrier to be "impossible." For that reason, there is an apparent incompatibility between the idealist theory of knowledge and the formal conception of teleology. The former renders impossible the "ideal disconnection" which the latter presupposes.[8] To hold the theory of knowledge, we must be biassed toward monism; to believe its practical deductions, we must incline to dualism.

IV.

Conformity to human knowledge is, however, only one half of that teleological aspect of the world which has here been described as "formal." There remains to be added the consideration that nature is amenable to human ends. This is presented by Professor Ward as an inference from the conformity to knowledge. "If they (nature and thought) do conform we are entitled to say, (1) that nature itself is in this respect teleological, and (2) teleological further in being consequently amenable to human ends." And why *consequently?*

[8] It should be noted that Kant, to whom Professor Ward is apparently in some measure indebted for this teleological attitude (v. especially p. 250, Vol. II) is quite differently placed, as regards such an argument, from the Neo-Kantians of any school. The difference between the doctrine of the thing in itself and that of duality in unity is a most vital one in such a discussion. It was quite possible for Kant, with his sharp divisions, to hold that the ideal of orderly and systematic knowledge was "something purely contingent," the conditions being as Professor Ward says "in us, who know, not in the things to be known." But modern idealism has completely changed the aspect of this argument, and what was possible for Kant seems to me impossible for it. As it is only in the course of knowing nature that we come to know the categories, it is difficult to regard them as an "hypothesis to be proved," however Kant may have urged this; the rest of my conclusion follows from the Neo-Kantian doctrine of the object-subject.

I should like to add that it seems not strictly relevant to say that "things need not conform to our thinking as the existence of error shows" (N. & A., p. 255). For the argument has been epistemological and this is a psychological consideration. The existence of error seems rather to show the contrary, that some standard of conformity has been reached; or we should not know what error was.

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Because "it is solely by our activity that this assimilation of nature is achieved." [9]

The key to this inference is to be found in those passages of "Naturalism and Agnosticism" in which there is so keen a development of the idea that the effort to think is the chiefest of all human purposes, and by no means the least arduous. It is the most general form of the effort to live, and to sustain one's self in the environment, both physical and social; that in its highest form, the pursuit of science and the deciphering of the order of things it means the sweat of the brow and not a reverie, Professor Ward has insisted with convincing emphasis. Conation or activity is in the very heart of thinking. Self-conservation requires that we shall think, and it is the primary fact of self-conscious mind.

"For a process entailing such strenuous and persistent exertion, there must be an adequate motive, and *that* there is in the feeling that ignorance entails helplessness, while knowledge brings security and power. . . . In a word, self-conservation is here the ultimate spring of action, and shows plainly that knowledge is teleological in its origin." [10]

This argument brings us very near to Schopenhauer; because if thought is a factor in the constitution of reality, and will is the pervading aspect of thought, nature is here presented to us as, in her inmost fibre, will. But we must consider how far this position, taken as part of the idealist theory, justifies the inference that nature is *teleologically* amenable to human ends.

Now, in the first place, it must be granted that the question of the amenability to ends falls within the previous one regarding the conformity to knowledge of nature; and what was said in the last division applies here again. For if nature and thought are essentially one, so that no question of teleological adaptation can arise, it takes us no further in the formal question to point out that thought embraces will as one, even the most important, of its aspects. We are arguing within the old issues, and have still no right to make the "ideal disconnection" which is no less implied by the phrase "amenability

[9] "Naturalism and Agnostisicm." Ch. XIX. Summary.
[10] Vol. II, p. 221.

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to ends" than by the phrase "conformity to thought," when these phrases are given teleological implications.

In the second place, we must insist that there is a difference between teleology and ethics. Finite conation as such is an ethical fact. Teleology is an objective result. We shall see reason for thinking that the two points of view may be in direct conflict, and we cannot straightway allow their identification. A teleological point of view could properly be based upon finite effort in thinking if it could be shown that all these efforts worked together for some good; that somehow they were all caught up in the realization of a universal purpose, which would have to be more than the mere acquisition of knowledge in finite minds. But so far as we regard them as only finite endeavors after self-conservation, they lead us only to the antechamber of ethics, and not to the inner shrine of objective purpose. Finite effort may fail. And what then? Would nature be teleological simply because we had *tried* to read her laws?

The difficulty of including both subjective effort and objective adaptation, which is the contrary of subjective effort, in the same general argument for design meets us very plainly in another part of Professor Ward's book. Even in respect to the conative aspect of knowledge we cannot escape this difficulty; for the greater the conation necessary, the less the adaptation which pre-existed, and ethics comes into prominence as metaphysical foundations sink. We are confirmed in this objection when we find elsewhere that finite conation is expressly called teleology, so that the confusion of the two meanings of this word is clear and insuperable.

V.

Professor Ward has argued that the process of evolution must itself be construed purposively because it implies two factors hitherto somewhat overlooked: self-conservation as an anabolic process, and subjective selection.

The former of these principles means that sentient activity is not mere blind persistence in pleasure or desistence from pain, but is "*directed to* the satisfaction of needs, appetites, or desires. . . . It implies an *impulse* to self-maintenance and

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betterment which so far become ends. Only in so far as these conceptions are applicable is there any meaning in talking of struggles to survive." [11] Other phrases are applied to it: "the will to live," "*pursuit of* betterment," "*struggle for* existence," "competition."

As to subjective selection, he writes: "Turn a miscellaneous lot of birds into a garden; a fly-catcher will at once be intent on the gnats, a bullfinch on the pease, a thrush on the worms and snails. Scatter a mixture of seeds evenly over a diversified piece of country; heath and cistus will spring up in the dry, flags and rushes in the marshy ground; violets and ferns in the shady hollows, gorse and broom on the hill-tops." [12]

Now, it is certainly open to doubt whether modern psychology would allow the use of such phrases as are applied to self-conservation in the organic world: whether there is so much foresight there as is implied in the phrase "pursuit of betterment": or whether the betterment is not rather, for an outside observer, the result of mechanical processes due to the pleasure-pain factor in evolution and competition. Again, it is clear that subjective selection, as above defined, comes very near being explained away; it would seem almost to follow that it is selective when cork floats while iron sinks. But, waiving these objections, is it not meanwhile evident that to add these factors to the evolution process is to diminish the force of a teleological argument, since certain effects which might have been regarded as useful and pleasurable coincidences of causal chains are now themselves directly ascribed to the causality of the efforts of organisms themselves? They add to the ethical aspect of the evolution process, by giving finite causation a greater part in it—and ethics may be more valuable than the argument for design—but they at least lessen the inductive evidence for design as a category going beyond causality in the content of our experience. "I call this factor (selection) teleological," writes Professor Ward, "simply on the ground that it presupposes conscious or at least sentient activity directed to the satis-

[11] Vol. I, p. 280.

[12] Vol. I, p. 274, cf. ibid., "The lion's roar which gathers the jackals, scatters the sheep."

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faction of needs and desires; psychical activity, in a word, as distinct from physical passivity or inertness."[13] I do not hesitate to reply that the teleological argument is stronger as it is based on the phenomena of physical passivity or inertness. For "teleological" in the above quotation it seems better to write "ethical." The above is not the sense in which Ward uses teleology when he argues that the adaptation of nature to thought or human activity is teleological. That implies contingency, coincidence, the absence of a complete causal explanation, the happily arranged satisfaction of a postulate. It was in order to justify theistic reasoning that the Professor took up his pen;[14] but it is clear that every ascription of results to finite intelligence forecloses theistic inquiry, because rational causes are already ascribed, and there is no unexplained coincidence to account for. The insistence on these factors debars both materialism and theism: it justifies the middle zone of ethics and extends the scope of the ethical view.

This consideration can be well explained by instances from the human sphere, where teleology might be claimed, though only ethics is allowable. The work to which a lawyer devotes himself is simply and solely the acquittal of his client. He may believe him guilty, but his only duty is to earn his fee, and by every resource of argument, by every technical advantage, and every available sophistry to win his case. Yet while each lawyer is independently working thus, the ends of justice on the whole are served. The perfection of legal justice, apparently in no way an end for the individual lawyer, is the resultant which emerges from the unscrupulous battle of wits and "raising of false issues"[15] in the courts of law.

Or to take a well-known case, which was explicitly quoted as teleological. Adam Smith's work is penetrated with the theory of the "unseen hand" in the phenomena of commerce and industry. For although, in private enterprise, everyone seeks his own good only, yet this competition is in the result the best thing for the public welfare. Are such cases not teleo-

[13] Vol. I, p. 280.
[14] Lecture II. Summary.
[15] Mr. Justice Grantham's definition of "pleading."

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logical? For in them we have results, apparently not calculated by the finite intellect, converging to an end generally useful and agreeable.

A little thought shows that the answer must be in the negative. These results are not directly due to finite individual conation, but indirectly they are. Because it is obvious that the universal result reached by the competition of finite wills is not a matter indifferent to them, but is only a remoter aim fully accounted for by reference to them. If the ends of justice were not served by our present legal system, that system would very soon be remodeled. In short, private advantage is not here distinct from or independent of public advantage. It is part of an individual's private endeavor, though not a part which is usually most prominent, that the state he lives in shall guarantee the advantage to the community as a whole of every activity permitted to individuals. The system is made by private conation, and could be unmade by it at any time. It is got by analysis of the end it realizes, supposes the conception and examination of that end, and is not the unforeseen result of endeavor that is heedless or ignorant of that end. It is referable to finite conation, and does not need a further assumption. It is an ethical not a teleological result.

If there were results of finite purpose, not in our power to make or unmake, which we could not alter if they were bad, but which are good in a striking degree, then we should be better placed for a teleological inference. Until such are discovered we have only reached an ethical result.

VI.

That the effort made by finite minds to understand the world implies for them a purpose of some kind is obvious; our objection has been that the purposiveness of an endeavor is one thing, and that it is not equivalent to the teleological structure of the facts upon which this endeavor is directed. On the contrary, it is evident that the greater the degree of natural teleology the less strenuous will be the subjective endeavor; for as nature is more completely adapted to thought the more direct and clear will be the meaning to thought of natural laws,

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and the less the strain of the acquisition of knowledge. And this, we must now indicate, is practically confessed; it is admitted, that is to say, that the subjective endeavor is an attribute of finitude, and that reality, or even the reality of a subject in its highest form, is cut free from such endeavor. For when idealists explain the absolute intelligence, they give the *conatus* no place in its intellectual life; a direct intuition now holds the field of attempts to interpret. The absolute experience is all-comprising. Its knowledge is "of the nature of direct insight," not of "generalizations about possibilities"; its will "is always consciously expressed with perfect harmony and completeness in the facts of which it is aware." "It would experience the whole of real existence directly as a system with internal consistency of structure, but without any reference to anything beyond itself. . . . Perfect apprehension of systematic reality as a whole would be able to deduce from any one fact in the universe the nature of any other fact. Or rather, as the whole would be presented at once in its entirety, there would be no need for the deduction; every fact would be directly seen as linked with every other by the directly intuited nature of the system to which all facts belong." [16] Now it is clear that an endeavor which is overcome in reality itself does not represent a true factor of reality; and that it is again impossible to present the purposive nature of finite search for truth as a proof of the teleological structure of reality itself.

Thus when the same author writes as follows: "To say that reality is essentially one with immediate feeling is only another way of saying that the real is essentially that which is of significance for the attainment of purpose, for feeling is essentially teleological," [17] he is defining the *essential* nature of the real by a function which he has expressly denied to belong to the truest outlook on reality. These views are not both tenable

[16] A. E. Taylor: "Metaphysics," Part I, Ch. 2, § 10, and p. 61.

[17] Ibid. 2, 1, 3. It is clear that the author has no right to hold that degrees of individuality are degrees of reality. The essential conative marks of finite individuality are not enhanced, but suppressed or sublated as soon as absolute existence is attained. (V. ibid, p. 275, and § 2, Ch. III.)

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together. Subjective purposiveness is not objective teleology. Ontologically, the former may be a phase of the latter in the sphere of time and space; epistemologically, the latter is within the scope of the former, when the same sphere is considered; but *absolutely,* the idealists tell us, the subject purposiveness of the effort to know reaches vanishing point the instant all is perfectly and completely known. It is of appearance, not of reality.

VII.

If, then, we cannot see our way to regard the adaptation of the world to thought as, on the idealist view of knowledge, a contingency, it remains to ask whether, assuming the essential unity of these two, there are any facts which render the union a pleasanter and happier one than it needed to be. For an answer to this question we turn naturally to consider the success with which the endeavor to comprehend the world has been accomplished. We ask whether in the history of philosophy, either in its mode of development or in its results, we can read such a progress as gives ground for an optimistic interpretation of the world as a whole.

This is, of course, a very difficult question to answer. It requires us to conceive other methods of development than that which has actually been followed, and to judge by some standard their relative values. Any pretense to reason closely on such a question would be manifestly absurd. We can only inquire whether among many possibilities—in view of the time that has elapsed since speculation began, of the results it has reached, and of the means by which it has reached them —the actuality comes near enough to what we should call the best to justify any degree of teleology. The broader the reply to this question is made, the better.

It would be idle to deny on any hand the progress of the endeavor to spell out the meaning of the universe. We have only, Mr. Haldane says, "to read the best histories of philosophy to see that, from this standpoint, we have been the witnesses of the growth of a conception ever increasing in depth and breadth, deepening and broadening as criticism succeeded to

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construction, and again construction to criticism; developing itself, as experience discloses, at different rates in different periods, with times of apparent stagnation and times of obvious vitality, adjusting its scope to the new materials and the fresh science which the time spirit called into being, but never going back on its traces. *Vestigia nulla retrorsum* is the motto of the philosopher." [18] And the introduction of Hegel to his History of Philosophy needs no citation. And yet, after two thousand years of the severe ordeal of speculative thought, it seems to be still held that the most pressing of the problems raised are not soluble by human reason. The freedom of the will—the gateway of ethics—is still in dispute; antinomy and perplexity still adhere to that problem, even in the view of many who would be called idealists. The existence of the external world, the first problem of all in logical order, can still be called the "crisis of modern speculation," or even abandoned as a philosophical position in face of the "logically unassailable" attitude of the solipsist, who, for being logical, is doomed to "the madhouse"—a most singular result.[19] It is said again [20] that "both religion and the higher poetry—just because they give up the pretense of an impossible exactitude—carry us nearer to the meaning of the world that the formulæ of an abstract metaphysics"; and it is this higher poetry which declares that "nothing worthy proving can be proven." While if we turn to the sources of belief in feeling, whose evidence Carlyle thought to be so immeasurably above what he contemptuously called the "probable God," of reason, we find that, to take the most modern instances, both Professor Ward and Mr. Haldane give it up as reliable on its own merits.[21] If, then, we must admit the fact of progress, we must also, in view of these results, grant that the progress of thought is along a line which at best is inclining very slowly toward reality.

And what of the evenness of this line? Mr. Haldane speaks of periods of criticism followed by periods of construction.

[18] "Pathway to Reality," p. 35.
[19] "Naturalism and Agnosticism," Vol. II, p. 168.
[20] Seth: "Man's Place," etc., p. 220.
[21] "Naturalism and Agnosticism," Ch. I. "Pathway to Reality," Ch. I.

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But this is perhaps a meiosis for what may also be regarded as a series of catastrophies, each followed by riding for another fall; and these sceptical catastrophies are recurrent with a fateful uniformity. We can write the history of philosophy in cycles which run toward scepticism on both sides at once.

At every starting point, philosophers stand by the union of nature and thought as the anchoring notion which holds them on to reality. At once two schools begin to appear, those who tend towards thought alone, and those who tend towards nature alone. Each goes its way for a few generations, till each finds it a sheer impossibility to go any further. Idealism is brought to its senses when thought has so rarified its own air that it dies of inanition. It collapses into mysticism, which is the truest empiricism, and so turns traitor to itself. Empiricism runs into its *impasse* when sensation has so absorbed everything that, for want of connection between the parts, the whole fabric falls asunder in ruins. Each school prostrates itself in scepticism. Then rises some one to point out the initial error, and to remind that reality is the union of nature and thought. This is accepted because it seems to admit no answer. But it produces no conviction. The old Adam reasserts himself, and the old story is retold. Thought will not rest in the unity of two things. Pure unity becomes again the seductive mirage leading it into the desert on this side or on that. It was thus from Thales to Gorgias and Parmenides; from Socrates to Plotinus or Pyrrhus: in the scholastic mystics and empiricists; from Descartes (whose union of sense and thought was, however, a difficult one) to Hume or Spinoza; from Kant to the absolutists or Mill.

If scepticism thus *belongs to the nature of the case,* and is the necessary method of transition which it is represented to be,[22] and if, after two thousand years of catastrophic progress, the main questions of thought remain, it is said, unanswerable by reason, the method and the result do not seem near enough to our ideas of what is best in development to justify us in be-

[22] *Cf.* A. Seth, "Scottish Philosophy," p. 72, "Scepticism is the bridge by which we pass from one system, or family of systems, found wanting, to another age with its fuller grasp of truth."

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lieving that the progress of thought has been of such an exceptional kind that it can be called an instance of the world's general purposiveness.

VIII.

But at this point we are brought up by an argument which gives a paradoxical turn to the discussion. The very fact that we cannot fully understand the world is made the ground for the teleological idea, presumably because it opens the door for faith. Here, then, is a contingent and happy circumstance in the nature of thought—its limitation. To Mr. Balfour's question, "What would be a world which we could understand?" the late Professor Wallace gives the answer: "A world, surely, without interest; the den of listlessness and dumb despair; or rather, the ice-age of humanity, when to be and not to be would for once be absolutely alike." [23] This assertion is probably connected with the view that the pleasures of pursuit are greater than those of attainment. If this opinion were true, an extension of its scope to the whole field of mental activity, such as was made in the well-known words of Lessing, who preferred the search for truth to its discovery, would prove the professor's case; though even then we might properly wonder that teleology should be seen in the gradual passage of knowledge, through effort, to no self-realizing goal.[24] But introspection leads me to the view that, where the end is really desired—and this is not commonly the case in the much-quoted instance of sport—and is, further, uncertain of achievement, then, if the end is not attained, there is little or no pleasure in the pursuit; while if the end is attained there is a pleasure in recalling the pursuit, but it is an almost indistinguishable part of the pleasure of achievement. It seems worth while, therefore, to examine on its merits Professor Wallace's opinion.

The view may be dismissed that the fragmentary world open to thought, enhanced by the objects of the "Will to Be-

[23] Essays, p. 97.

[24] *Cf.* "Prolegomena to Ethics, Sec. 187. Where one of the "essential implications" of development is "that the end of the process should be a real fulfillment of the capacities presupposed by the process."

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lieve," gives a total universe adapted to all our claims, and that it is the imperfection of knowledge which renders faith possible. It is not a proof of design that we can suppose it. And what is the "Will to Believe" but this supposition?

What, then, does complete knowledge [25] imply which renders it a thing so terrible? It may mean, in the first place, a comprehension of all general laws. This alone would surely not destroy mental effort. Why should we strive less because we know certainly all the results of endeavor, the consequences of material forces, the penalties of wrong, and the rewards of right? Because, it may be answered, complete knowledge might reveal penalties for right, and rewards for wrong. But this would be at least a contradiction. It would mean that the world was designed because the absence of design was concealed from us. Yet it would be equally contradictory to argue that there was design because the absence of design was revealed to us. This antinomy may be dismissed by assuming two positions which most philosophers will grant: (1) That nothing would be called right which was attended only with penalties, or wrong which was attended only with rewards, material or immaterial or both; (2) that right and wrong are higher motives than desire for pleasure and avoidance of pain. With these provisos, there is nothing in complete knowledge to discourage effort.

But complete knowledge may mean more than knowledge of all general laws. It may imply in addition knowledge of the exact disposition at any moment of each agent or vehicle of action—of every will and every particle; the knowledge of the Laplacean intellect. Is there any pessimism in this?

Not, so far as I can see, in the precise foreknowledge of results, or the perfect power to account for the present. Why should we not undertake our acts because we know their definite outcome? Or why be angry because we could have foretold yesterday what we are doing to-day? I think the secret of the difficulty is seen if we write the second person for the first. It seems to be imagined that I should not do

[25] This course does not imply the point of view that knowledge is not only complete, but absolutely deducible.

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a thing because you know its outcome, or because you could have predicted my act. Since when was the human will either so proud or so shy? Why should I hesitate to act because my act would then be part of the complete uniform scheme of all things, nature and mind together?[26]

The reason for which complete knowledge is looked askance at is, most probably, that it suggests determinism. Mind, it is supposed, would be shown to be bound together in the same laws with matter, and initiative would be a psychological delusion. But this statement begs the question at issue. When was it given for granted that complete knowledge was equivalent to recognition of mechanical determinism? There is so far no ground for thinking it less likely that complete knowledge would include the demonstration of free will. "But if there were free wills could knowledge be complete?" Why not? Because a thing is done freely, it may none the less be done accountably. There is no formal incongruity in the two notions.

Two cases, then, have to be considered. Complete knowledge may contain the knowledge of universal determinism. Would this be better or worse than our present indefiniteness on the point? Much consideration yields no answer to this question. If such determinism were certain, then effort would be prostrated and aspiration destroyed. But it would be the truth. On the other hand, the existing imperfection of knowledge would permit of aspiration and effort; but then these might be based on error. Truth is a pearl of great price, but how does it exchange with goodness? The choice offered is one which human nature, being the complex of intellect and conation which it is, would probably regard as indifferent. The bearing of these remarks on Kant's view of teleology will be plain. He permitted the notion, on the distinct understanding that it was not strictly true. He satisfied both intellect and conation by giving to purpose the middle position of a regulative notion.

The other side of the alternative is equally possible. And

[26] *Cf.* Bradley: "Ethical Studies," Ch. I.

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if complete knowledge revealed the freedom of the will on a plan which we should call perfect, it is not plain on what ground Professor Wallace and Mr. Balfour would prefer their present uncertainty. Surely the assurance ought to be enviable. It would both widen the scope and raise the tone of poetry. One can imagine, too, the enthusiasm with which, under such a happy state of things, teachers and preachers would point to our certainty on all pressing questions of destiny, and dwell for contrast on the gloomy alternative under which there might have been only doubtful opinion and pious hope.

We may conclude, therefore, that in all cases where judgment on the matter is possible, no case for pessimism can be made out as a corollary from complete knowledge, and no case for optimism on the ground of the limitation of knowledge.

IX.

Thus the result of this review of the modern teleology which has been called "formal," because it is based on very broad considerations of the world as a whole, leaves us doubtful either as to the existence of the contingencies which are asserted, or as to the teleological interpretation of such contingencies as may seem to obtain. We are unable to deduce that the general analysis of this theory of knowledge, especially with regard to its conative elements, gives trustworthy teleological results.

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THE SO-CALLED HEDONIST PARADOX.

THE hedonist paradox is variously stated, but as most popular and most usually accepted it takes the form, "He that seeks pleasure shall lose it." Despite the fact that men consciously seek pleasure and get it, strong arguments are set forth denying the search for pleasure as an actuality, and attempting either to show that pleasure is an illusion, or that in the supposed hunt for it, man is really seeking something else. By means either of popular argument or of the more highly refined logical presentations, pleasure is shown to be a delusion and a snare; and the search for it impossible. I do not wish to be so bold as to attempt any development of a hedonistic system of ethics. My intention is much more humble. Whether or not pleasure is *the* end of life I shall therefore not attempt here to show. But I think it possible to show that pleasure can be *an* end; that it can be something consciously sought; and that as a reality, it can be an end or aim, as can other things in this universe. I have the greatest respect for the old English Utilitarian school, and consider them not so paradoxical in this particular as is usually supposed.

The two or three lines of argument most successful against the hedonist view of pleasure as an end or aim are the more popular physiological "proofs" and the more abstract logical and psychological views. The former, while most easily refuted, is most dangerous because of its mixture of standpoints, and its semi-religious appeal. While the latter is much more subtle and demands a much closer analysis.

Throughout this paper my contention is that pleasure can be *an* end in life and can be consciously pursued. Whether or not it is *the* end, and whether or not such a hedonist policy is pernicious are therefore not here in question. It is the two last named questions which the popular physiological argument confuses in its supposed refutation of hedonism. In addition it seems to be backed by examples from daily experience which force themselves upon us. Is it not a fact that the most energetic hunters after pleasure are also the most *blasé*? That those who live for pleasure are usually physical wrecks? We

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note the pale, drawn face of the dyspeptic or the debilitated condition of the *roué* and perhaps accept as given that he who seeks pleasure must lose it. Or again, we see the virtuous man in all his glory, the happy father of a family, the energetic follower of the strenuous life, and here find happiness existent, but as a side issue; not as an end or aim *per se.* Is this not proof conclusive that pleasure consciously sought is pleasure unobtained; that the most happy man is he who takes his pleasure as something thrown in for good measure as it were; and must not therefore he who seeks pleasure lose it?

Popular arguments of this kind run into a tangle since they confuse pleasure as *the* end with pleasure *an* end, and also introduce the results of pleasure as proofs against pleasure. My present purpose is to deal only with the possibility of pleasure. as an end sought. Now the argument which tries to show that the perpetual pleasure seeker does not lead a happy life possesses its force because it mixes the standpoint which considers pleasure as the end and which emphasizes the evil results flowing therefrom, with that which looks upon pleasure as a possible end. It is evident that he who indulges in sensual pleasures may wreck his constitution because of the overstimulation, fatigue or what not which must result. These however are results of pleasure *already obtained.* The fact that a man has a headache in the morning is no argument against the fact that he had a rousing time the night before, or that he purposely sought such pleasing time. The pleasure was aimed at and reached. It may be ultimately a bad thing to indulge in such pleasure, and continual search therefore may and does finally lead to ruin. But the fact remains and is incontestable that the person concerned aims for such pleasure; reaches his end; realizes it and may or may not repent. In fact it is only by having such pleasures repeatedly that the individual concerned becomes *blasé* and worn out. He has sought his special type of pleasure and has found it. Because the consequences of such pleasure are physical and mental wretchedness, we cannot therefore affirm that pleasure has been sought and missed. It is only because it has been gained that the wreckage results. He that seeks pleasure may lose it as an ultimate end, if it be of the crass

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and sensual kind, because physiological limitations forbid.

If this last statement be granted, the whole case of hedonism need not be given up, as ultimately concerned. While it may be granted that pleasure is possible in installments, still as an everlasting possession it seems impossible. Everlasting bliss, "linked sweetness" are, on this earth hindered by the limitations of the flesh, which would break down in the strenuous efforts to reach pleasure; or such bliss is at least impossible, because of the limitations of the sense organs, which require rest, food and change. This carries the matter over into the question of pleasure as an ultimate end, and I shall touch upon this only in a suggestive manner. We do not mean by pleasure as an end, some sort of a continual performance. What is meant by pleasure as an ultimate end in this life is something which is to be obtained and felt, enjoyed; something which it is worth while working for; something which is pursued and believed in as an attainable object; and something which, as an end, is supreme over others, to which other ends must be subordinated, or for which they must be removed. What comes after the attainment of the end has nothing to do with the end in its first intention. For example, when we speak of a bit of food as the aim of a dog's chase, we mean simply that some goal is to be reached; not that there is to be an eternally existing goal, an everlasting performance, a perpetual state of bliss.

As so conceived hedonism as thus concerned is neither weaker nor stronger than intuitionism. The most rigid intuitionism is open to similar objections, as those above stated. Duty, as existent in action, virtue in its height, cannot be continuous in a single individual. A man cannot be doing his duty always and unintermittingly. Even Kant has acknowledged this. And if an individual pursues his duty without regard to his physical limitations he will fail in his ultimate purpose, if such be considered continuous, just as will the most earthy hedonist. And if in so doing he is really not following his aim, this can also be said of the hedonist. But similarly, as an intermittent possession, virtuous action is possible and may be sought, and so too, pleasure. As everlasting in intention, virtue is no more so than is pleasure. If we consider that the aim of

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the hedonist is to keep the tenement of clay erect so that such moments be possible, pleasure as an end or aim is just as much a fact as is duty, and arguments derived from physiological grounds are as valid against the one as against the other. If sleep, recuperation, change, etc., are necessary in the one case, so too are they in the other. And similarly, if considered subordinate to the great aim of duty, why the same thing may be said of the one great aim of pleasure.

The logical argument against the conception of pleasure as an end is much more subtle and demands a somewhat close examination if its validity is to be denied. That we may strive for a thing, it must be before us during the period of effort if it is to be an end; it must be an end *in view*. As such, it must exist as an idea, and to seek pleasure, therefore, we must transform it; it must exist in idea. It is not present; it must be kept in view as an end and so must undergo ideal transformation. But so soon as this is done, we have no longer the pleasure. The pleasure sought has become an idea, such idea being an idea of a pleasure giving object, of a pleasurable state of the self with serial connection with the present moment. But an idea is no longer a pleasure; we have passed from feeling to intellect, and the pleasure has, logically, apparently vanished. Even if the idea itself be pleasurable, this pleasure is not the pleasure in its first intention as sought. Moreover as actually existing, such reflected pleasure cannot be an aim since it is already present. So it seems that he who seeks pleasure shall lose it logically, if not physiologically.

The fallacy here involved resides in the false conception of the function of logical construction. Such construction does not create reality; it simply arranges it, reconstructs it, helps us to adapt it to our needs. Moreover, it fixes such interpretation by means of negotiable symbols, which make more or less rigid the concepts involved. An ideal construction is simply a serial arrangement of signs or marks which enable the individual to react properly to a given situation, or which enable him, by a series of reactions to reach a certain situation. The ideas, etc., are simply sign-boards pointing to the reality, and guiding

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proper adjustment, but they are not the reality. They are believed in as leading to some reality sought. Now one who aims at pleasure, *aims at pleasure or some pleasurable condition of the self*, and not at the idea of such state. If we considered the person concerned as aiming at some idea, we must needs have a continual progress, without any hope of ultimate realization. For the idea of the sought-for state is present. To become an aim it must exist in idea which latter however is also present and cannot be an end unless it too, is present in idea; and so on *ad infinitum*. The idea cannot become an aim for it is always with us in this connection. We have it, and as far as the *idea* is concerned, we need go no farther. This idea, however, must be considered only as a sign-board, as a concept leading to a pleasure-producing action. A man who seeks pleasure, usually knows what he wants, and he does not want a mere phantom. He endows his pleasure with a reality just as he does his hat, book, or what not which may be absent, and which he seeks. The ideas of end, means, etc., serially arranged, are simply guides which he follows because he believes their realization will bring him to his goal. *As such* they cannot constitute his aim.

It might be said that the seeker after pleasure aims at the realization of his ideas. This seems to me to be a misinterpretation of the logical construction of the impulses and reactions which have already taken place when the pleasure has been obtained. One who searches for pleasure *wants this pleasure*. He does not stop at the object producing such pleasure, at the realization of his idea, or at anything other than the pleasure. He may be forced to go through certain kinds of adjustment, but these are all (in the supposed search for pleasure) subordinate to the pleasure concerned. The series of ideas leading to such pleasure may be due to a logical construction of some given situation, in which pleasure has been felt, in which a certain state has been experienced. But such logical construction is not the reality, and as such, as purely formal, and lacking in reality (other than logical) cannot serve as an aim and is simply a directive agency. Each step up to the pleasure as existent is simply a means and not the final end.

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A striking illustration of opposition between aim and the present, with no logical construction acting as a guide to enable the bridging of the chasm, is seen in the baby who cries unceasingly, "I want my mama." The baby does not want the idea of his mother, nor his mother in any form other than "mama" present, real and tangible. The absence of the parent giving rise to a feeling of want, of dissatisfaction, produces a blind effort towards the mother, which comes "bang up" against failure, because of a lack of logical construction. But whether there be such construction present or not, we have as the end some object, some reality, believed in as existing.

A final consideration must be given to objections possible from the psychological side. Psychologically it might be objected that pleasure as such, has no reality apart from a self or agent, just as an object has no reality without the knower. This is confusing pleasure as a thing-in-itself, with pleasure as felt. Of course such pleasure or object has no existence as a felt pleasure or a known object apart from the self concerned, and it is only in this connection that they have any meaning at all. What pleasure is as a *ding-an-sich* does not worry me in the least when I seek it. I feel its absence, and strive to make it felt. It is considered and believed in to use Baldwin's phrase in connection with objects, as a thing which we can "leave behind and find again." As immediately experienced only, do objects mean anything to us, and as immediate experiences are they sought. That an object has some reality, whether as object, idea, consciousness or what not cannot be denied; it is sought as a believed-in reality. If it had no reality it could not be sought and found. To hold however, that pleasure has a reality, seems to involve us in difficulties.

I shall end my paper with an attempt to show the reality of pleasure. Pleasure as loosely used, may mean either the body in a certain state, or the abstraction used in psychology to designate the qualitative abstraction from the given situation, from the organic condition of the body. Just as consciousness in general means, when fully considered, consciousness of some object, and by abstraction is referred to a self, and the object to some external reality, so too, pleasure means in its full intent,

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some pleasurable condition of the body, and by abstraction is referred to a self, and the body to the world of space. It might be said that in trying to find a hat, for example, what we are really seeking is a touch , etc., of the hat. Popular usage, however, has fixed upon "hat" as the proper expression in such a case. Similarly the term "pleasure" has been made rigid in the like connection, and men do not say they are aiming at a bodily condition but at a pleasure. In the one case the emphasis is placed on the object as quantitative, in the other on the object as qualitative. But a reality is believed in, in both cases, whether such belief is scientifically expressed or not.

I again wish to emphasize that in the above discussion I have tried to show that there is no paradox in the search for pleasure. If we consider the matter consistently I think we must acknowledge, that, whatever be the physical and moral results, the search for pleasure is a fact. Indeed it is a question whether or not most of us are not, in a limited degree modern epicureans. Daily we seek pleasure, and daily, (I hope) most of us find it.

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NEW YORK.

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DISCUSSION.

[An article on "Is Vivisection Justifiable?" by Dr. C. S. Myers in the April number, 1904, was replied to by Dr. Albert Leffingwell in the January number, 1905. The discussion was continued by both writers in a somewhat personal manner in the July number, notwithstanding the elimination of some of the latter features by the Managing Editor. The following note of personal explanation was sent to us for the October number, and we now publish it, as requested, without any modification. The discussion between Dr. Myers and Dr. Leffingwell is herewith closed in this JOURNAL.]

THE VIVISECTION PROBLEM: A PERSONAL EXPLANATION.

Dr. Leffingwell's latest comments on the justifiability of vivisection are marked by such misrepresentation of fact and confusion of argument that further controversy must now close, at least so far as I am concerned. I wish here merely to add a word of personal explanation. My critic seeks to strengthen his position by the taunt that I write only what I have been told, while he professes to describe what he has personally seen. Although he is so good as to express his belief in my "sincerity and intellectual honesty," yet he claims that my opinions are valueless as I am neither physician nor vivisector. That Dr. Leffingwell himself is not a vivisector goes without saying: how well he is versed in medicine and in the history of pathological science I may safely leave others to judge. But for my own part, perhaps I may state that I have attended many vivisections, and that I feel sufficiently qualified alike on medical, ethical, and psychological grounds to maintain with sincerity and without change the views and statements which I have advanced in the pages of this JOURNAL.

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BOOK REVIEWS.

PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY; or Principles of Epistemology and Metaphysics. By James Hervey Hyslop, Ph.D., LL.D., Formerly Professor of Logic and Ethics, Columbia University, New York. New York: The Macmillan Company. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd. 1905. pp. xiv, 647.

This large volume, containing nearly 650 closely printed pages of text, is addressed to readers of general philosophy, rather than to students of ethics, but contains much which defines the author's position regarding practical as well as theoretical issues. The questions discussed are fundamental ones. The spirit is that of an unassuming, modest, but extremely patient, minute, and laborious inquirer, who spares neither his own pains, nor, upon some occasions, his reader's powers of attention. The result of reading the book must therefore be for a properly advanced student, a very useful training, not only in developing his own powers of philosophical thinking, but in the general spirit of free, courageous, and devoted truth-seeking. So much one can say at once, without thereby expressing any substantial agreement whatever with the author's point of view. For so far one speaks solely of the author's spirit and personality. The present reviewer, indeed, is very far from agreement with Dr. Hyslop's most characteristic teachings, and reads his text with a pretty constant sense of opposition which can only be welcome to the author; since the latter, in his turn, spends so much of his space in assailing what he views as the position of philosophical "idealism." But the author's spirit of personal fidelity and of critical inquiry is of more value to the reader of such a book, than are the results reached. For the results, however important or questionable in themselves, can have meaning only to a man who already possesses the philosophical spirit; while the purpose to teach that spirit is the main business of any teacher of philosophy. And our author's personal quality is such as to make him a wholesome and stimulating teacher. Nobody can doubt our author's long-since proven and serious devotion to the truth as he sees it, nor can anyone call in question his chivalrous willingness to defend investigations and results in regions which, like those of "psychical research," are often regarded as lying beyond the pale of scientific orthodoxy. His present book, to be sure, mentions psychical researches only in conclusion, and as one means of pro-

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ceeding further upon the road which he regards as that of a sound application of the "scientific method" to philosophy. But this book has everywhere an admirable individuality and an unconventionality of procedure which are obvious and wholesome, even when the views themselves which are defended, appear to be less original, or even when, to the present reviewer's mind, they are least valuable as results.

There is here no space to go into details regarding the minute and extended study of epistemological and metaphysical problems which this volume contains. In thirteen chapters Dr. Hyslop discusses, first introductory questions (chapters I and II), then (chapters (III-VIII) the problems of the theory of knowledge, thereafter (chapters IX-XII) metaphysical theories, with special reference to "materialism" and "spiritualism;" and, finally, (chapter XIII), he sums up his results in a general discussion of the office, the duties, the prospects, and the ethical significance of philosophy. This final chapter, very readable by itself, even apart from the rest of the book, is probably the one which the student of social and of ethical problems will find the most interesting.

Dr. Hyslop is of the opinion, as his preface states, that "Idealism has done so much to emphasize introspective and anthropocentic methods that, since Kant, it is almost impossible to induce philosophers to make any concessions to physical science and its results. Philosophy, where it was not phenomenalism in disguise, has run off into the blue empyrean of transcendentalism while protesting against the possibility of it." One of our author's purposes is therefore the reconciliation of philosophical study with the spirit and the results of physical science. His own study of the theory of knowledge is guided by this purpose. By methods which, as Dr. Hyslop tells us (in his preface; cf. also p. 183 of his text), have been decidedly influenced by Sir William Hamilton, our author undertakes an analysis of the problem of knowledge. This analysis is throughout influenced by the author's view of "the relation between epistemological and metaphysical theories" (p. 72). "Idealism," and "Realism," as our author defines them, are, in the strictest sense, epistemological theories, and are not properly to be regarded as "ontological" theories at all. That is, a realist might hold any metaphysical theory whatever—materialistic or spiritualistic. Realism is, for our author, simply the doctrine "that the mind can transcend

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its state in its 'knowledge,' that it can 'know' something else than its own states, that it can 'perceive' or posit an external reality as the cause of its sensations" (p. 73). Therefore, if idealism is to oppose realism, idealism also must be a doctrine about knowledge, and "must represent a denial of the possibility of 'knowing' any 'reality' beyond the subject's own states." Dr. Hyslop hereupon finds it easy to maintain (p. 75), that a perfectly clear opposition, in theories of knowledge, can exist only between "subjective Idealism or Solipsism, and intuitive Realism." Unless one is a solipsist, namely, he must admit that the knowing subject does or can transcend his own subjective states; and thus, in one's theory of knowledge, one must be *either* "solipsist" or else in some form "realist." Dr. Hyslop nevertheless regards the question as to how far, and in what sense, one is a realist, as a topic for a detailed study, and actually devotes many pages to a consideration of the range of our knowledge, of its forms, its categories, and its methods.

In any case, however, Dr. Hyslop's "idealist" remains, by definition, a sort of man without a country. If he were indeed what our author calls a "solipsist," our author knows "no way to refute solipsism" (p. 174), which, in Dr. Hyslop's opinion, "is logical." But no idealist, says our author, has ever admitted himself to be a solipsist. Hence, in practice, idealists profess a belief "which is an acceptance of the fundamental postulate of Realism, and makes Idealism identical with it in all essential characteristics" (p. 175). If this be the result, one would suppose that Dr. Hyslop would take delight (as being, on the whole, himself, in his epistemology, what he defines as a realist), in this easy reconciliation with his supposed opponents. For if the only idealists who could be in any genuine opposition to realism would be solipsists, and if there are no solipsists, it would seem that there must be no opponents of realism. And then one might wonder why our author devotes himself to so elaborate an attack upon such opponents. Despite the fact, however, that the only idealism which is not, "in all essential characteristics," "identical" with realism, is that solipsism which nobody holds, our author apparently regards actual live idealists with a decided aversion; and this sentiment turns out to be based upon grounds partly historical and partly moral. Idealists, historically viewed, that is, considered with reference to the place which they have occupied in controversy, are persons responsible, in Dr. Hyslop's

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opinion, for a certain stubborn confusing of the epistemological with the metaphysical issues; and, in the present day, Dr. Hyslop finds the idealist to be (p. 637) persons devoted to "equivocations which few detect," since they systematically conceal their "gospel of agnosticism," behind reflections that "appear to have a meaning because the language in which they are couched seems to favor the religious view." Thus, an idealist may apparently be defined as a person who ought to be a solipsist, but who, in fact, is a hypocrite. Such an one is fond of Kant and Hegel, speaks unintelligible jargon, and is a weariness to our author's flesh.

From the contemplation of so uninviting a person, one turns, with some relief, to that issue which our author finds, in the main, so much more attractive than is the epistemological problem. This other issue as he holds, cannot be decided upon any purely epistemological grounds, or, in fact, upon any grounds except those of the "scientific method." An elaborate historical discussion of the opposition between "materialism" and "spiritualism" in chapters IX, X and XI, leads to the result that, so far as the natural facts which are at present in sight can carry us, there is no way of deciding, with certainty, whether reality is or is not predominantly determined by the interests, purposes, and ideals, of minds, or of a mind, with which our own human moral interests and ideals stand in a definite relation of effective agreement. Further light, however, and, in our author's opinion, a very significant light, would be thrown upon this question by a discovery of positive evidence of the actual survival of human individuals after death. But such evidence would have to be tested by the "scientific method." And thus the ultimate issue between spiritualism and materialism becomes a scientific rather than a philosophical question (p. 508). The author leaves to the future the decision of this "scientific" question. Its discussion, so far as his own views about the empirical evidence for such survival, are concerned, he does not pursue in this book. But the philosophical treatment clears the way.

The discussion of the older stages of the controversy between spiritualism and materialism is extensive and minute. The balancing of what the author takes to be the evidence for the various forms of doctrine that are here at issue, is a process to which Dr. Hyslop devotes the most painstaking analysis. The light thrown upon the subject does not seem to me to be such as fully

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to compensate for our author's very patient and ingenious labors; but that is a matter for personal estimate. In any case, here is the part of the book where the most originality of treatment appears; as the closing chapter is the part of the book where the author gives the finest expression to his own position regarding the ethical motives of the pursuit of truth.

This latter position is, to my mind, substantially sound in its ethics. Free inquiry, the disguising of no difficulty, the avoidance of no issue because of its unpopularity, the willingness to combine scepticism in investigation with a hearty love for positive truth, the readiness to wait for light, the determination to make life worth living by our work, however much or however little we know—these are common ideals of serious students of such problems. Dr. Hyslop states them well; and his chapter is often inspiring, and always wholesome in its spirit, even if one disagrees with some of its polemic.

So much for a mere indication of the plan and range of this book. It is of course impossible, in a brief space, to criticise Dr. Hyslop's main doctrines. I doubt whether, in the present position of philosophical discussion, any detailed consideration of his effort to put asunder what the nature of things has joined in indissoluble bonds, namely, the epistemological and the metaphysical problems, is at all required. The evidence regarding this most general matter is long since in hand. Dr. Hyslop's own discussion repeatedly, although somewhat unconsciously, employs the methods of ratiocination which he condemns in his supposed opponents, so that, when he discusses the being of God, or the nature of substance, or of cause, he frequently uses fashions of reasoning to which, as I view the case, only the interpretations of the "idealists" could give any meaning whatever. But, in any case, let that matter rest, so far as this inadequate notice is concerned.

One does not wish to be captious. It is impossible, however, to avoid saying that Dr. Hyslop's English is often unnecessarily hard to follow, not by reason of mere technicalities, but by reason of imperfectly constructed sentences. "I regard universal scepticism as impossible as universal dogmatism," says our author, on page 196. In speaking of possible various ways of defining the term "knowledge," on p. 194, Dr. Hyslop says: "Besides the history of philosophy shows that there is no monopoly of the conception of knowledge. I have already shown that one of its

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fundamental ideas is certitude. This is the conception of it as applied to certain doctrines which scepticism takes of it in these supposed cases." The context of these sentences does not appear to me to make any clearer than does this quotation, the problem as to the antecedent of *its* in the second sentence quoted. And the third sentence quoted is an example of a type of construction which is only too frequent in our author's very laborious pages. In longer sentences, where the subject matter is especially difficult, such constructions are often a heavy burden to the reader; and occasionally they leave one in deep doubt as to how to decipher our author's meaning. Essential clearness and essential obscurity of construction are surely matters that are independent of whether the subject-matter is technical or not.

On p. 433 our author mentions Plato's "Apology," where he surely must mean to name instead the "Phaedo." On p. 185 in defining the general nature and use of formal logical reasoning, our author proceeds to state "the following accepted facts in logic," regarding the relations of premises and conclusions. Of these "accepted facts" the first one is that, in any case of formal reasoning: "If the premises are false and the reasoning correct the conclusion will be false." It seems almost incredible that any teacher of logic should have written these words and permitted them to stand; since the topic in question is one of the favorite "catches" used in examination papers in logic. A materially true conclusion, following, by perfectly correct reasoning, from entirely absurd premises, is a phenomenon too familiar to escape notice, if one looks at formal reasoning at all. And I do not doubt that this was a chance oversight to our author—a mere slip of the pen.

More serious, if there were time to develop them here, would be my objections to our author's interpretations of Kant, in chapter VIII. These interpretations seem to me widely astray. Dr. Hyslop's position regarding the Platonic conception of immortality has more ground to stand upon, at least so far as the critics of Plato are concerned. But Plato himself seems to have viewed his own doctrine in a different light.

JOSIAH ROYCE.

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THE MYTHS OF PLATO. Translated, with Introductory and other Observations, by Professor J. A. Stewart, M. A., London. MacMillan & Co., New York: The MacMillan Co., 1905.

This is an extremely interesting book, and, though most of it is rather outside the scope of this JOURNAL, it can be heartily recommended to the attention of all students of Ethics. Most of the Myths of Plato are here given both in the original Greek and in English translations; and they are accompanied by a number of valuable explanatory remarks. But the chief attraction of the volume lies rather in certain general views that are expounded in the introduction and applied in the course of the work. The view most commonly taken of Plato's Myths is that they fill up gaps in his constructive philosophical work. When he could not quite think anything out, he told a story instead. From this point of view, the Myths represent the failures in Plato's philosophical efforts. Professor Stewart's doctrine is almost diametrically opposed to this. For him the Myths are rather the culminating points in Plato's philosophy. They reveal "Plato the Mythologist, or Prophet, as distinguished from Plato the Dialectician, or Reasoner." "The Myth bursts in upon the dialogue with a revelation of something new and strange; the narrow, matter-of-fact, workaday experience, which the argumentative conversation puts in evidence, is suddenly flooded, as it were, and transfused by the inrush of a vast experience, as from another world—'Put off thy shoes from off thy feet, for the place whereon thou standest is holy ground.'" This view of the Platonic Myth is further connected by Professor Stewart with a general theory of poetry. "The essential charm of all poetry," he says, "lies in its power of inducing, satisfying, and regulating what may be called Transcendental Feeling, especially that form of Transcendental Feeling which manifests itself as solemn sense of Timeless Being—of 'That which was, and is, and ever shall be' overshadowing us with its presence." This view is illustrated at considerable length by long poetic extracts. "Transcendental feeling I would explain genetically," he goes on, "as an effect produced within consciousness (and, in the form in which poetry is chiefly concerned with Transcendental Feeling, within the dream-consciousness) by the persistence in us of that primeval condition from which we are sprung, when Life was still as sound asleep as Death, and there was no Time yet. The principle solely operative in that prime-

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val condition is indeed the fundamental principle of our nature, being that 'Vegetative Part of the Soul' which made from the first, and still silently makes, the assumption on which our whole rational life of conduct and science rests—the assumption that Life is worth living."

This point is further connected by Professor Stewart with a specific metaphysical doctrine, which is thus briefly indicated. "I hold that it is in Transcendental Feeling, manifested normally as Faith in the Value of Life, and ecstatically as sense of Timeless Being, and not in thought proceeding by way of speculative construction, that Consciousness comes nearest to the object of Metaphysics, Ultimate Reality." "The 'problem of the Universe' is not propounded to Consciousness, and Consciousness cannot solve it. Consciousness can *feel* that it has been propounded and solved elsewhere, but cannot genuinely *think* it. It is propounded to that on which Consciousness supervenes (and supervenes only because the problem has been already 'solved')—it is propounded to what I would call 'selfhood' or 'personality,' and is ever silently being 'understood' and 'solved' by that principle in the continued 'vegetative life' of individual and race. And the most trustworthy, or least misleading report of what the 'problem' is, and what its 'solution' is, reaches Consciousness through Feeling. Feeling stands nearer than Thought does to that basal self or personality which is, indeed, at once the living 'problem of the Universe' and its living solution."

These remarkable doctrines cannot be adequately dealt with in such a review as this. We can only suggest a few questions. 1. Can it be seriously maintained that Plato, the philosopher of Dialectic, he whose supreme conception of the highest kind of life was that of one in which we are free from the body and see things with the pure eye of thought, yet found his ultimate view of the world in something which is the negation of thought, and which has to be interpreted as "vegetative?" 2. Can "Transcendental Feeling" be a complete statement of the chief content of an art in which such writers as Chaucer and Burns are recognized as no inconsiderable masters? 3. Can a principle of "Life" be "timeless?" 4. What is meant by a condition in which "there *was* no Time yet?" 5. Can "That which *was*, and *is*, and ever *shall be*" be "Timeless Being?" In other words, is existence through all time the same thing as timeless existence? On these points one would be glad to have further light from Professor Stewart.

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Two further points may be noted in this volume, as being of special interest to students of Ethics. One is Professor Stewart's view of Plato's Militarism: "The doctrine of the *Republic* is that the leaders of civilization are men who have been trained for war. . . Here Plato seems to me to take hold of a fundamental principle in biology. Look at the races of living creatures; their specific beauty and intelligence have been developed on lines laid down by the necessity of defence and attack: *victrix causa deis placuit.* . . . The individual Soul may . . . enter into peace—*e venni dal martirio a questa pace;* but the State has no immortal destiny—it is of this world, and is always implicated in the struggle of the earthly life." The Aristotelian doctrine that we make war for the sake of peace is not in Plato's vein. Were war to cease in the world, what would become of the Platonic system of Education? Plato does not expect—and, more than that, does not wish—to see war cease. His ideal of earthly life is Hellas in arms against Barbarism. War began in ἐπιθυμία in appetite; then it was waged to satisfy θυμός —for *la gloire*, and we ought to hope that the time will come when it will be waged only in the cause of λόγος —to propagate an idea; but let us remember—this is Plato's message to us, as I understand it—that the "idea" we fight for—our ἐν τούτῳ νικᾶς —is a sign which shines only before the eyes of the militant, and would fade from the sky if we laid down our arms." This is interesting; but is it historically sound? Professor Stewart seems to express himself here as if Plato were a sort of antique Nietzsche, scorning the weak concessions of Aristotle, and preaching his militant "message" in the face of a slave "morality." But after all, Aristotle came after Plato; and even Aristotle *began* with the description of the military virtues. It is surely a strange inversion of history to write as if the world—and especially the Greek world—had to have the conception of the Military State brought to it as a "message." Surely it was at a far later time that men's "ears were stuffed with cotton."

The other point to which I wish to call attention is the instructive way in which Professor Stewart deals with the "Cambridge Platonists," and especially the way in which he connects their doctrines with those of Plato, on the one hand, and T. H. Green, on the other. But to this I can only refer.

The whole book is certainly full of suggestion; even if we must add—as I think we must—that the view of Plato's attitude here

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taken is a little unhistorical, and that the metaphysical doctrines here suggested are a little crude.

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KANT'S ETHIK. Eine Einführung in ihre Haupt-probleme und Beiträge zu deren Lösung, von Dr. August Messer, A. O., Professor der Philosophie zu Geissen. Leipzig, Veit & Conp. 1904.

Prof. Messer defines the objects of his book as two-fold: firstly, to serve as an introduction to the study of Kant's ethical writings; and secondly, to set forth their significance for the solution of the main ethical problems, in the form which they have, since Kant's own day assumed. In respect of both purposes, the author seems to me to have achieved conspicuous success. His study both of Kant's better-known writings and of the constantly increasing mass of posthumous Kantian publications has been patient and profound; while the appraisement of the issues which divide ethical speculation in the present, set forth with remarkable insight and clearness, especially in the thirteenth and sixteenth chapters, is in the highest degree stimulating and valuable.

To those readers, at least, whose main knowledge of Kant's thought has been derived from second-hand sources, Dr. Messer will seem to be an ideal commentator. While he would doubtless recognize Kant as his master, he falls into none of the extravagances of hero-worship, and is far from adopting a mere "Back to Kant!" as the burden of his discourse. He distinguishes by the help of the resources which fuller knowledge and the later development of thought supply, the essential and central achievements of Kant's intellect from the accretions derived from academic pedantry and personal idiosyncrasy. The effect upon the reader must be to kindle his interest anew in the growth of Kant's potent spiritual personality and to enable him to take up with hope and zeal the study of the original writings in which this growth can be clearly traced. The author claims, in my opinion, quite justly, that on the two main questions, as to which Kant is at issue with eudaemonist, evolutionist, and deterministic ethics, our verdict must be given in favor of Kant. The first Kantian doctrine which is vindicated against false interpretations and hostile attacks is the doctrine of the categorical imperative. The essence of this doctrine is shown to be that the only goodness which deserves the name of moral goodness consists in the per-

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formance of duty for its own sake; and that particular duties can only be determined by reflection upon the relations of a plurality of rational beings with equal right, in every case, to consideration. The determination of particular and general duties must be left to applied ethics, and in the last resort to the judgment of the individual; and no peculiarity in the circumstances need be ignored. The formal character of the categorical imperative is vindicated, indeed, as necessary to the free growth of the spirit, in correspondence with the varying demands which varying circumstances make upon it. The only comment which I would make is that, in my opinion Kant did consider his categorical imperative to be capable of establishing certain simple and rigorous rules of conduct, which the writers whom he criticised seemed to him to be perversely bent on undermining. However, our author's own ethical judgments seem to be as unlike the rigorous pharisaism attributed to Kant as can be; and it is a real service to thought to show that the difficulty which Kant apprehended in the eudaemonistic speculation of his time cannot be explained away by pointing to certain superficial defects and paradoxes in Kant's application of his own principles.

To an examination of Kant's views of the central problem of freedom, both in their development and in the final form which they assumed, the author devotes four masterly chapters. He admits that Kant's final statement of his attitude is unsatisfactory, and endeavors to supplement and complete it by means of the distinction advocated by Eucken, Windelband, Münsterberg and others between spirit and soul; the soul being the abstract succession of conscious states contemplated by psychology. In psychology as in other natural sciences the determinist postulate, or law of Causation, must be recognized; it has no application, however, to actual spiritual experience and to the sciences of spirit or mind, under which term, I presume, we are to understand, Logic, Ethics, the philosophy of Art, Religion and History. This statement will hardly, in my opinion, take rank as the final solution of the problem, though it follows the right direction. The Critique of Pure Reason can hardly remain for all time the final statement of the principles and postulates of scientific knowledge; and philosophy cannot acquiesce in a division of human knowledge into diverse sciences with totally distinct *Aufgaben* and totally distinct and even contradictory fundamental principles.

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PRINCIPLES AND METHODS OF INDUSTRIAL PEACE. By A. C. Pigou, M. A. Girdler's Lecture in Economics, Cambridge. London: MacMillan & Co. Pp. 240.

There has been no lack of books published in recent years on the subject of Industrial Peace. They have contributed largely to the formation of a more instructed public opinion on matters of the first social importance. But, for the most part, they have been concerned to describe the events incident to industrial conflicts and the machinery of settlement elaborated in connection therewith, rather than to analyse the material thus afforded and to present the results of such analysis in the form of economic generalizations. Mr. Pigou's book makes a distinct advance in the literature of the subject in that it is almost wholly devoted to this latter aim.

Every economist must constantly experience the desire to escape from the sea of disconnected particular facts and to reach the haven of general laws. On the other hand he is confronted by the ghost of the *economic* man which utters its warning against overabstraction, a cry echoed readily enough by popular sentiment. Notwithstanding, it seems to us that advance in the economic discussion of the great social problems of the day must be made, not only by more detailed analysis and classification of facts, but by a more fearless use of hypothesis and deduction. Mr. Pigou has given us a study that will command admiration for the closeness of his reasoning no less than for the power with which a vast mass of material has been used. There is no book that one would more unhesitatingly recommend to economic students as a cure for loose thinking and hasty generalization in a branch of their subject in which both evils are so common. Those actively occupied with the conduct of conciliation or arbitration should be no less grateful to Mr. Pigou, so long as they refrain from taking his conclusions as positive truths and remember to view his hypothetical conclusions in the light of the hypothesis from which they proceed. The book is divided into three parts. The first, Historical and Descriptive, is brief and the least important. The second, Principles of Industrial Peace, examines in detail how disputes arising between employer and employed ought to be settled. These disputes fall broadly into two heads: (a) those concerned with *demarcation of function;* (b) those with *fraction of wages.* It is the first three chapters of part ii, dealing with the theory of wage settlement, that will be read with chief interest. Part iii is

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given to a discussion of the machinery most appropriate under the varying circumstances for determining the differences discussed in part ii. The precise conclusions to which Mr. Pigou comes can not be given usefully without reproducing the conditions and limitations under which they are drawn. For these one must read the book. There is one point, however, to which we would venture to call attention.

The standpoint of the book is said to be ethical, aiming at a study of what ought to be rather than of what is. It is with pleasure that one sees a frank recognition in a scientific economic discussion of the ethical standpoint as appropriate to this kind of inquiry.

Unfortunately we are soon reminded that what ought to be must be limited by what is practicable and this would seem to be also very limited in extent. For Mr. Pigou has little difficulty in showing that, although it is desirable from the point of view of maximum satisfaction to aim at a greater equality of distribution, there is great probability of an arbitrator doing more harm than good, should he award a wage higher than the normal which competition tends to establish. In other words the general conclusion is reached that neither Trade Unions nor Arbitrators can usually improve upon competition as a wage regulator. But the chief aim of the Trade Union is to increase the standard of life and the minimum wage. In this it will have the support of ethical opinion. But competition compels any one group or nation to conform to the standard of those other peoples with whom it is in contact, allowing only such differences as may be due to differences of relative efficiency. There appears then the alternative of waiting for the whole body of the competing nations to advance together, or for any particular nation to seek some means of maintaining a standard of life higher than that of its neighbors by limiting free competition. This brings one to the old suggestion of a Minimum National Wage, a subject that one would like discussed in detail by those who advocate it. If one has to criticise Mr. Pigou it would be to say that while valuing his work as an economic exercise and regarding it as stimulating in its example of clear reasoning and acute analysis, it partly fails of its purpose as a contribution to the ethics of wage settlement, because it does not make sufficient attempt to suggest means to that end which economists agree in desiring and as yet refuse to include wholly among the things that are impracticable, viz: the main-

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tenance of a minimum wage higher than the necessary efficiency wage for the sake of a more widespread possibility of living a cultured existence. In view of a subsequent edition one may call attention to a clerical error in the index on page xi, § 4.

C. J. HAMILTON.

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A PECULIAR PEOPLE—THE DOUKHOBORS. By Aylmer Maude. London. A. Constable, Pp. viii, 338, 1905.

This book is in no sense a literary whole; fragmentary and ill-constructed, some parts are irrelevant and even uninteresting, and all are very loosely connected together. But it has the value of dealing with the sincerity and clearness of view that comes of sympathetic disillusionment, with a movement that is of real moment. The most interesting and valuable chapters of history are those that deal with the recurring attempts made by serious-minded people to incarnate their ideal of the meaning of life in a concrete form; to attain within the limits of their own experience some realization of what seems to them the real good of life. The tenets of the Doukhobors, their very partial attainment of their lofty if mistaken aims, are no more than a new aspect of the mystical mendicancy of St. Francis, the unedifying transports of the Flagellants, or the unmanageable heresies of the Fraticelli—their value lies in their attempt to visualize the truth as it appears to each individual conscience. Doukhoborism in the form of refusal to take part in war, of non-resistance generally, of extreme simplicity of life and a negation of the importance of all the external symbols and observances of religion, appeared in Russia in the early years of the eighteenth century, voiced by Skovorodá Kolésnikof and Pobiróhin. An attempt to live in literal accordance with the precept of Christ, its appeal was primarily to the poor. In spite of internal divisions, mainly on the question of property, the sect grew strong under persecution but it was hardly known to the Western world until the advocacy of Tolstoi and the subsequent transportation of 7,500 Doukhobors to Canada brought it into the English newspapers. In the recent development of their ideas, Tolstoi's teaching is the central fact; for Verígin, their leader, to whose words the members of the Brotherhood accord the authority of inspiration and an obedience more unquestioned than that claimed by any despot, has appro-

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priated from Tolstoi ideas that have been incorporated into the confession of faith of the sect. It is in obedience to Verigin and through him to Tolstoi that communism, based on a belief in the immorality of any use of physical force, has become an integral part of their system, and it is as a record of the experiment, the most recent and in some respects the most complete, in communism, that Mr. Maude's book is valuable. Economically the Doukhobors have flourished under the communistic regimè imposed on them by Verigin. Tolstoi's rule "Each man should work as much as possible and content himself with as little as possible," is the working rule of men of whom Mr. Maude declares, "it would be hard to find a community consisting of an equal number of people among whom there is less crime and more industry." But Tolstoi's support of communism is based rather upon moral than upon economic grounds; a communistic state is for him the only moral one, because property *per se* is immoral, as resting upon physical coercion. The Canadian Doukhobors have shown a single-minded desire to do without private property; but they have done so on the instructions of a strong leader whose authority dominates the entire group, who exercises a force of moral coercion more pervading and infinitely more dangerous than the physical coercion which it deprecates. And in spite of this moral authority, and the possession by the Doukhobors of a set of stereotyped religious views, held with intolerant fanaticism, there has been throughout Doukhobor history a continual tendency for individualism in the shape of the possession of private property to assert itself. The record of this as of every other experiment in communism goes to show that there can really be no profitable discussion of the "morality or immorality" of private property; there must in every case be a weighing against one another of a certain number of advantages and disadvantages, a recognition of certain sacrifices involved in the acceptance of either form. The Doukhobors have attained certain infinitely valuable things; they have especially recognized as the chief object of endeavor the development of that sense of intimate personal interconnection in which it is possible to realize that it is only by serving their fellows that men truly live; and for this they have sacrificed the intellectual benefits that belong to a complex society and the individual freedom of thought and action impossible in a communal existence. St. Francis declared that the poverty of the truly religious must be intellectual as well as material, and communism, especially

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a religious communism like that of the Doukhobors, which is perhaps the only feasible type, does involve a sacrifice of the few, and those the most gifted and finely touched, for the many.

Mr. Maude's book is suggestive rather than wholly satisfactory; but it is a fair and careful statement of the practical problems involved in the attempt to work out Tolstoi's simplification of life; it has the value which belongs to a fair-minded investigation of the most complete concrete example it is possible to examine of a certain definite and wholly sincere view of existence. If experiment does little more then reinforce the conclusions already reached by political theory, it is none the less valuable; and a debt of gratitude is therefore due to Mr. Maude for his description of the most important experiment that has yet been made in this direction.

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, CARDIFF. M. A. HAMILTON.

THE EDUCATIONAL IDEAS OF PESTALOZZI. By J. A. Green, B. A.; London: W. B. Clive, 1905. Pp. 222.

THE EDUCATIONAL IDEAS OF FROEBEL. By Jessie White, D. Sc., London: W. B. Clive, 1905. Pp. 156.

SCHOOL TRAINING. By R. E. Hughes, M. A.; B. Sc.; London: W. B. Clive, 1905. Pp. 118.

The King's Scholarship examination has changed its name and become the Certificate Examination. But it has more than changed its name; it has changed its character. Inasmuch as the teachers of the future will have all spent some time in a secondary school, the standard of this examination can with advantage be raised. Mathematics is carried to a much higher stage, and for the first time the budding teacher is expected to know something of the principles of education. He must have a clear idea of the relations of the school to the homes of the children and to the community at large. He must be familiar with the details of school organization. He must have studied the principles and methods of teaching the subjects in a primary school course. And last, but not least, he must have some notions of the great currents by which educational opinion and practice have been influenced in modern times. He may choose between the educational ideas of Pestalozzi and Froebel, Spencer's Education, and the lives of the Arnolds as told us by Fitch and Stanley. The University Tutorial Press seems determined to cater for the needs

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of such students, as successfully as it has done for candidates in the London University Examinations. The volumes which head this notice are instances of the sound instinct shown by the general editor in the choice of its authors. The price of the books brings them well within the reach of those of limited means. Their contents are what we might expect from the calibre of the authors. *Place aux Dames!* Miss Jessie White is a London D. Sc. and took a First Class in the Moral Science Tripos at Cambridge. She has had practical experience, having been Vice Principal of the Home and Colonial School Society's Kindergarten Training College. Her ideal has been a high one—to bring the reader to Froebel, to bring him to realize "the golden truths which underlie his errors and obscurities, and to learn not 'for examination,' but 'for life' all that is to be learned from the strenous endeavor of a strenuous life." With skilful touch she shows how the circumstances of the man and the spirit of the age combined to make him what he was. His methods are carefully described and the fundamental ideas are thrown into bold relief. In structure and content the whole book is excellent. It could only have been written by one who has felt to the full all that is suggested by Goethe's words: "Come, let us live for our children."

Mr. Green writes with authority, being Professor of Education at the University of North Wales, Bangor. He has German Pestalozzian literature at his finger-tips, and has done his part with German thoroughness. The result is a vivid picture of the life and work of Pestalozzi in which we do not lose sight of the influence of the age on the man, and in which his influence upon other educational thinkers is carefully shown. Accounts in some detail of the work at Stanz, Burgdorf and Yverdun are relegated to appendices, as is a list of Pestalozzi's chief educational writings, with analysis of those but slightly touched on in the text. As a rule the style is clear and attractive. Professor Green, like most of us, nods occasionally. "The high place which the school in Germany takes, the clear views held by both the governed and the governing classes as to its importance in relation to the future of the fatherland, is in no small degree due to the Pestalozzian spirit, as kept alive at a critical time by Diesterweg, who died three days after Sadowa, July 7, 1866," is a sentence which is not beyond reproach. There is a further point. The writer of this notice has read this presentation of Pestalozzi's life and work with very great interest and pleasure, and he hopes with some profit. But it has

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many times been borne in upon him that Professor Green has hardly realized, perhaps, the calibre of the average student for whom the book is mainly intended. It is inspiring to look forward to the end of the next decade when, no doubt, the teachers of the future will have reached such a standard of general development that, at the age for passing the certificate examinaion, they will be able to read such a book as this from cover to cover with understanding. Let the reader compare the prefaces of Miss White and Professor Green and he will at once see the difference of attitude. But as this criticism can only refer to less than a quarter of an admirable piece of work, and as the influence of the secondary school upon the development of the pupil teacher automatically increases, it will cease to have any point. We may congratulate the author on an excellent volume which will be welcomed by more than those for whom he intended it. The book lacks an index.

The volume by Mr. Hughes, quaintly characterized in the advertisement as "School Training (for the Certificate Examination)" is conceived on broad and generous lines. Education is treated in its two-fold aspect—national and individual. We face King Demos and all that this attitude connotes. The readers of this little volume are to be not only students, but "citizens who are anxious to fathom, if possible, these pregnant problems in national education that are agitating in different ways all the civilized communities of to-day." The author writes under the influence of Guyau, Fouillée, Compayré, and the like, and is at no pains to conceal his dislike of the "academic textbooks." The result is a broad and generous treatment of his subject which, for the pupil teacher as we have him at present, is all that could be desired. If the "man in the street" could only be brought to read a book of this description, if the views herein expounded so simply, and withal so cogently, were generally accepted, we are convinced that most of the difficulties which we foresee are in store for the nation as arrayed against the ratepayer would disappear. The fine ideal which the author has set himself to enforce is that the supreme purpose of school work is "to destroy differences and to unify national life." And this he has admirably done. While appreciating to the full all that has been done by the Board of Education to raise the standard which is to be expected from the young teachers of the future, we cannot help wondering what proportion of our young students will be attracted respectively by

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Pestalozzi and Froebel, by Spencer, and by Arnold. The choice of authority to be studied is catholic enough. But surely it must issue in not a two-fold but a three-fold division of view as to the ideal to be attained. In one county we shall have teachers trained to look on the Spencerian attitude as the only possible, and in the next county, (perhaps because the text-books available are easier to "get up") Arnoldian views will be the be-all and the end-all. It is very clear that, in future amendments of the regulations, it should be secured that all teachers should, at some period of their career, have read and be familiar with the divergence between the Arnoldian and the Spencerian views of the great problem.

STROUD, ENGLAND. W. J. GREENSTREET.

THE CHILD AND RELIGION. Eleven Essays by various writers, edited by Thomas Stephens, B. A. London: Williams & Norgate; New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1905.

On first perusal, this book gives the impression of being at once interesting and somewhat bewildering. So many points of view, so many different modes of expression are to be found therein, that at first sight they seem to be irreconcilable. More careful reading may, however, lead to the acceptance of the editor's statement in his introduction: "The points of agreement far outnumber the points of divergence"—"The variations are principally on the surface, . . . deeper down there is harmony and concord." In any case it is a most interesting experiment in focussing the attention of those whose ways would ordinarily lie far apart,—upon an object of common interest—the child.

The series begins with a very striking essay by Prof. Henry Jones on "The Child and Heredity," which alone would amply justify the publication of the book. The doctrines of evolution and heredity have no terrors for those who realize with him that "the higher is not determined by the lower, but is the fulfilment of its own promise within it." "Man is not product but producer, not consequence but cause."

He brings out with great clearness the truth—that there is no real opposition between heredity and environment—"the entire meaning and power of both lies in their relations." Neither alone is potent for good or evil, it is only by their interaction that character is affected. Character is not inherited and it is even doubt-

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ful whether good or bad tendencies can be transmitted. All one can say is—that the child inherits potential powers which may or may not be developed by environment. These powers may vary both relatively and absolutely "so that the appeal of the environment may mean very different things to different children." "No child is born either vicious or virtuous," but the training in morality is attended with more difficulty in some cases than in others. The child must obtain this moral training from his social environment and Professor Jones contends that it is the duty of the community to see that the child is brought under the right educative influences, because, "so rich is the innate inheritance of the child and so dependent is his possession of it upon those into whose hands his life falls."

Mr. Masterman's essay "The Child and Environment" gives much food for serious thought. He points out that at the present time, the environment for the majority of children is "the city." Certain consequences must therefore be faced. In the first place, the nature element is vanishing. The real city child lacks this important factor in his education and we must allow for it. For lack of direct experience of nature, even the scenes and analogies of the Bible are unintelligible to him and there is real danger that religious and moral teaching may therefore become meaningless and formal. Secondly, the human element makes for restlessness and brings about a premature development. Thirdly, this environment tends towards the abolition of family life. The writer urges the moral and religious importance of trying to cope with this new state of the child's environment.

Professor Ladd dealing with "The Child's Capacity for Religion" takes as his standpoint that "It is human to be religious." Religious experience is a complex, involving phenomena of feeling. thinking and willing; it is individual and expresses the spiritual unity of the race. He describes the child's capacity for religion as that of forming an idea of the Divine Being and of taking toward this idea a fitting attitude of feeling, intellect and will. This idea and this attitude will grow and develop with the unfolding of the child's mind and the influence of environment.

We have no space to consider the other interesting essays which deal either with special aspects of the child's religious experience (sin; conversion, etc.) or with the religious and moral training provided by various churches, viz: The Church

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of England; The Free Churches; The Swedenborgian, and the Jewish. They offer much attractive and suggestive material, and reading them in succession makes clear how great is still the need for the sympathetic study of other schools of thought and modes of expression, if one would rightly understand the moral and religious elements of human life.

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, CARDIFF. M. MACKENZIE.

SCHOOL TEACHING AND SCHOOL REFORM. By Sir Oliver Lodge. London: Williams & Norgate, 1905.

This very interesting little book by the Principal of Birmingham University, contains the four lectures delivered by him to Secondary Teachers and Teachers in training during February, 1905.

The scope of the book is sufficiently indicated by the titles of these lectures, viz:—1. Curricula and Methods; 2. History and Science; 3. Secondary School Reform in General; 4. Boarding School Problems.

In his brief preface the author tells us that he regards the subject from "the University point of view." Although this is necessarily a limitation in some respects, he holds, and with justice, that the adaptation of secondary education to modern conditions involves problems in the consideration of which the universities should lead the way.

Sir Oliver Lodge gives us his own views on education with much freshness and vigor and the book is eminently readable. He is in favor of a fairly wide school curriculum, which shall rouse interest and develop power, but, at the same time, result in the acquisition of knowledge valuable in itself, because "It must have not only a deadening intellectual influence, but even to some extent a deteriorating moral influence to work for a long time at a thing and then not to know it. If in exceptional cases agility results from the training, then it is dangerous." "A training of the mind by means which pretend to teach a subject and do not teach it . . . is not only a waste, it is a crime." "Men so trained never are the real teachers of any progressive race." These are strong words and which press home an important truth.

When discussing reform in methods of teaching he enters a powerful plea for the training of teachers especially of those who are to teach pupils between the ages of eight and sixteen. His

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many valuable suggestions with regard to the teaching of science, history and language cannot here be dealt with but reference must be made to the most suggestive lecture "Chiefly on Boarding School Problems."

He seems extremely doubtful of both the intellectual and moral influences of the boarding school. It is interesting to note that he lays special stress upon the difficulty of giving the boys enough time to themselves. "Hours of study are too long—"too few are available for leisure—"Overlong hours develop inattention." He urges the importance of "social studies" and the teaching of ethics and practical religion. "The essence of religious teaching . . . is to get the human being to realize his place in the Universe . . . to feel that he is not a helpless spectator but a competent artisan and co-worker of whom much is required." As he says further "Adolescence is the period we too much neglect," and yet it is the one period in which ethical ideals of life and social service can best be inculcated.

No doubt many will differ from the author upon points of detail and some perhaps with regard to certain general views, but even if it is mainly the fighting interest that is roused the profit will still be on the side of the reader.

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, CARDIFF. M. MACKENZIE.

LAW AND OPINION IN ENGLAND. By A. V. Dicey, K. C., B. C. L., Vinerian Professor of English in the University of Oxford. MacMillan, London, 1905. 500 Pp.

These lectures afford another proof, if proof were needed, that the law, properly considered, is not the driest but one of the most fascinating of studies. The laws by which a people really lives are the most general expression of its continuous natural life, and illustrate more clearly than anything else the problems about which it had from time to time to take thought and the spirit in which it approached them. It is therefore a matter of most fascinating study to make explicit, as Professor Dicey has done for a single country and a special period, the universally implied relations of law and public opinion.

In the history of England during the nineteenth century Professor Dicey discerns three main periods, each of which may be identified with the predominence of a distinct current of public opinion and legislation. The first of these periods is the period of

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old Toryism, beginning really in the middle of the eighteenth century and continuing to about 1830. During the latter part of this period, with which alone the lectures are directly concerned, the legislative quiescence which was the most general characteristic of the whole became asccentuated into a stage of positive reaction. The Combination Acts of 1799-1800 and the Six Acts of 1819 mark the passage from the complacent optimism of a paternal government to the suspicious terrors of an alarmed aristocracy. The second period is the period of Benthamism or Individualism, placed by Professor Dicey between 1825 and 1870. During this era of utilitarian reform and "philosophical radicalism" the combination Acts were repealed; the sphere of free contract was extended in every way--by the repeal of laws against forestalling and usury, by the Divorce Act 1857, by the sactioning of limited liability; and useless legal barbarities and technicalities were abolished; self-reliant individualism was inculcated by the establishment of the new Poor Law. The third period is the period of collectivism from 1865 to the present time, with its recognition of trade unionism; its enormous development of state and municipal activity; its significant growth of protective legislation for ever-widening classes of workers, and for the community of consumers at large.

The substantial truth of this analysis, suggested as it is by a mass of interesting illustrations and quotations, will hardly be questioned. Yet as Professor Dicey himself points out, the truth is only of the most general character. It is not only that social theories as held by the people at large are seldonm very definite or self-consistent; it is rather that, owing to the slow and uncertain spread of opinions in a large community, almost all the main types of social and political theory will at any one time be represented somewhere or other, will form counter-currents or cross-currents of opinion diverting or even reversing the main stream. Of the three systems of thought which have most influenced legal development during the century, Benthamism was far the most definite logical, and consistent; yet none suffered such crushing occasional reverses even at the height of its power. It is only necessary to recall the Truck Act of 1831, whose date hardly receives sufficient notice from Professor Dicey, the Ten Hour Act of 1847, or the Adulteration Act of 1860. Thorough-going individualism as its friends say, and amongst them is Professor Dicey, has never had a fair trial; as its enemies

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might reply, it proved a monster that had only to be seen to be hated. It has indeed accomplished far less in respect of positive legislation than in the field of private action and opinion falling outside the purview of these lectures.

Perhaps the most interesting modification to the broad division of periods, is the generalization that in England legislation must in the nature of things be twenty or thirty and judicial decision forty to fifty years behind the most enlightened opinion of the age. Legislators of fifty and judges of sixty to eighty will always apply to the problems before them the convictions acquired in far off impressionable adolescence. Professor Dicey indicates, but hardly discusses sufficiently, the very interesting action and re-action to which the difference of interval for the two English law making bodies—Parliament and Judiciary—gives rise. The history of trade union law, for instance, falls into regular periods of legislative action—judicial re-action stimulating Parliament into activity again.

To Professor Dicey's method there are of course obvious limitations. He has to disregard all public opinion which cannot affect legislation and much collective action which substantially if not technically, alters the rules by which men live.

The Trade Union legislation, which is his main ground for dating collectivism in 1870, in no way represents a revolution of opinion. It is not even fully explained, as Professor Dicey explains it, as marking the transference of power from classes holding one opinion to classes holding another *opinion*. The legislation recognized rather than initiated collectivism in the bargaining for wages; the development of continuous trade union organization, none the less collective for being outside the state, dates from 1850, not from 1870. These and kindred facts Professor Dicey, taking a strictly legal view of what amounts to legislation, has to disregard.

In consequence of this limited view he perhaps underestimates the applicability in substance of his method to other times or other countries. But no one will quarrel with Professor Dicey for concentrating attention in this fascinating book upon the legal system which he knows best, and upon the interesting immediate past from which we all hope to foretell the yet more interesting immediate future.

CARDIFF. C. J. HAMILTON.

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PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES. By David J. Ritchie, M. A., LL. D., Sometime Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of St. Andrews. Author of "Natural Rights," etc. Edited with a Memoir, by Robert Latta, M. A., D. Phil., Professor of Logic and Rhetoric in the University of Glasgow, London: MacMillan & Co., 1905. Pp. ix, 355.

By the premature death of Professor Ritchie the cause of clear and vigorous thinking in the field of political philosophy lost one of its leading representatives in Great Britain, while there can be no doubt that had he lived he would have made equally valuable contributions to the more theoretical departments of philosophy, to which his attention had been more prominently directed in the closing years of his life. This partial transfer of interest, which found expression in his retention of the Chair of Logic and Metaphysics in preference to that of Moral Philosophy, was not, however, the result of any weakening in the fundamentally social character of his thought. Whatever the subject with which he dealt his main source of inspiration lay in his conception of a social ideal; and, as his editor remarks, "probably the very fact that the social element is at first sight less prominent in the intellectual than in the practical human activities, attracted him especially to the study and teaching of logic, psychology and metaphysics."

For the present volume Professor Latta has written a Memoir, which contains a sympathetic appreciation of a winning and attractive personality, an exposition of Ritchie's philosophical position and some account of his views upon questions of theology and practical politics. The book contains two portraits, one of Ritchie as an undergraduate at Oxford, and the other showing him as he appeared in recent years. Its usefulness is enhanced by an index.

Three of the papers which are printed here have already appeared in philosophical journals, viz.: those upon "The Relation of Logic to Psychology," "The Relation of Metaphysics to Epistemology," and the paper entitled "The One and the Many." Of these the last two more specially deserve preservation, containing as they do some of Ritchie's most brilliant writing, and serving to define his position in relation to contemporary tendencies concerning ultimate questions. The new matter, comprising about half of the book, is in the main drawn from manuscript volumes, the contents of which have, however, been to some extent rear-

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ranged by the editor and supplemented from other sources. The earliest and slightest consist of a series of philosophical reflections written in 1885, under the title *"Confessio Fidei."* More mature expressions of the writer's views are contained in the *"Cogitatio Metaphysica,"* and in the sections headed "Moral Philosophy." If none of these, with the possible exception of the first part of the *Cogitatio,* can be regarded as having received a form which the author would have accepted as final, they possess in their unfinished state and frequently interrogative form, something of the interest which is aroused by the presentation of thought in the making. Coming early under the influence of Green, Ritchie remained constant in essentials to the point of view which he then made his own. The chief value of his work lay not so much in the criticisms or further development of ultimate conceptions as in the attempt to interpret concrete facts, particularly those of social life, in the light of first principles. To this task he brought a fine humanistic insight, and an unreserved sympathy with the aims of science which has not always been shown by those who have shared his philosophical position; while his knowledge of recent theories of biological evolution contributed one of the most distinctive elements to his writings upon ethics and political philosophy. In the ethical sections of the present volume the topics most fully treated are the general questions of the method and divisions of ethics and its relation to metaphysics on the one hand and the positive sciences on the other. Readers will, however, find much of interest in the more detached and slighter sections in which the author expresses his views upon some of the more concrete questions of life.

JAMES GIBSON,
UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF NORTH WALES, BANGOR.

LECTURES ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF KANT, AND OTHER PHILOSOPHICAL LECTURES AND ESSAYS. By the late Henry Sidgwick, Knightbridge Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Cambridge. London: MacMillan & Co.; New York: The MacMillan Co., 1905. Pp. x, 475.

This volume has but little direct bearing on Ethics, being almost purely metaphysical in character. Hence it claims only a short notice in this Journal, though intrinsically it is a work of great importance. Much the largest section of the book is devoted to

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the Metaphysics of Kant (207 pp.). Considerable parts are occupied with the discussion of the Metaphysics of T. H. Green and the Philosophy of Herbert Spencer. The volume includes also several essays, mostly reprinted from *Mind*. The value of the book lies no doubt in its searching criticisms of modern philosophical positions, but partly also in the indications that it contains of the constructive point of view towards which Sidgwick was moving. This may, on the whole, be described as the point of view of a Realism largely akin to that of Reid, but modified by the results of recent criticism; just as in Ethics his position may be described as that of Butler, with modifications of a similar character. Unfortunately his metaphysical position is nowhere worked out in a really constructive fashion. His criticisms—perhaps especially those on Kant—seem to me to suffer somewhat from a certain lack of what may be called the historic sense or the sense of process. He appears to be too apt to emphasize apparent contradictions, without considering how far the changes in expression are due to the development of the writer's thought. Such a mode of criticism is almost as inappropriate to Kant as it would be to Plato. Notwithstanding this defect, however, there can be no doubt that the criticisms are extremely valuable. The volume is edited by Professor James Ward.

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, CARDIFF. J. S. MACKENZIE.

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Articles by writers in Great Britain, and books to be reviewed, published in Great Britain, should be sent to Prof. J. S. Mackenzie, University College, Cardiff, Wales.

All other articles, and books to be reviewed published in the United States, should be sent to INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, 1415 Locust Street, Philadelphia.



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INTERNATIONAL

JOURNAL OF ETHICS.

APRIL, 1906.

RACE QUESTIONS AND PREJUDICES.

The numerous questions and prejudices which are aroused by the contact of the various races of men have always been important factors in human history. They promise, however, to become, in the near future, still more important than they have ever been before. Such increased importance of race questions and prejudices, if it comes to pass, will be due not to any change in human nature, and especially not to any increase in the diversity or in the contrasting traits of the races of men themselves, but simply to the greater extent and complexity of the work of civilization. Physically speaking, great masses of men are to-day brought into more frequent and closer contact than was formerly possible, because of the ease with which at present the numerous means of communication can be used, because of the increase of peaceful migrations, and because of the imperial ambitions of several of the world's great peoples. Hence whatever contact, conflict, or mutual influence the races of men have had in the past, we find to-day more ways and places in which men find themselves in the presence of alien races, with whom they have to learn to live in the same social order. When we think of East Indian coolies now present as laborers, side by side with the native negroes, and with white men, in the British West Indies; when we remember the problem of South Africa, as it was impressed upon our minds a few years since, at a moment when Dutchmen and Englishmen

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fought for the land, while Kaffirs and Zulus watched the conflict; when we recall what the recent war between Japan and Russia has already meant for the future of the races of men in the far East; and when, with a few only of such typical instances in mind, we turn back to our own country, and think how many different race-problems confront us, we then see that the earliest social problem of humanity is also the most recent problem. This is the problem of dealing with the men who seem to us somehow very widely different from ourselves, in physical constitution, in temperament, in all their deeper nature, so that we are tempted to think of them as natural strangers to our souls, while nevertheless we find that they are stubbornly there in our world, and that they are men as much determined to live as we are, and are men who, in turn, find us as incomprehensible as we find them. Of these diverse races, what ones are the superior and what ones are the inferior races? What race or races ought to rule? What ones ought to yield to their natural masters? To which one of these races has God, or nature, or destiny, ordained the rightful and final sovereignty of the earth? Which of these types of men is really the human type? Are they by their presence and their rivalry essentially perilous to one another's interests? And if so, what one amongst them is there whose spread, or whose increase in power or in number is most perilous to the true cause of civilization? Is it a "yellow peril," or a "black peril," or perhaps, after all is it not rather some form of "white peril," which most threatens the future of humanity in this day of great struggles and of complex issues? Are all men equal, as the Eighteenth Century theorists insisted? Or if the actual inequality of men in power, in value, in progressiveness, is an obvious fact, then how is this fact related to racial distinctions?

Such are a few of the questions that crowd upon us when we think about the races of men, and about their various relations to civilization. I do not mean, in this brief discussion to exhaust any of these questions, but I want to call attention to a few principles which seem to me to be serviceable to any one who wants to look at race questions fairly and humanely.

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I.

It will be natural for some of my readers to interpose, at this point, the suggestion that the principal guidance in any attempt to answer such questions as the foregoing must come from an appeal to the results of the modern scientific study of the races of men. Why speculate and moralize, one may say? Have not the races of men been studied in recent times with elaborate care? What can tell us how to deal with the race-problems, in case we neglect the results of anthropology and of ethnology? And if we consult those sciences, do they not already give us a basis for decision regarding all such matters—a basis which is far more valuable than any chance observations of an amateur can be?

As a fact, if I supposed that, in their present stage of progress, the sciences which deal with man had already attained to exact results regarding the mental and moral differences, prospects, and destinies, of the different stocks of the *genus homo,* nobody would be humbler than I should be in accepting, and in trying to use the verdict that would then have been obtained. But I confess that, as a student of ethics and of certain other aspects of our common human nature, I have been a good deal baffled in trying to discover just what the results of science are regarding the true psychological and moral meaning of race-differences. I shall later speak further of some of the difficulties of this scientific aspect of our topic. It is enough to say here that when I consult any of the known *Rassentheoretiker* for light, I do indeed learn that the concept of race is the key to the comprehension of all history, and that, if you only form a clear idea of the important types of men (types such, for instance, as the marvelous *Germanen* of Chamberlain's *Grundzüge des Neunzehnten Jahrhunderts),* you can then determine with exactness precisely who ought to rule and who ought to yield, and can predict the forms of civilization, the *Weltanschaunngen,* and the other possessions, which will be characteristic of each type of men, so long as that type shall endure. When I observe, however, that the *Rassentheoretiker* frequently uses his science to support most of his personal pre-

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judices, and is praised by his sympathizers almost equally for his exact knowledge and for his vigorous display of temperament, I begin to wonder whether a science which mainly devotes itself to proving that we ourselves are the salt of the earth, is after all so exact as it aims to be. It is with some modern race-theories, as it is with some forms of international yacht racing. I know nothing about yachting; but whenever any form of the exalted sport of international yachting proves to be definable as a sort of contest in which the foreigner is invariably beaten, I for my part take no interest in learning more about the rules of that particular game. And precisely so, when men marshal all the resources of their science to prove that their own race-prejudices are infallible, I can feel no confidence in what they imagine to be the result of science. Much of our modern race-theory reminds me, in its spirit, altogether too much of some of the conversations in the "Jungle-Book,"—or of the type of international courtesy expressed in "The Truce of the Bear,"—too much, I say to seem like exact science. Mowgli's remarks adressed to Red Dog may have been good natural history. But scientific Zoölogy does not proceed in that way.

While I deeply respect, then, the actual work of the sciences which deal with man, and while I fully recognize their modern progress, I greatly doubt that these sciences as yet furnish us with the exact results which representative race-theorists sometimes insist upon. Hence I am unable to begin this little study by a mere report of what science has established regarding the mental and moral varieties of men. I must rather make my beginning with a mention of two instances which have recently been much in my mind, and which bear upon the meaning of race prejudices. One of these instances is to-day in everybody's mind.

II.

I refer then, first, to the wonderful lesson that Japan has been teaching us regarding what human energy and devotion has done and can do, and can do also in case of a race that is indeed remote enough from our own. I remember well the Japan of the geography text-books of my childhood, text-books which

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were even then antiquated enough. But I believed them. Japan was a weird land, according to the old text-books,—a land from which foreigners were excluded, a land where all things were as perverse as possible, where criminals were boiled in oil, where Catholic missionaries had long ago been martyred. Whatever the Japanese were, they were plainly men of the wrong race. Later, however, I very soon learned something of the contemporary history of Japan as it then was. The scene was now, indeed, vastly changed. The Japanese had opened their land; and hereupon, lo! in a magic way, they were imitating, so we heard, *all* of our European customs. So we next had to alter our own opinion as to their essential nature. They became in our eyes a plastic race of wonderful little children, small of stature, quick of wit, light-minded—a folk who took up any suggestion precisely as the playful children often do. They, too, were playing, it seemed, with our whole Western civilization. Plainly, then, they were a race who had no serious life of their own at all. Those of us who disliked them noted that they thus showed an ape-like unsteadiness of conduct. This, then, was their racial characteristic. Those who admired them thought of them as a new sort of pets, to be humored and instructed with all our superior condescension. Well, as time went on, and I grew to manhood, I myself came to know some of these Japanese as students. Hereupon, however, I gradually learned to see such men in a wholly new light. I found them, with all their steadfast courtesy, pleasantly, but impenetrably reserved—keepers of their own counsel, men whose life had, as I soon found, a vast background of opinions and customs that I could not fathom. When, I said, shall I ever see what is behind that Japanese smile? What is in their hearts? With an immovable self-consciousness they resisted every effort to alter, from without, any of their essential ideals. Politely, whenever you pressed them they declined to admit that any of our Western arts or opinions were equal in value to their own most cherished national ideal treasures. And this they did even at the moment when they were present, most respectfully, as learners. They learned well; but plainly they meant to use this learning for their own purposes.

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An enthusiastic lady in an American University town was once seeking to draw from a Japanese visitor some admission of the importance of Christianity for the higher civilization of his country. "Confess" she insisted, "confess what a boon our missionaries have brought you in introducing Christianity into your land." "You are right," answered the Japanese, with his usual courteous smile, "You are right; the missionaries in introducing Christianity, have indeed brought us a great good. They have completed the variety of religions in Japan."

This impenetrable Japanese self-consciousness, this unconquerable polite and obstinate reserve, what did it mean? Well, Mr. Hearn and his kin have now let us know in a literary way something of the true heart of Japan. And the recent war has shown us what Japan meant by imitating our Western ways, and also what ancestral ideals have led her sons to death in battle, and still hold the nation so closely knit to their Emperor. Already I have heard some tender souls amongst us say: "It is *they* who are racially *our* superiors." Some of us may live to see Japanese customs pervading our land, and all of our professional imitators trying to be Japanese.

Well, I myself am no worshipper of any new fancy or distant civilization, merely because of its temporary prominence. But the true lesson which Japan teaches us to-day is, that it is somewhat hard to find out by looking at the features of a man's face, or at the color of his skin, or even at the reports of travellers who visit this land, what it is of which his race is really capable. Perhaps the Japanese are not of the right race; but we now admit that so long as we judged them merely by their race, and by mere appearances, we were judging them ignorantly, and falsely. This, I say, has been to me a most interesting lesson in the fallibility of some of our race judgments.

III.

So much, then, for one lesson of experience. I have recently been much impressed by another lesson, but by one of a very different character, occurring, so to speak, at the other extremity of the world of modern race-problems. The negro has so far shown none of the great powers of the Japanese. Let us, then,

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provisionally admit at this stage of our discussion that the negro is in his present backward state as a race, for reasons which are not due merely to circumstances, but which are quite innate in his mental constitution. I shall indeed return to that topic later on. But, for the moment, let that view pass as if it were finally accepted. View the negro, then, for the instant merely as a backward race. But let the race-question here be our own pressing Southern question: How can the white man and the negro, once forced, as they are in our South, to live side by side, best learn to live with a minimum of friction, with a maximum of coöperation? I have long learned from my Southern friends that this end can only be attained by a firm, and by a very constant and explicit insistence upon keeping the negro in his proper place, as a social inferior—who, then, as an inferior, should, of course, be treated humanely, but who must first be clearly and unmistakably taught where he belongs. I have observed that the pedagogical methods which my Southern friends of late years have found it their duty to use, to this end, are methods such as still keep awake a good deal of very lively and intense irritation, in the minds not only of the pupils but also of the teachers. Now irritation, viewed merely in itself, is not an enlightening state of mind. It is, therefore, according to our modern views, not a very pedagogical state of mind. I am myself, for instance, a fairly irritable person, and I am also a teacher. But at the moments when I am irritated I am certainly not just then a good teacher. Is, however, the irritation which seems to be the accompaniment of some of the recent Southern methods of teaching the negro his place an inevitable evil, a wholly necessary accompaniment of the present transition period in the South? *Must* such increase of race-hatred first come, in order that later, whenever the negro has fully learned his lesson, and aspires no more beyond his station, peace may later come? Well, concerning just this matter I lately learned what was to me, in my inexperience, a new lesson. I have had occasion three times, in recent summers, to visit British West Indies, Jamaica and Trinidad, at a time when few tourists were there. Upon visiting Jamaica I first went round the coast of the island, visiting its various ports. I then went inland, and walked

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for miles over its admirable country roads. I discussed its condition with men of various occupations. I read some of its official literature. I then consulted with a new interest its history. I watched its negroes in various places, and talked with some of them, too. I have since collected such further information as I had time to collect regarding its life, as various authorities have discussed the topic, and this is the result:

Jamaica has a population of surely not more than 14,000 or 15,000 whites, mostly English. Its black population considerably exceeds 600,000. Its mulatto population, of various shades, numbers, at the very least, some 40,000 or 50,000. Its plantation life, in the days before emancipation, was much sadder and severer, by common account, than ours in the South ever was. Both the period of emancipation and the immediately following period were of a very discouraging type. In the sixties of the last century there was one very unfortunate insurrection. The economic history of the island has also been in many ways unlucky even to the present day. Here, then, are certainly conditions which in some respects are decidedly such as would seem to tend towards a lasting state of general irritation, such as would make, you might suppose, race-questions acute. Moreover, the population, being a tropical one, has serious moral burdens to contend with of the sort that result from the known influences of such climates upon human character in the men of all races.

And yet, despite all these disadvantages, to-day, whatever the problems of Jamaica, whatever its defects, our own present Southern race-problem in the forms which we know best, simply does not exist. There is no public controversy about social race equality or superiority. Neither a white man nor a white woman feels insecure in moving about freely amongst the black population anywhere on the island. The colony has a Legislative Assembly, although one of extremely limited legislative powers. For the choice to this assembly a suffrage determined only by a decidedly low rate-qualification is free to all who have sufficient property, but is used by only a very small portion of the negro population. The negro is, on the whole, neither painfully obstrusive in his public

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manners, nor in need of being sharply kept in his place. Within the circles of the black population itself there is meanwhile a decidedly rich social differentiation. There are negroes in government service, negroes in the professions, negroes who are fairly prosperous peasant proprietors, and there are also the poor peasants; there are the thriftless, the poor in the towns,—yes, as in any tropical country, the beggars. In Kingston and in some other towns there is a small class of negroes who are distinctly criminal. On the whole, however, the negro and colored population, taken in the mass, are orderly, law-abiding, contented, still backward in their education, but apparently advancing. They are generally loyal to the government. The best of them are aspiring, in their own way, and wholesomely self-conscious. Yet there is no doubt whatever that English white men are the essential controllers of the destiny of the country. But these English whites, few as they are, control the country at present, with extraordinarily little friction, and wholly without those painful emotions, those insistent complaints, and anxieties, which at present are so prominent in the minds of many of our own Southern brethren. Life in Jamaica is not ideal. The economical aspect of the island is in many ways unsatisfactory. But the negro race-question, in our present American sense of that term, seems to be substantially solved.

How? By race-mixture?

The considerable extent to which race-mixture went in the earlier history of Jamaica, is generally known. Here, as elsewhere, however, it has been rather the social inequality of the races, than any approach to equality, which has been responsible for the mixture, in so far as such has occurred. It was the social inequality of the plantation days that began the process of mixture. If the often-mentioned desire to raise the "color" of their children, has later led the colored population to seek a further amalgamation of the two stocks, certainly that tendency, so far as it is effective, has been due to the social advantages of the lighter color—and not due to any motive which has decreased the ancient disadvantages under which the darker race has had to suffer. If race-amalgamation is indeed to be viewed as always an evil, the best way to counteract the growth of that

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evil must everywhere be the cultivation of racial self-respect and not of racial degradation. As a fact, it is not the amalgamation of the stocks, so far as that has occurred, which has tended to reduce the friction between the races in Jamaica. As to the English newcomers to the island, they probably do not tend to become amalgamated with the colored stocks in Jamaica, more than in any other region where the English live. The English stock tends, here as elsewhere, to be proud of itself, and to keep to itself. How then has the solution of what was once indeed a grave race-question been brought about in Jamaica?

I answer, by the simplest means in the world—the simplest, that is, for Englishmen—viz.: by English administration, and by English reticence. When once the sad period of emancipation and of subsequent occasional disorder was passed, the Englishman did in Jamaica what he has so often and so well done elsewhere. He organized his colony; he established good local courts, which gained by square treatment the confidence of the blacks. The judges of such courts were Englishmen. The English ruler also provided a good country constabulary, in which native blacks also found service, and in which they could exercise authority over other blacks. Black men, in other words, were trained, under English management, of course, to police black men. A sound civil service was also organized; and in that educated negroes found in due time their place, while the chief of each branch of the service were and are, in the main, Englishmen. The excise and the health services, both of which are very highly developed, have brought the law near to the life of the humblest negro, in ways which he sometimes finds, of course restraining, but which he also frequently finds beneficent. Hence he is accustomed to the law; he sees its ministers often, and often, too, as men of his own race; and in the main, he is fond of order, and to be respectful towards the established ways of society. The Jamaica negro is described by those who know him as especially fond of bringing his petty quarrels and personal grievances into court. He is litigious just as he is vivacious. But this confidence in the law is just what the courts have encouraged. That is one way, in fact, to deal with the too

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forward and strident negro. Encourage him to air his grievances in court, listen to him patiently, and fine him when he deserves fines. That is a truly English type of social pedagogy. It works in the direction of making the negro a conscious helper towards good social order.

Administration, I say, has done the larger half of the work of solving Jamaica's race-problem. Administration has filled the island with good roads, has reduced to a minimum the tropical diseases by means of an excellent health-service, has taught the population loyalty and order, has led them some steps already on the long road "up from slavery," has given them, in many cases the true self-respect of those who themselves officially coöperate in the work of the law, and it has done this without any such result as our Southern friends nowadays conceive when they think of what is called "negro domination." Administration has allayed ancient irritations. It has gone far to offset the serious economic and tropical troubles from which Jamaica meanwhile suffers.

Yes, the work has been done by administration,—and by reticence. For the Englishman, in his official and governmental dealings with backward peoples, has a great way of being superior without very often publicly saying that he is superior. You well know that in dealing, as an individual, with other individuals, trouble is seldom made by the fact that you are actually the superior of another man in any respect. The trouble comes when you tell the other man, too stridently that you are his superior. Be my superior, quietly, simply showing your superiority in your deeds, and very likely I shall love you for the very fact of your superiority. For we all love our leaders. But tell me that I am your inferior, and then perhaps I may grow boyish, and may throw stones. Well, it is so with races. Grant then that yours is the superior race. Then you can afford to say little about that subject in your public dealings with the backward race. Superiority is best shown by good deeds and by few boasts.

IV.

So much for the lesson that Jamaica has suggested to me. The widely different conditions of Trinidad suggest, despite the

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differences, a somewhat similar lesson. Here also there are great defects in the social order; but again, our Southern race-problem does not exist. When, with such lessons in mind, I recall our problem, as I hear it from my brethren of certain regions of our Union, I see how easily we can all mistake for a permanent race-problem a difficulty that is essentially a problem of quite another sort. Mr. Thomas Nelson Page in his recent book on the "Southerners' Problem" speaks, in one notable passage of the possibility which he calls Utopian, that perhaps some day the negro in the South may be made to coöperate in the keeping of order by the organization under State control of a police of their own race, who shall deal with blacks. He even mentions that the English in the East Indies, use native constabulary. But this possibility is not Utopian. When now I hear the complaint of the Southerner, that the race-problem is such as constantly to endanger the safety of his home, I now feel disposed to say: "The problem that endangers the sanctity of your homes and that is said sometimes to make lynching a necessity, is not a race-problem. It is an administrative problem. You have never organized a country constabulary. Hence when various social conditions, amongst which the habit of irritating public speech about race-questions is indeed one, though only one condition, have tended to the producing, and to the arousing of extremely dangerous criminals in your communities, you have no adequate means of guarding against the danger. When you complain that such criminals, when they flee from justice, get sympathy from some portion of their ignorant fellows and so are aided to get away you forget that you have not first made your negro countrymen familiar with and fond of the law, by means of a vigorous and well-organized and generally beneficent administration constantly before his eyes, not only in the pursuit of criminals, but in the whole care of public order and health. If you insist that in some districts the white population is too sparse or too poor, or both, to furnish an efficient country constabulary constantly on duty, why, then, have you not long since trained black men to police black men? Sympathy with the law grows with responsibility for its administration. If it is revolting to you to see black

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men possessed of the authority of a country constabulary, still, if you will, you can limit their authority to a control over their own race. If you say all this speech of mine is professorial, unpractical, Utopian, and if you still cry out bitterly for the effective protection of your womankind, I reply merely, look at Jamaica. Look at other English colonies.

In any case, the Southern race problem will never be relieved by speech or by practices such as increase irritation. It will be relieved when administration grows sufficiently effective, and when the negroes themselves get an increasingly responsible part in this administration in so far as it relates to their own race. That may seem a wild scheme. But I insist: It is the English way. Look at Jamaica, and learn how to protect your own homes.

I have reviewed two very different lessons which I have recently had brought home to me regarding race-problems. What is there which is common to these two lessons? Is it not this: In estimating, in dealing with races, in defining what their supposedly unchangeable characteristics are, in planning what to do with them, we are all prone to confuse the accidental with the essential. We are likely to take for an essential race-characteristic what is a transient incident, or a product of special social conditions. We are disposed to view as a fatal and overwhelming race-problem what is a perfectly curable accident of our present form of administration. If we are indeed of a superior race ourselves, we shall, however, best prove the fact by learning to distinguish the accidental from the essential in our relations with other races. I speak with no lack of sympathy for the genuine and bitter trials of our Southern brethren when I say that I suppose the mistake which I now point out, the mistake of confusing the essential and the accidental, is the mistake that they are now making in many of their sincerest expressions of concern over their race-problem.

So much for the two lessons that have led me to the present discussion. But now let me pass to a somewhat wider view of race problems. Let me ask a little more generally, What is it, if anything, which can be known to be essential about the characteristics of a race of men and consequently an essentially important consideration in our dealings with alien races? Speak-

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ing so far as we can, apart from prejudice, what can we say about what it is which distinguishes the various races of men from one another?

V.

The term Race is popularly used in a very vague way. The newspapers not long ago said, during trouble in Poland, that the Russian soldiers then in Warsaw showed "race antipathy" in their conflicts with the people. We all know, however that the mutual hatred of Russians and Poles is due mainly to political and to religious causes. Frenchmen of the northern provinces, who are anthropologically wholly indistinguishable, as Professor Ripley tells us, from the inhabitants of many western German districts, still have what they call a "race antipathy" for the men across the border. Thus almost any national or political or religious barrier, if it is old enough, may lead to a consciousness of difference of race. On the other hand, there are, of course, unquestionable physical varieties of mankind, distinguished by well-known physical contrasts. But the anthropologists still almost hopelessly disagree as to what the accurate classification of these true races may be. Such a classification, however, does not concern us here. We are now interested in the minds of men. We want to know what the races of men are socially good for. And not in the study of skulls or of hair, or of skin color, and not in the survey of all these bewildering complications with which physical anthropology deal, shall we easily find an answer to our more practical questions, viz.: to our questions regarding the way in which these various races of men are related to the interests of civilization, and regarding the spirit in which we ought to estimate and practically to deal with these racial traits of mankind.

For after all, it is a man's mind, rather than his skull, or his hair, or his skin, that we most need to estimate. And if hereupon we ask ourselves just how these physical varieties of the human stock, just how these shades of color, these types of hair, these forms of skull, or these contours of body, are related to the mental powers and to the moral characteristics of the men in question, then, if only we set prejudice wholly aside, and ap-

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peal to science to help us, we find ourselves in the present state of knowledge almost hopelessly at sea. We know too little as yet about the natural history of the human mind, our psychology is far too infantile a science, to give us any precise information as to the way in which the inherited, the native, the constitutional aspects of the minds of men really vary with their complexions or with their hair. Yet, that of course, is just what we most want to know. It is easy to show that an Australian is just now far below our mental level. But how far is his degradation due to the inherited and unchangeable characters of his race, and how far to his long struggle with the dreary desert? How far is he, as we now find him, a degenerate, whose ancestors were on some far higher level? In other words, is his type of mind a true variety of the human mind, inbred and unchangeable? How far is it, so to speak, a mere incident? Upon what level were the minds of our own ancestors in the early stone age of Europe? How did their minds then compare with the minds of those ancestors of the Australian who were then their contemporaries? Who shall answer such questions? Yet just such questions we should have to answer before we could decide upon the true relations of race and of mind.

To be sure, anthropology has made a beginning, and a very important beginning, in the study of the mental types of primitive man. By various comparative and archæological methods we can already learn a good deal about the minds of our own ancestors. We can also study various races as they are to-day. We know, about the early stages of human culture, far more than we knew a little while since. But one result may forthwith be stated regarding what we have so far learned concerning the early history of the human mind, whether it is the mind of our ancestors, or of other races. Of course, we cannot doubt that, just as now we widely differ in mental life, so always there must have been great contrasts between the minds of the various stocks of men. No doubt, if the sciences of man were exact, it would indeed include a race-psychology. But my present scepticism concerns the present state of science, and the result of such study as we have yet made of the racial psychology

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of man is distinctly disappointing to those who want to make their task easy by insisting that the physical varieties of mankind are in our present state of knowledge sufficient guides to an interpretation of the whole inner contrast of the characters and of the mental processes of men. For what anthropology thus far shows us is, that, so soon as you go back beyond those stages of cultivation where history is possible, and so soon as you view men as they are apart from the higher culture—well, then, all men, so far as we can yet study them, appear to us not, of course, the same in mind, but yet surprisingly alike in their minds, in their morals, and in their arts. Widely as the primitive men differ, in certain broad features they remain, for our present knowledge, notably similar. And these common features are such as are by no means altogether flattering to our racial pride, when we think that our own ancestors, too, were, not very long since, comparatively primitive men like the rest.

All the more primitive men, namely, are largely alike in the grossness and in the unpromising stupidity of their superstitions, and in their moral defects and virtues. Very many of them, belonging to the most various races, resemble one another in possessing customs which we now, for the most part, profoundly abhor, and which we are at present prone to view as characteristic of essentially debased minds. Such customs as cannibalism, or as human sacrifice, or as the systematic torturing of prisoners of war, such horrors as those of the witchcraft from whose bondage Europeans escaped only since the seventeenth century—such things, I say, are characteristic of no one race of men. To surround one's life with a confused mass of spiritual horrors, to believe in ghosts, or in vampires, in demons, in magic, in witchcraft, and in hostile gods of all sorts, to tangle up one's daily activities in a net of superstitious customs, to waste time in elaborate incantations, to live in fantastic terrors of an unseen world, to be terrified by tabus of all kinds, so that numerous sorts of useful deeds are superstitiously forbidden, to narrate impossible stories and believe in them, to live in filth, to persecute, to resist light, to fight against progress, to be mentally slothful, dull, sensuous, cruel, to be the prey of endless foolishness, to be treacherous, to be destruc-

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tive—well, these are the mental traits of no one or two races of men. These are simply the common evil, traits of primitive humanity, traits to which our own ancestors were very long ago a prey, traits against which civilized man has still constantly to fight. Any frenzied mob of civilized men may relapse in an hour to the level of a very base savagery. All the religions of men, without exception, and however lofty the heights that they have since climbed, appear to have begun with much the same chaos of weird customs and of unreasonable delusions. Man's mental burdens have thus been, in all races, of very much the same sort, except, to be sure, that civilization, side by side with the good that it has created, has invented some new mental burdens, such as our increasing percentage of insanity in recent times illustrates.

The souls of men, then, if viewed apart from the influences of culture, if viewed as they were in primitive times, are by no means as easy to classify as the woolly-haired and the straight-haired races at first appear to be. If you study the thoughts of the various peoples, as the anthropologist Bastian has loved to mass them together in his chaotic and learned monographs, or as Fraser has surveyed some of them in his Golden Bough, well, these primitive thoughts appear, in all their own chaos, and in all their vast varieties of detail, to be the outcome not of racial differences so much as of a few essentially human, although by no means always very lofty, motives. These fundamental motives appear, with almost monotonous regularity, in the superstitions, the customs, the legends, of all races. Esquimaux and Australians; negroes and Scotch Highlanders of former days; ancient Japanese and Hindoos; Polynesians and early Greeks:—all these appear side by side, in such comparative studies of the primitive mind of man, side by side as brothers in error and in ignorance, so soon as you proceed to study by the comparative method their early magic, their old beliefs, their early customs. Yet only by such a study could you hope to distinguish what really belongs to the mind of a race of men, as distinct from what belongs to culture.

If, then, it is the mind and the heart of man that you really want to know, you will find it hard, so soon as you leave civili-

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zation out of account, to tell what the precise meaning of the term "race of men" is, when that term is conceived as characterizing a distinct hereditary variety of human mental constitution. A race-psychology is still a science for the future to discover.

Perhaps, however, as you may say, I have not been just, in this very summary statement, to what, after all, may prove to be the best test of the true racial differences amongst the various types of the human mind. Some races, namely, have proved themselves to be *capable of civilization.* Other races have stubbornly refused civilization, or have remained helplessly degraded even when surrounded by civilization. Others still have perished at the first contact with civilization. The Germanic ancestors of the present western Europeans were barbarians, although of a high type. But when they met civilization, they first adopted, and then improved it. Not so was it with the Indians, with the Polynesians. Here, then, is the test of a true mental difference amongst races. Watch them when they meet civilization. Do they show themselves first teachable and then originative? Then they are mentally higher races. Do they stagnate or die out in the presence of civilization? Then they are of the lower types. Such differences, you will say, are deep and ineradicable, like the differences between the higher and the lower sorts of individual men. And such differences will enable us to define racial types of mind.

I fully agree that this test is an important one. Unfortunately, the test has never been so fairly applied by the civilized nations of men that it can give us any exact results. Again, the facts are too complex to be estimated with accuracy. Our Germanic ancestors accepted civilization when they met with it. Yes, but they met civilization under conditions peculiarly favorable to their own education. They had been more or less remotely influenced by its existence, centuries before they entered the field of history. When they entered this field, they met civilization first as formidable foes; they were long in contact with it without being themselves enslaved; and then later, in numerous cases they met civilization as conquerors, who, in the course of their very efforts to conquer, found thus the op-

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portunity and later something of the leisure to learn, and who had time to discover by centuries of hard experience, how great were the advantages the cultivation of the Roman empire had to offer them. But suppose that Cæsar in the first century B. C. had already had the opportunity to undertake the civilization of Germany by means of our own modern devices. Suppose that he had then possessed unlimited supplies of rum, of rifles and of machine guns. Suppose in brief that, by the aid of such gentle arts as we now often use, he had very greatly abbreviated the period of probation and of schooling that was open to the German barbarians to learn the lessons that the cultivated peoples had to teach. Suppose that Roman syndicates had been ready to take possession, at once of the partly depopulated lands of the north, and to keep the few surviving natives thenceforth in their place, by showing them how cultivated races can look down upon savage folk. Well, in that case, the further history of civilization might have gone on without the aid of the Germanic peoples. The latter would then have quickly proved their natural inferiority once for all. They would have furnished one instance more for the race-partisans to cite in order to show how incapable the lower races are of ascending from barbarism to civilization. Dead men not only tell no tales; they also, strange to say, attend no schools, and learn no lessons. And hereby they prove themselves in the eyes of certain students of race question to have been always of a much lower mental type than the cultivated men who killed them. Their surviving descendants, if sufficiently provided with the means of corruption, and if sufficiently downtrodden, may remain thenceforth models of degradation. For man, whatever his race, is an animal that you unquestionably can debase to whatever level you please, if you only have power, and if you then begin early enough, and devote yourself persistently enough to the noble and civilized task of proving him to be debased.

I do not doubt, then, that some races are more teachable than others. But I do very much doubt our power to estimate how teachable a race is, or what can be made of them, or what hereditary mental powers they have until we have given them

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centuries of opportunity to be taught. Fortune and the defects of the Roman Empire gave to the Germanic peoples an extraordinary opportunity to learn. So the world found out how teachable they were. Let their descendants not boast unduly until they, too, have given to other races, not indeed the opportunities of conquerors, but some equal opportunity to show of what sort of manhood they were capable.

Yet, you may insist, civilization itself had an origin. Were not the races that first won civilized rank superior in mental type to those that never showed themselves capable of such originality? Well, I reply, we do not know as yet precisely where, and still less how, civilization originated. But this seems clear, viz.: first, that physical environment and the forms of social aggregation which this environment determined, had a very great share in making the beginnings of civilization possible; while, secondly, whatever part race qualities played in early civilization, certainly no one race has the honor of beginning the process. Neither Chinese nor Egyptian, neither Caucasian nor Mongol, was the sole originator of civilization. The African of the tropical swamps and forests, the Australian of the desert, the Indian of our prairies, was sufficiently prevented by his physical environment from being the originator of a great civilization. What each of these races would have done in another environment, we cannot tell. But the Indian of Central America, of Mexico, and of Peru, shows us that race alone did not predetermine how remote from the origination of a higher civilization a stock must needs remain. Chinese civilization, and, in recent times Japanese civilization, have shown us that one need not be a Caucasian in order to originate a higher type of wisdom.

In brief, then, there is hardly any one thing that our actual knowledge of the human mind enables us to assert, with any scientific exactness, regarding the permanent, the hereditary, the unchangeable mental characteristics which distinguish even the most widely sundered physical varieties of mankind. There is, to be sure, one exception to this rule, which is itself instructive. It is the case where we are dealing with physical and social degeneracy, the result of circumstances and of environ-

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ment, and where such degeneracy has already gone so far that we have before us highly diseased human types, such as can no longer be reclaimed. But such types are not racial types. They are results of alcohol, of infection, or in some instances, of the long-continued pressure of physical environment. In such cases we can sometimes say, Here is a hopelessly degraded stock of men. But, then, civilization can create such stocks, out of any race of men, by means of a sufficient amount of oppression and of other causes of degradation, if continued through generations.

No race of men, then, can lay claim to a fixed and hereditary type of mental life such as we can now know with exactness to be unchangeable. We do not scientifically know what the true racial varieties of mental type really are. No doubt there are such varieties. The judgment day, or the science of the future, may demonstrate what they are. We are at present very ignorant regarding the whole matter.

VI.

What, then, in the light of these considerations, is there which can be called fundamentally significant about our numerous modern race-problems? I answer, scientifically viewed, these problems of ours turn out to be not so much problems caused by anything which is essential to the existence or to the nature of the races of men themselves. Our so-called race-problems are merely the problems caused by our antipathies.

Now, the mental antipathies of men, like the fears of men, are very elemental, widespread, and momentous mental phenomena. But they are also in their fundamental nature extremely capricious, and also extremely suggestible mental phenomena. Let an individual man alone, and he will feel antipathies for certain other human beings very much as any young child does—namely quite capriciously—just as he will also feel all sorts of capricious likings, for people. But train a man first to give names to his antipathies, and then to regard the antipathies thus named as sacred merely because they have a name, and then you get the phenomena of racial

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hatred, of religious hatred, of class hatred, and so on indefinitely. Such trained hatreds are peculiarly pathetic and peculiarly deceitful, because they combine in such a subtle way the elemental vehemence of the hatred that a child may feel for a stranger, or a cat for a dog, with the appearance of dignity and solemnity and even of duty which a name gives. Such antipathies will always play their part in human history. But what we can do about them is to try not to be fooled by them, not to take them too seriously because of their mere name. We can remember that they are childish phenomena in our lives, phenomena on a level with a dread of snakes, or of mice, phenomena that we share with the cats and with the dogs, not noble phenomena, but caprices of our complex nature.

Upon the theoretical aspects of the problem which such antipathies present, psychology can already throw some light. Man, as a social being, needs and possesses, a vast range of simply elemental tendencies to be socially sensitive when in the presence of other men. These elemental tendencies appear, more or less untrained, in the bashfulness of childhood, in the stage fright of the unskilled, in the emotional disturbances of young people who are finding their way in the world, in the surprises of early love, in the various sorts of anthropophobia which beset nervous patients, in the antipathies of country folk towards strangers, in the excitements of mobs, in countless other cases of social stress or of social novelty. Such sensitiveness may arise in advance of or apart from any individual experience which gives a conscious reason why one should feel thus. A common feature of all such experiences is the fact that one human being finds other human beings to be *portentous,* even when the socially sensitive being does not in the least know why they should be so. That such reactions have an instinctive basis is unquestionable. Their general use is that they prepare one, through interest in men, to be ready for social training, and to be submissively plastic. In milder forms, or upon the basis of agreeable social relations, such instinctive emotions easily come to be moulded into the most fascinating of human interests; and the social life is impossible without this

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basis of the elemental concerns which man feels merely because of the fact that other men are there in his world. If decidedly intense, however, such instinctively determined experiences are apt, like other intense disturbances, to be prevailingly painful. And since novelty, oddity, and lack of social training on the part of the subject concerned, are motives which tend to make such social reflexes intense, a very great number of the cruder and more childish social reactions involve antipathies; for a social antipathy is merely a painful, and so, in general, an over-intense, reflex disturbance in the presence of another human being. No light need be thrown, by the mere occurrence of such an antipathy, upon any permanently important social character of the hated object. The chance intensity of the passing experience may be alone significant. And any chance association may serve to secure, in a given case, the intensity of disturbance which makes the object hated. Oddities of feature or of complexion, slight physical variations from the customary, a strange dress, a scar, a too steady look, a limp, a loud or deep voice, any of these peculiarities, in a stranger, may be, to one child, or nervous subject, or other sensitive observer, an object of fascinated curiosity; to another, slightly less stable, observer, an intense irritation, an object of terror, or of violent antipathy. The significant fact is that we are all instinctively more or less sensitive to such features, simply because we are by heredity doomed to be interested in all facts which may prove to be socially important. Whether we are fascinated, or horror-stricken, or angry, is, apart from training, largely a matter of the momentary subjective intensity of the disturbance.

But all such elemental social experiences are *ipso facto,* highly suggestible. Our social training largely consists in the elimination or in the intensification or in the systematizing of these original reactions through the influence of suggestion and of habit. Hence the antipathy, once by chance aroused, but then named, imitated, insisted upon, becomes to its victims a sort of sacred revelation of truth, sacred merely because it is felt, a revelation merely because it has won a name and a social standing.

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What such sacred revelations, however, really mean, is proved by the fact that the hungry traveller, if deprived of his breakfast long enough, by means of an accidental delay of his train, or the tired camper in the forest, may readily come to feel whatever racial antipathy you please towards his own brother, if the latter then wounds social susceptibilities which the abnormal situation has made momentarily hyperæsthetic.

I have said little or nothing, in this paper, of human justice. I have spoken mainly of human illusions. We all have illusions, and hug them. Let us not sanctify them by the name of science.

For my part, then, I am a member of the human race, and this is a race which is, as a whole, considerably lower than the angels, so that the whole of it very badly needs race elevation. In this need of my race I personally and very deeply share. And it is in this spirit only that I am able to approach our problem.

Josiah Royce.

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THE ETHICAL DOCTRINE OF ARISTOTLE.

Exposition of the chief end of man is apt to labor under a disadvantage. It has to overcome the notion deeply rooted in the popular mind, and even in some ethical systems, that the end is something distant in the future. This is a notion —shall we say a fallacy?—that assumes various forms. For the end thus supposed to beckon us from afar may be variously conceived. It may be (as popularly it often is) a state of realized material prosperity; or a state of pleasurable feeling; a state of inward virtue that makes its possessor independent of any environment, or a state in which the perfect man has settled down into equilibrium with the perfect society. But whatever it be, the result is the same. In proportion as the end is thus projected into the future, and its fruition postponed, so do the actions of the here and now of

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daily experience sink to the level of mere means to ends. Should the ends be realized, good and well, our labor is not in vain. But should the end, the distant end, prove, as by reason of one or other of the many possible mischances that flesh is heir to it may prove, illusory, do not our actions drop at once into the dreary category of misspent time and service vain? Do we not all know instances of men, lured on by phantoms of wealth, power, happiness, who have lost their lives in drudgery for the sake of far-off ends they never realized?

It is one merit of Aristotle's idea of the end of life that it escapes this danger. There is a passage in the Xth Book of "The Ethics" where he discovers an analogy—not commonly realized—between the life of frivolous amusement and the life of virtuous activity.[1] For however wide asunder, wide as the poles, these two things be, there is yet one point in which they meet. In different ways their votaries alike refuse to sacrifice the actions of the passing hour by turning them into the mere means to a distant, and it may be precarious end. In different ways they both bear witness to their sense of the value of life as it goes on here and now. With the one it is the intrinsic worth of strenuous action; with the other it is the heedless absorption in amusement. With both, there is pronounced divergence from that type of utilitarian who "never is, but always to be blest," because all present toil and struggle are but the price for something that (so he hopes) is to come. *Carpe diem* is doubtless best known as the motto of the voluptuary. But it might also be appropriated by him who knows the inestimable worth that may lie in the daily round and common task.

This exactly illustrates Aristotle's view of the moral end. No one can hold more firmly that there is an end of life. No one can hold more firmly that our daily actions have inherent worth.[2] And he holds both things because he unites them in the conviction, fundamental to his ethical doctrine, that the end of life is so far from being remote from

[1] X, vi, 3. [2] *E. g.* VI, v, 4.

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the here and now of daily action that it may be already present, in actual fruition, in the life of every man whose actions lie in the difficult yet never—save in exceptional cases of degradation—inaccessible path of virtue.[3]

Not, indeed, present in finality; finality there is none in the changing scene of moral activity: yet still present in that essential worth which always appertains to action that is instinct with the spirit of virtue.

This comes out unmistakably in some remarks upon a well-worn aphorism which seems to have bulked largely in the Greek mind. "Count no man happy till his death," Solon had said, in words that have always come home to moralizers over man's vicissitudes—those vicissitudes which may wreck even a Lydian prosperity.[4] Aristotle joins direct issue. Why (so we may paraphrase his comment), Why thus, with Solon, withhold our verdict upon a man's life till we can write it only as epitaph or elegy? For if only our conception of human happiness be sound, if only we identify it, not with the comforts or the sumptuosities which may come and go at fortune's caprice, but with right living, strenuous moral activity, genuine fulfilment of function, then let us never suppose that when any man is happy in this sense, he has missed or ever can miss the end of life. In so far as a man acts nobly, a true life is his already. So far he *has* his end. And though dark days may come, what of that? Can dark days quench the life? Can they rob a man of the inalienable power of doing noble deeds, once he really has it? Or can they rob him of that life of thought which is in Aristotle's estimate, higher even than noble deeds? Nay, on the principle that "adversity doth best discover virtue" may not the very reverses of fortune furnish moral opportunities such as are denied to the prosperous. True nobility does but shine through the more brightly. Or in those other strong brief words, "It is what a man does that is the supreme thing in life."[5]

Let us, then, look straight at life as we find it. Let us recognize the value of "every crowded hour of glorious life"

[3] I, ix, 4. [4] *Cf.* I, x, 7 *et seq.* [5] I, x, 13.

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as it goes. Let us never fancy that its worth is staked upon eventualities. On the contrary, let us declare, unhesitatingly, that that man has already, *ipso facto*, entered upon the fruition of the end of his being who is here and now giving expression, giving actuality to what is in him, in thought, word and deed.

This view turned upon the Aristotelian conception of the end as in its essence, activity or function.[6] It was so Aristotle read experience. Looking out, with that comprehensive outlook which characterized him, upon life and nature, the fact he saw everywhere was change, process, activity. It was so, *e.g.*, in the arts. What does craftsman or artist exist for if it be not to *do* something? It is so again in the organic world. Do we not see there the spectacle of organs fulfilling this function, whether these be the several organs or the organisms of which they are constituent. So is it when we pass from the physiological to the psychical. The soul of man would not be the soul if it did not exist in order to energize. Never can the human soul rest from its labors, because it is its very nature not to rest but to realize its potentialities in and through its own activities.

But then it is above all things necessary that it should be active *in the right way*. For whilst the soul that is incapable of action is irretrievably atrophied, the soul that is left to act by light of nature is on the certain road to moral catastrophe.[7] Nor was it ever the prime difficulty, either with Plato or Aristotle, to bring mankind to act. It was not inertia or apathy they dreaded. It was that mankind were only too ready to act, to act energetically *in the wrong way*.

This is a point upon which Aristotle leaves us in no doubt. "It is a hard task to be good,"[8] he says. And the reason is neither human apathy nor depravity. It is found in the simple fact, as life is, that there are so many possible ways of going wrong. This is inevitable. For it comes of the fundamental fact, not to be evaded except by flight to the desert or cloister, that all human action is immersed in circumstances, and by consequence that every important deci-

[6] I, vii, 10, 11, *et seq.* [7] VI, xiii, 1. [8] II, ix, 2 and 7.

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sion of our lives has to be made face to face with conditions, many, diverse, complex, changing, incalculable. Thus, *e.g.*, to follow Aristotle's own illustration, it is difficult to be generous because it is so easy to give. Yes; but so difficult to give aright.[9]

This one may give to lavishness and spoil all by graceless ostentation. That one may give with the heart of a philanthropist—to the cause of folly or fanaticism. Still a third may in all his giving be admirable—except that he never seems able to give enough. And so on with all the duties of life. The steps of man are beset by pitfalls. He has unrivalled opportunities for backsliding. In this he is without a peer. Infinite as the Pythagoreans declared, are his ways of error.[10] Small wonder. Driven on by a troop of desires every one of which (having no moderating law within itself) may betray him into excess; confronted, in every act, by a multiplicity of conditions, many of them to the last degree variable, yet all requiring to be reckoned with, is it cause for surprise that the fallible human animal, left to the freedom of his own will, should not merely (as the catechism has it) fall from his high estate, but never so much as rise to it; and, indeed, go on stumbling and blundering till he finally stumbles into his grave in this unending task of adapting the desires, feelings, and purposes within to the complex and changing circumstances without?

Yet nothing less will suffice. Life must be lived. Men must act.[11] Decisions must be faced. And, thus beset by possible pitfalls, each man must do his best to find the way of virtue—that difficult way which, in each case, lies like a single narrow precarious path amidst many possibilities of disastrous deviation. Who will say that it is a way easy to find? Do not most men know well what it is to miss it?

> "From right to left eternal swerving
> They zig-zag on."

Yet everyone must learn to tread it, if he is to be equal to the difficulties of the moral life.

[9] II, ix, 2. [10] II, vi, 14. [11] I, viii, 10 *and passim.*

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Now this is the substance of what Aristotle has to say in that classical Second Book in which he sets himself to sketch the line, or course, or mode which a man's activities must take if they are justifiably to be identified with the activity which, as we have seen, he regarded as the end of life. He was entirely convinced that, just as surely as there is a right way of going to work in the practice of any art—that way *e.g.*, which a skilled musician would follow in playing the harp —so is there a right way of going to work in that greater and nobler art—the art of living.[12] Moral action, too, has its characteristic modes of excellence and they are no less real and definite than the characteristic excellencies which in their own departments mark the good doctor or seaman or musician.

And his way of expressing this is contained in the well-known statement that all human virtue (or excellence), just like all art, "aims at the mean."

Now it is above all things necessary to understand what this celebrated doctrine of "the mean" is *not*. It is not a worldly counsel of moderation. Still less is it a doctrine that involves the monstrous absurdity that a man must not be virtuous over much, lest by excess of virtue he may land himself in vice! Like every sane moralist, Aristotle believed—as in effect he says—that the more virtue a man can attain to, the better a man he is.[13] Nor, again, does this doctrine aim simply at telling us that every virtue can be represented as lying between excess and defect, as *e.g.*, courage can be located between passionate foolhardiness and pusillanimous cowardice. He has a deeper meaning to convey than this. What he sees is that, in every act of our lives, be it in the hour of danger or the hour of temptation, be it in the spending of our money or the conduct of our public life or the intercourse of business and friendship, we must assert that mastery over our feelings and desires which will alone enable us to do what is right *in the concrete situations in which we may be called upon to act.*

There is a well-known passage in the Second Book in which

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[12] I, vii, 14. [13] II, vi, 17.

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Aristotle says that virtue is more "exact" (ἀκριβεστέρα) than any art.[14] It sounds at first surprising. What, we might well ask, can be more "exact" than skilled craftsmanship? Does it not work up to definite plan? Does it not execute with all but faultless precision? Does it not astound us by the amazing deftness with which it handles, and humors, and masters its material? And is it of *virtue*—virtue which, even in the best, has its false steps, its conscious imperfections, its proverbially unsatisfactory achievements, its doleful record of miserable failures—is it of *this* we can honestly say that it is more "exact"?

Yet the dictum is justified. To "hit the mean" in art or handicraft may be hard enough. It is not done without apprenticeship. But to hit the mean in conduct is harder. For when we pass from the ordinary arts to the art of life, we pass from problems that are comparatively simple to problems that are indefinitely more complex; from conditions which are comparatively few and recurrent, to conditions that are many and variable—conditions of time and place, of ends and means, of circumstances and persons. And, then, in this master-art of life there is one matter of supreme moment with which the arts strictly so-called have nothing to do. In *them* it is enough that the craftsman knows his work, and turns out his product. It matters nothing to us in what spirit his work may be done. It is the skill of the artificer that concerns us, not the character of the man. Far otherwise when we turn to Virtue.[15] Virtue is not virtue—it is the mere shell and semblance of virtue—if it be not the expression of the moral spirit of the man, if it do not carry in it that settled, intelligent, deliberate and disinterested purpose which is of the essence of morality. And so it comes that, in moral action, as contradistinguished from craftsmanlike production, every one of us has to reckon not only with the external condition of his deeds, but with that inward world of feeling, desire, and purpose which, under these external conditions, has to be expressed and actualized. This being

[14] II, vi, 9; *cf.* the whole context. [15] II, iv, 3.

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so, who so blind as to fail to see that a truly virtuous deed demands a careful circumspection, and a nicety of adaptation, which go far beyond anything that can be expected even of the most skilled of craftsmen? To hit the mean—how can it be other than hard when the possibilities of missing it, in one way or another are so many? To be a good man, not in reputation or potentiality, but in the hour of actual concrete endeavor and choice, how can this be other than arduous, when it means the preservation of that difficult precarious narrow way of rectitude which is beset, within as well as without, by so many stones of stumbling and rocks of offence?[16]

Such are the difficulties of the moral life as they are set forth more especially in that great Second Book of "The Ethics." They do not lie where certain other moralists find them. Not in that depravity of the human heart and will which is the note of asceticism. Not in that sheer ignorance which has so often been regarded as the source of all evil, from Socrates to Bentham or Mill. Rather in those concrete acts of choice which must forever remain the inevitable daily difficulties of every man who sets himself to do his work in the world.

How, then, are these difficulties to be met? To this question an adequate answer would, of course, involve little short of an exposition of "The Ethics." Yet it is quite possible to go at once to the root of the matter. For it is the very core of Aristotelian doctrine that the man who can alone grapple victoriously with these difficulties of the moral life must bring to his tasks that master-virtue that is in translation variously rendered as practical wisdom, prudence, or sound moral judgment (φρόνησις).[17]

Aristotle is, in fact, the greatest of all the prophets of ancient or modern times of practical wisdom. His position here is akin to that which has been made familiar to Englishmen—at any rate in the domain of politics— by the writings of Burke. All that Burke says about the paramountcy of

[16] II, vi, 14. [17] *Cf.* VI, xiii, 6, and X, viii, 3.

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"prudence," the statesman's virtue, is but an echo, and, indeed, an acknowledged echo of what Aristotle says about φρόνησις. Both writers are convinced that the concrete difficulties of action are not to be solved by theories. Burke says so when he declares that "no lines are to be laid down for political wisdom," and in a hundred passages enjoins regard to the "circumstances" of the hour. And Aristotle says so, even more emphatically (if that be possible), when dwelling, as is his wont, on the variable and incalculable character of moral fact, he declares that we must abandon all expectation of theoretically working out moral principles (themselves only rough generalizations) into detail, and be content to leave concrete issues to the decisions of those confronted by them.[18] It is needless to multiply citations. The point follows from the inherent nature of moral fact. Moral fact, as Aristotle regards it, is something widely different from the fixed and comparatively simplified objects with which the abstract sciences are concerned. It is complex. It is subject to variation so great that, in the last resort, it defies strict scientific formulation altogether. It is even declared, in one startling context, to "have nothing invariable about it."[19] The result follows. Any attempt to deduce the concrete duties of life, *more geometrico*, from abstract moral principles is futile. The subtlety and flux of human affairs forbid it. No ethical system, be it never so closely reasoned, can tell a man what in the concrete he ought to do. Nor can all the volumes and learned doctors of casuistry, be their imaginations never so fertile, either foresee the precise actual form in which our difficulties will present themselves, or prescribe to us how we are to meet them. When the hour strikes the final appeal must lie, not to the casuistical or to any other system, but to what Burke calls "prudence," and Aristotle φρόνησις. For, even as it is by professional insight, such as theory alone can never produce, that a good doctor prescribes aright for the patient; even as it is by the artistic skill which is above formulas that the true

[18] II, ii, 3 and 4. [19] II, ii, 3, and *cf.* I, iii, 1-4, and VI, v, 3.

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craftsman makes the utmost of the materials at his disposal, so is it by the practical wisdom, which is not only a virtue, but the root of all virtues,[20] that mankind "hit the mean" in the manifold problems of the actual moral life.[21] Without this the cleverest, or the most learned, or the most reasoning of men stands foredoomed to blundering and failure. With it there is no problem, from the administration of the State to the petty concerns of private life, which a man need fear to face.[22]

Our next point follows. Clearly, if Aristotle speaks truth, we must, with all our getting, get practical wisdom.

Now it is not to be denied that upon this point Aristotle is tantalizing. Considering the place which φρόνησις holds in his scheme of life, being indeed none other than the supreme practical virtue, few readers can fail to wish that what he has to say about it (though he says much about it) had included a more direct account of the manner of its growth, nurture and development. The more so because "The Ethics"—as his own words so often remind us—is much more fitly described as a treatise on the art than on the science of morals.

Nevertheless there are certain points which emerge with utmost clearness. And one of these—vital in all ethical theory—is that we need never expect to find practical wisdom apart from goodness of character. This is repeated by Aristotle again and again.[23] It is central in his doctrine. No man—so he insists with the reiteration of conviction—can rightly grasp the principles of action, no man can come to a sound decision upon a concrete moral issue, unless he be a good man.

Mere cleverness will not suffice here. For though cleverness can see an intellectual difficulty, and be wonderfully astute is discerning means to ends, it is not to the cleverest man of our acquaintance that we should betake ourselves in

[20] VI, xiii, 6. "The presence of the single virtue of φρόνησις implies the presence of all the moral virtues."

[21] II, vi, 15. [22] *Cf.* VI, viii. [23] VI, xii, 10; X, viii, 3.

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the hour of our moral perplexities. The cleverest of scoundrels is after all a fool in *moral* insight. No; the only counsellor worth having is the man in whom a good character has kept the judgment sane and true. Few things in life are more striking, and, indeeed, more satisfactory, than the impotence of evil livers to form really sound judgments of men and affairs. Nor are many things more certain than that, upon a moral issue at any rate, the children of this world are *not* wiser in their generation than the children of light. Not that cleverness is to be undervalued, and, indeed, it would be a sorry compliment to honest men and true to suggest that their trials and perplexities are not sufficient to call forth all their powers, intelligence included. The true conclusion is Aristotle's—*that cleverness and character must strike alliance.*[24]

Now it is one of Aristotle's greatest services to ethical thought that he has pointed out not only that this is so, but why it must be so.

This comes out in a passage in that pregnant Sixth Book where he remarks with terse significance, that "Vice is destructive of principle"; and hastens to explain that he does not mean that it is destructive of all principle.[25] It is not (to take his own illustration) destructive of mathematical principles, which being abstract and scientific depend as little upon moral virtue as moral virtue depends upon them. Indubitably. It could hardly increase our confidence in a mathematician to be assured that he was virtuous. Mathematicians, let us hope, are all virtuous. But who will dare to say that it is their virtues that make them mathematicians? With *moral* principles however, it is otherwise. Tell me that a man is vicious and at a stroke all confidence in his moral judgment is shattered. For moral principles are not, like scientific principles, abstract, and removed from "the coloring of the affections." Far from it. They embody the concrete conditions of life and action, the concrete ends for which men struggle and strive.[26] And this being so it fol-

[24] VI, xii, 10. [25] VI, v, 6.

[26] VI, v, 6. "The principles of practice are the ends for which the actions are done."

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lows that the nature of a man's likings and dislikings, his attractions and repulsions (be they natural or be they acquired) must profoundly modify the practical judgments of his whole life. Thus let one or other of us have a constitutional craving for pleasure, or shrinking from pain; do we not know that these exaggerated susceptibilities will vitally and only too often disastrously, influence our practical valuations in every decision of our lives? The reason is manifest. In a moral judgment it is never enough that a man should simply *know* the facts, as he might, *e.g.*, know the data when he is constrained to judge that the angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles. No; he must also *weigh* the facts. He must value them in their relative importance or unimportance. And when it comes to the matter of weighing and valuing, how easy it is for these secret proclivities for pleasure, these secret recoils from pain, to reflect themselves in his estimates! As with pleasures and pains so with all the varied conditions which we gather up in our purposes and projects. We do not contemplate them in that dry light of the abstract understanding in which we regard the facts we formulate in scientific principles. Far otherwise. We regard them in the light of the valuations we have come to put upon them in the course of our personal experience. What nature has made us, or what our educators have made us, or what we have made ourselves, will here inevitably determine what we think. The saint will have one scale of valuation; the sinner another. And similarly along the whole graduated series—the mass of the human race—who lie between the saint and the sinner. What their experience has made salient in their characters, that will be salient in their practical judgments; and what their experience has made secondary, trifling or indifferent, will likewise be so in their apprehension of moral principles. Such at any rate is the teaching of Aristotle. We have called him the prophet of practical wisdom. So he is. Without practical wisdom, as we have said, the difficulties of the moral life are insoluble. This is certain. And it is equally certain that this supreme quality,

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this "eye of the soul," this root of all virtue, will never come to its maturity *except in organic union with moral character.*[27]

It follows at once that practical wisdom demands a long apprenticeship. Wishing for it will not give it us; nor will any mere effort of will however intense. Nor can the quickest wits command its presence. For the preparation for it must be begun when as yet it was little needed—far back in the early days of youth, when parents and teachers were building up the moral character. Let no man think, when he has met some crisis of later years with prudence and sagacity, that all the credit is his own. Let him think rather with gratitude of the friends of his youth who laid the foundations of all sanity of judgment by guiding his feet in the ways of virtue.

Now it is matter of common knowledge that the agency to which Aristotle assigns by far the greatest influence in this making of the character is habituation. All the world knows that he said that virtue was "habit."

This unmistakable emphasis upon habituation is due to the fact that Aristotle found himself unable to apply to the moral life that conception of development which pervades his philosophy of nature. It is the mark of a *natural* product that it unfolds its being from within. But this does not hold of a moral character. We cannot say of *it*, as we can of a natural product, that it is, from the first, potentially all that it becomes.[28] Man, in short, is not naturally virtuous. For though, in one passage at any rate, Aristotle cites the doctrine that men are supposed to have all virtues "from their very birth," he hastens to add that this is but a loose statement.[29] On strict analysis man is by nature neither virtuous nor depraved. He is morally indeterminate. He may come to honor or to shame: but it is not by natural necessity that he does either.

In this fact we find the grounds of the plea for "habit." For it is precisely the shortcoming of nature that is the educator's opportunity. Here, as elsewhere, art must remedy the imperfections of nature; and, in presence of this capacity

[27] VI, xii, 10. [28] *Cf.* VI, iv, 4, and II, i, 2-4. [29] VI, xiii, 1, *et seq.*

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for opposite developments (*δύναμις τῶν ἐναντιῶν*) step in and create that settled bias towards virtue which the natural man so conspicuously lacks. There is no other way. He who would win the harper's skill must win it by harping; he who would write, by writing; he who would heal the sick, by healing them. In these, as indeed in all the arts, *faculty is begotten of function,* and definite proclivity comes of determinate acts. So in life. Soul, like body, grows to the modes in which it is exercised. And this being so, the one thing needful is that, by all the resources of the State and family, the young should be brought to perform the appropriate acts that make the corresponding habits.[30]

We need not at present inquire how this is done, or how far Aristotle sides with those who allure or those who drive the young into the ways of virtue, however interesting these questions may be. It more concerns us to take note of the result, and to make ourselves clear as to the *kind of habit Aristotle identifies with virtue.*

It is *not* (and few misinterpretations could be worse) the kind of "habit" that implies automatism. So many strong words have been flung at habit, so understood, by the apostles of the free life of the spirit like Rousseau or Wordsworth, that it relieves us of much controversial embroilment to say at once that it is not for "habit" as so understood that Aristotle stands sponsor. How could he? We have seen already that change of circumstances—change from man to man, from place to place, from time to time—is precisely what creates the difficulties of life. It was so Aristotle saw life. Life is nothing if not a scene of change. Yet who does not know that it is change of circumstances—an altered situation, an unlooked for difficulty, an unexpected emergency —that puts the man of ruts and grooves to confusion. If, then, virtue be indeed a "habit," we may be sure that Aristotle would be the very last to regard it as a habit of such a kind as to stamp its luckless possessor with an inability to deal with his problems. It is true, no doubt, that the "habit"

[30] II, i. X, ix, 6, *et seq.*

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(ἕξις) we read of in the Second Book of "The Ethics" does involve in it a settled tendency to act in determinate ways. If it did not it would not be a habit; and indeed it is precisely in this respect (as already said) that habit differs from the indeterminateness of natural desire. So far, the man of virtue *is*, in a sense, the man of grooves. He has a settled tendency to be brave, or generous, or temperate, and so on. But, then, Aristotelian "habit" has another and no less essential aspect. It is, as runs its definition, "a habit *with the capacity of deliberate choice.*" In other words, while it involves on the one hand, the habitual tendency to strive in certain specific directions (which correspond to the various moral virtues), it no less involves the presence of that intelligence which can alone enable its possessor to adapt his behavior circumspectly to the changing situations which succeed one another in all ordinary experience. Now these two things—habit and intelligent self-adjustment to circumstances—are so often held to be opposites, that it is the more important to understand that every full-formed virtue—as Arisotle conceives—unites them both.

Thus, when a man is brave, he will come to meet the hour of danger not only with a settled tendency to face possible suffering or death as a brave man ought, but also with an entirely circumspect and deliberate consideration of the details of the concrete cases in which his courage is put to the proof. So with generosity with money. There is nothing to prevent a man from being generous *by habit, i.e.*, from having a settled tendency towards right giving; and at the same time exercising acute discrimination as to the persons to whom he gives, or the amounts he gives them, or the times and seasons of his giving. In earlier years, of course, when the young are under the watchful tutelage of parent or public authority, they will do, in the main, just what they are bidden, though even then there is always *some* room for incipient choice. Indeed, Aristotle remarks (in "The Politics") that deliberation begins in boyhood! But as the years go on, as the outlook on life becomes wider, as every man's tasks and problems become peculiarly his own, the deeply-rooted sec-

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ond nature which makes its possessor persistently brave or generous will be increasingly reinforced by deliberate choice in the details of behavior—choice which is so far from being blind or automatic that it implies a high development of the moral intelligence.[31] So far is the Aristotelian doctrine of habit from forgetfulness of the fact—written large on the face of Greek ethics—that man morally as well as speculatively is a rational being.

Bearing this in mind we are now in a position to draw together two aspects of Aristotle's teaching which at first sight might seem to fall asunder— the emphasis of habit and the primacy of practical wisdom. For so far are these from being incompatible that it is just because virtue is a habit—a habit *of the kind we have seen*—that practical wisdom can ever come to its maturity. It happens that the doctrine of habit and the doctrine of practical wisdom lie far apart in the arrangement of Aristotle's treatise. They do not, however, lie apart in significance. For, in truth, they are organically related.

For it is time now to recall the fact that the deliverances of practical wisdom are judgments *that reflect our valuations.* We saw this when we recognized how profoundly they are prone to be colored by our predispositions to pleasures or our repulsions from pains. We have now to see that they are influenced no less by those settled dispositions, those deeply cut proclivities we call habits. A true soldier, *e. g.* knows the meaning of wounds and death. He knows it well. But when he has, in actual campaigning, been habituated in that stern school to keep his face to the front, he will not, like the coward, suffer the prospect even of death to outweigh in his choice his habitual duty to his country. A generous giver knows the value of money; but in his estimates the niggardliness that makes money bulk large, and benevolence small, will find no place. It is so thoroughout the entire circle of the virtues. For good habits do not merely prompt us steadily to do good actions. Their influence

[31] *Cf.* III, ii, 17. III, 3. VI, ii, 2 and 4.

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goes deeper. It affects our moral judgments. Habitual courage, self-control, generosity, munificence, public spirit, justice, friendship, all of them imply those deeply-rooted likings and dislikings, attractions and repulsions, which inevitably influence all the concrete decisions of daily life. The first step towards making the moral judgment sound is to take care that the moral habits are good.

And then (as we have seen), the life of habit never with Aristotle becomes the death in life of automatism. Contrariwise. For though, as the years go on, habituation does not cease to cut ever deeper, and, indeed, indelible tracks in the soul, there is likewise all the while emerging, in ever fuller measure, that reason which is more truly man's distinctive characteristic than even the best of his habits.[32] From the first (as we have seen) the kind of habit that the father wishes to create in the son, or the statesman in the citizen, is a habit that goes with ability to choose, and as, with advancing life, cares, perplexities, trials, problems inevitably multiply, so is this faculty of choice called into fuller and ever fuller exercise, till eventually it issues in the practical wisdom of the developed type in whom intelligence has struck alliance with character, and in whom the stability of long-established habits has joined hands with the judgment, sagacity, shrewdness, considerateness, insight, deliberateness which mark the maturity of the practical reason.[33] So entirely is the doctrine of habit in harmony with the doctrine of practical wisdom.

It remains to see, somewhat more closely, what precisely this practical reason does.

Be it clearly understood, therefore, at the outset, that the practical reason of man is meant to be practical. It is what its name implies, and its function is not to construct a science of Ethics (for this, indeed, in the strict sense of the word, is regarded as impossible), not, in short, to theorize

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[32] IX, iv, 3 and 4. X, vii, 9.

[33] I assume that φρόνησις as the excellence of the practical reason includes all these.

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about morality, but to enable mankind, collectively and individually, to become moral.

It may seem something of a paradox that a thinker who, perhaps beyond all others, magnified the human reason, or, indeed, that a lecturer who gave the world the immortal "Ethics," should declare that a science of morals is not so much as possible. But so it is. Nor, if reiteration can convince, does he leave the readers of "The Ethics" in any doubt that that masterpiece was meant primarily not to tell the world what goodness is, but to enable mankind to attain some nearer actual approximation to it.[34]

Now we have already seen, in a general way, what it is that practical wisdom can do for its possessor. It enables him to decide, alike in large affairs or small, what under given circumstances ought here and now to be done. Such decisions, however (as we have seen), are not easy. They are, on the contrary, such as to call forth all the powers of deliberation and choice. Now on Deliberation Aristotle's teaching is alike clear and significant. Thus he leaves us in no doubt as to where Deliberation *ends*. Men, he remarks, cannot go on deliberating for ever. They must act, and therefore, as soon as in their deliberations they light upon some action here and now within their own control, they decide to do it. This is choice, and in choice deliberation *ends*. Where then does it *begin?* What do we deliberate about.

Aristotle's answer to this question is contained in a sentence which at first may startle. "Men," he says, "do not deliberate about *ends,* but about means to ends."[35] And not a little of Aristotle's doctrine is involved in the remark. For why is it that we are said not to deliberate about ends? And the question would probably be pressed home by those questioning spirits who are prepared to say that there is nothing, no duty whatever, which private judgment may not make matter of debate.

But Aristotle has his answer. We deliberate in order that

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[34] *E. g., cf.* I, iii, 6. II, ii, 1. X, ix, 1. [35] III, iii, 11.

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we may choose, and it is a fundamental Aristotelian doctrine that a man does not choose his ends. He does not choose his ends; because he finds them. Shall I quit myself as a man in the field? Shall I withstand the temptations of the flesh? Shall I administer my affairs with discretion? Shall I serve my country in civil life? Shall I be true to my friends? These are not questions about which a man deliberates and chooses. No. Speaking broadly, he regards the situation in which as a social being he finds himself as the arbiter of his ends, and his station in the social organism as the index of his duties.

For these powers of deliberation and choice are not there full-fledged from the first. They emerge only with experience and the gradual growth of reason; and when at last they come to their maturity, their possessor finds that there are limits to their range of reasonable exercise. By the care of parents, still more by the watchful nurture and discipline of the State, mankind are led, by one inducement or another, and by pains and penalties if nothing else will suffice, to walk in the ways in which they ought to go and to move steadily, month by month and year by year, upon those ends which it is essential for him who is to be at once good man and good citizen to pursue. This is the period of man's tutelage—his tutelage in the family and in the State —his tutelage as a member of the social organism.[36]

The time comes when these years of tutelage must be ended. The man comes of age as a moral being; and with the development of reason he begins to take the conduct of his life into his own hands. It is a momentous transition. It is the transition from the morality of leading-strings—the morality of habituation—to the higher morality of independent judgment.[37] But when the transition is made, it is no part of wisdom to think that we ought to use our reason to reconstruct our lives from the foundations, and to fall to deliberating about the fundamental duties (or ends) of life. Far otherwise. The man of practical wisdom will use his reason

[36] X, ix, 8, 9. [37] *Cf.* VI, xiii, 5.

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rather in recognizing and in accepting these great fundamental obligations that have been impressed upon his soul during the years when habituation was doing its work, and when private and public authority were conspiring to turn the desires to the steadfast pursuit of worthy and noble ends. All that is needful here is that men should become conscious of ends which—thanks to parents, guardians and legislators —they have been in their own lives pursuing for many a day.

This is the way in which, according to Aristotle, men learn their ends. As he thinks, there is no other way. It is not to be expected of any man that he should think out anew for himself the fundamental ends or duties of life. What *is* to be expected of him (and he will never attain his full stature as a moral being without it) is that he should become fully conscious of what these ends and duties are, and for the rest of his life go on to pursue them with open eyes and independent judgment. For it is in this way, by frankly accepting these fundamental ends, and not by deliberating about them as if they were matters of choice, that mankind will achieve that full and many-sided realization of their powers which (as we saw at the outset) is the supreme end of life.

Not that this will leave little for deliberation to do. It is one thing to apprehend our ends. It is another to find the means. A long way often lies between.[38] And in the complex, variable, and baffling conditions of moral action, it may well tax all our powers to think out the means to our ends, and to hit that difficult and precarious path of choice which (as we have seen above) is beset by so many possibilities of blundering and disaster. It is here we have the true province of deliberation; and it is here that practical wisdom will prove its quality.

Aristotle does not underestimate this task. Has he not told us that "It is a hard task to be good"? But he never doubts that it is a task in which the practical reason can prove victorious. There is a passage in which, in winding up

[38] III, iii, 11.

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his account of practical wisdom, Aristotle declares that "If a man have but the single virtue of practical wisdom, all the other virtues will be his likewise.[39] He does not say this simply because (as we have seen) he holds that no one can be practically wise till he has served a long apprenticeship in the moral virtues. There is the further fact that he who has won his way to this crowning excellence will for all time to come stand secure. Because, no matter where his duty may call him, be it to the battle-field, or to civic life, to the management of property, or to the administration of justice, he will never fail, by the uinon of habitual desire for noble ends, deliberative faculty and discriminating choice, to decide and do just what the circumstances of the hour demand. Dark days may come. Material resources may fail, and knowledge itself may vanish away.[40] But practical wisdom never faileth.

No, it never faileth—*in practical affairs.* But then, we must remember that Aristotle did not think that practical affairs were the greatest things in life. For it remains to be said that those who think morality the highest and most truly godlike thing on earth, and who follow the Stoics and Kant in proclaiming practical reason paramount, will find no encouragement in Aristotle's "Ethics,"[41] even though we have not hesitated to call him the prophet of practical wisdom.

For to the moral life, as he regards it, despite all its shining and manly virtues with practical wisdom as their crown, there still cling limitations and frustrations. It is deeply immersed in the world of change where ends are forever apt to be thwarted by untoward conditions, or by irrational or refractory desires. So far, it is never fully intelligible. Nor can it attain a completely abiding satisfaction. For it is intermittent in its activities, which cannot evade the coming of the hours of weariness and exhaustion; and in all its eager strivings in market, city or camp, it is forever restlessly reaching out after further and still further ends.[42] Not least,

[39] VI, xiii, 6. [40] VI, v, 8. [41] *Cf. esp.*, VI, vii, 4. [42] X, vii, 6 and 7.

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it is inexorably dependent upon externals; not, indeed, in the shape of luxuries or large possessions—for which Aristotle has a settled contempt—but in the reasonable guise of resources, equipment, instruments without which the virtues would never come to the birth. "It is impossible, or at least not easy, to act nobly without some furniture of fortune,"[43] so runs one of the many characteristic avowals. And though there are passages in which he rises almost to Stoic self-sufficingness, as when he describes the hero who, knowing better than all others the worth of life, lays it down on the field; or the nobility of soul that only shines forth the brighter because it has fallen on evil days, still the fact remains that the moral life, just because it is a life of self-realization *through action*, inexorably demands some sphere, some resources, some instruments, and, indeed, in the long run, if it is to come to maturity, nothing less than what the well-furnished Greek State offered to its citizens.

It is otherwise with the life of science and philosophy. It has more to give because it has less to ask. As one reads the words in which Aristotle describes it in his Tenth Book,[44] the mind goes irresistibly to the self-sufficing poverty of Spinoza, or to the serene austerity of Epictetus, or to the frugal spirituality of Wordsworth or Carlyle. Enough to live upon; the priceless leisure that the scholar and thinker know how to fill with strenuous work; a small circle of kindred spirits; the uninterrupted flow of thought that is unvexed by the cares and passions of public life, and serenely exempt from the fatigues and exhaustions which are the lot of all who toil for practical ends; above all the perpetual presence of those supreme objects of thought, the system of nature and the being of God—this is the kind of life that can alone draw forth what is best and most enduring in man. Nor can one wonder that this ideal was actually, in later times, impressed into the service as a plea for that ascetic withdrawal from the world which led the mystic to live in contemplation of the vision.

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[43] I, viii, 15 and 16; and *cf.* X, viii, 4 and 9. [44] X, vii.

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It is, indeed, thus that what is most akin to the religious spirit—so conspicuous by its absence in Aristotle's delineation of moral action—may come into human life. Not that it can so come, at any rate in its fulness, except to the comparatively few. For this higher life—higher immeasurably as Aristotle thinks—is never in "The Ethics" supposed to be possible except in and through a civilized community. And from this it follows that the leisure[45] that may be filled by great thoughts and scientific problems can only be won for some by the leisureless days of industrial, civic, and military life, in which the mass of citizens play their part. Nor is it to be supposed that, even under the more favoring intellectual conditions of the Greek State, the rank and file of citizens (to say nothing of the vast substratum of slaves) were either by predilection or faculty capable of the "higher" life. It remained then, as it remains now, for the few.

Yet it does not follow that this ideal of "the theoretic life" has no significance and no encouragement for many who are not by express calling and vocation men of science or thinkers. After all, the Aristotelian man of affairs and the thinker are not in nature different. They are alike citizens of one and the same State. There is no political or social wall of partition between them. They are above all partakers in the same human prerogative of reason. Grant that this reason finds in the two types widely divergent lines of development —divergent as is the wisdom of the statesman from the reasoning insight of the philosopher. Grant that the statesman who is a philosopher is as hard to find in actual experience as the philosopher who is statesman. (That dream of Plato!) True. But all this does not carry the conclusion that those whose lot it is to lead what Aristotle thought the lower life of affairs need be regarded as shut out from the light of science and speculation. In Greece at any rate, the two lives were not so divided. Did not historians, poets, philosophers play their part in the stormy scenes of war and politics? Were not soldiers and statesmen numbered among

[45] σχολή, which is emphatically contrasted with amusement and recreation.

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the votaries of literature and the disciples of philosophy? This being so we cannot suppose that it was to the men of science or the philosophers only of the ancient world, it is certainly not to them only in our modern world that there is significance in the memorable exhortation with which Aristotle closes his panegyric of the higher life:—

"If, then, Reason is a divine thing in comparison with our human nature; then also is the life of Reason a divine thing in comparison with the life of man. Let us give no heed to those who urge us as being men to think the things of humanity, and as mortals to think the things of mortality. Rather let us, to the limits of our powers, play the immortal, and in all we do, do it so as to live in accordance with the best that is in us." [46]

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THE EVOLUTION OF IDEALS.

The history of human thought being taken broadly into account, it is hardly to be doubted that the conception of evolution must be reckoned as the supreme contribution of the Nineteenth Century. It is not merely that evolution has been shown to be the significant fact in the order of Nature, throwing the stress of all interpretation upon the organic side, but (of vastly more importance) as a conception it has come to be the leading category of our everyday metaphysic. We have grown into the habit of *thinking* evolutionally. We require more than a reference to static fact or to substance and attribute to satisfy our intellectual needs. For full understandings we demand an end and a purpose as well as a cause or source; we demand a development, a life-history. Indeed, the life-history has come to be the unit regulating all our estimates of completeness and propriety, be our concern a solar system, a physical organism, a political party, or an idea.

Now evolution, as a category, is nothing short of downright negation of the rather smug idealisms of former times, with their reposeful faiths in definite and retainable Utopias. Evolution denies retainability. It refuses to allow any rest what-

[46] X, vii, 8.

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ever. Eternal volancy, eternal expectancy, eternal promise,—in these is its essence. So, in the realm of ideas, where once a stable and ponderous Truth was the exalted hoped-for, now—strange shifting!—insatiate Aspiration is seen to be inevitable. Paradoxically enough, it is seen, too, to be the one fit and appropriate form of mental life and the one possible satisfaction of mental need.

Yet if evolution is the gist of the natural process, the texture of reality, with aspiration for its psychical sign, whence, we ask, the old ideal of a static Truth? Whence arose the strange paradox of a mental life at variance with the essential principle of Nature?

The full interest of the problem appears only when we realize the immense and straining effort to which Nature must have been subjected in the bringing forth of Mind. For Mind is, so to speak, sundered from the parent being and established more or less at cross-purposes to it. It has achieved for itself a kind of hegemony, mainly by dint of a growing aloofness from Nature, engendering and evidenced in the paradoxical difference of Truth and Fact, of Ideal and Real. Now, however, in the Mind's maturity, there are signs of a coming *rapproachement* with Nature and of mutual understanding. Essentially this is only the Mind's understanding of itself, for Nature, as we know her, is merely the human habitation, fitted to life as closely as shell to mollusc. Accordingly, Natural History in its inner and true significance is the history of the evolution of human ideals, and in this history is our sole norm of intelligibility and our sole and proper index to the world's character.

I.

To get at the primitive quality of Nature we must abstract, as far as possible, all that constitutes the organization of our knowledge, in perception as well as in thought. There is a pre-natal life of the intelligence which it is our business to approximate, and only as we succeed in this shall we be able to grasp the *stoffliche* substance of reality. In that old life there is a kind of maternal warmth and nearness of experience, life

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engrossed in the senuous caress. So far as we are able to judge, all the lower animals live in immediacy. It is the present hunger that makes zestful the hunt, the sniff of present danger that urges flight, the satiety of present browsings that lures to shady repose; the amours of the mating season are the fresh creation of each recurring spring, and the nestling of to-day is the foe and rival of to-morrow. Foresight, prevision, the thought which represents to the mind something not in the immediate or incipient environment, are absent from the animal consciousness, and so there is no continuity of the conscious experience; there is only a kaleidoscopic succession of momentary nows and heres, each dependent for its quality upon the vivacity of attendant sensation.

But this primitive experience is not monotonous. Enlivened by Nature's whimsey and sport, it is endowed with a native picturesqueness. The merest sensation involves a play of sensation; from the very beginning mind is impressionable; changefulness, a certain prismatic character, is its chief first token. Distinction of mood,—hunger, fear, rage, desire, fondling, frolic,—are already differentiating mental quality and laying the foundations of Intelligence.

Correlative with the natural selection of traits in the physical series, there is, in the mental, a natural selection of impressions. Susceptibility to certain perceptions, readiness for certain mental reactions, are as important factors in evolutional security as efficient horns or an adaptable pair of heels. And just as horns are pronged or coiled and heels hoofed or splay to suit natural exigencies, so impressions are chosen, ordered and fixed, in bringing to pass the proportionate anatomy of the mind.

Of the multitude of sensations and feelings continuously assailing consciousness, the greater portion are but objects of idle curiosity, a few only are of vital interest. Whether the wind blow east or west is of little account to the grazing herd, save it blow toward or from a possible covert of huntsmen; the scent of danger is the one important impression for which all else must be neglected. In the long run, survival depends upon power to give exclusive heed to significant hints and signs. This is the *raison d'être* of that intensity and narrowness of per-

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ception which we note in the lower animals and the lower races of man. An African explorer has observed that the natives while keenly alive to signs of the trail to European eyes invisible, are yet oblivious to the larger, and to the European wholly impressive, natural features: and Darwin, on his famous voyage, made note that the Fuegians were immensely impressed with the boats of the white man's ships, which at least came within the genus of their dug-out canoes, while to the ships themselves they were indifferent or took them for granted. In the natural state life-interests are too precariously suited to circumstance to permit mental breadth or freedom. Perceptions are specialized to the present, and the mind made bond of the hour.

Instinct, with its huge economies of mental energy, is the first agent of freedom. But instinct is confined to the elementary and constant factors of experience, and, automatic and inelastic as it should be, it is incapable of serving other ends than its proper automatisms. True deliverance is possible only when *ideas* appear which are able to disengage themselves from the immediacy of sense and stand apart as *entia rationis,* as in a way veritable substances. The appearance of such ideas is the most significant event in the whole history of the mind's growth. Doubtless there preëxists a need which gives them birth, a sort of blind striving of the sensuous consciousness and a general orientation of mind in preparation for thought; but for all this, the ideas come into being only through strain and effort commensurate with the metamorphosis.

Evidence is afforded by the primitive wonder in the mere power of abstraction as shown in the magical potencies ascribed to abstract ideas. When all Nature is viewed as living Nature, all the varied display of physical creation is conceived as endowed with as varied a spiritual being. But if things are living powers, gifted each with its own natural magic, how less living shall be ideas, with ubiquities, powers, and prophecies, a hundredfold more impressive? Of course the question is not baldly put; none the less it is felt and satisfied. At the first the idea is an image, but it is also much more than this. It is an image whose verisimilitude reveals its real being as its ubiquity reveals

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its spiritual nature. It is, in fact, a kind of soul. Eidolon, phantasm, simulacrum, whatever its sensuous being, it is imbued with the life of that which it represents, and is not to be reckoned with except as a true natural power.

Imitations, however crude, are primitively conceived as possessing the aptitudes of their originals. Ceremonial dances, whether of war or the hunt, seed-time or harvest, are invariably imitative or symbolic; if an enemy is to be overthrown, he is slain first in mock combat; if a harvest is desired, the dancers adorn themselves with emblems of its fullness: the ceremony is always an *abstract* of the event expected. So, too, the painted symbols upon the face or weapons of the Red Indian are not mere tokens; they are powerful "medicine" for the confounding of enemies. Like powers are in the ideal image; only it, being veritable spirit, is the superior agency. Ere the Indian youth is initiated to man's estate, he fasts until in a vision he beholds the image of that, be it animate beast or animate thing, which is thenceforth to be his "medicine," his familiar, the guiding idea of his individual being. With its likeness he adorns his warlock, he paints his image on his teepee; as sacredly as the totem of his clan, he obeys its taboos and laws, until at last it becomes a part of his proper self and the measure of his personality.

Thought is thus at first, because of its sensuous splendor, a kind of living heraldry of the soul. Yet just on account of the brilliancy of its blazonry, it is not wholly free, not nimble nor adept. It may serve to bring into being all the wonderful fauna of mythic nature, dryad and hamadryad, nymph and genius and composite beast, but the swift, true grasp of essences is yet wanting. To know the keen zest of dialectic, it has still to pierce the dazzle of poetic imagery.

Among the earliest instances of that abstruser form of conception which makes dialectic possible are notions of number. The first really comprehensive philosophy of the Greeks—the Pythagorean—was an endeavor to find the essential natures of things in numerical relations. But the human mind had not yet attained to the conception of pure essence, pure abstraction, and accordingly the Pythagorean Numbers were not only essences

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but powers and deities as well. A geometric figure, the pentagram, was the symbol of the brotherhood and at the same time a talisman of magical efficiency; the heavenly spheres, moving in just proportion, give forth a celestial harmony which is the soul of the universe; the One, the Monad, is a Supreme Being, in a pantheon of divine Numbers.

Number, indeed, represents a first insight into Nature's law and order. At the very emergence of intelligence, fourfold direction, the four quarters of the earth, are fixed in the diviner's cross or swastika,while the science of the calendar is the earliest of sciences. To mathematics, as the beginning of abstraction, attaches all that peculiar veneration of the fixed and orderly which we of to-day accord to the notion of Natural Law. Nature as revealed in Law is Nature depersonalized; it is Nature as inexorable Destiny rather than placable Whim, and though we are long accustomed to this conception, it was, at the birth of science, an insight utterly unique, hence a fit theme of superstitious awe.

The dialectic instinct once awakened, general conceptions of all sorts spring into being. The keen Greek joy in this young dialectic is for us, in the gray years of thought, only to be vaguely inferred from remembered delights in the firstlings of our own youthful insights, and even so we must reckon in the centuries of conventionalizing which have rendered chill and austere, ideas that were to the Greek mind gloriously fresh and plastic. Of course it was in the mind of Plato that ideas achieved apotheosis. But Plato, I think, is to be taken, not as one apart, but as the logical expositor of the idealizing trend of the human mind. Thoroughly Greek, Plato is not merely Greek. He is the idealist of all time because he expresses so winningly the mind's naïve first reverence for its own diviner part. The Ideas, indeed, seemed to Plato so essentially superhuman that he could not credit a mere mortal's right to them. They were to him veritable divinities forming an august assemblage incomparably more lofty than Olympus. They were patterns and archetypes, supreme perfections, which the human soul sees as through a glass darkly, and which the whole created world strives with desperate dumb longing to appropriate into

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its being. This, in fact, is the reason of the world's being. The World of Ideas purely through its surpassing perfection evokes from the very Void itself an emulous shadow of its reality. The ache of Ideal plenum is too intense for solitary Heaven to endure till the consuming desire of the counter-world of fact springs up to give it ease.

So convinced was Plato of the divine nature of Ideas that he could only account for human knowledge of them as acquired by recollection of knowledge gained in some previous, nobler, more spiritual mode of being. The soul in its moments of recollection is "like a bird fluttering up, careless of the world below" and he whose initiation into this world is recent, "is amazed when he see anyone having a godlike face or form, which is the expression or imitation of divine Beauty; and at first a shudder runs through him and some misgiving of a former world steals over him; then looking upon the face of his beloved as of a god he reverences him, and if he were not afraid of being thought a dowright madman, he would sacrifice to his beloved as to the image of a god."[1]

It is not other than the Platonizing instinct which inspires men everywhere, in the dawn of mental life, to deify the conceptions which dominate their actions. The Christian virtues, Faith, Hope and Charity, are hardly less personal than the Roman deities Bellona and Fortuna, Fides and Amor. Nor are these abstractions less real than the potent ancestral species, or "elder brothers," which the American Indians conceive as the parents and protectors of all living kinds: the "elder brother" of moose is a giant, spirit Moose, of the bears an archetypal Bear, of buffaloes a manitou Buffalo animating the prairie herds. So also the rain gods and wind gods, the earth gods and water gods and fire gods, the sun gods and moon gods, found in all paganisms and filling all pantheons, are but the vivid dramatizations of form-compelling thought.

Every lasting idea is the result of a building up and subsequent compression of many related impressions. As in the physical world organs come into being by a long process of

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[1] *"Phaedrus,"* Jowett's translation.

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selective adaptation, so in the mental the natural selection of impressions creates ideas. The elemental conceptions first to appear are crystalizations of the immemorial experiences of the race and are thus in a more than Platonic sense true recollections. They constitute a subjective index of evolution, being, one might say, the patent incarnation of Nature's intention in bringing conscious life to pass. They represent those facts in the order of the world which are important to conscious being and are meant to enter into the house of thought. And coming as intensifications of the most ancient and vital of all impressions, it is little wonder, as it is wholly appropriate, that the mind, in the intoxicating hour of its initiation, should deem them revelations of more than mortal meaning. So it is that we find them gods of primitive men, who thus instinctively make supreme such of their experiences as most lift them above the brute. Nor can it be doubted that the instinct is other than a just expression of natural destiny, pointing the eventual freedom of the mind.

II.

There is an inveterate tendency of mankind, which no science can wholly disillusion, to hark back to the Golden Age. No matter how wretched and decadent, there is scarce a tribe the world over but recalls some former Eden, some Earthly Paradise, blessed with the clearest of rivers and the plentifullest fruitage and game; and no matter how drugged and lethargized by material prosperity, there is not a people but remembers Heroic Days when all its men were valiant and all its women fair. The explanation is patent. Idealization is instinctive, but the ideal estate is ever at odds with reality, and so gives rise to the fundamental contradiction which the human mind is ceaselessly endeavoring to surmount. The barbarian, from the very vividness of his conception, is unable, as the civilized man is loth, to admit the unreality of the ideal, and so both agree in relegating to the past what the present denies. The dream of the Golden Age springs invincibly from the homing instinct of the imagination.

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Utopia is thus less a memory than a prophecy, gauging the mental stature of its creators and forecasting their attainment. At the same time, with the more sophisticated races, there is a true sense in which the Golden Age is an age of the past, and that is in so far as it is the age of poetry. I do not mean that all poetry is now overpassed, but there is a prelogical period of mental history which is wholly poetic. When thought first emerges from sensation, ideas are still sensuous in texture; though they differ from sense in possessing a significance felt to be other than immediate, they share in its intuitive reality. Life other than in the concrete present is no easy achievement. Myriads of ages of hand-to-mouth existence have inbred the conviction of the superior reality of what is immediately present, and ideas, to gain the least initial prestige, were forced to appear in the guise of present being, as sensuous images. In order that abstract thought might exist at all it had first to compete with sense-perception in its own likeness and to make itself more interesting than sense-perception.

This is doubtless the bionomic reason for the fact that savage men are indefinitely credulous of what they can understand, or image, and equally sceptical of what transcends their experience. Of African natives, an observer writes: "Their imaginations become so lively that they can scarcely distinguish betweeen their dreams and their waking thoughts, between the real and the ideal, and they consequently utter falsehood without intending, and profess to seee things which never existed." Tylor relates: "When the Russians in Siberia listened to the talk of the rude Kirgis, they stood amazed at the barbarians' ceaseless flow of poetic improvisation, and exclaimed: 'Whatever these people see gives birth to fancies.'" The same trait is found in all primitive thinking, which thus appears in a *dramatic mood.* In a kind of natural realism of the imagination, it gives credence to whatever presents itself in the likeness of sense. The mood is the poetic mood of poets who are simple and clear-eyed in the old instinctive way of the ballad-makers. It is also the mood of objective reason and of those odd dream-lapses into the life of the past which sometimes amaze us by their explicitness and point.

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Doubtless, at the first, language was a powerful aid in this dramatization of ideas. "The mere fact," says Tylor, "of its individualizing in words such notions as winter and summer, cold and heat, war and peace, vice and virtue, gives the myth-maker the means of imagining these thoughts as personal beings." But language is also the main or exclusive agent for freeing the mind from the discursiveness and indirection of allegorical thinking. The word is a potent builder of myth; but myth itself, by its fixity and interplay of element, tends to conventionalize ideas. The mythic hero, the personified dawn, the god, the deed, enter into the mind's habitual furnishing and eventually become the stock symbols of thought. To be sure, there must be some facility of conception before any myth is possible, but with this attained, the mind is speedily induced to pass from the dramatic to the *reflective mood* of thought, from poetry to philosophy; 'tis but a scant transition from Hesiod to Thales. The reflective mood finds its warrant in utility rather than in attractiveness. Its business is to systematize. If imagination is the faculty which has lifted man above the time-serving brute, making possible his insight into what lies behind the screen of sensation, reflection is the instrument by means of which we rear the wonderful structure of human knowledge; its keenness measures possible science, its flexibility determines mental evolution.

There are two habits or modes of thought essential to all reflection which are responsible for the main puzzle of philosophy and the inherent contradictoriness of reason. The antithesis to which they give rise has been variously designated. With the Greeks it was the contradiction of the one and the many, of being and becoming; with moderns it is the problem of indentity in difference, or, in natural science, of uniformity and variation. All these antitheticals arise from contemplation of the *thing*, that which suffers change yet remains self-identical. In the mind's history the puzzle has found various solutions. In aesthetics reconciliation is effected by the notion of harmony; in psychology, by the conception of personality; in natural science, by the doctrine of evolution.

The two habits are the instinct for identification, or the psy-

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chical experience of recognition, and the instinct for ascribing causes, due to experience of volition,—that is, the powers of thinking and willing, which in joint operation constitute human efficiency. It is the instinct of causal thinking which induces the primitive mind to animate all Nature with will and intention. It is the instinct for forming definite and responsible estimates of things which leads to those composite impressions that we call ideas. The strength of the instinct for causes appears in the ready ascription of magical powers to these. The intensity of the effort to create a fixed mental furniture, a store of definite and accountable ideas, appears in the impulsive erection of general notions into real entities. From interplay of the two arise dynamic or deified conceptions, gods of the morning, noon and evening sun, of the sowing, the young vegetation, and the harvest, of the time for making war and the time for making peace,—Horus, Ra, and Tum, Semele, Dionysus, and Demeter, Mars and Quirinus,—all those nodes of mythic interest through which the natural classification of experience has been perfected.

The supreme instance of this happy congruence is the Platonic philosophy of Ideals or ideal forms which are at once the essential being and the formative causes of phenomena. According to Plato "the definition of being is simply power," and Ideas, the most real, are also the most powerful of beings. They are more than mere types or patterns; they are "souls," personalities, ideal individuals. Here, already, is foreshadowed the modern solution which finds in the individual the one abiding reality, though abiding only because its nature is to change and grow. The difference between this and the mere symbol is the difference between Everyman and Hamlet. In the one the experience is purely symbolic, typical of "*every man's;*" in the other the experience, still broad as humanity, is yet the one possible experience of the one soul, its avatar; Everyman is an ideal type, Hamlet an ideal individual.

Thinking in terms of individuality is, however, a late achievement of mankind. There is a long communal period beforehand. It was no light task for the human mind to master the more elemental and necessary ideal identities. These, as

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I have said, exist more or less at cross-purposes with reality. It is their nature and utility to be fixed and constant; it is the nature of reality to be ever changing. There are no such things as genera and species, at least in their nude abstraction, outside the mind of man; yet it is by means of genera and species that all our knowledge is coördinated. It is by dint of ideal integers, for example, that bank accounts are balanced; it is by comparison with the ideal husband, composite of all husbandly virtues, that real husbands are assorted and valued. Certain samenesses must be assumed in reality and precipitated in thought before any reasoning may take place. If this process gives the lie to truth, making it, because of its very constancy, untrue, it still has the sufficient plea of vast utility.

In magic, the science of primitive men, the evolution of the category is already well under way. Says Lang: "Among savages the belief that like produces like is exemplified by many practices. The New Caledonians, when they wish their yam plots to be fertile, bury in them with mystic ceremonies certain stones which are naturally shaped like yams. . . When the Bushmen want wet weather they light fires, believing that the black smoke clouds will attract black rain clouds; while the Zulus sacrifice black cattle to attract black clouds of rain. . . The custom of making a wax statuette of an enemy, and piercing it with pins or melting it before the fire, so that the detested person might waste as his semblance melted, was common in mediæval Europe, was known to Plato, and is practiced by the Negroes." If Thomas Hardy is to be trusted, this practice has hardly yet disappeared from England, where it must have been familiar in Shakespeare's time:

> "Have I not hideous death within my view,
> Retaining but a quantity of life
> Which bleeds away, even as a form of wax
> Resolveth from his figure, 'gainst the fire."

Thus we see from the beginning evidences of that intense search for analogies which is the key to the development of human thought. The whole later aspect of the mind bristles with illustrations of the impressiveness of these ideal identities. It appears in the councils and inquisitions which have banned

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and anathematized dissimilar—heterodox—thinking. It is the rationale of classificatory sciences, based on analogical characters. It is the intellectual motive of those strange, irrational Monisms, Henisms, and Materialisms, which seek to reduce to some essential One a universe which is so palpably a multitude.

Nor can there be doubt that the inveterate conservatism natural to a complex being has vastly aided this ideal concentration. Novelty, whether in environment or thought, is instinctively shunned by a not over-adaptable animal, and the savage finds reason a too incommensurable instrument to be handily employed. He prefers trust in the surety of instinct and custom. His thinking is so governed by the specific instance that it takes the form of a kind of mental ritual or cult of ideas; and since thinking is essentially a social phenomenon, whether between different minds or the same mind's different moods, it readily succumbs to ritualistic influences. Indeed, the chief business of cult and rite appears to be definition and conservation of ideas. Tribal traditions and ceremonies are the books of untutored peoples and the storehouses of their accumulated experiences. Just as the child's imitative play is his natural work, yielding him future facility in the real stress of life, so the imitative dances and ceremonials of primitive men are the beginnings of social training. The taboos, or prohibitions, by which savages protect game during the close season or forbid marriage within the family are enforced by a moral imperative stronger than the civilized conscience and are no less truly instinctive gropings after natural law than the establishments of meanings by the symbolisms of tribal mysteries are instinctive assimilations of the forms of thought. All the ordinances of tribal life are, psychologically speaking, but fixations of meanings whose stability is attested by the slowness of their erosion,—forming, as they still do, much of the "color" of what passes as modern thought.

III.

So far we have sketched the beginnings of recognition and the establishment of fixed conceptions as tools of reflective

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thought. There remains to treat the emergence of personality as the principle of explanation.

Sociologists tell us that social pressure everywhere results in "like-mindedness." In the formative period of society it is essential that individuals should act according to common understandings which are the natural prelude of law. The agency of their attainment (granted the community of feeling and appetite which a common human nature presupposes) appears to be the *strong man* or hero. The individual who succeeds in most widely impressing his personality upon his fellows becomes the ethnic ideal or type toward which they trend. Abraham, Herakles, Romulus, Beowulf, Arthur—each binds together in a single personality the ideal traits of a race. Each represents the like thought of all the young men and maids of his folk, the pattern of their emulation and their heart's desire.

Hero-worship has certainly had a deal to do with the humanizing of the species. The hero is the first conscious formulation of an end of evolution. He is already the better self of those whose admiration he excites and who to the extent of their power approximate to his likeness. By its very suggestiveness his personality dominates theirs, measuring in his attainment their possibility. The discrepancy, however, is keenly felt, and there is no more pathetic abnegation in human history nor any severer arraignment of average futility than the ascription by primitive folk of an immortality to their heroes which they deem themselves unworthy to share; it is only Elijahs who are snatched up into Heaven.

Primarily the hero is a chieftain. That is to say, he is a man exalted above his fellows not only by prowess and wisdom but by a subtler, more occult endowment. In primitive belief every man is gifted with a natural potency due to his nature such as it is. But some men possess a higher potentiality of this sort than others, whom they are thus able to sway. The warrior is victor not because of superior skill or craft but because his magic outweighs that of his enemy. If he falls victim, the reverse is true, and it is accordingly his anxious interest to fortify in every possible way his occult powers. Now

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the chieftain is a man more highly "charged" than his tribesmen, and it is by virtue of his surplus potency that he rules. It is his to lay and lift taboos, his to "smell out" and punish evildoers, his to reward or despoil. He is the incarnate law exercising a sovereignty more intangible and powerful than any in modern culture.

The fact that the chieftain's power springs from no mere physical prowess is attested not only by his wizardly offices, by his erection to demi-godship,—or even, as Egyptian kings and Roman emperors, to godship,—but most irrefutably by loyalty to his still living personality after death. Indeed, death seems rather to increase than diminish his potency; freed from the flesh there is little to let or hinder the play of spiritual powers. Manes-worship is perhaps the most ancient of religious venerations. Certainly it is a fact of no light significance that the vast laborious monuments—cairn and cromlech, dolmen and menhir—erected by prehistoric centuries of men are all monuments to the dead. No house of the living rivals the pyramid of Cheops; and no labor for the living counts a tithe of the ancient labors for the dead. There could be no more telling gauge of the intensity of the mental stress to which mankind was subjected in the process of social fusion than the spectacle of naked neolithic savages hewing out and lifting up the cyclopean avenues of megaliths on the plains of Brittany, or of the sweltering multitudes of Egypt toiling the huge toil of the pyramids. In the old monuments we are presented with a veritable embalment of a period of mental history, the vastness of their dead weight furnishing the proportional of the might of the living idea that demanded their erection.

The case of Egypt, where the passion for mere mass reaches acme, is particularly enlightening, for here we seem to see an instance of Nature over-reaching her own intention. The mightiness of Egypt's monuments is no more striking than the inertia of Egypt's ideals, the mummied perpetuity of the thoughts and institutions of the land whose one book is the Book of the Dead. It is as if the social consciousness wakened and focused in the dynasties of the pyramids, had fused and fixed past all dissolution the possibilities of Egyptian nature.

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Thereafter was never any chance for growth, never opportunity for the democratization of thought.

Every civilization creates its own cult of ideas and establishes its own norm of conduct and character. In the era of beginnings it is hardly to be doubted that autocratic centralization is the inevitable instrument for the fixation of these. Yet if there is to be growth, the community of civilization can serve only as a starting-point for differentiations; the net asset of traits which makes the communal individual or racial personality should not be allowed to exhaust the race's possibilities, but should serve merely as a basis for sympathy with individual developments. Egypt and China furnish instances of peoples balked of this natural development; in each case the social autocracy overpowered the individual bent, perhaps because of the very intensity of the social fusion, and consequently only a type, or race personality came into being.

For the happier development we look to classicism. It is true that the classic ideal, no less than the convention and ritual of Egypt, is a caste ideal, a demand for like-thought, identity, unity; but it is expression of this ideal in a far truer mode. The classic type is not an inanimate, weighted type; its very essence is buoyancy and life; it not only identifies Being but it achieves Becoming and so is imbued with evolutional vitality. Harmony, universality, and temperate mastery are its key-notes. We have seen how these are exemplified in Plato's Ideas, which are universal as being the essences each of some natural kind or species, harmonious as perfect in their individual natures while uniting in one guise a manifold of instances, and masterful as being the causal prototypes of all partial realizations in the physical world. Here first we have true individuals in the ideal world; they are universal individuals, personalities, archons of the mind; and just as the Homeric Olympus is the visible habitat of Hellenic imagination, so is the Platonic Hierarchy of Ideas the full revelation of the conceptual and moral consciousness of classic character.

But even so, no last development of personality is yet attained. The classic ideal defeats by its very perfection. The fullness of its realization denies evolution. Even its activity

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is a kind of rest; it is a contemplative, imitative activity, the "unmoving activity" of Aristotle. The beauty of the Greek temple, in its utter attainment, has been contrasted with the beauty of the Gothic cathedral, in its utter aspiration. No analogy could more truly index development. Classic domination of form and thought speedily degenerates into Procrustean measurement. The stir and tremor of growth is yet denied, and so the richness of promise. These come only with imperfection and freedom. Only to imperfect things is freedom meaningful, and only to free desire is promise sweet.

IV.

Nature is never long content with fixity. Her significant fact is her constant bringing forth of new life, her boundless evolutional energy. The social forces that make for the consolidation of human experience and the establishment of communal like-mindedness are continually offset by individual idiosyncrasies. There is an energy of growth ever straining the leash of mortal circumstances, and the individual's feeling of constraint under social domination and his hunger for a larger and richer experience are its proper subjective signs. We look with a kind of wonder upon the suicidal zeal of reformers such as Bruno and Roger Bacon, upon the intellectual intoxication of minds such as those of Paracelsus and Spinoza, yet if we consider them in the broad light of Nature's way, their very perversities are seen to be her necessary expression. They are predestined to rebellion; the purpose of their creation is their breaking with established conceits.

Human instinct for a freer life is thus the inner form of Nature's irrepressible expansion. No perfection is won except to be destroyed, except to be followed by new anticipations and new ideals. These new ideals often seem to us erratic, and for this reason we frequently meet in the history of thought as in the histories of nations, eras of seeming degeneration and dullness wherein the meanings of the old masters are lost and a one-sided enthusiasm replaces the symmetry of whole conceptions. But such periods always

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result in the long run in a return to the satisfying full view with some added insight and elevation of meaning; and it is for this reason that history has been likened to a spiral progression, the measure of advance being the added altitude, the added comprehensiveness of the standpoint won.

In the first revolt against convention, the likeliest creed of the revolutionary spirit is glorification of the flesh. The cramp and restraint of law become unbearable and long-pent impulses, irrepressible at last, break forth in the riot of sense. After Rome come the barbarians, and the world is seemingly broken up just for the remaking.

"Back to Nature!" is the slogan of the epoch, and by Nature is meant that frank avowal of naked whim which it has been the long schooling of reason to suppress. License is the order of the day and Unreason is its lord. Illustration is furnished by those paroxysms of orgiastic worship whereby the Asiatics sought in the madness of sense to rise above the obliterations of self and personality entailed by their crushing despotisms—worships which gradually penetrated Greece and Rome as their peoples more and more fell in thrall to the tyranny of the state. Illustration is afforded again by the "ghost dance" craze of the American Indians, a ceremonial in which the Red Men seek to free themselves from the oppressive visitation of the white man's culture, and, in a past revivified, to live once more the old life of their race. Illustration in a third mode is the mystic and ascetic struggle for intuitions transcending sense and reason, alike paltry to its view. The Bacchanalian orgy, the ghost dance, the mystic communion of the Quietest,—all are efforts to overleap the boundaries of time and grasp for the present need the elusive substance of reality.

The creed, the rationale, one might almost say the gist of such effort is realism. It is reaction against the futility of reason, and of the ideal which is reason's essence, and it is endeavor to achieve tangible contact with real being, to appropriate in the compass of the individual something of the larger life of Nature. After long domination classicism lapses into formalism. The living essence of reality is lost,

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and the mind concerns itself with meaningless repetitions. The revolt from this, the return to Nature, is realism, which conceives itself as an effort to apprehend the world as it actually is, and which is in fact an endeavor to obtain a new and significant point of view with respect to Nature and so to furnish the basis for the development of a new idealism.

It is true that in aiming to treat fact without bias realism misses the fact, as must ever be in a humanly constituted world. The reality of things is their significance and the being of significance is promise. Hence, like every form of living in immediacy, realism defeats itself; at its own valuation it is contradiction and sham. Its practice, however, is better than its understanding. No activity is possible without the exercise of selective power, and selection is the beginning of idealization. Realism brings to its selective activity a sincere and recipient mood. The nature of the realist determines the choice and fashioning of the material. Thus the most literal imitation is in some degree idealization, colored at least by that racial recollection which is the form of the mind and so sharing the general trend of development of which this form is the expression and index.

So, in last analysis, return to Nature is return to human nature. It is the renewal of that reliance upon personal inspiration which classicism tempers with a certain impersonal austerity and which ritualized classicism, or formalism, utterly snuffs out. "A cynic might say," says Bosanquet, "that the history of philosophy is a process in which the meaning of Plato and Aristotle is periodically forgotten by their disciples and rediscovered by their antagonists." This is perhaps more than a cynical truth. For is not the meaning of Plato and Aristotle an eternal restiveness of the creative instinct, satisfied only in the evolution of new patterns of desire? And is not this the necessary and perpetual discovery of every revolt to Nature when brought to its final self-realization?

With the attainment of this insight there is always reaction from the blindness of mere realism. There is awakened a better consciousness of values and a higher self-respect. The

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fruit of these is that chastening of the sense and purgation of the passions which is the beginning of spiritual freedom. Sometimes, to be sure, the first awakening comes in the guise of romanticism, which, however earnest and beautiful in the age when chivalry and Christian humanhood were in the making, is nowadays but a lazy and superficial idealism; yet, in the end, this always gives way to an impulsive and vigorous generation of types, the subjective token of a hale mental growth and the proper rationality of existence.

V.

Mental history is thus the significant content of evolution, and the scope and character of the mind's operations under the varying dominations of moulding influences give us our final clue to Nature. The mind itself necessarily reflects what Nature is for us. Its very being is in a sense of recapitulation of its creation, and viewed genetically it may be expected therefore to point its own natural destiny. That which it may be shown to have brought and to be bringing to pass is that for which we must surmise it came to be.

To gain some conception of this process has been the purpose of my essay, and the general result of the enquiry may now be stated. *The evolution of the ideal life is a gradual initiation of intelligence into Nature's secret ways to the end that personalities shall be created which are efficient both to understand and to aid the natural development.*

That such personalities might be free and capable agents it was essential that they be given a being apart from and more or less out of accord with the main course of creation. They were, in other words, to become minor creators in the whole of creation. This seeming miracle is what Nature achieves in the generation of an idealizing intelligence capable in some degree of forestalling her own operations.

It is worth while briefly to resume the steps of the process. In the beginning we found consciousness in thrall to an utterly mobile and whimsical reality. There was naught but the ceaseless play of feeling and sense, the flux and flow of the Heracliteans. Slowly, by dint of instinct first, time-bridg-

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ing experience came into being; identities were established, and the foundation of ideal permanence was laid. Thereafter was the tremendous fusion and refusion of these identities under the driving impulsion of the social instinct, until at last an immobility of culture—in some cases never to be overcome—had given (to communes and peoples) at least the external form of individuality. With this apotheosis of sameness the extreme disaccord of Nature and intelligence is reached. The ideal structure in its fixity is at absolute variance with Nature in her change, and Plato in despair of reconciliation cleaves the ideal world wholly from the real. But the fixity has been established only for the safe-guarding of an aggressive and growing individuality which must pursue its way wholly aloof from mere phenomenality if it is to attain permanence and personality. The gradual emancipation and democratization of thought is the carrying on of this development. We have seen it pursue its various dialectic: in art, passing from the first idealism to classicism, thence through ritualism to realism and renewed idealism; in philosophy, passing from personified whim to the notion of Nature's constancy and law, and finally to Nature's purpose and ideality; in science, progressing from a mere reliance upon magical analogies to the establishment of genuine identities, the conception of cause, and finally to the doctrine of evolution. The perception that idealism, teleology, and evolution are the same is the goal of our present arrival. Each defines personality, each grasps the permanent and prophetic essence of thought.

This development of conscious life wherein it passes from utter dependence upon the sensations and feelings of the moment to inclusive personality and temporal independence in the realm of ideas is what Spinoza described as the passage from bondage to freedom whereby the soul wins immortality. It is true that Spinoza's conception was transcendental rather than evolutionary and that it seemingly stopped short of the notion of personality as growing and as surviving by reason of growth. It culminated rather in a rest in the eternal verities, in peaceful accord with an immutable Divine Nature. Evolution substitutes for this an active, assimilative spiritual life.

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But evolution none the less reiterates Spinoza's argument with a modern pertinence in revealing personality as Nature's unique embodiment of a truly persistent being—one that persists not by grace of time, as the slow-eroding hills, but by conquering and compassing time, past and future being gathered in an endless present. We have not sufficient warrant to say, perhaps, that the soul must exist forever; our knowledge is still confined to a brief arc of experience. But we can assert as evident truth that the course of mental life assumes the form of eternity; in all Nature the mind is the unique embodiment of a real perpetuity as in all Nature personality is the unique exemplar of ideal anticipation and immortal hope.

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RELIGIOUS REVIVALS: THEIR ETHICAL SIGNIFICANCE.

This is from every point of view an exceedingly fruitful subject for investigation. An outburst of religious fervor is by the religious man attributed to the presence and personal agency of the Divine Being, and would thus be described as the outpouring of the Holy Spirit. For him this point of view alone possesses interest. He cares nothing whatever for the other aspects of the phenomenon, so long as "souls are saved" and believers are built up "on their most holy faith." Indeed it is hardly presented to his mind in the light of a phenomenon at all; it is a condition to be cultivated by prayer and other "means of grace," and it is an experience to be entered upon and enjoyed. The theologian, however, finds in any widespread religious movement what will certainly result in the reconstruction of some theological doctrine, or the restatement of some long-forgotten dogma or article of belief. The ecclesiastical student will not only trace back to such revivalistic outbursts some new principle or polity, but he will endeavor to show that there is not a church or sect in Christendom which has not its origin in one or other of the great revivals. It is

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remarkable, too, that a quickening of religious enthusiasm has always given a decided impetus to the fine arts. There is not only a revival of learning and art in general, as in the case of the Renaissance, but a distinctly new taste is generated in music and poetry. Every movement that has stirred the emotions of the people to the depths has been celebrated in song. Even the sociologist is able to trace in these explosive forces together with their after-effects, many tendencies which profoundly influence social and economic conditions. One striking illustration of this is seen in the contrast presented by the temper and conduct of the working classes of England during the Industrial Revolution, as they were influenced by the Wesleys and the early Methodist preachers, and the spirit of the same classes in the French Revolution. Even more interesting perhaps for students of philosophy are the peculiar manifestations of revivalistic energy regarded in the light of psychological phenomena and as data for ethical study. Professor William James has dealt with the former in his "Varieties of Religious Experience," and many interesting and important facts in the recent Welsh revival await his investigation. We would direct our attention in this paper especially to the ethical aspect of the subject, so far as space will allow; and we venture to bespeak the interest of the student of ethics in this question as one which furnishes abundant material for research amongst those forces which profoundly affect human life.

The most obvious reflection to be made upon the subject from the standpoint of ethics is that every form of true revivalistic fervor is a distinct gain to morality. Although its effects may appear to be transitory, and may be attended by unsatisfactory or even objectionable forms of excitement, yet the net result must be of value, in a greater or less degree. It will be urged that improved morality is always aimed at, at least, indirectly. Conviction of sin and repentance form the initial stage, even where the very conceptions of sin and the fruits of repentance are somewhat artificial; as, for instance when theatre-going, dancing, and smoking, are amongst the sins to be repented of and eschewed; or when a "missioner," like Dr. Torrey, adopts a reactionary attitude in theology, and de-

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nounces the Higher Criticism of the Bible; yet as a matter of fact, all serious forms of moral evil are singled out for attack, and are not allowed to pass the scrutiny of revivalistic judgment. Some good results in the direction of positive morality are always kept in view. In the case in which these results are not deemed entirely commensurate with the efforts made, the movement is usually regarded as being quite worth the labor if only "one soul is saved" from perdition. In support of this view, it is generally alleged that, making all deductions for backsliding and the unsatisfactory cases of conversion, many of the finest types of Christian workers have made their final moral choice during some special mission or revival services. It should not be overlooked that the latest movement of the kind, the Welsh revival, has been designated an ethical revival, on account of its widespread and most extraordinary effect upon the drinking habits, and the payment of debts, and in relation to the adjustment of old grievances and quarrels amongst the people.

These remarks probably express what most persons, favorable in the main towards these movements, would agree upon as to the ethical value of revivals. There are, however, a few points that must be referred to which advocates of special missions are apt to overlook. The unsatisfactory cases are more serious than favorably-disposed persons have generally imagined. It is not by any means a mere question of gathering the good and the bad into one net, and casting away the bad, the percentage of which has been duly discounted in advance, and every allowance made for failures. The unsatisfactory cases, where there is not down-right hypocrisy, are either (1) the result of undue excitement and pressure brought to bear upon the will, or (2) those of true back-sliding, in which the moral feeling having passed away, the convert has not sufficient firmness and stability of purpose to prevent a lapse into the old habits and mode of life. We do not often realize how seriously hardened such persons become after such an experience, "the last state" being so much "worse than the first." But this is not all by any means; of all moral cynics and reactionaries these persons are the worst, and the fact of their be-

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ing sent out of the "inquiry-room" to spread suspicion and distrust, and to suggest the unreality of the whole process, so far as they are concerned, amongst simple-minded people, is disastrous in the extreme to all moral influence. Christian workers who pride themselves upon the few promising converts who are gathered in and the "one soul saved," should think of the many souls that are *lost* as the indirect result of such methods. Reactions there will always be, and false disciples are perhaps inevitable, under present conditions, but the question is whether promoters of such movements are not responsible, more or less directly, for the disastrous results that follow, and moreover whether all cases of unhealthy excitement, of hypnotic suggestion, or of animal magnetism, are not attended by such undesirable consequences that they should for this reason be strenuously avoided.

But even granting the existence of this danger, it may be affirmed that it must necessarily be an advantage to morality that a moral ideal should be presented, however imperfectly, or however transient the impression produced. Perhaps we are not correct in designating a religious movement a revival at all unless the moral ideal is presented. Even though an untutored preacher may dilate upon the horrible condition of "the damned," and seek to frighten timid souls into a life of virtue, yet in so far as he does make it clear that the higher moral life is to be preferred to the lower, for its own sake; and in so far as he aims at convincing his hearers that the higher moral character and conduct are more *worthy* as well as more *safe*, it may be said that a moral ideal is therefore presented. And although the effect may be fleeting, and the vision may quickly fade, yet it is surely worth while that any man should come within sight of an ideal, if only for the briefest possible moment of his life. On moral grounds, one could devoutly wish that *fear*, as such, did not enter into the motive forces of religion at all; yet it must be admitted that suffering, or the dread of it, plays an important part as a deterrent throughout the whole of animal life in a state of nature, and perhaps it cannot be entirely excluded from the life of men in whom the animal nature has not been entirely subdued.

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We must, however, look into the subject a little more closely. The question arises, to what extent revivals occur in conformity with those rhythmic movements that characterize all human feeling and conduct, and which have their analogy in the swing of the pendulum, or more vividly in the motion of the sea-wave. Is there a necessary pulsation in morality as there is in all things that are in motion, in which we have action and reaction, movement and counter-movement? We must acknowledge that this tendency exists, but the point we wish to settle is how far this is a normal condition of moral progress, or, on the other hand, whether there should not be a steady onward march, generally continuous, of ethical development. This question is necessarily bound up with another, which is perhaps more fundamental. How far is the progress of society determined by the personality of its great leaders? In the natural world we observe the development of the race along a line that is fairly continuous, a spiral line it may be, but at any rate a line, which produces the finest specimens as the last in the order of progress, after the evolution of the species has become approximately complete. In the religious world it would appear, *prima facie,* as if the most highly-developed person stands at the initiation of the movement, which derives its impetus and inspiration from the personal character and enthusiasm of its founder. The movement is thus largely brought about by the instrumentality of the person most prominently associated with it, and in no sense can the higher type of personality as manifested in the leader be regarded as the resultant of the forces and tendencies at work at the time. In the religion of the ancient Hebrews none is greater than the distinguished legislator and prophet, Moses. Mohammedanism is largely the product of the person Mohammed. In the Lutheran Reformation we find no more prominent personality than that of Luther; and in Methodism no more striking or brilliant figure than John Wesley. In Christianity, if we may cite this as an instance, there is no person so transcendent as Jesus Christ; indeed it is often asserted that Christ is Christianity. In no sense can it be said that either person is the product of the movement to which his name is given, unless the demand or

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opportunity itself may be considered as constituting a cause in producing the person in question. The point of interest for ethical students at the present time, when so much attention is given to the subject of personality, is the extent to which moral movements are dependent upon the personal influence of some prominent individual for their vitality, and how far this is a normal condition of moral progress. In other words, we require to know if moral progress should be continuous, or if it should be an advance, leader by leader; and that, as "every seventh wave" is said to indicate the heighth of the tide, so the advance of the tide of morality should be determined by the points of advance gained by its successive leaders.

Let us return for a moment to the rhythmic movement. It should be noted that there never has been a great revival of religion without a preceding period of unusual stagnation of thought and deadness of feeling, with the loss of the sense of moral responsibility. It is a subject of common observation that the world was never in so thoroughly bankrupt a condition in art, philosophy, and literature, but more especially in morals, as at the time immediately preceding the dawn of Christianity. In more recent days, it has been remarked that the moral and social conditions of our own country were never worse than they were towards the end of the eighteenth century. It might be well to ask those who sigh for a return of the days of Whitfield and Wesley, if they are prepared to see their country reach so low an ebb in morals as those prevailing at that time, as a pre-condition of such a manifestation of revivalistic power.

It may be urged that no such decadence in morals was witnessed prior to the recent Welsh revival, but, on the other hand, that there was to some extent a state of preparedness for the movement. Those who are familiar with the mining areas of South Wales, where the revival was most in evidence, will know that there are two distinct elements in the social and religious life of that district. There is on the one hand the old-world religious element, as preserved in the Welsh Chapels, where the Puritanical spirit of worship has been maintained throughout. On the other hand, there is the cosmopolitan ele-

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ment, which is reinforced by the influx of persons that are attracted by the mining, steel making, and shipping industries, from all parts of the kingdom, and even of the world. It is not too much to say that this element has been a godless, irreligious, and to a certain extent, a recklessly immoral set. They were morally depraved enough and quite sufficiently numerous to need a special revival of some sort to bring them to a condition of moral responsiveness. This case is really no exception to, but a confirmation of, the rule that we are here examining.

From the consideration of these facts it would appear to be desirable that moral reformers should seek to avoid extremes on both sides. We should not wish for a "superfluity of naughtiness" as a preliminary to a mighty explosion of religious force, nor on the other hand should we crave for such a manifestation as would prematurely bring men to a supposed decision, and create an unhealthy or feverish excitement. The progress should be as steady and continuous as possible, for the reason that it will be the less likely to lead to dangerous and wasteful extremes, and more truly productive of satisfactory and lasting moral results. In support of this contention it will be argued that the best method of counteracting or preventing the bad effects of the tension of moral and psychical stimulation is to see that no undue pressure be brought to bear upon the will, and that all cases of moral development and decision be left to mature themselves in the ordinary course, and by means of systematic instruction and regular methods. By such means alone are the best and highest results attainable.

It does not follow therefore that revivals are useless. There may be times when the deadness to moral claims may come, in spite of all that earnest-minded people can do to prevent it, and possibly a revival may meet the need as nothing else can do. Nevertheless from whatever point of view we may regard the matter, it is preferable to promote continuous moral advance than to be subject to pronounced waves of emotion or explosive effects in any considerable degree.

The deeper question still remains, as to the influence of an outstanding personality. This we cannot discuss at length, but we are compelled in the light of modern investigation to

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accept the fact of the marvellous and even mysterious powers vested in a truly strong personality. Such a personality, when devoted to the highest moral ideals, exercises a unique and distinctively individual influence, that impresses in the highest degree the spirit and the action of other persons. And not only are these moral influences at work, but there are signs of a certain magnetic power or hypnotic suggestion which, however explained, cannot well be denied. Now that such a personality should be associated with a moral movement, to say nothing of the Divine power behind all morally elevating influences, is sufficient to account for waves and outbursts of psychic and moral energy, at the favorable moment.

That such individuals do not fall into line with the ordinary course of development, and are not the products of moral evolution in the ordinary sense, is only to affirm the uniqueness of the individual person. In the world of nature below man, there are those variations that prove to be of immense advantage to the race, and which establish the superiority of the type that survives. May not variations therefore of personal power and efficiency exist and become accentuated in the world of morals and religion, and may not those distinctive features outweigh the common and tribal and hereditary characteristics? On whatever grounds the variations of type may be explained, the fact remains that some individuals possess peculiar psychic and moral powers, and that their influence is considerable over their fellowmen; and moreover, that where their influence is distinctly of moral value, it is not by any means improbable that they should be instrumental in bringing about a revival in whatever sphere they may happen to move and work. Such persons are associated with waves of spiritual influence, and in large measure they produce them, especially in those conditions in which the minds of the people as a whole are made receptive by a preparatory course of study, meditation, and devotional exercise; nor would we say that such influence is not of the highest moral significance and efficacy.

Possibly this personal equation may account, far more than we have hitherto realized, for the fluctuations in religious and ethical movements; and who shall say that the individual per-

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son is not, after all, the most important determinant in all the tendencies and forces that are at work in human life, and in this way becomes the highest category for morals as it is for metaphysics and philosophy in general.

J. G. James.

Yeovil, England.

SOME THOUGHTS UNDERLYING GEORGE MEREDITH'S POEMS.

Laggard fame, having overtaken Meredith the novelist, may be expected in time to come up with Meredith the poet; the critics, when they have estimated *The Egotist,* will consider *The Empty Purse.* It is true that Mr. George Trevelyan and Mr. James Moffat are now directing attention to the poetical works. But it is only quite recently that such guides have been available, and meanwhile the majority of admirers of George Meredith's poems have stumbled on them tardily, by way of the novels, and been surprised to find that they contained the more explicit statement of their author's meaning.

Forty years ago, in a memorable letter to *The Spectator,* Swinburne replied to that paper's adverse criticism of *Modern Love* with the assertion,—"A more perfect piece of writing no man alive has ever turned out than the sonnet beginning,—'We saw the swallows gathering in the sky.'" In 1862, when Tennyson and Browning were at the height of their fame, this was a bold challenge, but the poem justifies the championship. It is composed of fifty stanzas of sixteen lines each, the whole forming a complete design, and telling the tale of two bound in an unhappy marriage. The story, in some respects is difficult to follow, connectives are missing, and it is not always easy to discriminate between the speakers. Yet from the outset two things are clear to the reader. First, that Meredith conceives of tragedy as something subtle and diffused, not discoverable in violence of action or expression, the suicide at the close of the poem being emotionally insignificant in comparison with changes that have taken place beneath a controlled and

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conventional exterior; second, that we are confronted with a writer whose generalizations are as vivid and pictorial as his instances. The humblest writer in attempting to reveal his convictions to other minds, realizes that in proportion as he penetrates caverns and recesses of thought he must set torches of metaphor to light the obscurity of unaccustomed paths. With Meredith the pathway is aflame; his metaphor is so vivid, so constant, as to seem the thought itself. In stanzas one to four of "Modern Love" the poet relates the experiences of the husband and wife; their awakening to consciousness of alienation succeeded by action and reaction of feeling, the man's exhausted vengefulness giving way to lethargy that "apes the magnanimity of love." In the fourth stanza the experience is universalized and Meredith speaks directly:—

"All other joys of life he strove to warm,
And magnify, and catch them to his lip:
But they had suffered shipwreck with the ship,
And gazed upon him sallow from the storm.
Or if delusion came, 'twas but to show
The coming minute mock the one that went.
Cold as a mountain in its star pitched tent
Stood high Philosophy, less friend than foe:
Whom self-caged Passion, from its prison bars,
Is always watching with a wondering hate.
Not till the fire is dying in the grate,
Look we for any kinship with the stars.
Oh, wisdom never comes when it is gold,
And the great price we pay for it full worth—
We have it only when we are half earth.
Little avails that coinage to the old."

So definite and exact is the rendering of moods and experience in the forty-six remaining "sonnets" that, at their close, the reader finds phrase after phrase etched as with acid on the plate of memory. Throughout, the poem is distinguished by greatness of metaphor, sustained and exalted till in the final quatrain perhaps its highest significance is reached:—

"In tragic hints here see what evermore
Moves dark as yonder midnight ocean's force,
Thundering like ramping hosts of warrior horse,
To throw that faint thin line upon the shore."

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A careful consideration of the criticism Mr. Swinburne challenged leads inevitably to the conclusion that it was in fact not the style but the subject of "Modern Love" to which the reviewers took exception. And this attitude Meredith appears to have foreseen when he prefaced the first edition of the poem with the words,

> "This is not meat
> For little people or for fools."

He was aware that both the classes he somewhat ungraciously indicated would find cause for complaint, the narrow-minded scenting danger in the ground work of the story, the unintelligent in whom "the senses still usurp the station of their issue mind," misapprehending the whole matter. Here, as elsewhere, Meredith treats of the elemental passions, but he is concerned with their complex expressions, their subtler issues, selecting emotional situations at the only point at which they are capable of intellectual consideration, where,

> "Change is on the wing to bud
> Rose in brain from rose in blood."

With "Poems and Lyrics of the Joy of Earth," published in 1883, we pass at once to the Nature Poetry which we have been told is, with "Modern Love," Meredith's peculiar contribution to literature. The term, in connection with Meredith, is meaningless. His ideal of the conditions of effective thought is best expressed in his own words:—

> "Not solitarily in fields we find
> Earth's secret open, though one page is there:
> Her plainest such as children spell and share
> With bird and beast, raised letters for the blind.
> Not where the troubled passions toss the mind,
> In turbid cities can the key be bare.
> It hangs for those who hither thither fare,
> Close interthreading nature with our kind."

On a merely superficial reading this would appear a sufficient warning against such classification of Meredith's work, and to those who in any degree have penetrated his teaching there must be something ludicrous in the idea of division in that which,

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from first to last, is a revelation of the unity between earth and man,—"her chief expression, her great word of life." Before this volume appeared "The Egoist" and "The Tragic Comedians" had been written and Meredith had mercilessly analysed much that is commonly termed love and showed it merely to be projection of self at a new angle, a seeking of the first person in the second. It was therefore unlikely that when he came to speak of feeling for nature he would, in himself or others, confuse an obscure transcendentalism with the love born of fearless and intimate knowledge. The song of the lark ascending shall indeed penetrate,—

> "To her beyond the handmaid ear
> Who sits beside our inner springs"

but the promise is to him whose outward ear is surrendered to the sweetness

> "And you shall hear the herb and tree,
> The better heart of men shall see
> Shall feel celestially, as long
> As you crave nothing but the song."

and that is the keynote of this volume of 1883, which contains "Earth and Man" and "The Woods of Westermain."

A recent number of *The Hibbert Journal* contained an article entitled "Mr. Meredith on Religion," in which after discussing Meredith's utterances in respect of Nature, Death and Prayer, Mr. Moffat concludes thus an estimate of his attitude towards the question of personal immortality. "Here he is putting his readers off with a mist of colored, gleaming words; for beyond the bar which he summons the soul thus cheerily to cross, it is doubtful if any Pilot is to be met face to face, and more than doubtful if any haven lies for what men learn upon these shores of time and space to prize above all price." This surely, is the strangest misconception. It may indeed be true, as Mr. Moffat suggests earlier, that by a kind of negative emphasis arising from his horror of individualism, Meredith at times is betrayed into an undue disparagement of the human personality. With a defence of his position we are not here concerned, but what that position is he has made abundantly

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clear. We are, he urges, to "read Earth" to learn the lesson of the woodland where,—

"The pine tree drops its dead;
They are quiet as under the sea.
Overhead, overhead
Rushes life in a race,
As the clouds the clouds chase;
And we go,
And we drop like the fruits of a tree,
Even we
Even so."

The interdependence of life and death he tells us, is manifest. No veil is over the face of the mother, a film in on the eyes of the child, and when the senses cease to cloud his intellect man will discern that the antithesis of natural and spiritual has been of his own making. The law of the transience of human individuality was set forth in "The Spirit of Earth in Autumn," published in 1862, and it lies at the very root of the "Poems and Lyrics" of 1883. In view of Meredith's subsequent publications it is difficult to imagine how Mr. Moffat's doubt, if genuine doubt it be, can have arisen, but, as Meredith is not a person to give meaningless titles, he would have done well to inquire why this collection is "Poems and Lyrics of the *Joy* of Earth?" The volume opens with a description of the magic forest of Westermain. Its entrance is scored with the feet of those who fly from the experience of life, but the traveller who penetrates to its core finds that his intellect is strengthened till he is able to face fear, and, tracking terror to its lair, he finds that the monster of his panic was but a lurid projection of his mind. The Allegory of "Westermain" is followed by these verses,—

"Last night returning from my twilight walk
I met the gray mist Death, whose eyeless brow
Was bent on me, and from his hand of chalk
He reached me flowers as from a withered bough:
O Death, what bitter nosegays givest thou!

Death said, I gather, and pursued his way—
Another stood by me, a shape in stone,
Sword-hacked and iron-stained, with breasts of clay,
And metal veins that sometimes fiery shone:
O Life, how naked and how hard when known!

Life said, As thou hast carved me, such am I.
Then memory like the nightjar on the pine,
And sightless hope, a woodlark in night sky,
Joined notes of Death and Life till night's decline:
Of Death, of Life those inwound notes are mine."

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It is upon this granite basis of hard-won experience, this abiding consciousness of the "inwound" realities of death and life that Meredith's optimism is reared. He has refused to retain anything that moth and rust can corrupt, but in discarding Hope he has disburdened himself of Fear. His Daughter of Hades has but one day on earth but she spends it in joy and not in complaining and Melampus, moving in love and humility amid the life of the woods sees beyond strife the issue of strife, "beholds in fulfillment the unfulfilled." It is through the fearless questionings embodied in "Westermain" and "Earth and Man" that the conclusion given in the last three lines of "My Theme" the sonnet at the end of the volume, has been gained,—

> "I say that this love of earth reveals
> A soul beside our own to quicken, quell,
> Irradiate, and through ruinous floods uplift."

"Ruinous floods" is one of the phrases that might have put Mr. Moffat on his guard, but he leads up to the closing words we have quoted from his article by remarking that if Meredith's attitude towards the belief in, and the desire for personal immortality, be of the nature he has seemed to suggest, "the general heart will be up in protest." It is difficult to regard with gravity a statement in which the inherent order of events is so completely neglected. This particular argument, if applied by their contemporaries to Galileo or Harvey or Darwin, would have been as apposite. In season and out of season, in poems of almost unmatched beauty like "The Hymn to Colour" and the "Thrush in February," in philosophical disquisitions like "A Faith on Trial," "Youth in Memory" and "The Ode to the Comic Spirit," Meredith has spent his life in assailing that which he fully realizes is regarded by his fellows as the stronghold of their faith. Against nothing less impregnable would such giant warfare have been sustained. In verse, at least, it is difficult to imagine a more direct and exhaustive treatment of the question Mr. Moffat has raised than that contained in "A Faith on Trial," a long poem in the volume entitled "A Reading of

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Earth," published in 1888. A position which more dramatically stated it may be possible to misunderstand is here set forth explicitly. From a room where death hangs over his wife, the poet on a brilliant May morning passes into the open air. The sight of beech leaves shimmering in the sun recalls his imagination to the land of his wife's birth—the days they spent together in Normandy. The sense of contrast between the security of the past and the terror of the present darkens the whole aspect of earth. Buds gleam silver against a background of yew, thrushes and blackbirds are singing, but to the ears of the mourner gladness is ribald. But this sentimental mood is short-lived, the writer of Westermain must walk to observe, not to project his own feelings or fancies. He recognizes that his nerves are prompting him to sin against knowledge, for in calmer days he found in Nature the face of a mother where he sees now "a visage of hags." Thinking thus of the present and the past he stands before a wild cherry in bloom. For years this tree has been the lovers' herald of spring, their image and symbol of immortality. It is radiant as ever and its mere beauty enlightens the darkness of the beholder, but today it seems to portend some revelation, and the poet pauses before it in anticipation of a fuller vision and a deeper insight. As he waits, a company of children carrying wreaths and a May-pole come round the corner of his garden. He willingly pays his toll and dismisses them with the recognition that this morning their minds are more attuned to the purposes of nature than his own. When they have gone, his attitude is altered from rebellion to passive acceptance of the blow Death is about to deal, and "patience, mortal of peace." The children's shouts continue to ring in his ears and he contrasts their merriment with his questioning. The mortal in himself has been shrinking from mortality, pleading with Earth for some sign of individual life after death and his pleading has proved "mere breath, breath on a buckler of steel." Legends and fictions are not avenues to her heart, the only road to that is the real, the only method of increasing insight is accepting facts. The senses must be disciplined to travel the highway of realities before heights of thought can be scaled. Man must for-

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sake his man-made fictions before he can accept such comfort as the truth can afford:—

> "Cry we for permanence fast;
> Permanence hangs by the grave;
> Sits on the grave green-grassed,
> On the roll of the heaved grave-mound."

Death and life are one, and man in his submission to a common destiny must learn to recognize his links with the past and the future. Earth, the life-giver, gathers each generation to her breast in order that the next may have being. Reason is man's ultimate guide but only when his fear of death is overcome and he is content to fall out of life quietly as the leaves and fir cones fall, will she issue out of confusion and take her due place. Earth's secrets can be read only by those who have secured control of the nerves that shrink from her processes. In man's infancy legends were serviceable, but the time has come for his theories to be rooted in fact. He is called on to realize the futility of his search for permanence in any object of the material world. In past ages he was instructed to cut the cables of lust, but he has remained bound to his flesh by cords of craving, and the longing for individual immortality is one of these cords. Now he is called upon to cut loose from the finer as well as the grosser strands of his desire and when he has seemed thus to cut himself adrift, for the first time he will find anchorage. For his beliefs will embrace and not contradict the facts. He

> "The battle the loss and the ache
> Will for pledge of vitality know."

Finally in considering Mr. Moffat's exposition it is impossible to escape from the conclusion that his imagery of the Pilot and the Bar, his talk of "the things men learn upon those shores of time and space to prize above all price" is singularly out of taste. To use a metaphor which has been accepted as an almost final expression of a definite faith, in connection with one who strives to dispel that faith, is scarcely less irreverent to the mysteries and sublimities of the creed that is called in question than it is alien to the matter in hand.

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In poetical quality "The Empty Purse" is not among the foremost of Meredith's creations, yet it is of importance as summing up and applying the ideas which have been suggested as underlying much of his earlier work. At the beginning of the poem, a youth reduced to the condition of the prodigal in the Bible story, is found seated on a wayside bank. The past, out of which the present predicament has arisen, is reviewed. A pampered babyhood with a title to docility based on the speed with which the child's screams ceased when his wants were supplied has been succeeded by a season of passion when, in virtue of his wealth, the world appeared as a feast outspread for his appetite. Any help he might have received from the laws of the multitude was denied to him, for in early days the suggestion "Not thou as commoner men" had been whispered in his ear. To Meredith an assumption of superiority to one's fellows appears the most pernicious of poisons, and much pains is spent in demonstrating to the prodigal that the homage which served to foster this belief was not paid to him but to his well-stored purse. In addressing the youth the poet paints his story in colors that are lurid, yet with a faithfulness to fact that he is forced to acknowledge. Having done this, he turns to reveal the truth of the present situation. This poverty, this nakedness, he says, is in reality no disaster, but rather the young man's golden opportunity and his first chance in life. The sole wealth earth has to offer lies in knowledge won from experience, and all this time his money has been keeping him a prisoner, holding him back from this birth-right.

> "But now from his cavernous hold,
> Free may thy soul be set,
> As a child of the Death and the Life, to learn,
> Refreshed by some bodily sweat,
> The meaning of either in turn,
> What issue may come of the two:—
> A morn beyond mornings, beyond all reach
> Of emotional arms at the stretch to unfold:
> A firmament passing our visible blue."

Thus far we recognize the familiar creed of the writer who everywhere destroys sentiment to reveal reality—the fundamental belief of the novelist who produced "The Egoist" and

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"The Story of Lady Camper and General Ople." A man must see himself divested of all false and adventitious aids and recognize exactly the nature of the raw material with which he works, before he can begin to weave the fabric of a life. In early days the shuttle may seem to cross and recross at a furious pace, but until a pattern has been chosen and the threads selected and controlled to some determined end there will be no issue upon the loom. The possibilities of self-deception are unlimited. Sir Willowby Patterne can swear eternal devotion while he is unable to commit himself to an exact hour for an appointment the next morning, and, in Meredith's view, of such unreality, such confusion between sentiment and emotion, every man may be guilty in his unregenerate youth. For Egotism is to Meredith what Original Sin was to our forefathers, an initial condition common to all and only to be outgrown by much prayer and fasting. It is his habit to correlate apparently separated issues under this head, and to focus attention on this root evil rather than the branch problems of our social life. In the main he chooses rather to communicate a principle than to demonstrate its special applications. But "The Empty Purse" contains more than a variation of his ancient theme of the necessity of self-knowledge and self-discipline. It is constructive and begins where the tales of the Egoist and General Ople are ended. With this prodigal, painful experience is to flower in thought and bear fruit in action, and the nature of the thought and the quality of the action are clearly indicated. But if the old instinct of competitive self-seeking be obliterated and the hope of heaven and fear of hell removed, what stimulus shall urge men to effort? We imagine an answer that is bloodless and vague; Meredith responds with a battle-cry:—

> *"Keep the young generations in hail*
> *And bequeath them no tumbled house."*

The power of preserving and perpetuating the medium of thought—the chalice of spirit—to Meredith this is eternal life, this is immortality in fact and in deed. His secret has been uttered, the riddle of conflict has been read, a meaning found in which the crooked becomes straight and rough places plain:—



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"There hast thou the sacred theme,
Therein the inveterate spur
Of the Innermost. See her one blink
In vision past eyeballs—Not thee
She cares for, but us. Follow her—
Follow her and thou wilt not sink.
With thy soul the life espouse:
This life of the visible, audible, ring
With thy love tight about and no death will be;
The name be an empty thing
And woe a forgotten old trick:
And battle will come as a challenge to drink:
As a warrior's wound each transient sting,
She leads to the uppermost link by link;
Exacts but vision, desires not vows.
Above us the singular number to see;
The plural warm round us; ourself in the thick,
A dot or a stop: that is our task;
Her lesson in figured arithmetic,
For the letters of Life behind its mask,
Her flower-like look under fearful brows."

But, and here lies the immediate point of the poem, this larger altruistic vision involves a complete readjustment of our present social and economic arrangements. These, as they exist, belong to a non-spiritual past, to the childhood of the race when might and not right prevailed. This youth who, before his birth, was condemned to disaster by parental stupidity is called on to testify against the mistake from which he has suffered. But the error is deep-rooted and will not be easy to eradicate, for its displacement involves readjusted activities and new valuations. Hitherto the most idealistic of men have supposed that money should be one item at least, of their children's inheritance. As yet they fail to realize that wealth sufficient in degree to prevent youth from finding its true level, rubbing shoulder to shoulder with men "by necessity urged," is not only unjust to the world at large but is also destructive of the special interests they are attempting to protect:—

"Ask what crown
Comes of our tides of the blood at war,
For man to bequeath generations down!
And ask what thou wast when the Purse was brimmed:
What high-sounding ball for the Gods at play:
A conservative youth who the cream-bowl skimmed
Desiring affairs to be left as they are."

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Unless the power of enjoyment be sustained it is futile to hand on objects to be enjoyed, and the faculty of enjoyment is dependent on keenness and alertness of mind. Some kind of effort is essential to its continuance, and purposeful effort must be founded on a knowledge of the realities of existence. Money obtained without work cloaks these realities and prevents its possessor from "striking earth," that is, grounding his effort, and consequently his sense of relative values, on the actualities of nature and human life. But neither here, nor anywhere else, is Meredith an exponent of asceticism. He appeals in virtue of "feasting to come." He points out that increased brotherhood and community of feeling is incompatible with a desire for the kind of wealth which, because its supply is limited, must be competitively obtained. Men have confused pleasures and luxuries till they have come to think of them as identical. But the sources of pleasure are in fact common and inexhaustible and when these are preferred to luxuries and excitements money will assume its real, and comparatively elementary, significance:—

> "When our Earth we have seen and have linked
> With the home of the spirit to whom we unfold,
> Imprisoned humanity, open will throw
> Its fortress gates, and rivers of gold
> For the congregate friendliness flow."

That day will bring to mankind delights and revelations now unimagined and unimaginable. Meanwhile Meredith urges on the individual the need of a closer contact with the hearts of his fellows and a deeper intimacy with the processes of nature:—

> "Yield into harness thy best and thy worst;
> Away on the trot of thy servitude start,
> Through the rigors and joys and sustainments of air.
> I promise not more save that feasting will come
> To a mind and a body no longer inversed:
> The sense of large charity over the land,
> Earth's wheaten of wisdom dispensed in the rough,
> And a bell ringing thanks for a sustenance meal
> Through the active machine: lean fare,
> But it carries a sparkle!
>
> * * * * * * * *

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"Our season of drought is reminder rude:—
No later than yesternoon,
I looked on the horse of a cart,
By the wayside water trough.
How at every draught of his bride of thirst
His nostrils widened! The sight was good:
Food for us, food, such as first
Drew our thoughts to earth's lowly for food."

M. Sturge Henderson.

Kingham, Oxon., England.

MATTHEW ARNOLD ON THE "POWERS" OF LIFE.

If we wish to know what interests ethical philosophers most, I suppose we can find a clue in the badges and party-names they wear. Hedonism, "teleological energism," "ethical idealism," these, which are taken as marking parties, are the names of opinions about what is the largest good conceivable, or about the nature of good. Determinism, indeterminism—these are names of opinions about the sense in which we are free to pursue or reject the good at all. If we examine the contents of contemporary volumes on ethics, the emphasis of such names will not surprise us. The questions whether "ought" can be reduced to "is," whether "ought" is super-personal, how the "ought" of logic and æsthetics is related to that of ethics; again, "pleasure, duty and the good"—especially pleasure, eternal focus for the refining intellects of psychology, metaphysics and the theory of knowledge—take up a generous space in the books and, as we soon perceive, in the moralists' minds. Now the factitious problem of "free will," though it is admirably calculated to sharpen the analytic instrument of the human mind, and to afford a field for those temperamental impulses that play so great a part in philosophy, has for morals probably no importance whatever. And though this is not quite true of the nature of obligation and the good, yet it is almost true. As a student of these things I was not wholly taken aback when a well-kown English philosopher dropped the remark, "Of course ethics has nothing to say about what we are to do."

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Those who take interest in what we are to do would do well to look mainly, for the present, elsewhere. Let them turn for instance from Mill's Utilitarianism to his essay on Bentham. "We are much nearer" Mill says, "agreeing with Bentham in his principle than in the degree of importance which he attached to it. We think utility, or happiness, much too complex and indefinite an end to be sought except through the medium of various secondary ends, concerning which there may be, and often is, agreement among persons who differ in their ultimate standard. As mankind are much more nearly of one nature than of one opinion about their own nature, they are more easily brought to agree in their intermediate principles, *vera illa et media axiomata,* as Bacon says, than in their first principles."

It is worth while to recall attention to an idea of one of the most judicious English philosophers of the nineteenth century, a philosopher not of first principles—for he feels that in respect of settlement at least, the first shall be last—but of *axiomata media,* of middle principles. Matthew Arnold tells us that broadly speaking, human completeness requires the development of four powers. Granting at the outset vitality and progressiveness, granting, that is, what he calls expansion—there are required the power of conduct, the power of intellect and knowledge, the power of social life and manners, and the power of beauty. The Hebrew nation was pre-eminent in morals. The Hellenic race was pre-eminent in the other three powers. In modern times, Italy excels in the sense for beauty, Germany in intellect and knowledge, France in the instinct for social life and manners. But "when we talk of man's advance toward his full humanity, we think of an advance, not along one line only, but along several"—along all these four.

It has been said that Arnold was no analyst. He was, I think, a born analyst of a peculiar sort. He never pushed his analysis to the atom, never to the bitter or insipid end, never where science alone could follow him, never beyond what the naked eye could see. The philosopher of middle principles, the seer of the naked eye, he does here the admirable service that he is fitted to do. He gives us the sublimation of a rule of

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thumb, a distinction that can be verified without apparatus, a rough but available classification. In the study of men, societies, sentiments and philosophies it forwards us. Here I wish only to ask, in Arnold's own spirit (that is, without attempting an irrelevant psychological nicety of analysis), What does it involve? and Is it complete?

It involves, in one power, more than Arnold or his northern race have clearly felt. It involves the independence of the power of beauty. Northern philosophy has usually made beauty exist for the sake of something else. It is a training for something else, or a secret vision of something else, it is almost always something else in disguise. In his scheme, as we see, Arnold gives a place to beauty in fee simple, but when in his essay on Wordsworth he comes to tell us the function of poetry, he says it is to criticise life, that is, if I understand him, to show us the things of life in such lights that we see their true values. To give us insight into the values that pertain to life; that is a moral function. Poetry can do this, but it can do something else. Poetry for beauty he disparages. And when he comes to his essay on poetry he ascribes the same function to all literature. But the experience of beauty is a form of well-being, of the good, however that may be defined. It is an end in itself, though it can harmonize with other ends.

And now, are there any omissions? We may ask where to put the practical wisdom or shrewdness of daily life; but probably this, so far as it can be taught or consciously developed, can be accommodated in the department of intellect and knowledge. There is, however, a power for which it is not easy to find a place under any of the four. I mean the human affections. For by the power of social intercourse and manners Arnold means tact and grace, urbanity and amenity, not the elemental passions of society. He means the trait which is his favorite, though he would not put it first, that ἐπιείκεια, that reasonableness with sweetness to which he so often recurs. Thus in the four powers we have conscience, taste, and mind represented—taste both in beauty and in social life—but heart not fully. In the essay on Wordsworth he regards it as the merit of Wordsworth's poetry to make us feel

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the value, the happiness, that lies in the affections as well as in the care for nature; but in general it may be said that the affections did not sufficiently figure in his scheme, did not sufficiently color, for instance, his idea of God. Accordingly they find no sufficient place in his plan of human completeness.

And then, religion. Arnold places it of course with conduct; since religion is, to him, "morality touched with emotion" —the moral sense heightened and aglow with the emotions proper to it —with the feeling, that is, of its obedience and affinity to the power in the world that makes for righteousness. One does not like to tamper casually with anything reasoned in so large and sane a spirit as Arnold's account of these things. But it may be said, with some diffidence, that there appears an element in religion that sometimes takes forms independent of the feeling of conscience supported by an exterior power. The creature, as we have all learned to say, lives by "reacting upon" his environment. When he is on all fours he sees little but the environment to which he must immediately respond. But, to speak both literally and in a metaphor, when he stands erect he can more readily look before and after. He can see, or the developing hemispheres of the brain enable him to imagine, stretches of environment destined, it may be, to affect him in the future, filled to his imagination with vague portent, but to which he does not know how to make present response. This leaves him in some degree of that disturbing uncertainty that seizes us when we feel environing forces but do not know what "reaction" to make. The imagination must solve the problem it has created. It must enable him to represent the potentialities of which for the first time he has become aware, in such a form that he can at once react appropriately to them and not be left wholly at a loss. If we never had time to think, religion would not arise. If we never had time to look about us, to grow conscious of our weakness in the presence of complex circumstance and doubtful futures, we should never want to know the character, the *spirit* of those forces and futures, that we might propitiate or trust or rejoice in them. Religion seems not primarily a need of the conscience, but a spiritual need—a need of our own literal spirit, which must have support

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in its hours of liberated consciousness. It seems one of the forms of the demand for knowledge, that we may adjust ourselves to our life. No doubt, the spirit of things, once represented, may address itself to our conscience and conscience may fitly lean upon it. But even in the highest religion there appears something beyond the moral, though partly fused with that—a reverent companionship with the spirit of the world.

Arnold seems thus to have omitted from his inventory the power of the affections and the distinctive power of religion. He has made another, a more unrelieved omission. It is the grand omission characteristic of his class; of men of intellect and men of soul, who feel the spell of their studies and live in the brain. It is also the grand omission characteristic of mature age. It is an omission that tends to be characteristic of civilization, on which Arnold's eye is fixed. He leaves out the power of bodily life and the senses. It never occurs to him to include that power. That power is only an instrument, a means of making the other powers possible. In "Culture and Anarchy" we find him quoting the Epistle to Timothy, the common sense of Franklin, and the pagan philosophy of Epictetus to the same effect, that bodily exercise and pleasure have no other value than to keep us in health. "The moment we disjoin them," he says, "from the idea of a perfect spiritual condition and pursue them for their own sake . . . our worship of them becomes mere worship of machinery." Yet this is all a relic of the ascetic contempt for the flesh, the perverted doctrine of purification. The refinement of the senses does not consist solely in their repression or in their subordination to the mind. They have their own law of refinement. The delight in the body's force and the senses' freshness, physical *Lebensherrlichkeit,* is a form of well-being, of the good, however that may be defined. It is an end-in-itself, though it can harmonize with other ends.

We seem now to have reviewed all the large powers that go to the making of human faculty in its civilized completeness. Let us enumerate them. The power of conduct, the power of bodily life and the senses, the power of the affections, the power of religion, the power of intellect and knowledge, the power of social life and manners, the power of beauty. We have here

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at once an aid toward placing the partial ideals of authors and spiritual movements, and toward combining the fragments they offer in a whole. Let me take but a single instance. We could ill spare Carlyle from moral literature, but in all these powers but one he is found wanting. His prodigious gift for painting life and imparting impulse cannot hide the poverty of his ideal world; the fact that it is the power of conduct, some portion of the powers of religion, beauty, and affection, and these only, that his work sufficiently acknowledges. The deficiency once seen, he will not let us forget it; he not only fails to acknowledge the rest, he is too ready to disparage them. But it is not enough to find in any teacher how far these powers are represented or discerned. To find the order of their precedence in the author's interest or ideal, and in the light of life and many ideals to find the just order of their precedence, these are some of the tasks for which we have here a rough but ready and trusty material supplied. I have detailed them in the order of what seems their social importance.

This brings me to a remark on the construction of the scheme. Rightly looked upon, the power of conduct includes all. Ethics really has to answer the question, How to live. What we call morals (and this name might best be substituted for that of the first power)—morals or the more elementary power of conscience, has taken to itself the title that belongs in strictness to the whole, because it was the first thing needful. It was better to smite that string even if the rest were left silent. But in a large view the idea of right compasses the whole life; nothing escapes it. For in the end the right identifies itself with the best. Arnold himself feels this is the conclusion of "Literature and Dogma," where he tells us that eventually the divine will appear as the power that makes, not only for righteousness, but for the fulfillment of the whole law of our being, and to which not only a sin against conscience, but a sin against good taste is an offence.

Such a way of considering life is simple; and not therefore shallow or unsound. Indeed, I cannot lay the subject down without a return of admiration for Arnold's desire to point out what all may see, to see, for his own part, eye to

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eye with his fellow-minds. "This," he says, "is the *social idea.* The men of culture are the true apostles of equality. The great men of culture are those who have had a passion for diffusing, for making prevail, for carrying from one end of society to the other, the best knowledge, the best ideas of their time; who have labored to divest knowledge of all that was harsh, uncouth, difficult, abstract, professional, exclusive; to humanize it, to make it efficient outside the clique of the cultivated and learned, yet still remaining the best knowledge and thought of the time." The abstract, the difficult, let us add, science must enter upon; but to labor as we can to divest knowledge of its difficulty, to make it a simpler and thereby a clearer knowledge, is an effort conceived in the spirit of scienc itself.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY. DICKINSON S. MILLER.

A METHOD OF DEALING WITH THE LABOR PROBLEM.

The old way of dealing with distress arising out of imperfect social conditions was by the indiscriminate and unorganized distribution of doles, a method perhaps justified in certain social stages. Of new ways, originating from new conditions of life and largely from a more sensitive conscience, there seems to be so many that it is difficult even to enumerate them. The latest development, and it is a very surprising one, is chiefly inspired by commercial considerations and aims to do the utmost for the employé because, so the theory runs, the more the welfare of the worker is studied, the more will the establishment in which he is employed thrive. However, the widely recognized methods of dealing with the social problem are of various kinds and are due to various motives. There is the method of organized charity, as illustrated by the London Charity Organization Society, the *Auskunftsstelle* of the Berlin Ethical Society, and the Paris *Société des Visiteurs,* all aiming not so much to alleviate as to remove distress and all anxious to develop rather than to lower self-respect, as can be seen even in the more or less intentionally ambiguous names of those bodies. A relatively higher and different kind of philanthropy is that of the "good" employer

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who provides light, fresh air and comfort in his factory and who goes to the length of building small model towns for his employés. Finally, if we omit those well-doers who endow and support institutions such as hospitals, libraries, and colleges, and if we leave aside those who attempt to remedy, more or less drastically, social evils and inequalities by legislation, we meet everywhere with coöperative organizations where the workers are determined to compass their own economic and moral salvation.

Professor Ernst Abbe's endeavors, in connection with the world-famed optical works in Jena, known as those of Karl Zeiss, of which he was the sole proprietor, belong to none of the above categories. Just because he was almost irresistibly inclined to be charitable, he intensely disliked all forms of charity, whether indiscriminate or organized, whether promoted by the State, by society, or by the individual. Nor was he a decided believer in "the future State" where everything would be ideally settled by the Democracy, though his sympathies with the Social Democrats of Germany were of an unmistakable character. Least of all would he have favored wide-reaching reforms in factories on the ground that the generous treatment of the workers was financially profitable.

Ernst Abbe's efforts demand attention, therefore, if only because of the new point of view from which he approached social reform. Not profit, not charity, not coöperation, not doctrinaire legislation, but justice, was his leading thought, and if we wish to penetrate into the inner meaning of the Karl Zeiss *Stiftung* we must carry that thought always with us. What the Regulations contain has the force of law and is independent of what the management may determine apart from the Regulations. Every employé, from highest to lowest, is party to a legal contract, and the final authority, outside the law, rests in a State official whose business, as regards the firm, is solely to see that the Regulations, which are of the most elaborate kind, are loyally adhered to. Furthermore, Abbe's main idea was that similar Regulations should be drawn up and enforced by the State, and that thus a sense and an act of justice should lie at the basis of all industrial relations.

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What is the Karl Zeiss *Stiftung* and who was Professor Ernst Abbe? Karl Zeiss came in 1846 to Jena and opened up a small workshop as a mechanician. After a time, stimulated by the needs of the University, he began to manufacture microscopes which, we are told, were no better and no worse than those manufactured by respectable firms However, Karl Zeiss, plain mechanician as he was, had a luminous idea which he was anxious and determined to see realized; it was nothing less than that microscopes should be constructed on scientific principles and not by rule of thumb, by chance experience. At first he was not successful in finding any one to translate his idea effectively into fact, but his persistency was rewarded at last by meeting with Abbe who was Professor of Theoretical Physics and Astronomy in Jena. Abbe accordingly investigated the problem of the microscope, as Fraunhofer before him had investigated the problem of the telescope, and made a series of brilliant scientific discoveries which resulted ultimately in a revolution in the conception and construction of the microscope. Abbe became partner in the firm in 1875, and under his stimulus the small workshop employing about twenty men became a factory, including here the glass works, employing about two thousand. Karl Zeiss died in 1888, and the firm consisted then of Abbe and the son of Zeiss, Dr. Roderich Zeiss. The year after, in 1889, Abbe made an arrangement with his partner and became sole proprietor. This was but a prelude to a very significant step which had been planned by him as early as 1886. Abbe was concerned that his death should not mean the death of the Regulations which he had carefully elaborated, and so he decided to turn the enterprise into an impersonal *Stiftung* becoming an employé in his own works. Instead of drawing an annual income of over a million marks, he, having deprived himself of his fortune, was prepared to accept 13,000 marks a year as one of the members of the Board of Management. This act by itself brings out vividly the profound ethical convictions which animated Abbe. For the last few years of his life, then,—he died all too early, on January 14th, of last year, at the age of sixty-five,—he was one of the Board of Managers under the *Stiftung*.

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That Abbe was a very remarkable man, indeed, will now be evident. Still, to understand the Regulations of which an account is to be given in this article, we must know more about their originator. The founder of the *Stiftung* was the son of a foreman in a spinning mill at Eisenach. In the Common School Ernst proved to be so exceptional a scholar that at the age of ten his teachers pressed the father to send him to a *Real-gymnasium.* Ernst went accordingly to the High School and at the age of seventeen entered the University of Jena where he studied for two years. A prize offered by the faculty for the solution of some physical problem was not only won by him, but brought high praise. With great difficulty Abbe managed to pay his way, and, at last, at the age of twenty-one, he took his doctorate—a *summa*—at Göttingen. At twenty-three he was warmly welcomed at Jena as a *Privat Docent,* with a small salary, and afterwards he occupied with distinction a professional chair and became the Director of the Observatory.

His being the son of a workingman explains probably Abbe's abhorrence of charity and his demand for justice in the industrial relations, as well as his sympathy with the Social Democrats and his dislike of the dogmas of the Churches. That fact, too, helps to make clear the keen insight he displayed in the chief grievances of the working classes, an insight which is possibly unsurpassed. Yet, as we shall see, Professor Abbe had also a deep respect for the advancement of learning and the development of what was best in the picturesquely situated little town of Jena where the works happened to be.

To come to the Regulations. Abbe considered that the individuality of employés should be held sacred—a point of view which, according to him, flatly contradicts the German practice of to-day. A man's politics, a man's religion, or a man's descent, must form no ground of acceptance or rejection, and absolute impartiality in these matters is insisted on in the Regulations. Seeing, too, that everybody ought to be free to serve his community and his country, provision is made that, irrespective of the color or shade of opinion, every employé who is elected as a local or national representative shall continue to re-

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ceive his salary or wages during the time of necessary absence from his works. Leave must also be granted on a reasonable cause being given (including military service and imprisonment up to six months); the working of overtime is optional; and, generally speaking, the freedom of the individual outside the factory is guaranteed. The employés, too, may elect committees, hold meetings, and their representatives must be heard by the Board of Management. In other words, a man no longer sells his opinions and his life with his labor power.

The hours of work at Karl Zeiss were reduced, after a period of trial, from nine to eight. The worker, therefore, has reasonable leisure in which to live a life apart from his profession, and he is not overfatigued through too many hours of strenuous effort. Overtime, as mentioned above, is optional; the ordinary holy days, about eleven in number, count as working days, and a right exists of a fortnight's holiday of which one week is paid by the firm.

The wage problem is dealt with in the following manner. Every worker receives a fixed weekly wage. Piece work is the rule in the factory, but is not compulsory; and a piece worker may earn more than the fixed wage, but cannot earn less. Should work be slack, the wages remain unaltered, though a certain fixed amount of unpaid overtime may be demanded when the slackness passes. Wages begin with sixteen marks for those who are new-comers and unskilled; the average wage of those who are over twenty-four years of age and who have been in the firm for three years, including the deferred annual wages, is at present thirty-four marks, which, considering the general provisions, is a far higher wage than is obtained in other optical works. A certain percentage above a certain fixed profit is distributed annually as deferred payment, not as a share in profits. This uncertain factor is, in a sense, contrary to the general spirit of the Regulations, and was only agreed to so as to allow for a fixed minimum wage. The average for some years was an addition of about nine per cent. to the fixed wages, though in 1902 there was no addition at all. In the past year—1905—it is understood, there was a large surplus. Another item is also of considerable interest. Professor Abbe

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did not believe that the disparity in incomes should be unlimited, and so the Regulations fix the maximum salary at ten times the average wage of the workers, and provision is also made that the total income of those who receive salaries should not exceed a certain proportion of the total annual wages. To secure impartiality, it is also declared that the members of the Board of Management can receive no annual or other addition to their salaries, except such as is due to inventions made by them.

What shall become of the aged or invalided worker? Professor Abbe held that a firm must in justice allow for depreciation in workers as for deprication in materials. Accordingly, a far-reaching pension scheme exists which embraces the worker, his wife, his children, and any other dependent. There is a minimum which may be claimed after five years' service when some accident or illness disables the worker. The maximum after five, ten and fifteen years, respectively, is 100, 120 and 140 marks, and the maximum received after thirty years' service and the attainment of sixty-five years of age, consists of seventy-five per cent. of the wages. Four-fifths of the invalid pensions may be allowed to the dependents of the deceased. Every precaution is taken that the spirit of the Regulations on this point should not be evaded; *e. g.,* the basis of the pension is the highest fixed wage received.

The problem of the unemployed, which is perhaps the most difficult one to solve of all modern industrial problems, is thus attacked. Professor Abbe felt that, on the one hand, everything possible should be done to discourage the unnecessary dismissal of men, and, on the other hand, that dismissal was unjust to the men since it implied that the worker had to suffer because no provision was made by a firm against slack times. Accordingly, no one who has been three years in the service of the *Stiftung* can be dismissed unless he receives a sum of money equal to a full six months' wages as compensation. That has produced the desired result—security of employment is almost absolute, and the temptation to take on or to dismiss men lightly is at a minimum. When, a short time ago, a number of wage-earners were dismissed, the firm paid them 30,000 marks as compensation.

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Needless to say, the Regulations are generous in the case of illness, the firm paying into the sick fund, which is managed by the workers, about as much as the total amount of the workers' contributions; and a sum equal to three-fourths of the wages is given as sick pay for six months. There is also a Savings Bank; a Bathing Establishment, which is made use of during working time, is on the premises; and scores of minor arrangements exist which cannot be referred to here for want of space.

So much as to the position of the employés under the Regulations. The business is by no means permitted to develop apart from certain moral considerations. Improvements which affect research or have a scientific value must not be patented; thorough and original work must be encouraged; and mere quantity of production and profit must not be the aim of the Board of Management. In other words, everything is done to moralize business conceptions, and nothing is done to encourage mass production irrespective of social usefulness.

The considerable profits of this flourishing and expanding establishment are distributed in accordance with the Regulations. Precisely as the idea of justice inspires the prescribed relations of the employés to the *Stiftung* and as the idea of the common good determines the class and the quality of the optical work to be undertaken, so the notion of justice presides over the distribution of a certain percentage of the profit. Wealth, according to Abbe, is a social product, and an establishment such as that of Karl Zeiss owes much to scientific research. In accordance with this the University of Jena receives, as a kind of repayment, a considerable share of the surplus, on the condition that the freedom of teaching and opinion is guaranteed. The salaries of professors have thus been raised; a hygienic, a mineralogical, and a physico-technical institute have been built; and a new University building has become possible through a contribution by the firm of 450,000 marks. In competent quarters it is even asserted that but for the generous assistance rendered by the optical works, the University of Jena, belonging as it does to an insignificant principality, would not have been able to maintain its position against the competition of the other German Universities. The University of Jena will not decay as long as the firm of Karl Zeiss is successful in its enterprises.

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The Regulations show similar concern for the town in which the works are situated. The new *Volkshaus,* or People's Institute, built at an expenditure of a million marks, is a public building to which it would be difficult to find an equal. It possesses splendid reading rooms which contain all the important European dailies and periodicals. Democratic, liberal and conservative papers and periodicals are to be found, and free thought is there the peer of orthodoxy. So, too, with the magnificent rooms and halls: they are let to all sections of the community, including the boycotted followers of Marx who previously could obtain no meeting-place in Jena. A public library, supported mainly by the firm, is housed in the Public Institute, and is among the best used ones in Germany. The Institute also has a technological museum and a technical school. The firm will soon build commodious baths for Jena. It is unnecessary to mention that Abbe has done many other things for the town which, mainly owing to his enterprise, has grown in fifteen years from 11,000 to 25,000 inhabitants.

Professor Ernst Abbe was a member and a most liberal supporter of the Jena Ethical Society. Though a declared freethinker and follower of Haeckel, though he renounced the Christian faith, and had committed the offence of placing the Socialists on an absolute equality with their fellows, men of all parties in Jena mourned his death, His ability, his sincerity, his strenuousness, his self-sacrifice, his humility, his broad sympathies and impartiality, impressed every one deeply, and his personal friends, several of whom the present writer had the pleasure of meeting in Jena, could scarcely convey the profound admiration which he roused in them. Abbe was a veritable saint of modern times—ethical and rationalistic to the core, honoring men's individuality and anxious to promote the public welfare.

Professor Abbe was a serious student of English affairs, and it seems, therefore, surprising that the coöperative spirit is almost wholly absent in the Karl Zeiss undertaking. After all, to serve out justice is but a loftier kind of charity and benevolent despotism. According to the coöperative ideal, the Regulations should have been elaborated coöperatively and the em-

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ployés should have had some distinct representation on the Board of Management. The most advanced ideal is surely that the workers should feel that they are a vital part of an undertaking and share the responsibilities of the management. The wage earners should not play as they do an almost receptive and passive rôle. In practice, however, certain important deductions have to be made which scarcely justify in full the inferior position of the workers at Karl Zeiss. Professor Abbe argued that the enterprise was of too scientific a character for the workers to be entrusted with a share in the management, and he believed besides that only special talent was equal to such a task. He feared that incompetence would destroy or make void the Regulations. Much may be said in defence of Abbe. It was true when the Regulations were drawn up, and it seems true to-day, that German workingmen are yet in the stage of political rather than of economic action. Abbe had occasion to reproach the Workmen's Committee that they never met unless the Management invited them to do so, and it is likely, under the circumstances, that more democratically conceived Regulations would not have persuaded the workers to take an enthusiastic interest in the Management. Nevertheless, if manufacturers in the United States and in Great Britain should think of modelling their factories on the Abbe Regulations, they ought certainly to allow for a closer identification of the workmen with the enterprise.

One other serious criticism suggests itself. While the motive inspiring the pension scheme is just and the provisions are generous, yet the certainty of the pension depends on the firm being successful in its operations. One would have thought that in so serious a matter the element of chance would have been reduced to its lowest limit by the firm insuring its employés. But this raises the most significant issue, viz.: that the whole of the provisions of the Regulations depend on whether the firm flourishes or not, so that only under some State guarantee could Professor Abbe's method of grappling with industrial problems be satisfactory as a general solution. Nor can one help feeling that too straight a line is drawn between salaried and wage-earning workers.

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Dr. Czapski, who was Abbe's private secretary and now on the Board of Management, has in hand the publication of various writings of the founder of the *Stiftung,* and it is to be hoped that while the memory of this remarkable man is yet fresh, we may have a good biography which shall inspire others to seek for a solution of industrial problems along the lines of justice and humanity.*

GUSTAV SPILLER.

LONDON.

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* Readers who would make a study of the Karl Zeiss *Stiftung* may be interested to know the literature on the subject. A general account is to be found in "The Zeiss Works and the Karl Zeiss Stiftung in Jena," translated by S. F. Paul and F. J. Cheshire, published in London by Marshall, Brookes & Chalkeley, Ld. A very brief account in sixteen pages is "Abbe Karl Zeiss Stiftung in Jena," by Leopold Katscher, Leipsic, Felix Deitrich, 1905. An economic appreciation is that of Prof. Pierstorff of Jena "Ernst Abbe als Sozialpolitiker;" Jena, Gustav Fischer, 1905. A scientific appreciation is offered by Prof. Winckelmann of Jena, "Ernst Abbe"; Jena, Gustav Fischer, 1905. A personal appreciation is supplied by Friedrich Thieme, "Ernst Abbe, Ein Lebens u. Charakterbild"; Poesneck in Thür., Bruno Feigenspan, 1905 (contains portrait); and in the "Gedenkreden und Ansprachen gehalten bei der Trauerfeier für Ernst Abbe" published by the firm. The rules and regulations are contained in the *Statuten,* the *Pensions-Statut* and in the *Arbeitsvertrag.* Of Abbe's own writings we may mention "Ueber die Grundlagen der Lohnregelung in der optischen Werkstätte," "Ueber die Aufgaben des Arbeiter-Ausschusses," "Die volkswirtschaftliche Bedeutung der Verkürzung des industriellen Arbeitstages" (a Report), and "Welche soziale Forderungen soll die Freisinnige Volkspartei' in ihr Program aufnehmen?"

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BOOK REVIEWS.

LES AFFIRMATIONS DE LA CONSCIENCE MODERNE, par Gabriel Séailles. Paris: Armand Colin, 1905.

EDUCATION OU RÉVOLUTION, par Gabriel Séailles: Paris: Armand Colin.

M. Séailles has made it the business of his life to make the French democracy conscious of its own soul. As President of the "Union pour l'action morale" he has done more than any living Frenchman to inspire the work of social and political reform with moral earnestness and purpose. These volumes are the record of his attempt. They are the sermons of a Freethinker, yet warm from lips touched with something of the sacred fire. They are as little like the utterances of a university professor as can well be imagined. Yet their significance is that they were spoken by one of the most capable teachers of the Sorbonne.

We must take M. Séailles, at any rate for the present, on his own ground. Christianity is for him a system from which we have definitely emerged. It has ceased to influence modern life still more because of its moral inefficiency than because of its doctrinal bankruptcy. Indeed its dogmas have for him been evacuated of their living force principally because of their correspondence with and their symbolical expression of a morality that has become outworn. It is true that he devotes one of the essays in his volume on the affirmations of the modern conscience to an exposition of the conflict between Christian dogma and the modern scientific view of the world. But it is the moral rift between Christianity as he understands it and the modern conscience which weighs with him chiefly in his judgment of the former.

It must not be supposed, however, that M. Séailles is obtuse to the moral charm and attractiveness of Christianity. His indictment is determined and even passionate, but it aims at being scrupulously just and it succeeds in being occasionally even sympathetic. It is evident that he would willingly hold his hand if it were possible. It is a new note in the campaign of militant Freethought. He recognizes wholeheartedly the beauty of the preëminent Christian virtues, charity and humility. But he holds that they are deprived of the full measure of their efficacy by their connection with an absolute doctrine of Providence. That doctrine reduces them to the ineffectual expressions of an ideal optimism or the not too

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effectual alleviations of a practical pessimism. It is for this reason that he claims that there is a positive moral element in the mere negation of Christian ethics. The static order of things receives from Christian belief a kind of ultimate sanction. The dynamic order has been hardly recognized by it. In virtue of its theoretic idealism it is the necessary enemy of progress.

M. Séailles finds in the recognition of the dynamic conditions of life at once the basis and the sanction of morals. The secret of the individual life is the conflict of inner forces, the sense of a hierarchy of values among them, the ceaseless and instinctive quest of a harmony between them by the reduction of the lower to the service of the higher, the satisfying triumph of reason over instinct, of a distant over an immediate good. The reality of goodness, or rather of the good, is given in this essential nature of the inner life. And a similar experience recurs in our relation with the outer world. The demands of the reason and the heart are being constantly denied by the actual facts of life. Nature is red in tooth and claw, or is relentlessly indifferent to the weal of man. Its rage has to be patiently exorcised. Its force has to be wheedled into submission, its indifference coaxed into coöperation. By his instinct of reason man is continually extracting some kind of order out of nature's confusion. But what he has at any moment secured fails to satisfy him. The history of the past is to his mood of the present nothing but a record of bungling failures, of moral scandal. Yet there lies his undying hope, the certainty of his moral force, the guarantee of the continuance of his moral life. He rejects the past only because it is his surmounted self. He toils towards the future as towards the self that he would be. He lives only in the fuller order which he can create. Here is the sufficient evidence of his moral nature, the eternal sanction of his moral effort. And here, too, is the growing revelation of what morality is. It is not offered as an afterthought to life already in existence, but given in the very essence of life as the principle by which it is, as the energy through which it acts, as the good towards which it moves.

By this test M. Séailles examines the distinctive affirmations of the modern conscience, which he gathers together under the Revolutionary watchwords of liberty, equality, and fraternity. He considers these moral ideals as more adequate than the ascetic morality which he attributes to Christianity, because they correspond with a progressive conception of human history. But he is

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fully alive to the danger of their becoming in turn the bulwarks of a static view of society or worse still the instruments of its dissolution. They must not remain moral formulas, but must become moral forces. Liberty may too easily remain for the individual the mere right to do what he will, the removal of the last shackle upon the effectuation of momentary desire. But our very nature, rightly understood, is the sufficient protest against such a fatal tendency. It soon teaches us that such liberty becomes the most intolerable slavery. The truth is that freedom from external restraint is not moral liberty at all, but only, in the degree in which it can ever be attained, its condition, and even then only its negative condition. True liberty is not a mere outer condition, but a real inner acquisition. It is not the opportunity of doing what we please, but the power, patiently acquired by the use of that opportunity, of becoming and doing the highest that we can will. And this is the only kind of freedom which can justify and permanently establish a true social freedom in the human world outside ourside ourselves. To let ourselves go is the sure precursor of leaving things alone, and to leave things alone must result in the accentenuation of the war of natural forces from which it was the very object of freedom to deliver us.

In the same way equality may prove itself the dream of an absurd or even harmful idealism. Life has its differences of original gift and of acquired character. We cannot stereotype if we would what nature has stamped with the hall-mark of her variety. But none the less equality means something of a prerogative importance both in the outer condition and in the inner life. It means the cancelling in the interest of an even-handed justice of every artificial privilege which the mere inertia of society tends continually to create and establish. The jealous elimination of such privileges is the evidence of moral force in every society which it characterizes. The lazy or despairing submission to their existence or their continuance is the certain mark of moral decay. But equality is still more an inner virtue. It is the recognition under all natural varieties of the essential oneness of humanity, of a still deeper natural equality which binds us all together. It is the transmutation of the Christ virtue of humility, the immediate affirmation of that which is most deeply and broadly human in us, the deliverance from the pride of accidental differences, the deliberate entrance into the republic of the simple-hearted. It is the kind of equality which would express itself socially in the banishment of

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petty rivalries and absurd social ambitions, in the disappearance of silly pretensions, of insane luxury, of stupid prejudices, of the gross vulgarity which fosters caste distinction.

Similarly, fraternity may be the mere nerveless recognition of our common lot. But the fraternity of which M. Séailles speaks as specially characteristic of modern modes of feeling is more than this. It is more even than the sympathy which urges us to the alleviation of suffering, more than the untrustworthy altruism which deceives itself by the pretence that it has left egotism behind, by the belief that it can do so. It is the positive conversion of egotism into altruism through the increasing conviction that it is our own interests that are at stake in the fortunes of others, that their real loss is our loss, that what is really gain to them is gain to us. And it is thus the intelligence of what is really human in us all, the consistent and continuous effort to make it prevail. Fraternity has not begun to be so long as the fortunate accept it as inevitable that there will be whole classes of men condemned to a wretched and hopeless life, so long as the miserable regard the lot of the fortunate with a conviction which must always degenerate into hatred. It can only express itself in the steady will to reach the true human dignity and to help others to reach it. That dignity is violated by the wanton luxury of the rich, by the debasing misery of the poor. True fraternity depends upon the growing sense of what is worthy of man, upon the growing determination to make life correspond with that worthiness.

It will be seen that M. Séailles' answer to the question, what is morality, is briefly, "Live, and you will discover." The modern conscience has clearly affirmed, at least the conditions of life which will lead to this discovery. Liberty, equality, fraternity, are merely such conditions. They refuse to allow us to find the nature of the good in the dictates of mere individual or social interest. They urge us on through all individual and social interest towards a real and permanent human good for which we are always feeling, towards an end in which the individual and social interest may become one, in which we may touch the good that is so simply human that it is no longer yours or mine but essentially yours and mine. The goal towards which they impel us proves itself to be the true human goal in that it always recedes before our approach and always beckons us on. It is not something that we may reach, but something that we must follow. And the true satisfaction of man lies in following, not in attaining. The abso-

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lutes of life are not given in a prior knowledge which could only paralyze action. They are found in life itself, in action which is the passionate search for them. As M. Séailles puts it: "To know God, let us go forth to meet Him." It is but Pascal's conviction over again: "In that thou art seeking me, thou hast already found me."

Two great practical counsels recur with infinite variations in these two volumes. Avoid intolerance and avoid mere force. Intolerance is the fruitful mother of the viper brood which poisons life and devours it. It is a more unpardonable sin against humanity on the part of the Freethinker for whom truth is but relative and human, than on the part of the Christian for whom it is absolute and divine. And force is the mother of all hatred and strife. It invariably defeats its own purpose. Human history has reached the stage where the blind forces of occasional revolution must be replaced by the steady disciplined intelligent action of the reason and the heart.

The only criticism of M. Séailles in which one might be inclined to indulge is that he seems to ignore the fact that even in his own country, still more in Protestant countries, there are Christian teachers who are in entire sympathy with this view of the nature of morality and of its relation to life. They, too, conceive of morality as dynamic and not static. They too feel that the absolutes of life are attainments of the incessant and unending spiritual labor of humanity, not objects of its antecedent knowledge. A knowledge of them indeed they would claim, but it is a knowledge of the heart rather than of the mind, a knowledge, too, which has been inherited out of past living and must be transmuted through present living into the clearer knowledge of the future. And they would admit that all intellectual apprehension of these absolutes must be imperfect, human, symbolical. We apprehend them only for the purposes of action. For these teachers the static character of dogma has ceased to be. It too has entered upon its dynamic phase. What distinguishes such men as these from M. Séailles is that they still hope to recommend the main truths for which both of them are contending as a development of the Christianity of the past, while he thinks that the breach with that past is irrevocable, or, if not, then necessary. But whether they join hands or not, they are working towards a common end in a common spirit.

A. L. Lilley.

London.

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THE FREEDOM OF AUTHORITY. Essays in Apologetics. By J. MacBride Sterrett, D. D. The Head Professor of Philosophy in the George Washington University. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1905. Pp. vii, 319.

The author of these essays in apologetics is an impassioned pleader for religious conformity. Emerson's dictum "Whoso would be a man must be a non-conformist" inspires him with a feeling which he has no hesitancy in designating as *odium theologicum,* though he apologizes for it, as it "may sometimes seem to swamp the philosophic calm." He also apologizes for "the mixture of metaphor with the dialect of philosophy," and confesses that "the larger part of the book was written *aus einem Gusse,* in a heat, almost at a sitting." The rest consists of reprinted chapters from earlier books by the author on "Reason and Authority in Religion" and "Hegel's Philosophy of Religion," and articles in the *Andover Review,* the *New World,* and the *Philosophical Review.* In all parts of the volume one enjoys "the mixture of metaphor." It allows a clearer insight into the peculiar workings of the author's mind, and makes a deeper impression on a thoughtful reader, than the sections composed in "the dialect of philosophy."

Professor Sterrett's discussion of the ethics of creed-conformity and his criticism of Sabatier, Harnack, and Loisy deserve attention. Again and again he affirms, "Whoso would be a man must be a conformist." According to him, the man of good manners conforms to the prevailing views and common practices of his tribe. He believes in the catholic creeds, or at least repeats them; he goes to church and partakes of the Eucharist which is "the chief means for realizing the real presence of a bodily absent Lord;" and he behaves as respectable people do. It is not quite clear what a man should do whose tribe is made up of Unitarians, Quakers, Social Democrats, or Buddhists. Apparently the author would make an exception in his case and permit him to deny the creed of his fathers, to abandon the ancestral customs, to become "a veritable Ishmaelite" and heed the call of the Protestant Episcopal Church. A genuine conviction is always to be respected, and there is much to be said in favor of the author's main thesis. It is, therefore, with a certain regret one notes his plea for a disingenuous use of the creeds. "It remains true," he says, "that we can accept many traditional conceptions and dogmas only in a

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Pickwickian sense." He presumes to make the amazing assertion that "divine grace sweeps onward to convert even the devil himself and to drown out the inextinguishable fires of an everlasting hell, leaving at most the refining and transforming experience of a purgatory," in utter forgetfulness of the solemn anathema at the end of the Nicene creed, and of his own bitter denunciation of such private judgments. He confides to the reader that when he repeats a creed, he means by it: "I, John ——,do hereby, with my whole nineteen-century-long history and thought, yield unfeigned assent to the result of this history and thought, as embodied in the historical creed before me." To make a fourth or sixteenth century formula the result of the last nineteen centuries of history and thought is perhaps the least astonishing feat in this intellectual jugglery.

The reviewer once asked a friend of his, a noble man and a minister in the Episcopal Church, how he could repeatedly affirm, in the presence of men, that he believed that Jesus was born of a virgin, when in reality he believed that he was the son of Joseph and Mary. The answer was, "I mean by it that I believe Jesus to have led a remarkably pure life." Professor Sterrett would probably not go as far as that. His sincere admiration for the Nicene formula as "the liberator of the perplexed conscience and the doubting intellect of Christendom to-day" and "the one sacred hieroglyph to which a philosophy of history demands loyal assent from every rational Christian" no doubt prevents such a marked difference between public profession and private faith. But as he allows himself, and encourages others, to give an "unfeigned assent" to dogmas which he confesses that he "can only accept in a Pickwickian sense," there is no reason why he should not let his real thought go where it pleases, and assign any meaning he chooses to the words of the creed.

Professor Sterrett views with alarm the "de-religionizing of the Church" by the attempt to escape from orthodoxy into ethical Christianity, into the religious consciousness of the Christ, and into social ethics, or the philanthropic work of "institutional churches;" and he sounds a note of warning against the dangerous descent to "mere ethics," "secular morality," and "humanitarianism." There seems to be a certain incompatibility between "mere ethics" and the profession of faith in formulas that "can only be accepted in a Pickwickian sense."

Conformity has, of course, its place as well as independence.

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The individual is profoundly influenced by the prevailing views and common practices in his environment. Some part of the knowledge gained by the human race and some rules of expediency resulting from its long experience come to him through these channels. It is well that he should grow in knowledge and in character by observation, imitation, and obedience, by seeing what others have seen and by acting as others have acted. It is desirable that he should be inspired by the noblest sentiments, enlightened by the truest thoughts, and impelled to action by the finest examples society can set before him, and it is his privilege and duty to enter into the rich heritage of the past with reverence, docility, and gratitude. Because of this tremendous pressure of the social life upon the individual it is also of great importance that the collective creed, howsoever expressed, the prevalent public opinion, be sensitive to the advance of thought, and that social institutions reflect high ideals of equity and justice. The suggestion of Jesus that new wine be poured into new wineskins seems wiser than the favorite method in church and state of pouring new wine into the old skins, by which both are spoiled. On the other hand, there is no progress except by the reaction of strong personalities against the common views and practices, by their insistence upon seeing things with their own eyes, trusting in their own judgment, speaking with their own voice, and pursuing their heart's desire away from the beaten paths. These are the heroes of our race, the majestic figures that inspire our youth, the leaders men delight to follow. In the presence of one who stands on his own feet and lives out of his own life nobly, not willing to be conformed to the fashions of the world about him, but longing to be transformed into his own ideal, rising by his spiritual independence above the crowd of respectable conformists who repeat upon their bended knees the opinions of other men and other days, we instinctively feel, "This is a man." That is evidently what Emerson meant. That is why the Bible appeals to us so much more strongly than the creeds. The bulk of it was written by incurable non-conformists. The canonization of the radical is the tardy recognition by the conservative of the simple truth that, in nature's economy, there is room for a centrifugal force as well as for a centripetal force, for a tendency to vary the type as well as a tendency to preserve it.

In his criticism of Harnack and Sabatier, Professor Sterrett points out some real weaknesses in their position. It does not

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seem fair to define Christianity in such a manner as to leave out what has been most characteristic of this historic phenomenon during the many centuries of its existence. To ascribe absolute finality to the religious consciousness of Jesus and to make it an external standard seems impossible in view of the uncertainty as to the actual contents of this consciousness, when historical criticism is allowed to do its work. But it is neither dignified nor just to designate the earnest call of these thinkers to the Church to return to the faith of Jesus as a "crab-cry" and to denounce those who raise it as "flying in the face of our western form of civilization, and aiding and abetting the yellow peril of Orientalism." The author looks, with a curious embarrassment, upon "the anti-ecclesiastical religion of the Christ when on earth," and cannot conceal his contempt for those who would sacrifice the "decent clothing" of "historical Christianity" for a thing like that. The historical Jesus who lived and died among men has little interest to him. The creeds which he regards as "a sufficient statement of the Christian faith," as is well known, completely ignore the teachings of Jesus, his attitude on moral and religious questions, his relations to different classes of men, his character and spirit.

Professor Sterrett is in greater sympathy with Loisy than with the Protestant thinkers. For with all his radicalism, the Catholic scholar acknowledges the authority of the Church. He is in this essential point a conformist. Besides, Loisy does not deny that Jesus was raised from the dead, but only denies that this is demonstrable as an historical fact. And Loisy insists upon the importance of the cult and the indispensable character of the historic episcopate. As to the historic episcopate, Professor Sterrett believes it to be absolutely necessary to the Church's well-being, but not to its being; and in an appendix copied from an earlier book he denounces unsparingly the right wing of the high church party in the Protestant Episcopal Church. He belongs himself to the left wing of that party. He is angry with this little clique, whose harmless conceit only amuses other people, because its "noisy aggressiveness" prevents Christendom from coming together peaceably on the Lambeth platform (Scriptures, Apostles' and Nicene Creed, two Sacraments and no more, and the Historic Episcopate), and from inviting the nations of the earth to join a united Church.

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AN INTRODUCTORY STUDY OF ETHICS. By Warner Fite. Longmans, Green & Co. New York, London and Bombay, 1903. Pp. xi, 383.

In spite of the fact that the science of ethics has been one of the least progressive branches of knowledge, the writing of a satisfactory text book on the subject seems to have been extremely difficult. The very familiarity of the material seems to have induced a desire to impart a novelty and freshness extraneous to the subject itself. Instead of presenting the obvious facts of the moral life in their simplicity, writers have offered the conflicting philosophic interpretations of these facts. The battle has been waged so long that the real issues have been lost in smoke. What the beginning student needs is a direct analysis of the moral experience itself, not a discussion, however lucid, of what others have thought about it. As both Plato and Aristotle point out, there is a certain danger to the youthful mind in the study of ethics and this danger is increased by whatever tends to substitute conceptions for facts. The laboratory method is at least the ideal of every science. Nothing takes the place of a first-hand study of the material itself.

Professor Fite's book is an introduction to the subject, designed both for the college student and the mature man of general culture. As such, it presupposes a certain maturity and seriousness of mind which, the author admits, may not often be found in the average student. It might perhaps be called a moral philosophy rather than an introductory ethics, for its contents consist of an elaborate development of the philosophic implications of rival ethical theories, a development which is decidedly acute, though far from elementary. It is true that the philosophic body of the book is prefaced by two chapters on the scope and problems of ethics, in which we have a refreshingly simple statement of the author's own views, but having thus defined only too briefly the problems, he plunges at once into the discussion of hedonism and idealism as systems of morals, of society, and of philosophy. It is only after having presented the strength and weakness of these systems, that he offers his own as a compromise between the two. That the conclusion is cleverly worked out does not remove the impression that it would be much more effective on the student if it came as the result of a direct analysis of morality itself. The whole process of stirring up the rivals in order to pacify them at last seems a waste of good time from the educational point of view.

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But whatever be one's ideas on the question of the best method of teaching ethics, one cannot fail to admire the systematic and thorough way in which Professor Fite handles his problems. There is a largeness and simplicity in his conception of them, which, while it may mislead in some details, is very suggestive and clarifying. The main problem of practical life, as he sees it, is the conflict between the conservative and the progressive tendencies in human nature, between the tendency to let well enough alone and to enjoy the fruits of one's labors and the tendency to disturb existing conditions in the interest of a more satisfactory ideal, between habit and new adjustment. This conflict within the individual is only one illustration of a universal contrast between principles which appear in society and in the world at large, so that the adequate discussion of the moral problem leads us on into social and philosophic theories. In this larger field the contrast is perhaps best expressed in the antithesis of the mechanical and the purposeful, which are the principles respectively of hedonism and idealism. Accordingly we have discussions of both hedonism and idealism as social theories and as philosophies as well as comparisons of their moral estimates with the judgments of common sense. Nowhere else have these implications been worked out so clearly and concisely as they are here and the discussion forms the most valuable portion of the book. If one were to criticize, it might be suggested that the rival theories represent logical antitheses rather than actual historical systems, but, as the purpose is not primarily historical, this would hardly be a legitimate ground for criticism.

The author's conclusion is that both these attitudes toward life are justifiable, that there must be a place for contentment with achieved good as well as for aspiration after the ideal. "The hedonist proposes to ignore the ideal considerations and to conform strictly to the conditions. The idealist, on the other hand, urges us to ignore the conditions and to devote ourselves immediately to the pursuit of ideal ends. In reply to the hedonist we may claim that the mechanical conditions do not represent a fixed quantity or an impassable limit. The supposedly fixed conditions are themselves in a constant course of development. The mechanical world is being made constantly more serviceable for ideal ends. To the idealist, on the other hand, we may reply that the attainment of ideals is not a question merely of the earnestness and sincerity of our devotion. Admitting that all ideals are

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ultimately attainable, we have still to remember that they are only to be attained by proceeding in a certain definite manner from the standpoint of the present situation." The reasonable life is accordingly that in which a compromise is effected between our abstract ideals and the mechanical conditions of their realization. The result constitutes moral health, of which the rule is, "keep your ideals pure, and keep your feet constantly on firm ground," or, "press constantly forward toward the attainment of your highest ideals, but do not attempt a higher flight than you can permanently sustain." This contrast between ideals and reality is a permanent one. Our human life is essentially problematic. "We never reach a point either of complete realization of ideals or of complete conformity to conditions." Our duty is to effect the best possible adjustment of the two, which will consist in the greatest satisfaction of each.

Throughout this positive portion of his work the author's treatment reminds one strongly of Spencer's reconciliation of egoism and altruism, though the optimism of the latter is lacking and the problem is stated in somewhat different terms. But the essential difficulty is the same, the impossibility of reconciling two contrasting points of view without the assumption of a higher point of view from which both the others may be judged. Unless egoism and altruism or hedonism and idealism are to fight it out between them in cat and dog fashion there must be discovered some principle for a proper adjustment of their respective claims, which means that neither is ultimate. Such a principle the author suggests in the idea of moral health, yet if it is to be a true principle it must be more than a resultant of opposite tendencies in human nature, and if it is more than this it would seem to be necessarily some sort of an ideal and not a compromise between ideals and conditions. The author's difficulty perhaps arises from his failure to keep distinct the practical and the theoretical aspects of the problem. It is true enough that every action falls short of its ideal, but that is hardly enough to warrant the statement that the principle is itself a compromise. As a protest against impracticable idealism in actual life the author's discussion is valuable and suggestive, but, as a reconciliation of hedonism and idealism, it is not convincing.

NORMAN WILDE.

UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA.

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BETTING AND GAMBLING: A National Evil. Edited by B. Seebohm Rowntree. London: Macmillan & Co. L.; New York; The Macmillan Co., 1905. Pp. xii, 250.

There is probably no more useful work on the whole subject of Betting and Gambling than the present volume. One conclusion which it constantly enforces is that the gambling habit is, at the present time, as pervasive a feature of social life and as potent a source of social danger as the habit of intemperance to the evils of which the social reformer is much more widely awake. The comparison leads one to think of this book in connection with the volume on "The Temperance Problem and Social Reform" by Mr. Joseph Rowntree and Mr. Arthur Sherwell; and it must be said at once that, in wealth of statistical information and thoroughness of execution, it cannot stand comparison with that monumental work. But the comparison would be hardly fair, as the plan of this book excludes thoroughness, though it is many-sided, informative, and suggestive. It consists of nine essays by eight different hands on different aspects of its problem, and it contains several valuable appendices, a bibliography, and an index.

The first essay, on the "Ethics of Gambling," by Mr. J. A. Hobson, published in this JOURNAL, January, 1905, is of most interest to the philosophical student. Gambling is defined as "the determination of the ownership of property by appeal to chance;" and this appeal to chance is regarded as a "deliberate reversion" to the conduct and outlook of the savage:

"Gambling involves the denial of all system in the apportionment of property; it plunges the mind in a world of anarchy, where things come upon one and pass from one miraculously. It does not so manifestly sin against the canons of justice as do other bad modes of transfer—theft, fraud, sweating—for every one is said to have an equal chance; but it inflicts a graver damage on the intellect. Based as it is on an organized rejection of all reason as a factor, it removes its devotees into a positive atmosphere of miracles, and generates an emotional excitement that inhibits those checks which reason more or less contrives to place upon emotional extravagances. The essence of gambling consists in an abandonment of reason."

There is no doubt that Mr. Hobson goes to the root of the matter; and his analysis is worked out with great ability. But I am not sure that his view is comprehensive enough. It would cover the case of the "backer" of horses (who seems always to lose in the

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long run), but hardly of the bookmaker (who is pretty safe to win). Perhaps Mr. Hobson would refuse to call the latter a gambler—simply a business man with an anti-social trade, who knows that trade. But throughout a great deal of gambling, skill modifies chance. In whist or bridge, for example, the result of every rubber depends far more on luck than it does on "play;" and yet the regular player may count on his skill being rewarded. Is he not a gambler because he can be pretty sure of making an income out of his game? Take the young lady, mentioned in another essay, who could do with a small dress allowance because she "was such a good bridge player that she easily made £1000 a year." It would be strange to say that this young lady did not gamble, and equally unjust to charge her with "an abandonment of reason." It was in order to allow for cases of this sort that, in this JOURNAL ("Betting and Gambling," Vol. xiii, July, 1903,) I ventured on a somewhat different analysis of gambling from that set forth in Mr. Hobson's able and interesting paper.

Mr. Hawke, the Secretary of the National Anti-Gambling League, contributes two valuable essays on the "Extent of Gambling," and on "Existing Legislation." It is impossible to summarize these essays, though a few sentences may be quoted. "The most disquieting feature (as regards betting) is its spread among the wage-earning classes." "The twenty or so bookmakers of the beginning of the century grew into an army of twenty thousand." "One of these retail men who was not given to boasting admitted that his business had a turnover of £250,000." "The estimate adopted by Sir R. Giffen . . . of £5,000,000 per annum as going into the pockets of bookmakers," is a very conservative one. "The gigantic monetary interest of the postoffice in the betting system." Still more serious is the assertion, in the article on Existing Legislation, that it was by "a collusive civil case" being "trumped up" that the Court of Appeal and House of Lords overruled the decision of the (Criminal) High Court by which a ring was held to be a "place" within the meaning of the act of 1853. "Unhappily," says the writer, "it must be added that such a black page of disgrace would not have defaced our law reports but for private and influential pressure brought to bear upon certain members of the courts." This latter statement is almost incredible.

Mr. A. J. Wilson, in an article on Stock Exchange Gambling, has less hope of improvement from legislation than Mr. Hawke. He does, indeed, blame the £1 share for facilitating gambling in

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stock. But the disease is "incurable, especially in a society constructed with such all-pervading artificiality as ours." "Against the force of human passions no Stock Exchange can hope to war with success."

The other articles must be mentioned more shortly. Mr. J. A. Hogge writes on "Gambling Among Women;" Canon Horsley on "Crime and Gambling;" a Bookmaker on "The Deluded Sportsman"—a most entertaining discourse. The article on "Gambling and Citizenship" by Mr. J. Ramsay MacDonald is disfigured by the class-agitators' endeavor to blame the rich for the faults of the poor, as well as for their own faults. He is also guilty of spoiling by misquotation the well-known and magnificent lines of the Marquis of Montrose.

The volume would have been more complete had it included a paper on gambling in schools. There is incidental evidence in the present essays that systematic opportunities are offered to the young to acquire the gambling habit early in life. These facilities find their way into some, at any rate, of our large public schools: though schoolmasters say little about them, and perhaps do not know very much.

The work closes with a thoughtful paper on "The Repression of Gambling," by the editor, who concludes by stating his "belief that the solution of the gambling evil, as of many other social evils, will never be permanently effected without a great deepening of the moral and spiritual life of the nation."

W. R. Sorley.

Cambridge, England.

Some Ethical Gains Through Legislation. By Florence Kelley. Citizens' Library. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1905.

In the borderland where ethics, economics and politics meet, most of the social problems of the future will have to be worked out. The day of the natural rights of the individual has gone by, and modern students are trying to define, in terms of social utility, a new series of distinctly social rights. Under present economic conditions, such rights can with difficulty be securely established except as they are embodied in well-enforced legislation.

Mrs. Kelley's book is a successful attempt to define four of these social rights, and to show how far they have been embodied in the

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statute law. The right to childhood, the right of working-people to leisure, the right of women to the ballot, and the right of purchasers to buy clean goods made by fairly-paid labor under wholesome conditions of work, are taken up in turn. The method of treatment involves a review of the legislation and court decisions of the various states and the federal government on the questions of child labor, a shorter working-day, woman suffrage and the sweating system.

The main contention of the work may be briefly stated. Leaving aside for the moment the question of woman suffrage, let us look at the discussion of the other three issues. Child labor, long hours of work, and home manufacture are proved, both by reason and experience, to be utterly destructive of all that makes life worth living. They ruin health and promote disease, they stunt intellectual development, they make a truly moral life almost impossible and render moral degradation inevitable. The evidence and the reasoning on this point are irrefutable.

Notwithstanding this moral condemnation, the economic motive draws us straight on into these evils. The greed of parents, driven by poverty, the greed of manufacturers, eager for profits, the greed of purchasers, clamoring for a cheap product, and the greed of the community, desirous to be rid of supporting its dependent members, all conspire to fasten these three evils on our industrial life. If we are to be freed from them, we must be freed by collective, not individual, action; for competition makes mere individual action inadequate and often impossible. Hence the necessity for embodying the dictates of the enlightened social conscience in effective legislation.

The path of progress by statutory enactment is beset by many legalistic pitfalls. The legal and judicial mind has been notoriously slow to recognize industrial changes and their implications. The law lags behind the fact, the interpretation behind the law. Hence the courts have repeatedly declared laws for the protection of labor unconstitutional, on the ground that they infringed freedom of contract and the sacred right of personal liberty, a right which laborers have striven hard to be rid of.

The decision of the Supreme Court in the Utah Eight Hours Cases has now definitely established the right of the states to restrict the freedom of contract in occupations injurious to health, but the courts still seem to regard it as their province, rather than that of the legislature, to determine what are such occupations,

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and refuse to recognize "the gradual, culminative effect of working conditions, and of living conditions, upon the public health," thus limiting the sphere within which the legislature can act. The courts have no machinery for investigating such questions, while the legislature has; hence the peculiarly reactionary tendency of court decisions, and the need for judicial enlightenment.

Deprived of legal protection., labor has undertaken to secure these rights by means of the trade union, and has achieved some notable results. But such gains are attainable only in the organized trades, and leave the most needy and defenseless members of the community, the working women and children and the unorganized men, without protection. Thus we are driven back to the slow process of legal enactment and judicial education for the achieving of far-reaching and permanent results.

So much for the main argument. It is buttressed by a strong array of evidence. The author's years of experience as factory inspector in Illinois and as Secretary of the National Consumers' League, combined with her legal training and intimate acquaintance with the processes of legislatures and courts, enable her to speak with authority as to facts. Her keen economic analysis and clear ethical insight lead her straight to the heart of her problems.

The chapter on woman suffrage is one of the most suggestive in the book. In place of the time-worn and foolish plea that this reform will purify politics, we find a cogent argument that the ballot in the hands of woman will make easier the securing and enforcement of good laws in all matters affecting women and children, such as schools, juvenile delinquency, divorce, and labor of women and minors. The argument is fortified by an appeal to the experience of those states and cities which have granted woman either full or restricted suffrage. In this discussion the author is guilty of making a rather unfair comparison of the condition of children in Colorado, with woman suffrage, and their position in Georgia and South Carolina, without it. Nevertheless the argument is vigorous, and the conclusion eminently sound. What sort of mental perversity leads anyone to wish to exclude such students as Mrs. Kelley from the right to vote?

The book is marred by extremely bad arrangement. Economic and ethical theory, description of existing conditions, catalogues of statute laws, discussion of judicial decisions, and suggestions for improvement are all mixed together in such a way that it is hard to follow the extremely forcible line of argument which the author

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pursues. In spite of this, the volume is rich in fact, sound in theory, generally correct in reasoning, and replete with suggestion and stimulation. It deserves, as it will undoubtedly secure, a wide reading by persons interested in social reform. It ought to interest others in that work.

Two points deserve special mention. An appendix contains the text of four important judicial decisions on labor laws. In chapter two is found a discussion of the proposed United States Commission for Children, to study such problems as infant mortality, desertion, delinquency and child labor.

HENRY RAYMOND MUSSEY.

BRYN MAWR COLLEGE.

ETHISCHE PRÄLUDIEN. Von Dr. M. Kronenberg. München, 1905.

This is a most interesting and successful book. It belongs to a class of literature in which the writers and makers are only feeling their way. It endeavors to examine and discuss current moral problems from the point of view of free thought—a free thought which has been enlightened and unified by philosophical study, but which, in addressing itself to current problems, does not seek to "apply" any philosophical system, nor to express itself in philosophical terms. This literature addresses itself to an ever-growing public of non-philosophical people, who desire to be guided in the formation of their moral judgments and in the growth of their religious point of view by Reason, and not by any merely external authority. The ideal of such literature is the realization of the function which Socrates ascribed to himself, *i. e.* the bringing to birth of ideas which are involved in the daily experience of human beings, but which for lack of development and unification fail to reach birth or recognition. In this class of modern ethical literature the writers must for the most part be content to be "interpreters betwixt the gods and man" rather than discoverers of the Socratian order.

It is precisely to this quality of interpreters that Dr. Kronenberg owes his success. He is much at home in the literature of his own people and knows where to turn for striking quotation and illustration of his meaning. His method moreover of coupling the particular idea which he wishes to discuss with the name of a particular thinker of whose life and times he speaks, gives him the

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popularity which always belongs to biography. The book consists of twenty-two essays, short, and very brightly written. These are divided into three parts: (1) Historisches, Charakteristiken. (2) Individualethik. Ethik und Religion. (3) Sozialethik.

Dr. Kronenberg is much concerned throughout his book to establish in the popular consciousness the independence of ethics, especially: "die Loslösung der Ethik von der religiösen Voraussetzungen." This was begun—for modern Europe—by the crusades, carried on by the Reformation, and reached its philosophical completion: "durch die Gedanken-revolution welche sich an den Namen Kant knüpft." Kant is for Dr. Kronenberg "the greatest modern thinker," and Dr. Kronenberg therefore sums up his Individualethik in Kant's words: "Handle so, dass du jederzeit wollen kannst, die Maxime deines Handelns möge zum Gesetz für die ganze Menschheit werden."

The essay on Goethe is one of the pleasantest in the book. In spite of a considerable summoning of evidence to prove that Goethe was "wohl von Christentum entfernt," "eben ein entschiedener Heide," the chapter is engaged for the most part with the positive elements in Goethe's teaching: "Die Richtung auf das Positive." The Hellenism of Goethe is charmingly conveyed and his saying aptly quoted that the Greeks "Den traum des Lebens am schönsten geträumt haben." His "uneingeschränkte Freude an der Wiklichkeit," his "Hingabe an die Natur, der Glaube an sie und das Weltganze," are delightfully brought out, together with the natural result that he "auf die menschliche Natur immer mit Glaube und Liebe hinblickte," and that "das griechische Lebensideal, Vollendung der Natur in vollendeter Kultur" became his moral ideal also. Especially interesting and characteristic of Dr. Kronenberg's point of view is his account of this Selbstbehauptung as the central element of Goethe's ethics. "Diese Selbstbehauptung im ethischen Sinne hat gleichsam zwei Hauptseiten: Selbstbeschränkung und Selbsthingebung."

"The Herrenmoral" of Nietzsche is considered in a short and sensible chapter. It is regarded as a reaction against Idealism, as a "mass of contradictions" which yet must do good service to truth in being not so much half truths as "ganze, voll ausgedachte Irrtümer." It is cleverly shown how Nietzsche, by the extremity of his pessimism and revolt against idealism, really

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attains at last to a new idealism, at least to the extent of a passionate longing after perfection, and belief in humanity.

Dr. Kronenberg is at pains throughout his book to indicate his view that traditional theological Christianity is not only impossible of acceptance by the understanding, but immoral and a hindrance to the development of human mind and character. He however does not regard religion, as such, as either irrational or immoral. On the contrary he considers it a duty of each individual to cultivate religion. What he understands by religion he tells us in the following words: "Das Wesen der Religion ist für Schleiermacher weder Denken noch Handeln, weder Glauben noch Wissen sondern lediglich Anschauung und Gefühl, und zwar Anschauung und Gefühl des Universums in seiner Einheit und Unendlichkeit derart, dass dadurch zugleich das innerste Sein und Leben des Menschen in und aus dieser Anschauung des Universums zur höchstmöglichen Stufe der Vollendung erhoben wird." This would be quite perfect if only Dr. Kronenberg told us how Anschauung und Gefühl des Universums in seiner Einheit und Unendlichkeit, could be got without thought or action or belief or knowledge. In his preface our author tells us that one of the most urgent problems of the present time is the relation of "Gefühl und Verstand in der Gewinnung, Entwickelung und Aufnahme ethischer Normen." His treatment of the relationship of feeling and understanding in the essay on Schleiermacher's "Reden über die Religion" is one of the worst failures in the book. The essay "Ethik und Religion" in the second part of the book has many admirable points, but the whole is penetrated and vitiated by an extraordinarily crass separation of feeling and idea. The same fault mars the otherwise admirable treatment of Frömmigkeit (p. 195).

There are excellent essays on "Egoismus und Altruismus"; "Das Nationalitätsprinzip," and "Die Idee des ewigen Friedens." As a whole the book is admirably suited to its purpose.

MARY GILLILAND HUSBAND.

LONDON.

ESSAYS IN REVOLT: Being a discussion of what should be taught at School. By Herbert M. Thompson. London: J. M. Dent & Co., 1905.

While the form of Mr. Thompson's title indicates that his attitude in regard to the relative value of school studies and to

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methods of teaching is one of opposition to current practice, it is not to be understood as implying that he is at variance with the best educational theory now accepted by many thinkers. His main contentions follow lines of criticism and suggestion that are not altogether new, but his outlook is undoubtedly fresh, and there are certain original features in the presentation of his case that may serve the useful purpose of bringing conviction in quarters where the light of earlier arguments has failed to penetrate. The substance of the first essay, on "Moral Instruction in Schools," has already appeared in the pages of the JOURNAL OF ETHICS. This essay, in addition to formulating a scheme of lessons which has had the advantage of being tested by experience, deals with some of the preliminary questions that have risen into importance with the present situation in England as to religious teaching. One or two of these are treated somewhat exhaustively, and the conclusions reached must commend themselves to the more enlightened section of the community. The author is probably right in his estimate of the opinions and wishes of the average parent as to the kind of moral and religious influence to be gained from the school. There is no doubt a common ground of agreement as to essential principles, but the difficulty comes in with the large margin of uncertainty and difference. Mr. Thompson does not seem to take sufficient account of the wide divergencies which exist, even as to purely ethical sanctions, in connection with many of the most vital departments of conduct, and which raise such unfortunate complications in meeting the claims of political justice. From the educational standpoint there is satisfactory recognition of the importance of creating a moral atmosphere in the school as a condition of fruitful moral instruction, but nevertheless it would seem that the author has too much confidence in the value of theoretical teaching in the subject, or at least that he makes the mistake of antedating the period when such a form of presentation is useful. In the ideal time-table, appended to the first essay, we find in the plan of work and instruction for children of eleven years of age, "The theory of morals gradually to be explained," and in that for pupils of fifteen, "Systematized study of ethics." Now surely this is to forestall the natural development of intelligence and interest. The former instruction should come in place of the latter, which should in its turn be postponed to the very last year of school-life.

The essay on the teaching of history is full of wise suggestion.

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The line of reform proposed is the progressive choice of material for study according to nearness of time and place. Young children should begin with the history of their own times, and as far as possible, of their own district. The author rightly recognizes that at present far too much is sacrificed to a pedantic regard for a chronological arrangement that cannot be followed with any advantage by those whose minds have not been prepared. Perhaps, however, this view is pressed rather too far. It is a sound principle to begin with what is most familiar, but a compromise may be made which shall not ignore altogether the advantage of presenting an orderly arrangement, and cultivating a sense of the perspective of events from the very first. The author admits that biographical lessons and sociological comparisons of different phases and conditions of life may form suitable materials for the beginner in historical study; and in view of this it may be suggested that, instead of confining attention to the nineteenth century alone for the first year, to the eighteenth and nineteenth for the second year, and so on, it would be better to start more or less from the beginning every year, but at first to touch very lightly upon everything in the earlier centuries that could not be made interesting, and pass on rapidly to dwell chiefly upon recent times. In successive years the preliminary parts could be treated with increasing fullness, till in the end the plan became complete. At the same time, the author is undoubtedly right in making a vigorous protest against the notion that any school courses, even for advanced pupils, should be occupied so largely with the governmental aspect of history as is now the common practice.

In his essay on the teaching of the classics, Mr. Thompson is perhaps open to the charge that from the argumentative standpoint he is attempting "thrice to slay the slain." It is to be feared that no additional ground of reason can now be brought forward that will have any effect on the defenders of the preposterous absorption in Latin and Greek that is permitted in our public schools. There seems to be nothing for it but to wait until these survivals in culture gradually die out.

In his first essay Mr. Thompson succumbs to the fascination of constructing time-tables of school study. This is a seductive but dangerous pastime for those who have not had a wide experience of school organization, and it cannot be said that in the present attempt the numerous pitfalls are all successfully avoided.

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The pity is that in committing himself to details of the apportionment of time the author is apt to prejudice unfairly some of his general contentions. The most obvious criticism from the practical side is that the chief difficulty of all, the difficulty of finding time for everything that should be included, is in the case of the younger pupils at all events, simply "jumped," by assigning them an excessive length of time under school discipline. It is impossible to keep children of ten profitably employed for thirty hours a week, when no allowance is made for the necessary intervals. In matters of educational principle there are two special points where the time-tables seem open to objection. One of these concerns the direct cultivation of the reasoning power. The author's notion that the teaching of Euclid in girls' schools might be expected to diminish the logical deficiencies of women seems rather droll. He seems to count too much upon formal training as dissociated from subject-matter, and in any case he is surely far wide of the mark in placing it where he does. Children of ten are to study Euclid, in preference to the modern substitutes where geometrical ideas are admittedly presented in a more natural order, on account of its value in developing the reasoning faculty, and at the age of fourteen they are to enter upon Formal Logic! This is to court disaster. There is scarcely any subject that cannot by judicious teaching be made to afford a valuable training in reasoning, and for young people the serving up of dry bones alone would be the surest way to dissipate interest. The second point is the postponement of all modern language study till after fourteen years of age. This is directly opposed to the guidance of experience and to the unanimous opinion of modern language teachers of the newer school. While the study of a dead language gains by the maturity of the learner it is quite otherwise with the study of a living tongue. The ready and accurate use of ear and tongue can only be acquired while nerve and muscle are still pliable, and this basis of facility should be secured, in one modern language at least, long before the age of fourteen. Mr. Thompson expressly excludes all modern language study from the curriculum of those whose ordinary school life closes with the compulsory limit, but there are strong reasons for doubting the wisdom of this. Experience in France and Germany has proved that a real command of a living foreign tongue can be acquired by concentrated study on the new methods between the ages of ten and fourteen, and this is a posses-

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sion of which no child should be deprived, whatever its future is to be. Apart from the manifold indirect advantages of the mastery of French or German, the study may be defended on the broad educational ground that he who knows no second language does not even know his own.

JAMES OLIPHANT.

LONDON.

GEDANKEN UND DENKER: Gesammelte Aufsätze. By Prof. Wilhelm Jerusalem. Wien & Leipzig; Braumüller. Pp. viii, 292.
DER KRITISCHE IDEALISMUS UND DIE REINE LOGIK. EIN RUF IM STREITE. By Prof. Wilhelm Jerusalem. Wein & Leipzig; Braumüller. Pp. xii, 226.

The first of these books is mainly a collection of reviews and essays contributed by Prof. Jerusalem to the press, for the most part to the *Neue Freie Presse* of Vienna. They are interesting and vigorously written but "popular," and less important than the second book, which in spite (or perhaps in virtue) of its polemical form, is a distinct contribution to the crisis through which modern logic is passing. For Prof. Jerusalem is one of the most advanced and notable of the advocates of what in Germany is called *psychologism* in Logic, *i. e.* of the view that the doctrines of any tenable logic must arise out of, and rest upon, the psychological facts of actual thinking. The basis of logic therefore becomes empirical, its norms are not *a priori,* eternal and unalterable, but (like the rules of grammar) derived from the actual practice of thought and embody the ways of thinking which have verified and generally approved themselves. Logical rules facilitate and "economize" thought, and "the original and persistent task of knowledge is to enrich the content of life, and to increase the possibilities of happiness" (p 85). Hence knowledge has arisen from the will to live and its theory is a genetic and biological psychology of thought (p. 146).

That is to say, Prof. Jerusalem has set out from the same idea from which the pragmatic movement in the English-speaking world has drawn its chief inspiration, viz: that it is necessary to apply the psychical facts of our cognitive procedure (as modern psychology has revealed them) to the reform of logical tradition. The natural result is that he arrives at very nearly the same conclusions as the pragmatists. For example he denies the existence of truths *per se* (p. 109) or "absolute" (p. 118) : he points out that

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"true and false originally mean merely useful or harmful in a biological sense; or, more precisely, the valuation bestowed on a completed interpretation, in virtue of the usefulness or harmfulness of the measures to which it led" (p. 162-3). Again (p. 165) "What can this truth, which differs in content for every species of conscious being and is in no wise a reflection of things in themselves, essentially be but that way of conceiving which, in connection with the whole organization of the species, its strength and its needs, leads to useful consequences? . . . "With the honorable title of 'true' we endow those ideas which, when acting as real forces or movements in us, induce salutary behavior." (P. 167) "Even now we have no other criterion for the truth of a judgment than the consequences of the judgment" (this last is Peirce's principle almost *verbatim*).

Even the "humanist" extensions of pragmatism are paralleled. *E. g.* (p. 140) "all cognition is human cognition, and 'true' and 'false' have a meaning only for men that judge. All talk about 'consciousness in general,' or 'universal consciousness,' or 'truths *per se*,' which remain the same whether they are grasped by men or gods, is criticism of knowledge no longer, but is uncritical, dogmatic, and moreover arbitrary and aimless, metaphysics." So, too, the inevitableness of anthropomorphism is admitted (p. 150, 181) and the prevalence of intellectualism condemned (p. 15, 136).

It cannot, indeed, be contended that Prof. Jerusalem has drawn all the consequences of which his method seems logically capable, or even all that have been drawn by others. It is extraordinarily difficult to sustain so novel a standpoint with unyielding consistency, and to guard against relapses into older ways. And so we ought not, perhaps, to be so puzzled to find that Prof. Jerusalem also, even after his strenuous polemic against Husserl's "pure logic" and after a declaration (p. 157) that "the development of the cognitive instinct beyond its biological significance is itself only a biological development," analogous to the overdevelopments of the imitative and sexual instincts, concedes that "we can really get to purely theoretic judgments" (p. 169). This, however, only seems to mean that a taste for the "theoretic" function grows up, which is not psychologically felt to refer to any end beyond itself, and a thoroughgoing pragmatist would not hesitate to declare the "purity" of such theoretic functioning to be quite illusory.

Again Prof. Jerusalem's conception of the metaphysical completion which a psychological epistemology requires (p. 220-1) seems

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to me to be still conceived in a quite gratuitously intellectualistic fashion. I am somewhat disposed to question also whether the *epistemological* realism which is pragmatically justified by the *de facto* success of the assumption of an "independent" external world is not too easily converted by Prof. Jerusalem into a *metaphysical* realism, which has as little real interest or importance for logic as antithetical idealism, so long as both are conceived intelluctualistically. But these are minor blemishes in what is on the whole an admirably conceived book, which gains ethical interest from the author's firm grasp of the fact that the new philosophy is destined to keep more in touch with human life than the abstractions which were supposed to be true for all "intelligence." He perceives that by recalling logic from the isolation to which it had been relegated (p. 78), we shall the better appreciate our powers of cognition, and be better equipped to control our own destiny (p. viii). And that after all is so far from being a degradation of pure reason as to portend a fulfillment of the very systematization of ends which Plato failed to achieve intellectualistically in his "Idea of Good."

F. C. S. SCHILLER.

CORPUS CHRISTI COLLEGE, OXFORD.

THE METAPHYSICS OF NATURE. By Carveth Read, M. A., Professor of Philosophy of Mind and Logic in University College, London. London: Adam and Charles Stock, 1905. Pp. 354.

Professor Read's book is a "study of the validity and adequacy of knowledge and belief" regarding Nature. His use of the term Nature excludes the Ideals expressed in Polity, Religion, Art, and Virtue. The Metaphysics of Ideals is a distinct study and does not come within the scope of the present work. That branch of metaphysics may yet be treated by him. For he is not sceptical of its importance; and various statements scattered through this book show that he is not afflicted with the paralysis of self-suspicion and fear which seizes many thinkers in facing such problems.

He approaches his subject in a hopeful mood; but his expectations are modest. Speculation, he realizes, is in its infancy. "Our descendants may perhaps show a Newton as we show an ape." We cannot therefore expect to know things with any degree of completeness. "In the fulness of time it may be possible to hold beliefs with intelligence as well as conviction. . . . That time is not yet; and meanwhile the reproach of 'scepticism' is an appeal

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to lewd fallacies of a baser sort." Scepticism of some sort is a good thing; it is a necessary condition of all prudent investigation. "Truth lives only while she is militant (as Mill urges), so that even our own doctrines may be the better for candid strictures."

Professor Read has been very much influenced by Hume, who was, he points out, in many directions a constructive thinker. "Hume's liability to be classed among sceptics is not so clear as common repute would lead us to suppose." "To psychology, ethics, æsthetics, inductive logic, economics, politics, philosophy of history and religion, his contributions are numerous and important." Few philosophers, if any, have done more for the positive instruction as well as for the enlightenment, of the human mind." Scepticism was to some extent a disguise with Hume. "His real position seemed to be somewhere between the problematic scepticism of Carneades and the assertory scepticism of Mill, but decidedly nearer to Mill."

Professor Read agrees with Hume that the extreme sceptical position is turned by the "pragmatic" argument. But Pragmatism as a theory of knowledge (held by Professor W. James and Mr. Schiller) he rejects, because it seems to imply the entire relativity of knowledge to action. "Truth is essentially cognitive and the primary tests are cognitive." "In a sense Pragmatism is a kind of Scepticism as any doctrine must be that puts the conviction of Reason solely upon any ground other than cognition, whether it be action or feeling." Action is important as a guarantee of truth. How important it is may be seen in this—that Empirical Reality is brought home to us in action, and that (biologically considered) only workable beliefs can survive. But the mere survival of a belief connected with successful action tells us nothing until we have clearly and coherently described their relations. "If action is to verify belief other than in universal experience it cannot be by *post hoc, propter hoc,* but must be subject to the same conditions as other experimental proofs." The same holds of feeling. The preference of one argument over another may be a matter of feeling, as Hume held, but this feeling of preference is not independent of the character of the arguments.

The tests of truth are definiteness, verification and coördination; and in every study, "in proportion as definiteness of conception, vigor of verification, or systematic coördination is wanting, in that proportion, a good mind does not experience necessary conviction."

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The ideal of knowledge is a system of Positive Philosophy. Such a system must "start from, and return to Empirical Reality; its judgments must consist of definite concepts definitely related; the things and processes supposed to obtain beyond the region of sense perception must be interpreted on the analogy of those within this region; judgments or laws concerning these things and processes must harmonize with one another and conspire to form one system under the presiding schemata of the axioms and causation."

His ideal of knowledge does not cause Professor Read to shrink from the discussion of ultimate problems. He offers a theory of Reality, but a theory which we should expect to find defective, since the significance of Ideals has not been sufficiently considered in formulating it. His theory in outline is: that in our consciousness we have an immediate knowledge of Ultimate Reality, and that the remainder of Empirical Reality, including our own bodies and the external world is a system of phenomena constructed in consciousness and in some manner representing the Ultimate Reality; that Reality is universally conscious, but its whole being cannot be fully expressed by consciousness, so that as to the remainder of its being, it is transcendent and can only be understood, partly, from the laws of phenomena which represent it objectively, and partly, from the laws of self-consciousness, which does not represent it and is not a phenomenon, but the reality itself subjectively conditioned.

This position is connected historically with that of Spinoza. Professor Read and Spinoza agree in maintaining that consciousness is Reality, and that it is a factor of all Reality. But Read differs from Spinoza by maintaining that extension is not on the same level as consciousness. Substance, Being, God, may be called a thinking thing but not an extended thing. For Spinoza, thought and extension are equally attributes of substance, and their modes of being (the phenomena of the object and the powers of consciousness) are parallel manifestation of Reality; whereas for Professor Read "extension and body are phenomena constructed in the generic consciousness to represent transcendent Being." And since mind and body are not on the same footing the doctrine of parallelism is metaphysically not true.

But although processes of consciousness are immediate Reality and not phenomena, it is convenient he thinks to treat them as such for the purposes of psychology working as a natural science, and

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in determining the physiological conditions of sensation and volition, the hypothesis of parallelism is indispensable. Many modern thinkers (notably Professor Ward) reject parallelism as a metaphysical theory and are disposed to accept the conception of the interaction of mind and body. But our author rejects this conception contemptuously. "The notion of interaction," he says, "is the greatest absurdity that speculation has adopted from popular delusion." On his theory body cannot be the stimulus of sensation for the phenomenon cannot influence the being on which it depends. Volition (as a conscious power) is not the cause of movement; it is the consciousness of something that happens in Being and becomes manifest in the phenomenon, but it does not determine the happening. Volition is an activity of being, not however, dependent on phenomena nor (strictly speaking) upon natural laws, yet it is an activity which acts according to an invariable order. It does not imply "spontaneity, contingency, irregularity, or any deviation of character from the uniformity of nature."

The relation between the transcendent Being and its phenomena requires a new category to describe it. The category of causality is inapplicable. Substance and attribute, noumenon and phenomenon are also rejected as "incurably static and otiose." He proposes "manifestation," a term which fully recognizes the one-sided character of the relation described—a relation namely, of which there is only one term in experience. The category is imperfect; it is "not constitutive, but only indicative or orectic, for the other term being beyond experience is inapprehensible."

We feel dissatisfied with this result. It is not what the description of the ideal of knowlege already referred to, led us to expect. There is something incongruous in the conception of a system of positive philosophy, and a transcendent Being, which cannot enter into the Empirical Reality. A system of positive philosophy, we have been told, "must start from, and return to, Empirical Reality." The transcendent Being of Professor Read's system is obtained by inference based on analysis of the empirical facts of life; but it is not brought back into relation with the world. It remains an other; an other, moreover, which makes no difference to our conception of the empirical world. For the ontological hypothesis above described, has the merit, the author thinks, of "not making the slightest difference to any scientific proposition." His belief that psycho-physical parallelism is a good working

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hypothesis for scientific purposes, but not metaphysically true, seems somewhat inconsistent with this statement.

We have no space to refer in detail to the valuable discussions on Substance, Space, Time, Matter, Motion, the Subject, Relation, the various Physical Categories, and the Categories of Subjective Activity. They are well worth reading. The treatment throughout is fresh, clear, and masterly, and the literary form is exceptionally good. The book may be classed with the most important works published in this generation. And we hope that Professor Read will follow it up with a treatise on the Metaphysics of Ideals.

DAVID PHILLIPS.

RADYR, CARDIFF.

RELIGIOUS GENIUS. By L. S. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1905. Pp. 264.

Religious genius is assumed in this volume, to be primarily a quality, or kind of power, which is represented by a type of religious life and experience. Its characteristics are spontaneity, enthusiasm, illumination, intuitive perception, and power. A religious man of this type has "the *intuitive* power to grasp the things of God in a superhuman and miraculous way as distinguished from the slow and plodding human methods of reaching up to the Divine life and light." He has also a power over sin and infirmity which is different from and far in excess of, the highest he knew on the uninspired plane. His life is "the result not of a great effort but of a great force." Whether the measure of the genius be small or great it is qualitatively different from "talent" even in its highest form. In this it is akin to genius in literature and art. It will be seen that the word genius is used in a special sense. The author does not mean by it "an extraordinary degree of original force and ability." Presumably he would say that so called "men of genius" are men who possess this quality or power in an unusual degree. But every one who has been "converted," or has "received a new heart" and "been born again of the spirit" possesses it in some measure. In the Protestant Church, religious genius is represented by the Evangelicals; while opposed to them the Anglicans "stand as champions and advocates of strenuous effort and noble struggle in the realm of moral and spiritual progress."

Religious genius does not necessarily produce "the grandest characters or the best specimens of virtue." It would do so if

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"translated into practical power." But this translation does not always take place. When it does the result is, a saint. The ideal saint is holy; and by holiness is meant *wholeness,* soundness, symmetry. The saint may not be proficient in all the arts and sciences, but he must "enter into the spirit of these and reverence them, meeting with intelligent sympathy and interest those to whom they are so large a part of life." In *spirit* he is world-wide in his relatedness. The ideal was realized in Jesus. And it is possible for every individual to obtain this wholeness of life. Perfection along these lives is the end, not merely of the race, but of each separate human character.

The interest of the volume consists in its account of a variety of experience which is receiving a good deal of attention at present. No attempt is here made to analyze its nature and conditions, and to relate it to other experiences. The author says that it is unique. But to call it unique and to prefer it to a special kind of power is not to explain it. Every experience has probably, a peculiar quality which distinguishes it from all others; yet experiences can be analyzed and related, and their conditions ascertained.

RADYR, CARDIFF. DAVID PHILLIPS.

THE DUTIES OF WOMEN. A Course of Lectures by Frances Power Cobbe. Given in 1881. Posthumous edition. Pp. xii, 193. London: Swan Sonnenschin & Co.

I am reminded by this little book of lectures given nearly a quarter of a century ago of how great and silent a change has taken place in the position of women during that period. There has been nothing revolutionary about the change: it has not been marked by any epoch-making legislative reforms; but we feel that if the author were still living and were to rewrite the book now it would need to be from a very different point of view. The change is one which she herself had a large share in bringing about, but all the same it has the effect of making the book seem a little out of date. Otherwise it is for the most part eminently sensible and highminded. I think it is an error of judgment as well as of ethics to lay it down as an invariable obligation of the wife to seek the moral good of her husband; and it is perhaps inconsistent with the axiom previously laid down, that we can only choose virtue for ourselves and not for another, and can never *make* anybody else virtuous (p. 41).

ST. ANDREWS, SCOTLAND. HELEN BOSANQUET.

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

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Articles by writers in Great Britain, and books to be reviewed, published in Great Britain, should be sent to Prof. J. S. Mackenzie, University College, Cardiff, Wales.

All other articles, and books to be reviewed, published in the United States, should be sent to INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, 1415 Locust Street, Philadelphia.

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INTERNATIONAL

JOURNAL OF ETHICS.

JULY, 1906.

MORAL INSTRUCTION.

It would be surprising if serious difficulties did not present themselves in regard to the subject of moral instruction, for it involves at once many vexed questions of ethics, of education, and of political justice—three of the most thorny topics in the whole realm of controversy. It may safely be said that not until men reach universal agreement as to what is right and what is wrong, what is just and what is unjust, what is practicable and what is impracticable in the way of moral and intellectual influence over the young, will the problem of moral instruction be happily solved. While this consummation is delayed, any treatment of the question will perforce be tentative and imperfect. Everyone who presumes to put forward a theory or plan must make large assumptions in two or three different spheres of thought, and it is unlikely that many readers will be ready to grant him the particular combination of premises that his argument requires. But as some provisional solution must be found, it is no time to withhold contributions on the ground that their appeal is of necessity greatly restricted.

There is a widespread notion that when the field of religion is left, and the neighboring region of ethics is entered, all serious differences of conviction disappear. This idea is chiefly prevalent in Protestant countries where people are accustomed to find numerous religious sects warring fiercely amongst them-

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selves on points of ritual, or church government, or abstruse doctrines, while they remain in substantial agreement as to the ordinary maxims of morality. But the diversity and the unity alike are to a large extent illusory. The religious divergences that seem so marked are generally concerned with matters of little real significance, and the superficial antagonisms mask what is often a virtual identity of belief. On the other hand, what is apparently the common ground of moral conviction is frequently but a conventional acquiescence in certain general formulas, which may coexist with genuine differences in the whole outlook upon life. In short, if the term "religion" be taken, as for the present purpose it must, to stand for the conceptions held in regard to supernatural influences on human destiny, and to the formal duties that these are held to involve, while "morals" represent the principles governing the practical conduct of life, whatever may be the sanctions on which these principles are conceived to rest, then it may safely be said that with ninety-nine people out of a hundred, in a country like England at least, the crucial differences arise not in the former, but in the latter sphere. Men stand apart, not because one believes in the Thirty-nine Articles, while another holds to the Westminster Confession of Faith, but because, whatever may be their nominal sects, one believes that he should devote himself to preparing for a life to come, while the other finds his duties in the present world; because one thinks that war is good and the other thinks it is bad; because one believes in asceticism and the other in self-indulgence; because one holds to truth and honesty as embodying the best worldly policy, while the other clings to them through good and evil report. This is not a question of difference between profession and practice; it is a difference of ideal in all cases.

The fact must be faced, then, that people are very far from being agreed on the essentials of ethical teaching, and that their divergences are likely to bulk more and more largely in their consciousness, as purely religious animosities die down, and as economics and social politics become increasingly moralized. It is true that the chief difficulty that arises at this point is only of partial application; it comes up in connection with a com-

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pulsory system of education, and will be considered later on. The parent who retains full control of his children's upbringing will not feel that it is part of his responsibility towards them to take account of the uncertain authority of his ethical principles; he will have no scruple in leading them, as far as he can, to adopt his own ideals and beliefs on matters of conduct, although he knows that they are not universally shared. Indeed he will hesitate much less here than with regard to religious doctrine, where he may well doubt both the justice and the wisdom of forcing his own beliefs over-strenuously on his children. When they arrive at the years of discretion, he will wish them to prove all things, in the realm of morals as well as of religion, but until that stage is reached, he will have most confidence in recommending his own judgments when it is a question of practical ideals, and if of his own will he commits his responsibility into the hands of anyone else, he will do his best to choose a substitute whom he can trust to exert an influence similar to his own.

Keeping for the present to cases of this kind, where the problem is not complicated by considerations of political justice, let us ask what procedure would be most reasonable on educational grounds. To take the simplest conditions, let it be supposed that the child is wholly brought up by his parents. How is the earliest period, when he automatically responds to external command or suggestion, to give place to the first stage of moral instruction proper? The parents have their own idea, on which they may be presumed to be more or less at one, as to the conduct which they wish their child to pursue, and they know that at some point the formation of habits by authority must be supplemented, if not superseded, by an independent attitude on the child's part. They must induce him to choose for himself the path they wish him to tread, and for this there must be not only guidance but impulsion. All direct appeal to fear or immediate self-interest must be foregone, though of course such natural rewards and punishments as suffice only to express approval and disapproval are not necessarily excluded.

It is admitted that in the teaching of every art there should be an admixture of theory with the direct guidance of practice,

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and ethics, which deals with the art of individual conduct in its widest relations, can in the strict sense be no exception to the general rule. It is doubtful, however, whether much light is thrown on the question of moral instruction by analogies drawn from the experience of teaching a purely physical exercise, such as swimming or skating. At least it is rather from a view of the differences than of the resemblances in the two situations that suggestions may be gained. The problem for the skater is to learn how to adjust nerve and muscle to a particular action in harmony with special surroundings. It may be said, indeed, that skating is only a specialized form of walking, and that the simpler art is invariably acquired through practice and imitation alone. This is true, and it may be granted that the more complex adjustment may be successfully reached in the same way; but however empirical the later process may be in appearance, it is pretty certain that no learner fails to apply, more or less consciously, rules that have been drawn from his previous experience of the reaction of the external world on his own movements. The better these applications are systematized, the quicker will be the progress.

So far the analogy does not fail us in reference to moral instruction. In the conduct of life we have also the use of physical powers that have been developed for general purposes. We cannot act in a moral sense without the medium of bodily movements, that we have learned to adapt to our environment to secure ends that may justifiably be termed non-moral. Skating and moral conduct are alike specialized forms of controlling the motions of the body in harmony with the surroundings —wherein, then, lies any difference that has a significance in relation to the teaching of these arts?

It is of less importance than might at first sight appear, that in the simpler case the environment is merely inorganic, while in the more complex art it is in the main organic and social. The really significant difference lies in the fact that in the one instance the end to be attained is obvious and proximate, while in the other it is remote and more or less obscure. Simple material conditions imply an individual reaction of a kind that belongs to the rudimentary physical instincts; complex social

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conditions make demands upon the higher cerebral centres. For it is not simply a question of the mental recognition of a certain end as a possible object of effort, but also of the practical submission to the influence of the external forces. The universe, and especially its organic constituent, moulds us slowly but surely into whatever shape it will. In the simpler relations of life the process is comparatively easy; in the most complicated it is difficult and painful.

The teacher is the representative and epitome of the outside world for each learner. It is his task to focus impressions, to select pertinent channels of influence, to abbreviate processes of understanding. He must, as it were, hurl the cosmos at the individual in a concentrated form. The difficulty in each special case does not always lie in the nature of the final end proposed; it is rather a question of the intermediate steps. It would seem to be a simple issue to teach a child how to measure the distance of a particular star from the earth, yet how intricate and arduous is the path towards such a calculation! In the widest realm of all, where we have to deal with the whole range of personal conduct, the ultimate end can no doubt be stated with scarcely less simplicity, but the proximate ends which must first be sought are so diverse, so elusive, so imperfectly conceived, that it is a hard matter indeed to convey their appeal effectively to the individual consciousness, so as to affect the springs of conduct.

There is so much truth at least in the doctrine that knowledge is virtue, that if we could anticipate at the beginning of life all that we come to know at the end, our conduct would assuredly be more in harmony with our environment than it is. We learn through the results of our experiments, and the question is how far, and by what means, this process can be artificially forestalled. The purpose of such forestalling is threefold. Mistakes may be prevented that would injure at once the one who makes them and those whom his actions affect; the opportunity of forming useful habits may be seized while the nature is pliable; and the conditions of the lesson may be so arranged as to combine a maximum of effectiveness with a minimum of painful effort. Although there is admittedly something artifi-

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cial in all this, it is clear that the doctrine that we learn only by doing is not altogether impugned. Conduct need not be less real because the circumstances have to some extent been chosen for a particular end; the fault of Rousseau's suggested experiments in this direction lay rather in the clumsiness of the procedure he proposed than in any error of method. Society assumes the right to order the lives of the individuals who come without experience into the circle of its influence, and this right is exercised not only in the long run, through the inevitable discipline of natural events, but in providing such preparation as it may deem necessary in its own interest. Indeed, it is only in the earlier part that the constraint can practicably be made conscious and systematic; in the race of life, it is not the final course to be run, but only the preliminary canter, that can be marked out with any definiteness.

The task which is confided by society to parents and teachers is to explain to the intelligence of children what general rules of individual conduct must be observed, if the welfare of the community is to be secured, and to induce them to keep these rules. Is this a single problem, or is it essentially twofold, as it appears? Theoretically there is but one problem. If we could grasp fully the whole consequences of our actions, so that the consciousness pervaded every part of our being, those of us who are normally constituted would not be able to refrain from such conduct as subserved the general good. We should be completely socialized. But so long as this remains an unrealizable counsel of perfection, the parts of the problem must be separated for practical purposes. The intellectual demonstration of ethical principles must be largely detached from the inculcation of proximate rules of conduct, and this in its turn must often give way to purely imperative incentives and restraints. It is, of course, the stage of development which mainly determines the opportuneness of the different methods. At the outset the child must have its conduct laid down for it without appeal by authority and compulsion, while on approaching maturity it must be initiated into entire freedom of rational choice. So far, all are agreed. It is in the intermediate stages, where

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the problem of *moral instruction* strictly so termed comes into question, that doubt and discussion arise.

The teacher of any art must presuppose some natural inclination behind the efforts of the learner. It is true that the process of learning may to some extent be made pleasurable and become an end in itself, but the satisfaction will not at all times outweigh the irksomeness of the necessary drudgery; some other inducement must, in the first instance at least, be present. In certain cases, such as the aptitude and love for music, there seems to be an inborn instinct of a quite special kind, that directs the driving power. In other cases the motive is wholly extrinsic; there may either be the positive promptings of ambition, vanity, self-interest, or the negative stimulus afforded by the fear of failure and want. In teaching the art of conduct, parents certainly cannot rely on the existence of a perfectly definite instinct in the child, which not only opens up a path for him, but pushes him along it. Extrinsic inducements may not be wholly wanting, but if those which are purely arbitrary are to be excluded, little help will come from this source at the age when an intelligent appeal is first to be made. There is but one natural instinct, which can be of any service as an impelling force in which moral instruction may find its material—the instinct of sympathy, the fellow-feeling which constrains all of us, in a greater or less degree, to share the joys and sorrows of other human beings whose lives are brought before us, either directly through the senses, or through an appeal to our imagination. Strictly speaking, of course, this sympathetic instinct is not a source of power, but a guiding principle; the force on which it acts is the vital energy, that must find an outlet in some form of outward movement. But when such guidance conflicts with the immediate promptings towards personal satisfactions, it may without impropriety be regarded as a distinct motive, with which the egoistic impulses have to be accommodated.

The problem for the teacher of morals is how best to help the child to give altruism its proper place in his scheme of life. The sympathies must be quickened, and the imaginative insight into the probable consequences of present conduct must

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be strengthened. It is of the highest importance to recognize the place filled by the imagination in moral development. Although, no doubt, this power may be used as the instrument of self-interest, it is in its nature antagonistic to egoism. We cannot easily look forward without letting our vision stray on one side or the other of the track of our own immediate personality. While selfish desires may be pursued with a minimum of prevision, even the rudiments of sympathetic feelings are impossible without a considerable measure of representative activity. The first task of the moral instructor, then, is clearly to feed the springs of imaginative sympathy, to enable the child to put himself in the place of all those whom his actions may affect. It is not enough, however, to enrich the mind with a variety of vicarious emotions; these must be so far classified, according to the nature of the relations to which they belong, as to aid in the formulation of general rules of conduct. Still a third phase may be distinguished. While a philosophical investigation of the foundations of ethical theory would be in place only towards the close of a state of pupillage, there should at least be some suggestion of the subject at an earlier period. All that can profitably be said as to the apportionment of these three forms of moral instruction to the different periods of growth, is that the presentation of material for imaginative sympathy should begin with the first dawning of intelligence, and continue to the end; that the attempt to generalize the impressions given should come afterwards, and receive increasing attention in the later years of education; and that the purely theoretic and speculative standpoint should be definitely proposed till the age of discretion is at hand.

The stage of mental development at which the attention of the child may fitly be directed to the results of his actions, does not admit of exact determination, but it undoubtedly comes very early. It matters little that these results will at first seem quite arbitrary. If the child sees no logical connection between its own behavior and its mother's pleasure or displeasure, it at least forms certain mental associations which afford a basis for sympathetic feeling. Personal hopes and fears will be gradually mingled with ebullitions of the sympathetic instincts.

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The child will soon come to recognize by what acts it can make its mother happy, and to find a joy in performing them. This motive will often, of course, be outweighed by egoistic impulses, but it is a great deal that it should have come into the conflict at all. There need be no hurry to explain to the child why certain of its acts give pleasure, and others pain, where the consequences are not obvious, but the opportunity for explanation should be taken as it arises naturally, if the matter happens to be well within its comprehension. This is moral instruction through direct practice of the art, supplemented by a few rules of thumb; and the ordinary life of the home, as well as of the school, offers a large field for its exercise. Indeed, if the life of childhood were all, such practical teaching might suffice for good guidance. But as it is the function of education to prepare also for the years beyond, when everyone must stand on his own feet, moral instruction cannot afford to stop short at events of immediate personal concern. Although, as has been said, conditions that are more or less artificial can sometimes be arranged that extend the range of individual experience without any obtrusive unreality, the limits of this method are somewhat narrow, and the teacher must depend largely on the effect of represented situations.

The choice of such examples, and the manner of their presentation, are of the highest importance. It is here that the question arises whether moral instruction should be conveyed by formal lessons, or should depend wholly on the incidental opportunities that occur in connection with other studies. Those who advocate a regular course at stated hours are probably moved more by considerations of expediency and convenience than by regard for educational principles. The lessons in Morals are often proposed in lieu of religious instruction in public schools, and there is a desire that they should seem no less systematic in plan. Or it is feared that there would be a lack of concentration in the impressions formed, if the illustrations of moral qualities were scattered over the ordinary work and there were no definite occasions for dogmatic enforcement. It is difficult to see that parents who undertake their children's whole upbringing could have anything to gain,

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by adopting the plan of formal lessons, that would outweigh the undoubted objections. However pleasant learning may be made to children, it is inevitable that the lessons which are given to them in formal fashion at appointed hours should take on something of the aspect of taskwork. Now, it is especially desirable that instruction which bears such a close relation to the springs of feeling, should be dissociated from any appearance of being forced. Children are naturally suspicious of any attempt to capture their sympathies by express means, and the arbitrary selection of a particular precept for the illustration of which examples are piled up, can hardly seem to them to be straightforward dealing. Formal lessons in conduct are, in fact, at the same disadvantage as artificially arranged experiences where the device is not successfully concealed; they bring distrust and a sense of constraint into a region where it is of great moment that everything should be open and spontaneous. All the impressions which it is desired to produce can be gained frankly and naturally through the use of actual occurrences, and the judicious choice of incidents from history, poetry and fiction. The arguments in favor of regularity and continuity that would be quite in place in connection with the teaching of most subjects, do not apply to moral instruction at the stage that is being considered. There is here no such relation in time and place, or in logic, between one part of the ground and another, as makes a consecutive plan desirable in the study of history or science, and no possibility of systematic drill such as is required in the practice of an art that depends on the development of aptitude in a special organ. As long as a scientific discussion of the foundations of ethics is premature, there is loss rather than gain in the appearance of orderly arrangement. To young children any systematic division of the subject can be of little value as an aid to comprehension, while it is bound to have a mechanical aspect, in which the living interest in the concrete is lessened by association with abstract distinctions. If the impressions are sufficiently numerous, nothing will be lost in the permanent effect by their occurrence in no settled order, and there will be the immense advantage that they will appear to be produced

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naturally. The sympathies of children are far more strongly roused when they are taken unawares.

So far the conclusions reached may seem to be mainly negative. There should be no set lessons, no attempt at systems, no dogmatic deliverance, no formal precept for which illustrations have to be found, or to which a bundle of supplied illustrations will palpably lead up. To some ardent moralists it may appear that after all these exclusions little will be left. But let us think what effect we wish our teaching to produce. Surely all will be agreed that our chief hope is to equip our children morally for the journey of life by inspiring them with a passion for all that makes for the welfare of mankind. We are primarily concerned with the cultivation of the emotions that determine conduct. The intellectual task of tracing out the more intricate paths that lead to the goal we seek does not belong to the sphere of moral instruction which is now being considered. The social and political and economic policies by which human well-being may best be realized must form the subject of special studies, which can be entered upon only in the later years of education, and belong for the most part to adult life. The moral teaching that is appropriate to the years of childhood and youth is not of the nature of information. It lies almost wholly in the quickening of those impulses that pass beyond what is immediately personal—in stimulating love, admiration, gratitude, pity, indignation. Even the practice of the various forms of self-control that make up the necessary discipline of the home and the school, and are commonly held to be an essential part of moral training, must be regarded as subordinate, for in so far as obedience is yielded under the fear of penalties it cannot properly be considered a virtue, and in so far as it is voluntary, it must be due to an emotional prompting. Indeed, it is generous feeling that lies at the root of all the virtues—courage, temperance, justice. If we can open the hearts of the young to the influences that kindle these noble fires, we shall have done all that we can hope for. And this is to be achieved only by the careful guidance of individual conduct through advice and warning, by the example of parent and teacher in pursuing high ideals with single-heartedness, and by the enrich-

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ment of the children's experience through illustrations of admirable conduct and appeals to sympathy that are presented with all the effectiveness of art.

But are we not to help children to form moral judgments? Are rules of conduct not to be laid down? Is the decalogue to be abolished? As to moral judgments, by all means let children be encouraged to form them in regard to their own conduct, and by implication in regard to the conduct of others, as occasion arises. All exercises of the reasoning power, and all training of the judgment, are valuable in education, whatever be the material, provided that they are well adapted to the stage of mental progress. But the discussion of questions of casuistry is not moral instruction, though it may fitly be associated with the study of concrete instances of moral conduct. As to general rules for the guidance of such conduct, it is difficult to see what purpose they could serve, even if it were possible to frame them so as to suit all cases and to command universal assent. Administrative regulations there must be, of course, for the government of every institution, be it home or school, and submission to these in the interest of all concerned may properly be represented as a duty, illustrating the necessary subordination of the individual will, but there is nothing here that does not come under the Golden Rule, which has superseded the law and the prophets, and which is merely the expression of the active sympathy that is the prime mover in all moral action.

Let a definite instance be taken. There is no precept which would more readily commend itself as suitable for the moral instruction of children than the injunction to speak the truth. What are the possible ways in which this might be impressed on them? Is it to be stated simply as a dogma, unsupported by reasons, that it is wrong to tell a lie, and are the children to learn this by heart, as a piece of useful information? It is to be feared that a great deal of what passes current for moral instruction is no more enlightened in idea than this, but we may assume that among all thoughtful people such methods are now sufficiently discredited, as unsound alike on strictly ethical and on educational grounds. No strength of assertion can give

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any moral principle the authority that attaches to the statement of material facts, partly because the impossibility of conclusive verification is always more or less clearly recognized, and partly because the terms in which it is expressed are necessarily wanting in precision. The child may seem to accept the assurance that it is wrong to tell a lie with the same submissiveness that it shows on being told that the earth goes round the sun, but it can attach no distinct meaning to the word *wrong*, and in any case the proposition will seem incapable of the highest degree of proof. But even if conviction were complete, it would involve no practical application to conduct. The most it could effect would be a predisposition to truth-telling in the absence of any temptation to falsehood, and it would therefore fail just at the point where it was wanted. Let us suppose, however, that such recourse to absolute authoritative dogma is given up, and that reliance is placed on some kind of imperative injunction. This may either take the form of "You must not tell a lie," or "You ought not to tell a lie." In the former case the moral plane is implicitly abandoned, and the command becomes a mere matter of police regulation, to be enforced by pains and penalties. In the latter case, the bare injunction may convey little more meaning and force than the statement that falsehood is wrong, but it may be accompanied by an appeal to certain sanctions. There may be an attempt to give reasons why the truth should be told. In so far as the sanctions are supernatural in character, they need not be considered here. Within the sphere of naturalistic ethics what reasons can be given and what cogency could they have? It is fruitless to talk to children about what it is their duty to do or to leave undone, unless some motive can be put forward which touches their inclination. You must make them *wish* to tell the truth, and the only way to do this is to represent the consequences of falsehood so vividly that the picture calls up active emotions which act as a deterrent. These emotions need not be wholly altruistic. It is reasonable to show that an enlightened self-interest would prompt us to win a character for honesty and sincerity, but the most powerful and the most serviceable inducement will be the sympathetic desire to avoid giving pain to others. There will,

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of course, be all degrees of completeness with which the consequences of a lie can be imaginatively presented to the young. At an early age the pain that is caused will seem to a large extent arbitrary, but it will always be possible in some measure to show that the parent's displeasure is a natural result of inability to put full trust in the child. Another great advantage of this method of tracing the act of falsehood to its probable effects, proximate and remote, is that it permits the teacher to relate one class of ethical considerations to another. Long before it is possible to enter fully into the philosophy of the subject, children may gain some notion of the relative character of the so-called moral laws, by realizing how these may conflict among themselves, and how they can be reconciled only by their subordination to the ultimate ideal of human wellbeing. Without some conception of this kind they must remain subject to disillusionments that will have a paralyzing effect on conduct. If they have accepted the rule of truth-telling as absolute, and have followed it out to its logical conclusions, they will be disconcerted to find that in our imperfect society its application is often impracticable. Their moral stability must be safeguarded by the possession of the touchstone of an instructed sympathy, which will test all courses of action by their effects, as these are imaginatively viewed to the furthest possible limits. It would appear, then, that the only way to give a child an intelligent understanding of the law of truth in word and deed, and of inspiring him with a desire to obey it, is to enlarge his views of the influence of his acts, and to quicken his sensitiveness to the feelings of those whom they affect.

In what has gone before no account has been taken of the special difficulties that await those who have to undertake the moral instruction of other people's children, and who must perform their task under conditions that restrict their freedom. Something may first be said in regard to the modifications of plan that may be necessary owing to the mere circumstance that the teacher has only partial control of the children's upbringing, and that he has to deal with them in numbers. If he have otherwise a free hand, then his only difficulties will be, that even though the parents should have given him full discretion,

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his teaching cannot agree at all points with the moral training received at every home; that the moral atmosphere of the homes, and the impressionability of the children will vary greatly; and that the exigencies of school life may demand opportunities of moral influence of a more formal kind than would otherwise be desirable. It may be maintained that every one of these difficulties is materially lessened by the adoption of the method of teaching entirely through examples of moral situations that seem to arise in the natural course of events, and of avoiding all set formulas and systematic syllabuses. Discrepancies between home and school influence, even where they cause no trouble with the parents, are most unfortunate in confusing the issues in the children's minds, and thus lessening the effect of emotional impressions. Now, the more precise and explicit moral precepts are made, the more danger will there be of obvious conflicts of authority. If there were no other objections to a doctrinaire attitude on the teacher's part, this alone would be well worthy of attention. The same course is suggested by the difficulty of dealing with different stages of moral development, which are largely independent of classifications on the score of mental capacity. The emotions are less differentiated than the faculties of perception and reasoning, and afford an excellent common ground of appeal. Further, the provisional need for a definite apportionment of hours to lessons in morals would make it all the more imperative that what is taught at these stated times should be conveyed in as informal a fashion as possible, so that all suggestion of a hortatory purpose should be avoided, and the children should have nothing but pleasure in anticipation.

The final question, raising the issue of political justice, arises when the principle of compulsion is introduced. Although the citizen is not forced by the law of the land to provide his children with moral instruction, his freedom in the matter may be practically interfered with in two different ways. If a national system of education in which moral teaching has a place, is supported out of rates and taxes to which he must contribute, he may hold that he has a grievance when he disapproves of the doctrine taught. If circumstances constrain him

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to send his children to a particular school where the teaching is repugnant to him, his grievance will be greatly aggravated. This is, of course, the same situation as that which arises in connection with religious teaching, and it must first be asked whether the difficulty due to differences of ethical conviction is as genuine as that brought about by conflicting religious creeds. It has been already urged that the claim made by many advocates of systematic moral instruction that it offers scope for the practical guidance of life without introducing matters of serious controversy, is not well founded. If the ethical doctrine is formulated with any definiteness, it bristles with points that are in dispute, and that excite all the more lively feelings because they relate to every-day conduct. Wide differences of faith, such as that between Theism and Agnosticism, or Mohammedanism and Christianity, or even Catholicism and Protestantism, involve equally wide differences of moral attitude, while the minor religious differences are insignificant compared with the moral antagonisms that exist along with them. It is generally admitted, for instance, that the breach between Church and Dissent in England is much more social and political than doctrinal. In view of this, it would seem a most unfortunate proposal to substitute a more or less elaborate scheme of dogmatic *moral* instruction for the dogmatic *religious* instruction that is objected to. The great advantage that moral instruction possesses from an educational point of view, in circumstances where some compromise between diverging opinions has to be sought, is that it admits more readily than religious teaching of being conveyed through impressions which do not depend for their vitality upon purely intellectual conceptions. When this advantage is sacrificed, the injustice, if it be an injustice, of taxing people for the propagation of truths in which they do not believe, is in no way mitigated. From the political side, therefore, no less than from the ethical and the educational, we are led to the conclusion that moral instruction should be freed to the utmost from every appearance of dogmatic presentation.

The abstract question of the right of the majority to enforce, directly or indirectly, the teaching of any particular doc-

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trine, whether it be religious, ethical, political or economic, on which opinions are divided, does not fall to be considered here, but a word may be said as to the duty of the teacher in the matter. If he is granted any reasonable latitude in the choice of method, he will be wise to avoid any appearance of laying down the law in controversial questions that bear immediately on conduct. In moral instruction he will find it easier to preserve an impartial, or at least a tolerant, attitude without losing force of influence than in any other subject dealing with social relations, for the simple reason, already so often insisted upon, that he is here dealing rather with the springs of action, and the general effects of certain broad lines of conduct, than with the detailed application of principles to particular circumstances. His teaching will lose nothing in persuasiveness because it is suggestive rather than authoritative in form. Where he has to give a definite lead on a question at issue, his judgment will have all the more weight if he has been careful to do justice to points of view other than his own. He need not shrink from the responsibility of guidance, as long as his influence is exerted through the channels of personal example and sympathetic help. Let him not be afraid of his teaching becoming too vague and non-committal. It is not his task to determine his pupils' conduct, but to train them to determine it for themselves. He may safely leave them to frame their own moral principles, if he does his part worthily in giving them the emotional material out of which to build them up.

Some readers of the foregoing pages will find it difficult to understand the insistence on the point that moral instruction should be unsystematic in form. Even those who do not adhere strongly to the opposite view may be inclined to doubt whether the question of form can be of such importance. In reply to such criticism, and in conclusion of this paper, a few words may be said. It is the curse of our present-day education to be overburdened with system. The methods that are essential in the study of the sciences, and of many of the arts, have been extended to subjects to which, in their elementary stages at least, they are quite inapplicable. History, Literature, Morals, and Religion have suffered most from this evil tendency. It is the

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dry bones of these subjects that we offer to our children; the life and soul have all been squeezed out of them first. What is commonly taught of them in our public elementary schools is much worse than nothing at all. All that really matters in such studies—the enlargement of the vision, the quickening of interest in the manifold life of the world, the appeal to the sympathetic emotions—is too often crowded out to make room for the memorizing of epitomes and barren records of events, of formulas and dogmas and catechisms, which to the children is only meaningless and irksome taskwork. In our ill-judged haste to initiate them into what we rightly consider to be the most humanizing subjects of study, we offer them the husks in place of the kernel; when they ask for bread, we give them a stone. No greater disservice can be done to any subject than to associate it in the minds of the learners with tedium and obscurity and compulsion. And if the danger of thus creating a lasting distaste is to be feared in the case of History and Literature, surely it is infinitely more serious when it is a question of the cultivation of the feelings on which the whole conduct of life immediately depends.

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ABOUT CONSCIENCE.

It has often been thought that conscience is a sort of disturbing and somewhat supernatural force in human life, nagging and warning man. Men imagine that they would probably be more comfortable without conscience. The fact is that conscience is one of the great normal life forces, without which man's life as man would cease. To be without conscience or moral sense would be very much the same as to be without the sense of hunger or thirst, or without the power to feel pain. We recall that the most subtle peril of death is when a man, freezing in the cold, becomes insensible, or a drowning man loses consciousness.

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Conscience, however, is not a negative sense; it is positive and constructive. It is like all the other modes of our consciousness. Hunger is on the whole more pleasurable than painful; the sense of hearing, while it warns us and admits discord, is the avenue of music and thought. So conscience in the normal or natural man is the doorway of all his highest satisfactions. Thus, there is a rare pleasure in recognizing moral distinctions, and much more in expressing them. As the artist expresses on his canvas the differences, the contrasts and the harmonies of a landscape, so man through his moral sense sees, and takes joy in uttering ideal judgments in all that wide field of life where social and moral relations hold good. It becomes as real a pleasure to satisfy conscience as to satisfy any other instinct or feeling. It is evidently as much more important to render this sort of satisfaction, as the field of moral conduct is wider than the scope of any other form of consciousness.

It is very suggestive that the word conscience by derivation involves the idea of kinship or comradeship. It is a social word. Could there be conscience at all in the case of a solitary being? What idea of right or wrong have you, except as your life is related to other lives? Even if you could think of your life only as related to the life of a Supreme Being or God, herein at once arises the social relation. You cannot do merely what it pleases you to do. You cannot be at ease while there is discord of will between you and another intelligent being.

Am I not bound, you may ask, even though quite alone, to be clean, pure and temperate. Are there no personal virtues? But these personal virtues, as they are called, take their moral color from our ideas of social conduct. The only way in which you can conceive of a solitary man in a solitary world is as he is imagined to be the survival of a race of men—a race of men too, who have worshiped. The personal virtues of such an imaginary man are really the survivals of virtues which were once related to social conduct. Thus cleanliness, purity, temperance, and specially honor and sincerity are never personal alone. All acts, thoughts and emotions characterize man as human, that is as social in a social universe. The law of his being is to recognize other beings. Has his brother aught

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against him? The man is not the same man in the atmosphere of ill-will or disapproval as he was in the atmosphere of good-fellowship. Has a man ill-will towards another? He is so far out of accord with his world. So far as the flow of social good-will is shut off from his life, he is isolated and he cannot be happy. Conscience is the name of the tie, or the force, which binds men socially, and (we venture to conceive) like a spiritual gravitation, draws them to the thought of a universal Life.

There has been widespread misapprehension as to what conscience does. The supernatural idea of it has been that it is a distinct command of God, bidding or forbidding man to do some particular thing. There can be no more confusing mistake than this. Conscience, except in the lowest sense, is no voice of God; it makes no infallible judgments. The moral sense upon which it plays is indeed like the artistic sense. Its judgments in any particular man may be quite erroneous, like his judgments upon artistic values. He may have an immature or false or depraved moral sense—quite like some men's æsthetic taste. Why is it that the Hindu mother, like Jephthah in the ancient story, thinks it a duty to sacrifice her child. Why is it that the Scotch or New England Sabbatarians judged it wicked to drive on Sunday, and felt the actual stings of conscience for indulging in laughter on that day? Lutheran and Romanist Christians saw no sin in the same acts. Surely the voice of God cannot contradict itself in different men!

There are two valid elements in what men call a decision of conscience. One element is intellectual; the other is emotional. All forms of sensibility have their roots in the mind. Consider for a moment the analogy of the art of music. A child is learning to be a pianist. He begins with a more or less vague and uncultivated musical sense. He has a rude sense of discords, and also of simple melodies. But his understanding and enjoyment of the higher order of musical works will depend on a certain intellectual discipline, and on the quality of his mind. By and by he will judge and choose between various musical values; he will pronounce some works bad and others good. Two elements will enter into these judgments, thought and feeling, never indeed far apart in man's life, but yet distinct forms

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of activity. Given the most perfect musical genius, with trained intellect and at the same time rich artistic sensibility, you will have accurate judgments of musical value. What is more, this man, if himself a musician, will keep the laws of musical expression; he will perforce do artistic work. It will hurt his feelings to play bad music, or to play out of tune. You cannot bribe him to degrade his musical gifts to unworthy uses. His devotion to musical ideals will be a form of religion. In his highest artistic moments he is a citizen of an ideal universe.

Now the same distinction holds between moral feeling and moral thought or judgment. The child begins with vague and untrained moral feeling. The susceptibility is present; the child easily and instinctively feels the discord of an injustice. Conscience, if not wholly a social feeling, is closely and always related to the social sense. In the home or in the tribe, or between one man and another, there is always the social nexus. The child is conscious of being in or out of this social tie. Injustice, hate, blows, murder, injure this sense and make moral discord.

The child grows and develops. His intellect acts and reacts upon the facts of moral experience. He comes into sight of the laws and the moral ideals of his age and community. He dares to revise the standard codes of his childhood; he finds new codes in Japan and China, as he finds strange forms of art. His reason sets aside moral prohibitions which it once stung him to disregard. His reason adds higher and more difficult requirements. We are tracing now the course of a normal development of the moral sense. We are leaving out those cases where the growing child, finding the code too severe for his strength, or under stress of great temptation, blunts the edge of his conscience and loses the power of nice discrimination.

Given now the best type of man, broad in his thought, fine in his judgments, well equipped and experienced in the moral history of the race, this man's judgments like the good musician's, will approach an infallible standard. Moral feeling also will match and re-enforce his judgments and he will do whatever

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his conscience bids. Moral discord will be odious and impossible for him. Moral harmony will become his nature.

We have the clew to understand the meaning of both elements in the action of conscience. We conceive that the universe is founded on thought; all its manifold relations establish an intellectual order and unity. We agree as to what this order is, or ought to be, in the life of the individual. His life ought to be the expression of good will, shown in all his acts and words, using as its channel all his activities. All the codes and commandments, so far as they are valid, are simply forms throughout which good will expresses itself towards one's fellows. This is individual righteousness. The ideal of social righteousness is a society, wherein all men shall have the largest possible opportunity, through the use of their labor, through their skill, through the wealth and powers of the world, through arts and literature, through closer social relations, to express their good will to each other. This ideal, like a grand symphony, is the work of the mind; it seems to be the the mind of man entering into and sharing the thought of God. All ethical judgments are instances of approach toward this ideal of human welfare. What is right? What is duty, or what ought we to do? That is right, as we can easily see in detail, which expresses humanity and promotes the interests of humanity. That is right, and, once seen as right, becomes duty, which adds to the social welfare. The attitude of good will is the highest form of right.

What now shall we say of the strange sense of *ought*—the feeling which matches and attends all moral judgments. It will not let us alone till we do whatever the moral sense pronounces right. Is this anything more than a sort of social pressure, the feeling of what one's neighbors or one's group may demand of us? This social pressure is in it, but it does not constitute it, any more than one's neighbors' impressions of art account for the artistic sense. This sense rises constantly quite above the average taste of the group, and even urges new standards of beauty before they are yet popular. So man's moral sense continually dictates, as we have seen, new modes of

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conduct in the teeth of prejudice and popular clamor, and prophesies moral advantage beyond any man's sight.

This urgency, this pressure, this unrest in presence of untried duty is like a life force. If there is any life higher than man's in the universe, this urgency must arise out of the depths of this greater Life. If there is "a Power that makes for Righteousness," then conscience belongs to that Power. If all thought is of God, then the pressure of conscience is also of Him. What is power in any form, except the life of the Universe?

There is no inerrancy however in the urgency of conscience any more than in any other instinct or hunger. As the light is turned and refracted and loses its brightness in penetrating a faulty piece of glass, so the force of conscience suffers refraction and loss in an ignorant, prejudiced or selfish mind. It marks a tendency or direction. It follows the naive traditions of childhood, and the sanctions of society; it takes the quite human and natural channels made for it. It pushes and urges toward the light, as the sunshine compels the tiny plant to stretch on its appointed way upwards. It tends, if obeyed, to enlarge and purify the flow of the life. It ever reaches forward into the region of intelligence. It is never at rest till it becomes one with the judgment, and also with love and happiness. It presses toward unity and harmony. When reason says that an act is right, when love demands it, conscience then becomes irresistible to compel it. Happiness or satisfaction naturally follows it.

The divine Good Will is like an infinite line. Man's life is an asymptote, proceeding out of the ground of selfishness, but ever urged by the way of an almighty curve to come up into the higher regions and approach complete parallelism with the will of God. Man's happiness, the happiness of the race, is to be in accord with the Life of God. Each new motion of this approach gives new satisfaction. Each new sense of the gap between the ideal and the reality bring fresh unrest. The unrest compels fresh endeavor and promises new gladness. So by a rythmic movement man's life approaches fulfillment.

BOSTON, MASS. CHARLES F. DOLE.

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HUMANITY AND GOD.

I.

The English Positivists are proud of the historic fact that within twenty-five years after their propaganda began it became a custom among magazine writers and the authors of books to write Humanity with a capital H and to place the words Humanity and God side by side coupled by an "and." This had not been the custom of any writer until the Positivists educated the leaders of thought to their own sense of the dignity, sublimity and reality of idealized Humanity. To-day we are all so used to group God and Humanity together in our sentiment that we can hardly realize the extreme modernity of this association.

But has the process which the Positivists began reached its logical end? Is that impulse which raised Humanity on high and placed it, if not at the right hand, at least at the left hand of God, satisfied and exhausted in so doing? Humanity as a spiritual organism—has it ascended the throne as a supplementary equal, or as a subordinate to God? We may have stopped asking the question as to what right Humanity has to be in such close association with Deity. But if so, it is only the more incumbent upon us to inquire the exact relation of the one to the other. Indeed the problem to settle is not simply whether Humanity be equal and supplementary, or subordinate and subservient. There is a third horn to the alternative.

If Humanity is to be counted equal with God it may press the still further claim of being not only equal but identical. Such a claim on behalf of some newly-felt factor in life has often been maintained and come out triumphant in the case of earlier deities. The God of the Jews was not only compelled to admit Jesus and the Holy Ghost to the same level of dignity and power with himself, but to concede that he had no existence apart from them and was one in substance with them. It was not Father and Son and Holy Ghost, but Father, Son, Holy Ghost—one God.

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We must therefore ask: What is the Christian community going to mean after the Positivist worship of Humanity has taught its sentiment to the full—what will the Community mean when it speaks of Humanity *and* God? Is this phrase to signify that Humanity is something else than God, or that there is a God outside of Humanity as a spiritual organism? Are there to be two Gods, each limited by and needing the other? Or is Humanity God? If not, why is it coupled with deity as if equal in power and majesty? If there be two Gods, how can there be two? Is a divided allegiance possible?

So far as I am aware, the Positivists have never declared that Humanity is God. But they have maintained that all the homage and obedience which had been rendered to God should now be transferred to Humanity. They have worshiped Humanity, they have prayed to it, they have found consolation and strength in communion with it. Surely, then, it has become their God.

Why did they not call it *their* God? And if they believed that it ought to become and was destined to be all men's God, why did they not boldly proclaim: Humanity is God! This is what the intimate friends of Jesus who survived his death did with him. They asserted his godhead. They did not only worship, pray to and obey him, but they professed with their lips in so many words: Jesus is God!

Why have the Positivists stopped short of such profession with the lips? Why have they kept dumb—why have they abstained from the only adequate embodiment in words of the new thought and the new life that animates them? Why have they not said: Humanity is God! Why have they advised one another to make use of such a hymn as "Nearer, my God, to thee," by *thinking* "Humanity" wherever the word "God" appeared, unless Humanity *was* their God? And if it was, why did they not say so? The Christian in singing "Nearer, my God, to thee," would *think* "Jesus" wherever the word "God" occurred. But if asked how he could do this, he would answer that Jesus was *his* God, and was God, and that he therefore in thinking "Jesus" was not thinking one thing in his heart while uttering a different thing with his lips.

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Those who have known the state of public opinion in England during the last fifty years know well why the Positivists stopped short of declaring Humanity to be the only true and living God. They were practicing what John Henry Newman would have called "economy." It is indiscreet for the truth's sake for teachers to say more than their pupils at any given time can digest and assimilate. The Positivists as pedagogues to the British public were going just so far in the utterance of this truth as they could without arousing intellectual and moral prejudices in their pupils. The Positivists have never been agitators, firebrands or revolutionists. Yet not from cowardice or shrewd self-interest or unwillingness to suffer martyrdom. It was not to save their own skin that they lay low as to the whole of the truth which they had in mind. It was for truth's own sake, that in the end it might be adopted the more quickly and fully. They would say only so much as their pupil could understand and love. They were willing to give in instalments, until there should be at least the beginning of a demand for what they might offer.

The British public to-day is ripe, and in my opinion has been ready these ten years, for something more, and further in the same direction, than anything which the English Positivists have yet said.

II

Three aspects of the Positivist doctrine must be proclaimed, which neither Comte nor his followers have ever set forth. They may be aspects which neither Comte nor his professed disciples would have accepted; but such an accident would be no proof that they were not further instalments of the same fundamental idea.

As to the first of these aspects, the British Ethical Societies have supplemented, corrected and improved upon the work of the Positivists by emphasizing and glorifying the words "morality," "right," "duty," "conscience," "the Moral Ideal." The Ethical Movement has been doing for the words "the Moral Ideal" what the Positivists did for the word "Humanity."

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But the Moral Ideal is not something else than Humanity; that being which the Positivists call Humanity is an ideal, and it is the Moral Ideal. More than this: The significance of Humanity is due to the fact that it is the Moral Ideal. To worship the Moral Ideal is to worship Humanity. But to call the reality indicated by this term the Moral Ideal is to penetrate deeper into the psychology and philosophy of its nature than to call it Humanity. To name it "Humanity" is to turn attention to its empirical contents, to its history, to its concrete fulness; but to name it "the Moral Ideal" is to illuminate it in relation to the constitutional structure of the human mind, of the reason and the will, indeed of all mind, and of universal reason. Superficial and inadequate is any one's conception of Humanity if he does not consciously realize that the Moral Ideal as such is that which ultimately is worthy of supreme reverence, and that Humanity is worthy of being associated with deity only in so far as Humanity is recognized to be the Ideal of a Perfect Being.

As to the second aspect, the British Ethical Societies have differed from the Positivists in regard to Agnosticism. The Positivists have proclaimed Agnosticism as the philosophic basis of Positivism. The Ethicists have insisted that Ethicism no more needs an agnostic than it does a materialistic theory as to the reality of a universe independent of the mind that knows it. They declare that one need not settle the relation of Thought to an independent Being by declaring it to be insoluble, as the philosophic sceptics do or maintaining with the Materialists that Force itself in time and space is Being, or with the Agnostics that one can only say *that* independent Being is, but never can know *what* it is.

The English Ethicists maintain that science is absolutely neutral as to the relation of Thought to a Being independent of Thought. They do not care what such a relation is. Their interest begins wholly on this side of the relation of Thought to a Being independent of Thought. The geometrician will not for an instant discuss whether time and space are independent of the mind or exist only in the mind. He will not discuss for an instant whether the mind itself for which time

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and space at least exist, is itself a reality or not. He *assumes* its reality and the reality of Time and Space for it. Now the Ethical Movement has identified itself with this scientific attitude. It is no more committed to Agnostic Monism than to Materialistic Monism.

Neither is it allied in any way to any of the more recent forms of philosophic pluralism. Ethics must be as free as geometry, as independent as algebra of Agnosticism or any other theory of the relation of Thought to a Being independent of Thought. Clearness on this point is an enormous advance over the teachings of Comte and his disciples. Instead of discarding its fundamental idea of Humanity it clears that idea of extraneous associations.

These are two enormous gains. Humanity is the Moral Ideal, and its credential to sovereignty consists in this fact. The reasons, furthermore, for worshiping Humanity are wholly unrelated to the question whether the human mind can know or not know of the existence of a reality independent of thought. The reasons for paying attention to the Moral Ideal are of the same kind as those for all other science and art. Ethical principles and applications may be infinitely more valuable but are no more entangled with the ultimate question of metaphysics than are geometry and engineering.

The third aspect of the Religion of Humanity which needs clearing up, and which the British public is now ready to understand and appreciate, is the relation of the Moral Ideal to the conception of God. The Ethical Societies have not as such committed themselves one way or the other concerning this relationship. But a few of their members are convinced that no object has ever been called God, except when and because it was worshiped as the source of man's deliverance from misery and sin and that therefore the Moral Ideal ought always to have been accepted as "Very God of Very God," and ought now to be so proclaimed. It ought to be insisted upon that the term "God" is as applicable to a Supreme Being in a naturalistic scheme of values as in a supernaturalistic and superhumanistic scheme.

The Positivists have been saying something more than

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that Humanity is Humanity. They have said that Humanity is the Supreme Being. In saying this they have implied that Humanity is God.

STANTON COIT.

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MR. MOORE ON HEDONISM.

I must begin by expressing agreement with much of what Mr. Moore says in his "Principia Ethica"—a good deal of which is, indeed, as he himself observes, to be found in substance in the "Methods of Ethics," though Mr. Moore prefers to give his own statements, which must be allowed to be generally clear and incisive and remarkably free from irrelevancies.

Among the points to which I refer are some very important questions of method. Mr. Moore holds that what is intrinsically good, desirable in itself or as an end, should be distinguished from what is right or good as means; that the question what *is* good in itself can only be decided by intuition, while questions of what it is right *to do,* involve actual relations of cause and effect, and require empirical treatment, an investigation into the *results* of actions (cp. "Methods of Ethics," 6th Ed., p. 195 etc.) He holds further that the notion "good" is indefinable—indefinable that is, in the Conceptualist sense, in which *Definition* means analysis of a notion and is only applicable where there is complexity (cp. "Principia Ethica" p. 7). If and in as far as this notion is identifiable with *ought,* it would seem that it is simple and ultimate and that Mr. Moore is right here. We can, of course, as he would allow ("Principia Ethica," pp. 5, 67, etc.), try to convey our meaning by saying that Good is desirable,—it is what ought to exist, what we ought to desire, and ought to seek to produce—Right actions are what ought to be done, etc.,[1] but this is only to express the same simple notion from

[1] As I understand Mr. Moore, he inclines to agree on the whole with Common Sense views of right conduct.

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different aspects and in different phrase. In Mr. Moore's view, we can *not* say that Good *means* some "natural" object—something of which the existence is admittedly an object of experience—*e.g.,* What is Necessary,[2] What is Normal, What is Pleasant; or some other object which is inferred to exist in a supersensible world—*e.g.,* What is the true Reality,—so that the question, "What is Good?" logically depends upon the answer to the question, "What is the nature of supersensible existence." ("Principia Ethica," pp. 38, 39, viii, ix.)

Although Mr. Moore holds that Good is indefinable, he says that we *can* define what he calls The Good, *i.e.,* the things that are good—which things we can only know to be good by intuition (cp. "Principia Ethica," pp. viii, ix). What Mr. Moore means by Definition *here,* however, appears to be what has been called "extensive definition"—what Dr. Bosanquet calls "enumeration." Thus to say that *Metals* are: Gold, Silver, Iron, Copper, Tin, Platinum, etc., is to give an Extensive Definition of Metal, *i. e.,* an Enumeration of Metals.[3] Still if what are intuitively known to be such that Good is predicable of them, are types or classes of things (and this seems to be Mr. Moore's view), we *can* also give at least the connotation of *each* such type or class. We intuitively recognize such and such things to be good—the things, say, that have qualities ABC or DEF; of what we call ABC then or, DEF,—of objects *recognizable by the possession of those attributes*—Good is predicable, though Good does not *mean* ABC or DEF, any more than yellow *means* Gold or Orange or Topaz or Sulphur. "We are all aware," says Mr. Moore, "of a certain simple quality which . . . and not any thing else is what we mainly mean by the term 'good'; and.... not one but many different things possess this quality . . . things which are good *do not owe their goodness to*[4] their common possession of any other property [or properties]." And not only so, but apparently in Mr. Moore's view, they do not even *possess* any selection of distinctive common properties which might be set out in a (connotative) definition common

[2] Is this, however, an object of experience?
[3] Cf. "Principia Ethica," p. 3, § 4, etc.
[4] Italics mine.

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to the whole group *of good things.* They are intuited to be *good* as turquoises, violets, the sea, the sky, are intuited to be *blue*—but we have *not* in the case of good (as we *have e. g.* in the case of Truth) any criterion or test.

Thus we cannot on Mr. Moore's view, give an ordinary connotative definition of "the things which are good," but only at most a sort of alternative definition—we may, that is (if we accept his selection of the greatest goods), define (1) Personal Affection and (2) Contemplation of Beauty—but we can give no distinctive definition which covers both (1) and (2). I agree with Dr. Bosanquet that Mr. Moore's position here, seems rather unsatisfactory, though I think that Goodness is indefinable—as much indefinable as Existence (to which it is opposed as Ideal to Real)—neither notion can be analysed into simpler elements, neither can be "defined" *per genus et differentiam.* This does not of course mean that *nothing can be said* about Goodness or Existence, as Dr. Bosanquet, through an unusual extension of the meaning of Definition seems to suggest. In Dr. Bosanquet's view of Definition the statements *e. g.,* that "Yellow is the basis of good color," or that "Yellow is a more cheerful color than blue," are parts of the *Definition* of Yellow.

Mr. Moore appears to hold that uniqueness is a cause of indefinableness, and says (p. 13) "though pleasure is absolutely indefinable, though pleasure is pleasure and nothing else whatever, etc.,"—and again, (p.140), "unless yellow did in the end mean just 'yellow' and nothing else whatever—unless it was absolutely indefinable." But it is not uniqueness which is the cause of indefinableness, either in the Conceptualist sense of Definition (as analysis of a notion), or in the ordinary Nominalist sense, in which Definition means setting out the meaning or connotation of a word. Every notion (as Dr. Bosanquet has recently pointed out), is unique whether simple or not. It is also to be noted that if we could take *any* concept or meaning purely and strictly in connotation, we could not even define it. We could affirm absolutely nothing whatever but *A is A* —we could say nothing significant,we could make no synthetic or even explanatory assertion—we could not even state the

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equivalence of different terms or phrases, we could not even affirm that *A means X.* Yellow connotatively *is* Yellow and nothing else whatever, just as Orange (though complex and definable) *is* Orange and nothing else whatever; and similarly Good is Good and nothing else whatever. But as Yellow or Orange, or Goodness, or anything else, can only be spoken of or thought of, can only be subject or predicate of a judgment, if regarded in relation to some other thing or quality *i. e.*, if the denotational or extensional aspect is taken account of—it follows that whenever we do think or talk of anything with intelligence, whenever we frame judgments about it of the form *A is B, then* we do necessarily take account of it extensionally (as well as intensionally). A mere abstract idea, a meaning or connotation regarded purely connotationally, purely as a concept, is like one of Leibniz's monads, having "no windows" by which anything could get into or out of it, a closed, solitary, impenetrable whole, incapable of entering into relations with anything else. And it is clear that we cannot say all this about it, unless we are considering it in denotation and in relation to other things. As Locke long ago declared: "All our affirmations are only in concrete," and no general name taken *merely intensively,* merely qualitatively, is more than abstract (in Locke's sense of abstract). Both in nature and in thought nothing can be used or useful which has not its place in relation to other things, as well as an intrinsic nature, and an abstract "meaning" to its name. I think, then, that what is both the source and in some sense a justification of the distinction which Mr. Moore tries to draw between Good and The Good (=Good things) is, that of the *notion* Good taken purely in abstraction we can only say *A is A,* while if we take the denotation also into account—that is, if we take *concrete* Good, we may intelligibly, whether or not correctly, say of it that it *is*—not that it *means*—*Æsthetic* Enjoyment, or Personal Affection, or Pleasant Feeling, that it is known intuitively, etc.

To the criticisms on Naturalistic Ethics (other than Hedonism) in Ch. II. I have no intention of objecting—indeed I do not know what competent thinker would at the present time attempt to defend the ethical system of Herbert Spencer, or the

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view that what is Normal (usual) or Necessary is, as such, Good. Again, I have no desire to attempt the re-vindication of "Metaphysical" Ethics (Ch. IV) against Mr. Moore's attacks—this defence is, moreover, already in the ablest hands. I turn to Ch. III in which Mr. Moore makes a very elaborate and determined onslaught on "Hedonism." He seems to take this even more seriously than the discussion of Metaphysical Ethics, or the other forms of Naturalistic Ethics—and no doubt the question in dispute here is very critical. It is specially difficult to deal with, and the views which Mr. Moore attempts to controvert are the final conclusions of the thinker to whom his own doctrine and method owe so much.

Having accepted as the definition of Ethical Hedonism that it is the doctrine which takes Pleasure (or Happiness) as the sole good, he first enters on a discussion and criticism of J. S. Mill's views. Much of this criticism is already familiar to students of the "Methods of Ethics" to which Mr. Moore here acknowledges his obligations (p.64). We already know, for instance that Mill's "Proof" of Utilitarianism will not stand examination, that Psychological Hedonism is not a true doctrine, and that it is something quite different from Ethical Hedonism. Mr. Moore, however, adds some items, including the following original disproof of Psychological Hedonism, which does not seem to me convincing.

"Let us try to analyze the psychological state which is called "desire." That name is usually confined to a state of mind in which the idea of some object or event, not yet existing is present to us. Suppose, for instance, I am desiring a glass of port wine. I have the idea of drinking such a glass before my mind, although I am not yet drinking it. Well, how does pleasure enter into this relation? My theory is that it enters in, in this way. The idea of the drinking causes a feeling of pleasure in my mind, which helps to produce that state of incipient activity, which is called "desire." It is, therefore, because of a pleasure, which I already have—the pleasure excited by a mere idea—that I desire the wine, which I have not. And I am ready to admit that a pleasure of this kind, an actual pleasure, is always among the causes of every desire, and not only of every desire,

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but of every mental activity, whether conscious or sub-conscious. I am ready to *admit* this, I say: I cannot vouch that it is the true psychological doctrine; but, at all events, it is not *prima facie* quite absurd. And now, what is the other doctrine, the doctrine which I am supposing held, and which is at all events essential to Mill's argument? It is this: That when I desire the wine, it is not the wine which I desire but the pleasure which I expect to get from it. In other words, the doctrine is that the idea of a pleasure *not actual* is always necessary to cause desire; whereas my doctrine was that the *actual* pleasure caused by the idea of something else was always necessary to cause desire [of something *other* than pleasure]. It is these two different theories which I suppose the Psychological Hedonist to confuse: the confusion is, as Mr. Bradley puts it,[6] between "a pleasant thought" and "the thought of a pleasure." It is in fact only where the latter, the "thought of a pleasure," is present, that pleasure can be said to be the *object* of desire, or the *motive* to action. On the other hand, when only a pleasant thought is present, as, I admit, *may* always be the case, then it is the object of the thought—that which we are thinking about—which is the object of desire and the motive to action; and the pleasure, which that thought excites, may, indeed, cause our desire or move us to action, but it is *not* our end or object nor our motive." ("Principia Ethica," pp. 69, 70.)

Mr. Moore thinks that the (mistaken) doctrine of Psychological Hedonism—the doctrine that nothing but Pleasure is *desired*—is largely due to confusion between the *cause* and *object* of desire, and that thus his analysis (given above) of the nature and causes of desire furnishes an explanation of the prevalence of the psychological-hedonist's theory. It seems to me, however, in view of the somewhat doubtful nature of this analysis of desire, more plausible to hold that—pleasure (pleasant consciousness and freedom from pain) having a very important place among the objects of *actual desire,* and being at the same time recognized as desirable (=what *ought* to be desired, or is *reasonably* desired)—by a confusion between the

[6] "Ethical Studies," p. 232.

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ethical and psychological points of view, the psychological fact is confirmed, exaggerated, and finally universalized.[7]

Having devoted six sections (39-44) of this Chapter to criticism of Mill's Utilitarianism, Mr. Moore proceeds in §§ 45 ff. to consider Hedonism in the form in which (as he holds) it is set forth in the "Methods of Ethics." As already noted, he agrees:—(1) in regarding the Principle of Hedonism—that Happiness (=Pleasure and the Absence of Pain) is the sole end of action—as being an object of Intuition and incapable of proof; (2) in holding that there is no difference of *quality* in pleasure (or Happiness); and proceeds at once to consider the vital question: Is Pleasure (or Happiness) the sole Good?

Mr. Moore allows that proof or disproof in the strict sense is impossible, but as there is here a conflict of intuitions, he attempts to "present considerations capable of determining the intellect" to *reject* the "intuitive" principle in question, and he then sets out on this further stage of investigation in the hope that he will in the course of it "remove some more of such prejudices and misunderstandings as might prevent agreement" with him (p. 81).

The discussion here has four stages, being concerned with (1) the question whether all good (for man) is part of conscious Human Existence; (2) whether Pleasure as distinct from the consciousness of it is intrinsically valuable and the sole thing that is thus valuable; (3) whether consciousness of Pleasure (conscious Happiness) is the sole good; (4) a consideration of the Egoistic and Utilitarian varieties of Hedonism.

(1) Mr. Moore combats the view that what is intrinsically good must be a good of *consciousness*,[8] and in order to "determine the intellect" of his readers to agree with him, puts a supposititious case[9] of two "worlds," one the most beautiful (to the eye) and the other the most ugly, that could be imag-

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[7] Compare with Mr. Moore's remarks about Mill's confusion in reference to money as end, the note on p. 93 of *Methods of Ethics*.

[8] Compare here § 113 of "Principia Ethica."

[9] Compare here § 4 of Ch. IX of Bk. I, and §§ 3-5 of Ch. XIV of Book III of "Methods of Ethics."

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ined, the circumstances being such that neither can ever be an object of consciousness to any conscious mind. By supposition, no conscious creature sees, knows or imagines anything whatever about these worlds—to every living, thinking, seeing, feeling being they are as though they were not—they neither help nor hinder, please nor displease—no one ever came across them in experience or fancy; and yet the supposed beautiful world, we are told, is to be esteemed by us as intrinsically *good,* its "existence" would be a "part of our end." In this case either our end may be partly *not* an end of which we are conscious, *or* the worlds are objects of imaginary contemplation to us. The latter possibility, however, seems contrary to the supposed conditions of the case, and particularly inadmissible in view of Mr. Moore's own estimate of the value of imaginary objects (see the last paragraph of his book: "These goods are undoubtedly good even when the things or persons loved are imaginary etc."—p. 224, §135).

We ought (to put Mr. Moore's case) to imagine these worlds as having no effect on conscious minds, as being entirely apart from feeling or cognition—in this case by what method do we reach the judgment that the one is better than the other? Granting that there is no difficulty about what Beauty is, or by what standard it is to be judged, we must still ask: Is visible Beauty apart from any perception of it (real or imagined) any more valuable than *e.g.,* sound that is unheard?—Mr. Moore adds, that it would be "well" for *us* "to do what we could to produce" the beautiful world rather than the ugly one. This looks like an inadvertence. It is no doubt one very natural to fall into in the circumstances—still it is unfortunate for Mr. Moore's contention. I am unable to see any reason for agreeing with Mr. Moore here, but this is perhaps of the less consequence, as he affirms on the next page (p. 85) that the matter seems to him not very important—a mistake here being, he says "utterly insignificant" in comparison with the mistake of considering pleasure or consciousness of pleasure as the sole good. Moreover it appears in § 113, p. 188, that in Mr. Moore's view "the most valuable things which we know or can imagine are certain states of con-

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sciousness" (correspondingly, the great evils are evils of consciousness).[10]

(2) We pass to the question whether *Pleasure as distinct from consciousness of pleasure* is the sole thing intrinsically good. Mr. Moore deals with this in §52 and supports his view by quoting from the "Philebus" a page of dialogue in which Protarchus having been led by Socrates into the avowal that he would gladly spend his whole life "in the enjoyment of the greatest pleasures," is inveigled step by step into further admissions which end by committing him to acceptance of the life of an oyster or some other creature whose soul is "concealed in a shelly body," such denizens of the seas having (according to Socrates) no knowledge or intelligence, no memory, no sight. "Well, then, can we think such a life desirable?" Socrates finally asks. To this Protarchus has no answer but: "Socrates your reasoning has left me utterly dumb." [11]

Protarchus might perhaps have made a stand before this final stage of disintegration was reached, but at least, at the bitter end, he might have turned upon Socrates with the counter-question: "*Would* such a life as you have described, destitute of the causes and avenues of human pleasure, be full of enjoyment of the greatest pleasures, and, in particular, does a life of enjoyment of the greatest pleasures *mean* a life in which there is no *knowledge* (that is, no consciousness, no awareness or experience) of Pleasure? Does not Pleasure *mean* Pleasant-consciousness? *You* ask *me:* Would such a life be desirable? but *I* ask *you:* Would such a life be pleasant? *If* any life were '*full of enjoyment* of the *greatest* pleasures' it would no

[10] That the good must be a Good of Conscious life (=existence)— *i. e.*, of the life of some living conscious being—means that it must be a good to that conscious being of whose conscious life it is a part—however a "good of consciousness" may be interpreted, a spectator can judge it to be a "good" of consciousness only on this account.

[11] It may be observed that from Mr. Moore's point of view, Socrates' argument seems to have no standing *here*—for pleasure of which there is no consciousness, awareness, or experience, is certainly not a good of consciousness, nor a part of human existence. And here (in §§ 51, 52), Mr. Moore has (as I understand) passed to consider goods which are goods of consciousness, part of human existence (cf. "Methods of Ethics" I, iii, § 4).

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doubt be, so far, desirable, intrinsically good; but what is *fullness of enjoyment,* what is *greatest pleasures,* of which there is no consciousness? Is not *enjoyment,* or *pleasure, without consciousness,* a ridiculous abstraction, a contradiction in terms? Socrates, "your psychological analysis is faulty."

If indeed by *knowledge of being pleased* Socrates meant *self-conscious* recognition by, *e. g.,* Protarchus, that *he* was pleased and not mere unself-conscious awareness of pleasure, or feeling of pleasure—then I think it would have to be allowed that a life of great happiness *is* possible without this "knowledge,"—just as a thinker may have great stores of learning without saying to himself: "*I* know all this." But (1) Mr. Moore does not take or use the argument in this sense. (2) It is not an argument against Hedonism as held by Hedonists. (3) It is not clear that the psychological analysis of Plato had gone so far as to distinguish unambiguously between these two senses of *knowledge of pleasure*—indeed it seems probable that we owe this argument with Protarchus to be absence of such distinction in Plato's mind.

I go on to ask: Is it possible that Socrates, in his discourse with Protarchus, means by Pleasure the abstract idea of Pleasurableness (in Locke's sense of Abstract Idea)? If he does, his polemic is as obviously unnecessary as it would be if he meant by *knowledge* of Pleasure *self-conscious knowledge.* It is unnecessary to prove that an abstract idea of anything whatever—of Pleasure-without-consciousness (if such an idea is possible) or Pleasure-with-consciousness—is not *The Good.* An abstraction—the idea of *e. g.,* "Pleasure" (however understood) withdrawn from denotation or extension—cannot even be an object of rational desire, *a fortiori* it cannot be the sole good. In this case, then, the polemic of Socrates is superfluous; and it is only by taking "Pleasure" in a different sense—in the *concrete* general sense of Pleasant states or Pleasant experience (as ordinary thought takes it or as Mr. Moore, *e. g.,* does in his discussion of Psychological Hedonism) that the argument is either plausible or applicable. In this latter case, however—if, that is, we take the concrete general sense of Pleasure (in Mill's meaning of "concrete")—the argument of

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Socrates breaks down. For Pleasure in the concrete, as an element of life, as a possible human end, as enjoyment, can at any rate not be separated from all consciousness (=awareness) of Pleasure. However, Mr. Moore's conclusion here (p. 89) is that Socrates has shown "Hedonism" to be absurd (as in the "Protagoras," with even more convincing argument, he showed it to be the one true doctrine). But when has it been held, either by professed Hedonists or by Common Sense, that *Pleasure-without-consciousness* (that is, without awareness of Pleasure) is good? What indeed *is* Pleasure-without-consciousness (without awareness)? What does it mean? And it certainly cannot for a moment be maintained that Professor Sidgwick holds Pleasure-without-consciousness to be The Good. For him, *Pleasure* is *pleasant feeling, Happiness* is *pleasant feeling and the absence of unpleasant feeling (or pain)*—Happiness is that element of conscious life which (in his view) makes conscious life desirable. (He describes the Utilitarian as aiming at "the greatest possible happiness under certain definitely conceived conditions," cp. "Lectures on Green's Ethics," p. 111.) And even granting that the *pleasantness* in any state of consciousness could be distiguished from the consciousness, and that it is this *pleasantness-distinguished-from-consciousness,* which makes the state in itself desirable, it seems clear that it cannot even be conceived or imagined in actual separation from it, that the idea of pleasure that is not conscious pleasure, pleasant feeling that is not feeling, is self-destructive, as much so as blue that is not blue color, color that is not extended, warmth that is not temperature, a reflection in a mirror which is not a reflection of the object reflected. I think, however, that we can *not* even distinguish the pleasure from the consciousness in any pleasant conscious state, but only the pleasant-consciousness from some other kind of consciousness, just as in a colored visible surface we cannot distinguish the color from the extension which bears it (because it is *extended color*), but only one colored extension from another colored extension. So in a picture or embroidery or tapestry we cannot even abstract the pictorial composition with which the extension is filled from extension. But of course extension

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or consciousness can be abstracted from any particular case or variety of extension or consciousness. At any rate it seems to me that Pleasure that is not conscious or experienced pleasure, pleasure of which no one is aware, pleasant feeling that is not felt, is not only plainly valueless, but is further self-contradictory. Socrates in the passage quoted from the "Philebus" is perhaps not trying to *prove* the truth, but only by a dexterous use of his rhetorical yet unrivalled dialectic, to harry his overmatched and confused adversary somehow or other into an admission of that which he is himself at the time, putting forward as true, or at any rate arguable.

Mr. Moore, convinced it would seem by Socrates, appears to think that there can be concrete Pleasure (Pleasant feeling) without consciousness, and speaks of the possibility of "some day" producing "the intensest pleasure without any consciousness that it is there." (See also p. 212, where he speaks of "Pleasure, however intense, which no one felt.")

This is indeed a "precipice of paradox," yet not more so than his account of *Pain* (p. 212), which (as I understand) he explains to be simple *cognition* of an object (*i. e., Pain,*) not involving any "feeling-attitude." It is not clear whether Mr. Moore's psychology of Pleasure is analogous, nor how far he distinguishes between consciousness=mere awareness or experience [of Pleasure] and consciousness=self-conscious reflection [on Pleasure]. No doubt Pain and Pleasure may be merely objects of cognition—as, *e. g.,* when their value is reflectively estimated by the moralist or psychologist. This, however, is not their character as items of experience, it is not their character as existent, as occuring in conscious life. (Compare here Mr. Moore's explanation of Psychological Hedonism.) Pleasure may no doubt be felt, experienced, without being reflected on and recognized as *my Pleasure—having Pleasure* does not mean knowing that *I* have pleasure, any more than *perceiving an object* means knowing that *I* perceive it, or than willing a thing means that I reflect that I will it. However, as already observed, it seems fairly inferrible that for Mr. Moore in his polemic, consciousness of Pleasure does not mean *reflective self-consciousness consciousness.* I think the self-

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conscious consciousness would not really apply throughout his discussion, and it seems as clear that Hedonism does *not* require and has not postulated this, as that it *does* require, and has postulated, the other unreflective un-self-conscious consciousness, or awareness, of pleasure (pleasant consciousness).

Here once more, however, after a struggle in which he has again contested the ground inch by inch, Mr. Moore concedes that the point is of "comparatively slight" importance. "What I wish to maintain," he says, "is that even consciousness of pleasure is not the sole good."

(3) To this point, then, he now addresses himself. "In order to ask the question fairly" he says, "we must isolate *consciousness of pleasure.* We must ask: Suppose we were *conscious of pleasure only* . . . would that stage of things, *however great the quantity,*[12] be very desirable? *No one,* I think, *can* suppose it so." [13]

We must note here that Mr. Moore, after thus stating the question as he considers it must be put in order that the final case for Hedonism may be fairly judged, says that in his opinion *no one can* suppose that an answer in favor of Hedonism can be given. But then either the Hedonist position is not fairly stated, or Mr. Moore is mistaken in thinking that *no one can* accept the position—else what becomes of the existence of Hedonists, and what need of so much controversy in order to refute them?

I incline to think that we must accept the first alternative, and allow that the position as Mr. Moore conceives he has presented it, is *not* fairly stated. And this opinion is strengthened by a comparison of what Mr. Moore goes on to say, namely that "on the other hand it seems quite plain that we do regard as very desirable many complicated states of mind in which the consciousness of pleasure is combined with consciousness of other things—states which we call *enjoyment of so and so*—with what he (inadvertently, I suppose) says and implies in putting (on p. 95) the decisive question about pleasure quoted above.

[12] Consider what is involved in anyone's consciousness of an indefinitely great quantity of pleasure.

[13] Italics mine.

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For if *we* (any *we*) are conscious of pleasure and of a great quantity of pleasure, consciousness of pleasure is itself a "complicated state" in which, as Mr. Moore seems to recognize, there is included not only pleasure and awareness of it, but also the conscious subject who experiences it and must apparently be aware of quantity, of more or less, and moreover a conscious subject of the ordinary human sort, who is supposed to exist under conditions of time, and is possessed at the least of memory and as much intelligence as that implies (unless we imagine any quantity of pleasure to be experienced in an indivisible instant). There is also, I hold, necessarily implied in this complicated state a further complication, namely that some object of cognition,—sensational, perceptional, ideational—must be present to, and attended to by, the conscious subject of pleasant experience before he can experience pleasure—pleasant experience must have a cause. Mr. Moore, inclining as I understand, to hold that Pleasure and Pain are primarily objects of the cognitive consciousness not only of the psychologist but also of the beings whose Pleasure and Pain they are, treats them very strangely. Still he does not I think, indicate that they should not be treated correspondingly, except in one respect, that of their worth. Here, while Pleasure in any quantity or intensity he holds to be of very slight positive value, intense Pain (even when a "mere cognition") he holds to be a very great evil. But intense Pain, and still more long-continued Pain, seems to involve memory and anticipation, and similarly it would seem that intense Pleasure, and, still more, extensive quanity of Pleasure (and all quantity of Pleasure must have extent), must involve them. Mr. Moore sometimes speaks as if Pleasure or Pain could be treated on exactly the same footing in relation to the other "parts" of the state of consciousness to which they belong, as one part of a machine to the rest, thus mixing up the worth in a thing or state, that in it which, on a hedonistic view, is good or bad, with the objects of cognitive consciousness on the presence of which the feeling in the case—the pain or pleasure or indifference—depends. But we do not add the pleasure to the total of a complex object of cognition as we may add a touch to a picture, a color to a surface, a stitch to an embroidery,

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any more than we add goodness or badness to it; the object being, otherwise, what it is, its pleasantness, or painfulness (as its goodness or badness, or in a proposition, its truth) is thereby determined. For a Hedonist the Happiness of a state is that in the state which has intrinsic value; it is not an element of value to be added to other disparate elements of value, and so made into a "sum"; it is the *other* elements of the state which are together the cause of this one intrinsically and finally valuable element. For the conscious subject his Pleasure or Pain is conditioned by the nature of the object presented to him. We may abstract from *any feeling-producing object in particular*, but cannot abstract from all—at least we have to recognize that Pleasure or Pain imply an object as much as they imply a subject. Some of the complex wholes, which Mr. Moore regards as desirable, seem to differ from so-called *pleasant states*, only by specifying the character of the objects of cognition involved—by being rather more definite, rather less abstract.

To return, however, to Mr. Moore's discussion of Professor Sidgwick's arguments in favor of Hedonism. He reviews the considerations put forward in the "Methods of Ethics," Bk. III, Ch. XIV, in support of the view that granting what is *intrinsically, in itself*, good or desirable (=what ought to be desired) to be Desirable Consciousness, our choice is between (1) Happiness, (2) certain objective relations of the Conscious Mind, and that it is (1) which ought to be chosen.

"When, [says Professor Sidgwick *op. cit.* p. 398] we reflect on a cognition as a transient fact of an individual's psychical experience,—distinguishing it on the one hand from the feeling that normally accompanies it, and on the other hand from that relation of the knowing mind to the object known which is implied in the term 'true' or 'valid cognition'—it is seen to be an element of consciousness quite neutral in respect of desirability: and the same may be said of Volitions, when we abstract from their concomitant feelings, and their relation to an objective norm or ideal, as well as from all their consequences. It is no doubt true that in ordinary thought certain states of consciousness—such as Cognition of Truth, Contemplation of Beauty, Volition to realize Freedom or Virtue—are sometimes judged to be preferable on other grounds than their pleasantness; but the general explanation of this seems to be (as was suggested in Book II, Chap. ii, § 2), that what in such cases we really prefer is not the present consciousness itself, but either effects on future consciousness more or less distinctly forseen, or else something in the

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objective relations of the conscious being, not strictly included in his present consciousness.

"The second of these alternatives may perhaps be made clearer by some illustrations. A man may prefer the mental state of apprehending truth to the state of half-reliance on generally accredited fictions, while recognizing that the former state may be more painful than the latter, and independently of any effect which he expects either state to have upon his subsequent consciousness. Here, on my view, the real object of preference is not the consciousness of knowing truth, considered merely as consciousness,—the element of pleasure or satisfaction in this being more than outweighed by the concomitant pain,—but the relation between the mind and something else, which as the very notion of 'truth' implies, is whatever it is independently of our cognition of it, and which I therefore call objective. This may become more clear if we imagine ourselves learning afterwards that what we took for truth is not really such: for in this case we should certainly feel that our preference had been mistaken: whereas if our choice had really been between two elements of transient consciousness, its reasonableness could not be affected by any subsequent discovery.

"Similarly, a man may prefer freedom and penury to a life of luxurious servitude, not because the pleasant consciousness of being free outweighs in prospect all the comforts and securities that the other life would afford, but because he has a predominant aversion to that relation between his will and the will of another which we call slavery: or, again, a philosopher may choose what he conceives as 'inner freedom'—the consistent self-determination of the will—rather than the gratifications of appetite; though recognizing that the latter are more desirable, considered merely as transient feelings. In either case, he will be led to regard his preference as mistaken, if he be afterwards persuaded that his conception of Freedom or self-determination was illusory; that we are all slaves of circumstances, destiny, etc.

"So again, the preference of conformity to Virtue, or contemplation of Beauty, to a state of consciousness recognized as more pleasant seems to depend on a belief that one's conception of Virtue or Beauty corresponds to an ideal to some extent objective and valid for all minds. Apart from any consideration of future consequences, we should generally agree that a man who sacrificed happiness to an erroneous conception of Virtue or Beauty made a mistaken choice.

"Still, it may be said that this is merely a question of definition; that we may take 'conscious life' in a wide sense, so as to include the objective relations of the conscious being implied in our notions of Virtue, Truth, Beauty, Freedom; and that from this point of view we may regard cognition of Truth, contemplation of Beauty, Free or Virtuous action, as in some measure preferable alternatives to Pleasure or Happiness,—even though we admit that Happiness must be included as a part of Ultimate Good. In this case the principle of Rational Benevolence, which was stated in the last chapter as an indubitable intuition of the practical Reason, would not direct us to the pursuit of universal happiness alone, but to these "ideal goods" as well, as ends ultimately desirable for mankind generally.

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"I think, however, that this view ought not to commend itself to the sober judgment of reflective persons. In order to show this, I must ask the reader to use the same twofold procedure that I before requested him to employ in considering the absolute and independent validity of common moral precepts. I appeal firstly to his intuitive judgment after due consideration of the question when fairly placed before it: and secondly to a comprehensive comparison of the ordinary judgments of mankind. As regards the first argument, to me at least it seems clear after reflection that these objective relations of the conscious subject, when distinguished from the consciousness accompanying and resulting from them, are not ultimately and intrinsically desirable; any more than material or other objects are, when considered apart from any relation to conscious existence. Admitting that we have actual experience of such preferences as have just been described, of which the ultimate object is something that is not merely consciousness: it still seems to me that when (to use Butler's phrase) we 'sit down in a cool hour', we can only justify to ourselves the importance that we attach to any of these objects by considering its conduciveness, in one way or another, to the happiness of sentient beings.

"The second argument, that refers to the common sense of mankind, obviously cannot be made completely cogent; since, as above stated, several cultivated persons do habitually judge that knowledge, art, etc.,—not to speak of Virtue—are ends independently of the pleasure derived from them. But we may urge not only that all these elements of "ideal good" are productive of pleasure in various ways; but also that they seem to obtain the commendation of Common Sense, roughly speaking, in proportion to the degree of this productiveness. This seems obviously true of Beauty; and will hardly be denied in respect of any kind of social ideal; it is paradoxical to maintain that any degree of Freedom, or any form of social order, would still be commonly regarded as desirable even if we were certain that it had no tendency to promote the general happiness. The case of Knowledge is rather more complex; but certainly Common Sense is most impressed with the value of knowledge, when its 'fruitfulness' has been demonstrated. It is, however, aware that experience has frequently shown how knowledge, long fruitless, may become unexpectedly fruitful, and how light may be shed on one part of the field of knowledge from another apparently remote: and even if any particular branch of scientific pursuit could be shown to be devoid of even this indirect utility, it would still deserve some respect on utilitarian grounds; both as furnishing to the inquirer the refined and innocent pleasures of curiosity, and because the intellectual disposition which it exhibits and sustains is likely on the whole to produce fruitful knowledge. Still in cases approximating to this last, Common Sense is somewhat disposed to complain of the misdirection of valuable effort; so that the meed of honor commonly paid to Science seems to be graduated, though perhaps unconsciously, by a tolerably exact utilitarian scale. Certainly the moment the legitimacy of any branch of scientific inquiry is seriously disputed, as in the recent case of vivisection, the controversy on both sides is generally conducted on an avowedly utilitarian basis" (p. 402).

Mr. Moore criticises the appeal here to Common Sense, say-

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ing that even if "roughly speaking" the commendation of Common Sense is in proportion to the felicific effects of that which it commends, and assuming the judgments of Common Sense to be on the whole correct, this would only show "that pleasure was a good *criterion* of right action—that the same conduct which produced most pleasure would also produce most good on the whole. But this would by no means entitle us to the conclusion that the greatest pleasure *constituted* what was best on the whole." We should, however, I think, be entitled to the conclusion that *in the opinion of Common Sense,* the greatest happiness (or pleasure and absence of pain) does constitute what is best on the whole[14] and of course it is to *Common Sense opinion* that Professor Sidgwick appeals. Professor Sidgwick's detailed illustrations here, says Mr. Moore (p.92), only tend to show that a thing is not held to be good unless it gives a balance of pleasure; but I think they go so far beyond this as to support the allegation that what produces much Happiness receives much commendation from Common Sense—while on the other hand there is doubt that whatever produces much unhappiness or pain or misery does in a general way receive much blame. In fact, if of two actions quite similar in intention and motive one produces much suffering and the other does not, the one that produces the suffering may be severely blamed, the other not at all (and so, *mutatis mutandis,* of felicific results.) Consider for instance the blame meted out to a railway official when some quite ordinary and very slight omission, or carelessness, or want of judgment, unfortunately produces an awful railway accident. At any rate there is no doubt that an abundance of illustrations of the sort required might very easily be brought forward, and "the meed of honor commonly paid to Science" and other elements of ideal good, does "seem to be graduated, though perhaps unconsciously, by a tolerably exact utilitarian scale." The cumulative argument of the "Methods of Ethics" (cf. Book III) for the implicit ap-

[14] On the hedonist view, a state's immediate intrinsic goodness=its happiness or pleasantness, while in estimating the state's value on the whole, its felicific (=pleasure-producing) quality (its goodness as means) must also be taken into account.

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proval by Common Sense of Happiness (=Pleasure and absence of Pain) as intrinsically valuable is overwhelming, and a consideration of Political Theory would provide perhaps even more striking confirmation.

As regards the appeal to our "intuitive judgment after due consideration of the question when fairly placed before it," Mr. Moore remarks that "Professor Sidgwick has failed, in two essential respects, to place the question fairly before either himself or his reader. (1) What he has to show is, as he says himself, *not merely* that 'Happiness must be included as a *part*[15] of Ultimate Good.' This view, he says, 'ought not to commend itself to be sober judgment of reflective persons.' And why? Because 'these objective relations, when distinguished from the consciousness accompanying and resulting from them, are not ultimately and intrinsically desirable.' Now, this reason, which is offered as showing that to consider Happiness as a mere part of Ultimate Good does not meet the facts of intuition, is, on the contrary, only sufficient to show that it *is* a part of Ultimate Good.[16] For from the fact that no value resides in one part of a whole, considered by itself, we cannot infer that all the value belonging to the whole does reside in the other part, considered by itself." ("Principia Ethica," p. 92.)

On this I have to remark first that a certain amount of awkwardness and obscurity appears to me to be produced by the ellipticalness of the quotations and the way in which they are introduced. I beg a reference to the whole passage[17] from which portions are here quoted. Secondly, I think that Professor Sidgwick in the passage to which Mr. Moore refers is merely trying to show that *cognition of Truth, contemplation of Beauty, etc.,* "when *distinguished* from the *consciousness accompanying and resulting from them*[18] are not ultimately and intrinsically desirable," are not in any measure "preferable alter-

[15] Italics mine.

[16] Can it on Mr. Moore's principles do even this? And can we on his principles infer that *any* value resides in "the other part"?

[17] Quoted more fully by Mr. Moore on pp. 85-87.

[18] *Italics mine.*

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natives to Pleasure or Happiness." I cannot perceive that he here arrives at the conclusion that Happiness is the sole ultimate good by subtracting from a whole state of consciousness the "objective relations" under consideration, and concluding that what gives to the whole state the value which it has is solely the emotional element, as Mr. Moore complains that he does. It seems to me that what he does *here* (in the quotation on p. 92) is to isolate for consideration the "objective relations" referred to, and on reflection, reject their claims to be elements which have *intrinsic* value. The claims of purely cognitive and volitional consciousness to be intrinsically valuable are dealt with ("Methods of Ethics" Bk. I, Ch. ix, cp. Bk. II, Ch. xiv, § 5, p. 401) by the same method of distinction and separate consideration, and so is the claim of Happiness—in the latter case this method has been used with special carefulness and rigor (Bk. I, Ch. ix; Bk. II, Chs. ii, iii; Bk. III, Ch. xiv). I am supposing that the Method of Isolation (to use Mr. Moore's phrase) has been sufficiently applied if its object has been *distinguished* from other things and separately *considered,* and that this method does not necessarily require that the isolated thing or element should be even conceived or imagined as existing or occurring in separation. We may distinguish the reflection in a mirror from the object reflected, but do not conceive that it can occur separately, we can distinguish a picture from the canvas on which it is displayed, and may hold the picture or color to be the admirable element in the whole, but we do not think that the picture is actually separable from the canvas. The *object mirrored* is a necessary producing cause of its reflection, the extended surface is a necessary condition (not beautiful in itself) of the presentation of the pleasing picture. We similarly *distinguish* the sides and angles of a triangle, but to try and imagine them actually separated, seems absurd.

Professor Sidgwick certainly, as far as I am aware, does not ask: *If consciousness of pleasure* existed absolutely by itself, etc.?[19] But then no more does he ask: If the *objective relations*

[19] Cp. "The Methods of Ethics" (a) p. 133, and (b) 135-136: (a) "It is possible that Green may mean that pleasure cannot be thought to exist apart from conditions which are not feelings and that it necessarily varies

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involved in Cognition of Truth, etc., existed absolutely by themselves?—nor does this seem necessary or useful. States of conscious life (including elements of cognition, conation and feeling) and objective relations, are considered as wholes—such *e.g.,* as discovery of truth, satisfied curiosity, eager pursuit, disappointed ambition—and their constituent factors are distinguished and evaluated. Such a procedure appears to satisfy the requirements of the case; and to ask (supposing this possible) whether if, *e. g.,* consciousness of Pleasure *existed absolutely by itself,* it would be intuitively recognized as intrinsically valuable,[20] would, it seems to me, taken alone not suffice on Mr. Moore's principles to recommend Hedonism to our acceptance, even though every one agreed as to the intuition,—since, by his Principle of Organic Unity, what is valuable if it exists absolutely by itself, can give no guidance as to the value of any com-

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with any variation in its conditions. The statement thus interpreted I do not deny, but it is quite irrelevant to the question whether pleasure can *be estimated* separately from its conditions which are not feelings or whether pleasures received under different conditions can be quantitatively compared. I cannot have the pleasure of witnessing a tragedy or the pleasure of witnessing a farce, without having along with either a complex of innumerable thoughts and images, very diverse in quality in the two cases: but this does not prevent me from deciding confidently whether the tragedy or the farce will afford me most pleasure on the whole."

(b) "So far as my own experience goes, it does not appear to me that the mere transiency of pleasures is a serious source of discontent, so long as one has a fair prospect of having as valuable pleasures in the future as in the past—or even so long as the life before one has any substantial amount of pleasure to offer. But I do not doubt that an important element of happiness, for all or most men, is derived from the consciousness of possessing "relatively permanent" sources of pleasure—whether external, as wealth, social position, family, friends; or internal, as knowledge, culture, strong and lively interest in the well-being of fairly prosperous persons or institutions. This, however, does not in my opinion constitute an objection to Hedonism: it rather seems obvious from the Hedonistic point of view, that "as soon as intelligence discovers that there are fixed objects, permanent sources of pleasure, and large groups of enduring interests, which yield a variety of recurring enjoyments, the rational will, preferring the greater to the less, will unfailingly devote its energies to the pursuit of these."

[20] It is Pleasure itself that *is* (not that *means* of course) the value of some valuable whole (compare Truth, Beauty).

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plex whole of which it may form a part, so that, even if I knew a whole (ABC)

made up of elements { A, having in itself prior to the combination, value a.
B, " " " " " " " " b.
C, " " " " " " " " c.

to have value (abc), I could not conclude that *in (ABC),* A has value a, etc.

And since Happiness as we know or can imagine it, only occurs as a factor in complex states, the difficulty arises, on any principles, that something regarded as "existing absolutely by itself" seems difficult to compare with something which is regarded as bound up with other elements of a complex unity. But indeed to talk of Pleasure as existing absolutely by itself, seems as absurd as it would be to talk *e. g.,* of *Trueness* as existing absolutely by itself, in abstraction from facts or statements which *are* true, or *Goodness* as existing apart from things which are good.

In this "intuitionistic" Hedonism (the phrase is Mr. Moore's) there is, I think, no failure to apply a reasonable Method of Isolation to the parts of Wholes-of-Consciousness. Mr. Moore's other requirement as to method here, is regard for his Principle of Organic Unity. This, he holds has not been duly recognized. This Principle is that: The value of a whole [of value] bears no regular proportion to the sum of values of its parts. It does not, however, follow from this that the value of a whole *may* not in some cases be equal to the sum of values of its parts, and Mr. Moore cannot use his Principle here against Professor Sidgwick's conclusion unless he can show, or determine our intellects to allow (and I submit that he has not done this), that *in the case under consideration* the value of the wholes concerned cannot be measured by the pleasure-pain value of their feeling-element. What the Principle of Organic Unity [21] requires is only that we shall not assume *prior to investigation, in any case,* that the value of a whole may be ascer-

[21] This principle is of more positive application when we are considering,—not essentially complex wholes *qua* good or beautiful—but wholes subject to so-called Physical Division (or Partition) or Metaphysical

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tained by summing the values of the parts. It will hardly be disputed that in the case of some "wholes" the value of the whole is equal to the sum of values of the parts, while in the case of other wholes this is not so.

It seems to me that in the particular case of Pleasure-Pain value, if a certain quantity of *e. g.*, pleasure (=pleasant-consciousness) is estimated as having in itself a certain intrinsic value, then since it is allowed that pleasures (and pains) do not vary in quality, if the quantity of pleasure is regarded as in combination with other elements, its intrinsic value when so added must be precisely what it was when taken alone (unless, of course, the *quantity* is supposed to be altered by the entering into combination.) Whether any whole has or has not a value differing from the sum of the values of its parts, would I suppose on Mr. Moore's principles of method only be shown by a careful intuitive evaluation (1) of the parts, and (2) of the whole. As already indicated, however, there seems to be a grave difficulty about this.

Professor Sidgwick apparently holds that desirable conscious life is a complex concrete whole, careful consideration of which shows that its intrinsic value depends upon, or rather is constituted by, the value of the feeling-element of consciousness. This feeling-element may be distinguished and specially considered, but can only occur as part of a complex whole and conditioned by the possibilities and limitations of human existence. According to him, "the good life must be essentially life" ("Lec-

Division; *e. g.*, a Tree as divisible into root, trunk, branches, etc., an Orange as having color, form, taste, etc.

There are two sorts of abstraction, one (necessary for all thought) which abstracts from some of the attributes of things thought of as having denotation or extension, the other which abstracts from denotation altogether, taking concepts (Locke's *abstract ideas*) solely in connotation. In the latter case it is only with the content of the idea, or the definition of the name applying to it, that we can concern ourselves. The Abstract idea "Humanity," *e. g.*, can be analyzed into its constituents, or the word "Humanity" can have a definition, or synonym or translation given of it,—but that is all—all our affirmations here are verbal, or reduce to *A* is *A*. Where, however, the denotative or applicational aspect is taken into account, we are dealing with what is not only *abstract* in the first sense mentioned, but also "concrete", because applying to subjects of attributes. In this case *general* is perhaps a better name than *abstract*.

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tures on Green's Ethics," p.119). And again, he says that "all depends on the *quality of life.*" It is human life as it ought to be that the human moralist (hedonist or other) is concerned with.

One further argument Mr. Moore marshals at this point. He says that the appeal to Common Sense can only be plausible if it is made in favor of pleasure as a *means,* that there may be a rough proportion between the commendation of a thing by Common Sense and its conduciveness to Happiness, but that Common Sense would deny that the most pleasant (or happy) states are always intrinsically best.

In answer to this I would observe first that Common Sense is certainly (more or less confusedly) aware of *value on the whole,* as well as of *immediate* value. And, indeed, in Common Sense Morality we have, incontestably a most convincing though unconscious witness of the value which Common Sense sets on *means* to Happiness. Secondly, Mr. Moore in putting the case here, instead of confining the inquiry to the question whether Common Sense, as far as it does clearly distinguish, holds the simply most pleasant (or happy) consciousness to be intrinsically the best, the most desirable in itself, confuses the issue by appealing to grotesque imaginations of concrete cases where the causes and concomitants of pleasant feeling are supposed such as to arouse strong condemnation of the whole state. His instances depend for their repulsiveness not upon immediate pleasantness of feeling, but upon the relations of this to other things, especially relations of co-existence, and effect—the estimation of pleasure in itself has got very much tangled up with its estimation on the whole. If it were allowed that pain, *simply in itself* is bad, whatever its causes, accompaniments, and effects,—and pleasant feeling, *simply in itself* good, whatever its causes, accompaniments and effects, it would not follow that Pain is in all cases bad *on the whole,* or Pleasure in all cases good *on the whole.*

Plain Common Sense, though perhaps in general and in the long run broadly right, is seldom exactly so—and may not be very much adapted to distinguish quite clearly and consistently between means and end, and between what is intrinsically good, and what is good on the whole. It can perhaps *not*

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". . . distinguish and divide
A hair 'twixt north and north-west side."

But surely there is little doubt that it does set very high value on Happiness as End—the commonest currency of good wishes is "happy returns," "happy New Year," "long life and happiness;" and the absence of Happiness, and still more the presence of Pain, are in the view of Common Sense intrinsically objects of reasonable aversion. If the question is fairly before Common Sense whether a happy hour is not good *quâ* happy, and the happier the better as far as immediate or intrinsic value is concerned, does it, or would it, give any other answer than *yes?* That a given concrete state may be pleasant and yet not *good on the whole,* is no proof that pleasant Consciousness (not *uncaused but however caused and connected*) is *in itself* not good, even to crude Common Sense, even on Mr. Moore's own showing. Similarly a given concrete state may be painful and yet not bad *on the whole,* though *quâ painful,* it is *intrinsically* bad, whatever its accompaniments and casual connections—anything is what it is, and is not its causes or effects. And when men are driven to despair, is it not want of Happiness—absence of pleasure and presence of pain—that drives them to it? One person may be poor and sick and mean and alone in the world without being unhappy, and in such a case his life is valuable to him; another may seem to have everything the world can give and yet be so wretched that life is an intolerable burden. Is it not *misery,* pain without pleasure, however caused, that is felt in itself to be so evil as to be unbearable?

If we could steadily enough abstract and distinguish, we should I think, allow that everywhere and at all times joy, happy feeling, pleasant Consciousness, is *in itself pure good,* is, *in itself,* desirable, worth having, however trivial the cause. A child's pleasure *e. g.,* in a sweetmeat or a new toy is *in itself* good, and good to see. Pleasure is, in fact, just Goodness of Feeling, as Truth is Goodness of Thinking and Virtue is Goodness of Conduct. Pleasure is also in itself as purely psychical, as absolutely mental, as thought—if we could realize and remember this, it would save pleasant-feeling, awareness-of-pleasure, from much of the obloquy with which it is sometimes attempted

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to load it. In as far as there is a Common Sense disinclination to recognize Happiness (=sum of Pleasures *minus Pain*) as The Good, this may be partly explained by the considerations that in ordinary usage Pleasure suggests too prominently the coarser and commoner kinds of pleasures—(here it is the *cause* of the Pleasure which is in fault)—or pleasures which involve as concomitant or consequent either a greater amout of pain or the loss of more important pleasures. And Common Sense often fails to distinguish between the Egoistic and the Utilitarian end, or one's own Happiness and the Happiness of others. ("Methods of Ethics, Bk. III, Ch. xiv, § 5). Again, many important pleasures can only be felt on condition of experiencing desires for other things than pleasure.

We ought to take into consideration, too, the intellectual and volitional equipment involved in seeking even one's own Happiness *on the whole* (=both as End in itself, and as cause or means, and result), the self-control required and the wide and accurate knowledge (1) of the character of those causes which are productive of human Happiness—as *e. g.*, health, wealth, affection, things we care greatly about, or take great interest in, (2) of the means by which those "causes" may be produced. Being as we are, we not only cannot have Pleasure without Consciousness, we cannot have much of it without caring for a great many things other than Happiness. For a creature like man, with a spiritual and social nature, with intellect looking before and after, feeling himself part of a larger whole, caring for others, and—whether he will or not—for truth and beauty and virtue, the causes of Happiness, or Pleasure and absence of Pain (still more of the greatest Happiness of the greatest number), must be many and various, and must include much more than the satisfaction of physical needs, much more, for any individual, than merely "private" or selfish satisfaction. To know of any pain or wrong anywhere is distressing to a rational and sensitive creature. The Universalistic Hedonist is called upon to live the most strenuous and unselfish life—to fulfil all recognized duties, to practice unremittingly the traditional virtues, to love his neighbor as himself. Does not Common Sense approve of a man (at least roughly) in proportion as he conduces to the

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Happiness of others? And is not a primary condition of General Happiness, General Virtue (as we commonly conceive Virtue)? And does Common Sense on reflection think that any state of consciousness is in itself worth having if painful or destitute of pleasantness? Or that any state is in itself valueless *quâ* pleasant? And if (as Mr. Moore allows) Pleasure has *some* intrinsic worth, an immense quantity of Pleasure must have a good deal of worth.

The Hedonist Moralist (like any other) in judging any concrete state or action to be actually good, judges it not only by its intrinsic worth, its immediate value as distinguished from antecedents, concomitants and effects, but also with reference to its value *on the whole,* to what it involves of cost and consequences, the past price that may have had to be paid for it in good and means to good, or the future consequences that it may involve in evil and loss of good, or its felicific connections as cause or result. And Common Sense, with a sane and wholesome practical instinct, does the same though in a rougher fashion; but Common Sense is not a psychological expert, and it is perhaps only with an effort that it can consciously estimate the *immediate intrinsic* value of a state or act without being warped by reference to its value on the whole.

(4) The last stage in Mr. Moore's criticism in Ch. III is a consideration of the two forms of Hedonism (1) Egoistic and (2) Utilitarian Hedonism. (1) Is the doctrine that what it is ultimately reasonable for the sensitive and rational agent to seek from a merely personal point of view is his own Happiness, (2) that what it is reasonable for the sensitive and rational agent to seek from a universal point of view is the Happiness of the whole of which he is a part—the greatest Happiness of the greatest number. Egoism (whether Hedonistic or other) Mr. Moore asserts to be self-contradictory, because "when I declare a thing to be my own good,[22] I must be declaring it to be *good absolutely* or else not good at all" (p. xvii). "When," he says ("Principia Ethica," p. 99), "I talk of a thing as 'my own good,' all that I can mean is that something which

[22] It may be questioned whether Egotistic *Hedonism* was, as Mr. Moore affirms, "at the bottom of Hobbes's Ethics."

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will be exclusively mine, as my own pleasure is mine (whatever be the various senses of this relation denoted by 'possession'), is also *good absolutely;* or rather that my possession of it is *good absolutely.* The *good* of it can in no possible sense be 'private' or belong to me; any more than a thing can *exist* privately or *for* one person only. The only reason I can have for aiming at 'my own good' is that it is *good absolutely* [absolutely=intrinsically, in itself] that what I so call should belong to me—*good absolutely* that I should *have* something, which, if I have it, others cannot have [?]. But if it is *good absolutely* that I should have it, then everyone else has, *from the universal point of view, as much* reason for aiming at *my* having it, *as I have myself.*[23] If therefore, it is true of *any* single man's 'interest' or 'happiness' that [from the universal point of view][24] it ought to be his *sole* ultimate end, this can only mean that *that* man's 'interest' or 'happiness' is *the sole good,* the Universal Good, and the only thing that anybody ought to aim at. What Egoism holds, therefore, is that each man's happiness is the sole good—that a number of different things are *each* of them the only good thing there is—an absolute contradiction!"

In trying to answer Mr. Moore here the first point to notice is that *if* Pleasure is allowed to be something that must be felt, his criticism of Egoistic Hedonism is a criticism from the outside. It is an objection that excludes Pleasure from even having a try for the position of the Good, that arbitrarily rules out Pleasant Feeling from the list of claimants because it does not conform to conditions applicable only to quite different things. Granting that Pleasure is (or may be) a good (as Mr. Moore himself allows) it is clear that if Pleasure exists only as felt, and only for the person who feels it, it must, if it exist at all, be a good *for* or *of* or *to,* that person—its existence must depend on his—it is not like a thunderstorm, or a straight line, which may conceivably exist (as Beauty may) without being an object of consciousness.

Of course if Pleasure can exist without being felt, then there

[23] Italics mine.

[24] Mr. Moore's *data* require this addition, but it seems to vitiate his argument.

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is no more sense in saying that it is good *for* me or you, than in saying that a straight line is straight for me or for you. But I do not know what psychologist would agree to this. If we accept Happiness or Pleasure as what is *intrinsically* good or desirable, it seems evident that this good cannot exist or be imagined or conceived except as the Happiness of some conscious being or beings—in order that there should be Happiness or Pleasure at all, it must be the Happiness or Pleasure *of* A or B [25] and if Happiness or Pleasure is good, then the Happiness of A or B is, in an intelligible and indeed necessary sense, the good *of A* or B. That it is *absolutely* good means, I suppose, no more than that it is really good in itself, and if it is not this, it cannot be good at all (except as means) and therefore not the Good of anybody. And of course unless Happiness or Pleasure is desirable to the conscious subject of it, it is not good at all: if it is good to him, it is good absolutely, good intrinsically and in itself and rightly judged to be to him desirable or what he *ought to desire.* Similar considerations may be applied to Mr. Moore's "great goods" of Contemplation of Beauty and Personal Affection.

If Happiness is intrinsically good, and the sole good, a man alone in the world, a being with only himself to consider, can have no other end or good than his own Happiness. But when there are others connected with him as members of the same universe, from the point of view of a reasonable knowing creature, of a being rational and sensitive and valuing his own Happiness as *in itself and intrinsically* good, good as *Happiness*, and not simply because it is *his own* (although it must be somebody's) he has to take into account the Happiness (and Misery) of all the other members of his world—the good of each is absolutely and intrinsically good, and therefore reasonably to be promoted by every reasonable creature[26]—his own Happiness and

[25] The "kleine Unbequemlichkeit" caused by the fact that if it exists at all, it must exist as the Happiness of some given individual, is not peculial to Hedonism, but is shared by all ethical systems that consider "good" to be a good of consciousness. And the difficulties attaching to the differentiation of Being, to the relation of Whole and Part, are also not peculiar to Hedonism.

[26] "As *rational beings* we are manifestly bound to aim *at good generally,*

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the Happiness of every other individual is a part of Universal Good, and the Happiness of all together is the whole of that good. Is there any more difficulty here than there is about any other Good of consciousness? It surely matters to me as a conscious being whether it is I or someone else who contemplates Beauty, or feels affection, or experiences Happiness. If such goods as Happiness, Affection, etc., are to exist, *some one* must experience them, and it is only in my own case that I can know directly or immediately of their experience or nature. If there are a plurality of conscious beings in the world, it must be A or B who has experience in a given case. By the very conditions and limitations of conscious life as known to us, such goods must have a special individualized existence, but they cannot be "goods" to A or B unless they are good. For the Hedonist, Happiness is truly good in itself and every quantum of Happiness a part of Universal Good; but all the same, each portion of this is an absolutely inalienable asset of some individual who is as absolutely unable to transfer it as he is to transfer his intelligence or sweet temper, his loyalty or good taste. They are "his" like his Happiness in the sense that without him they cannot exist, and that they die with him—though the remembrance of them may live.

To the question "Is general Happiness the right end of action?" the Universalistic Hedonist answers *Yes;* but he would have no reason to say so unless he knew from his own experience, as a matter of intuition, that his own Happiness is to him desirable, and rightly judged to be intrinsically good, an end in itself. Thus Egoistic Hedonism is the presupposition of Universalistic Hedonism—unless *each one's* Happiness concerned him primarily and individually, there would, on hedonistic principles, be no good of the whole to be aimed at.

If it is reasonable for anyone to aim at his own Happiness, because it is good (it is both his good, and also a part of universal good) difficulty about the end can only arise where one portion of universal good comes into conflict with

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not merely at this or that part of it; we can only evade the conviction of this obligation by denying that there is any such universal good." *Methods of Ethics,* Bk. III, Ch. xiii, §3.

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some other portion. The conflict when it does occur is very frequently (though by no means always) between the good of the agent himself and of some other; *both* are parts of universal good, we must remember, and universal good is made up of all the particular parts. The perfect good for each, regarded both as an individual and as part of the whole, would be something which, while in itself and intrinsically *best* to him, is also a *means* to what is intrinsically best to all the rest of the world, while what is intrinsically best to them is to him a means to his end (or to part of his end). *Your* Happiness is not, and cannot be, *my* Happiness, but it may be a *cause* of mine. Is it not this which is meant in the poet's dream: "All men find their own in all men's good?" The intrinsic good for one is conceived as a *means* to the intrinsic good for others, the happiness of one is a cause of happiness in others, and pain in one is cause of pain in others. Each one may be aware that the happier he is, the happier he makes other people. (It is not any man's *Happiness* which need deprive any other of Happiness, but his possession of certain means to Happiness [*e. g.*, wealth]. My being happy does not exclude anyone else from being so—but my having a given *cause* of Happiness may exclude him from having it.) Thus Rational Benevolence or Benevolent Reason would rule.

And if the Good—that which we as sensitive creatures who are both individuals and members of a community, rationally desire—is Happiness (excellence of Feeling) both for ourselves and others, considering *our* Good *on the whole,* and *their* Good *on the whole*—that is, Universal Good—and the means to this—there seems plenty of scope for an articulate Theory of Good, in which the whole of Human Nature in its individuality and relatedness, in its complexity as rational, sensitive, and volitional, and all members of the human community, are duly taken account of.

Happiness is not an isolated, closed uncaused, inefficient, unrelated item—as an element of experience, as making life worth having, it is also cause and effect, and on a comprehensive view has to be so considered. Happiness always and everywhere, *in itself, quâ* Happiness, is good—but we have to consider it

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also as means and result. Even if Personal Affection and Contemplation of Beauty were always "good" in themselves, they must, as "moments" of life (*Conscious life*) be also so considered. But *are* they always good in themselves? Not only may both Æsthetic Contemplation and Personal Affection have evil and ugly antecedents, accompaniments and effects (just as Pleasant Consciousness may), but also in concrete instances they may both have evil and ugly elements, which are essential factors of the case. Nero fiddling while Rome was on fire is not a solitary instance in which, taking a state of æsthetic enjoyment as a whole (and it seems to be an essential requirement of Mr. Moore's method that it should be taken—see *e. g.*, "Principia Ethica," §55), that state cannot be judged good or beautiful, but on the contrary is very evil, and affection may be foolish, exacting, not "good" even to the person beloved, unjust to others; and even an admirable and devoted affection may be intensely painful—*e. g.*, if its object is suffering or in danger, or becomes unworthy.

Hedonism is not tied down to any hard and fast system of unvarying rules, but allows of such rules as are generally acceptable and accepted being modified or transcended if required, in order that, in any given concrete case, that conduct may be chosen which is most conducive to the end—it thus combines stability of *end* with flexibility of *means* and the most untrammelled liberty of reference —the supremacy of the reasonable individual with some assistance and support from science and the practical wisdom of others. Even the greatest genius is not so unique that he starts entirely fresh—and in any department he may be helped, though he need not be bound, by traditional rules and inherited knowledge.

Should we not on the line already indicated attain to a theoretical "harmony between the maxim of Prudence and the maxim of Rational Benevolence" (see "Principia Ethica," p. 102), our end being the greatest Happiness both of the individual agent and of the whole, and would not the practical acceptance of Hedonism (Ideal Hedonism it might be called) of this type, tend to an immense increase in æsthetic enjoyment and personal affection (which both no doubt have value)?

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Mr. Moore says that (1) Egoistic and (2) Universalistic Hedonism are directly contradictory to each other and that (1) is self-contradictory; but the above conception does not, I think, involve a contradiction. It does indeed not seem at present completely realizable, and seems almost indefinitely far from being *completely* realized, still there is no reason why it should not come to be realized much more than it is. It is already realized almost completely in some persons, and to a considerable extent in most—consider *e. g.*, Mr. Moore's very emphatic condemnation of cruelty, which is in thorough accord with Common Sense, and the general approval of a person who feels pleasure at the pleasure of others, and pain at their pain. The extent to whichh Utilitarianism [27] theoretical or practical is actually accepted is also significant in this connection. Of course, in so far as Duty and Self-interest do as a matter of fact diverge, the hedonistic end cannot be altogether attained, and there remains not only a discrepancy of "mere fact" but also, for the individual agent concerned, the practical impossibility of being completely rational, and further it may be, a serious difficulty in knowing which of possible alternatives is *most* rational. All these however some conceivable distribution of sanctions might remove—they are difficulties which depend upon matter of fact, upon the actual condition of affairs, and might, as Professor Sidgwick points out, be amended by "an alteration in facts" ("Principia Ethica," p. 103).

Of Mr. Moore's own view of what the "great positive goods" are—namely Contemplation of what is Beautiful and Personal Affection—it may be asked whether they are not abstract in the same sense in which Happy Conscious States are abstract, and whether they are not open to the objections which he brings on that score against Happiness as an end. They may indeed be "complex wholes" as he observes, but if so Happiness is also a complex whole. It is *conscious life which is pleasant and free from pain,* and involves at least (1) a conscious subject; (2) an object presented to that subject, (3) the feeling which the subject consequently has. Perhaps Mr. Moore would say that Happiness thus conceived is *not* the end of Hedonism. Well,

[27] I agree that the name is not a good one.

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the name does not matter, but the *Pleasure existing absolutely by itself* which Mr. Moore has tried to force upon "Hedonists" as their end is not only a palpably impossible end, it is also ***not*** the end which Hedonists would accept and defend.

If Mr. Moore intends to appeal on behalf of his own view to Common Sense, it may be suggested that ordinary Common Sense would hardly pronounce Contemplation of Beauty to be one of the very greatest of (non-hedonistic) goods, a good which is an end in itself. And if the case were put so that Contemplation of Beauty is not understood as necessarily implying Pleasure, would not Common Sense decisively disagree with Mr. Moore? If by Contemplation of Beauty is meant *Contemplation-of-Beauty when pleasurable and not too expensive,* then indeed, Common Sense would probably agree that this is in itself good. Again, if Personal Affection was not at all pleasant intrinsically, as it sometimes is not, and had no "good" effects, as it sometimes has not, would Common Sense approve? Would anyone think it one of the greatest goods? And what if it were accompanied by absence of pleasure, or presence of pain? And if, as Mr. Moore holds, knowledge of *causes* of good is so inadequate and untrustworthy, whilst the "great goods" of Personal Affection and Contemplation of Beauty are interrupted and broken, subject to relapses, waverings, vanishings (as they are), they present a somewhat unsatisfactory end of action. Again, there seems a quantitative difficulty. How much Beauty is it of which the contemplation is good? How great must Personal affection be in order to be good? Further the relation of Beauty to Good wants clearing up, for while Contemplation of Beauty is good, Beauty is said to be *that of which the contemplation is good*—thus the statement that *Contemplation of Beauty is good* means that *Contemplation of that of which the Contemplation is good, is good.* Is this tautology or not? And unless affection means Benevolence interpreted hedonistically, we are also left asking what is to be understood by affection, and I have still a further difficulty as to how "good" in "good persons" is to be understood. The Personal Affection which is a "great good" is explained (p. 224) to be "love of good persons," and this love includes,

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as its probably most valuable element, appreciation of actual corporeal beauty (so far, I suppose, affection=admiration). Are we to conclude that the "goodness" of the persons beloved is (extensionally not intensionally) beauty—that it is the *beautiful* thing that is the *good thing?* Material qualities—matter—are according to Mr. Moore (p. 207) "the best we know." I am further not quite clear in the end, whether, when Mr. Moore says that Personal Affection (which is a good of consciousness) is a great good, he means that it is good as an object of contemplation to the disinterested spectator, or that it is good to the person who feels it (cp. "Principia Ethica" p. xxvi, §122), or to the person who is the object of it, or that it is judged by the spectator to be good because of its intrinsic value as an element of the conscious life of the person who feels it. It is announced as a good of consciousness—it must therefore always exist as a good of some conscious being. In short, my difficulty here is: *What* is that Whole of Personal Affection which is such a great good?

Mr. Moore, as we have seen, says that Personal Affection and Contemplation of Beauty are the two great goods—they have, however, in his view to be taken as Whole States. Now, if Mr. Moore (as I understand him to do), gives, as a reason why *Pleasant Consciousness* may not be taken as a good in itself, the fact that it may occur as part of a state in which some of the constituent elements are evil (either intrinsically or as means), then, according to his principles, Personal Affection and Contemplation of Beauty ought not to be taken as goods in themselves, because they may occur (which they certainly may) as parts of states in which there are elements which are evil and ugly. Clearly either (1) Personal Affection and Contemplation of Beauty should be taken as intrinsically and therefore always under all circumstances good in themselves, abstracting from all accompaniments, etc., which though unessential may be actual—so that a state is good *in as far* as it contains Personal Affection or Contemplation of Beauty—*i. e.*, abstractly (in the sense in which *abstract=general* and does not exclude denotation); or, (2) taking *the whole states* in which Personal Affection and Contemplation of

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Beauty occur, we must say that these whole states (on account of the presence of Personal Affection and Contemplation of Beauty, and irrespective of what their other constituents may be), are always good—*i. e.*, the *concrete states* are good as Wholes. But in (1) we do *not* take actual unabridged concrete cases, whereas this is what Mr. Moore sometimes seems to insist upon as a requirement of method (see "Principia Ethica," § 55). It may be observed that to *do* this—to take actual concrete states as wholes—would apparently make even an extensive definition" of The Good out of the question—it would surely reduce us to that hopelessly unsystematic ethical view which Professor Sidgwick calls Perceptional Intuitionism. In (2) we *do* adopt this procedure; but as Mr. Moore will not allow it to be done in the case of *e. g.*, Pleasant Consciousness, inconsistency of method seems again to be the result.

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LITERATURE AND THE MORAL CODE.

"Vérité en dèçà des Pyrénées, erreur au delà."—*Pascal.*

Within the past few months one or two English authors have put on the stage plays which have been attacked for the freedom which they allowed themselves in discussing moral problems. This is unusual, for it is generally French writers who arouse criticism on that score. The stir created by these plays in Anglo-Saxon countries makes it appear timely to discuss the respective attitudes of Anglo-Saxon and of Latin races in such matters.

No attempt will be made in the present paper to show that one side is right and the other wrong; nor is it intended to offer a compromise. On the contrary, the purpose of this article is to show that the two standpoints are not reducible to the same terms, to show why they are bound to clash and why there can be no reconciliation. An attempt will be made to make the problem thus presented better understood.

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First of all we must make a clear distinction between the two attitudes—the attitude of literature toward morality, and another which can by no means be identified with it, although one must admit that there is some connection between the two. Some writers maintain that art has its aim in itself; it is the theory of art for the sake of art, which is a distinctly Latin ideal. Others, the great majority of Anglo-Saxon writers, maintain that art must be only a means to an end. One ideal is purely æsthetic, the other purely didactic.

But it would be a mistake to infer that Latin writers ignore moral problems, and that art for the sake of art is their only ideal. It would be decidedly erroneous to believe that this is the most common attitude among French artists. All sorts of practical problems are treated as they are in Anglo-Saxon countries, but the difference lies in the way they are approached. The respective positions can be described about as follows: The Anglo-Saxons say that literature must be kept within the limits of the ethical laws that govern us, must insist upon the beauty of those laws, and encourage their observance by the public. The Latins say that literature has no such obligation in treating moral problems.

Let us first examine the Anglo-Saxon standpoint. Eliminating all rhetoric from the discussion, the argument may be summed up as follows: Society rests upon certain moral and social principles which assure order; to suggest doubts as to the excellence of those principles means to shake society to its foundations, to breed disorder and anarchy. The very fact that some persons, thanks to special gifts of nature, hold a position of leadership, places upon them increased responsibilities. Authors, therefore, ought not to discuss problems of ethics in such a fashion as to mislead the public. This attitude is perfectly reasonable, but at the same time there are some consequences which must be recognized.

It implies, first, that no art must be cultivated except that which is accessible to the masses and suited to their intelligence. It should be remembered that the problem of freedom of thought in the treatment of moral questions is a comparatively modern one in art and literature. There was a time

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when books were not accessible to all as they are to-day. Instruction was the privilege of a few and literature was confined to the educated classes. From the present moral point of view, the literatures of past centuries were much freer than ours. Of course no one in our day would be likely to suffer imprisonment or torture or death for expressing ideas disapproved by political or ecclesiastical authorities; but the restriction now imposed by moral obligations, by what is called "public opinion," is in fact even greater than the physical coercion of past centuries. We are not concerned here with the question whether the present standpoint is better or worse than the old. But that democracy is responsible for the limitation of freedom of speech and thought that hampers modern authors is certain. This is recognized by some of those who have come forward lately protesting against liberty in literature. The writer recently attended a large meeting of one of the important literary clubs in this country, where the chief speaker, a well-known professor of ethics, said that if no protest is made against the too free treatment of certain questions in novels or on the stage, our democracy will be seriously threatened.

The attempt to restrict moral discussion has another *consequence.* It is an assumption that our present moral code is final. Now, in the progress of centuries, as every one knows, ethical standards have changed. Our modern conception of marriage, our duties toward children, our moral attitude toward inferior races, and so forth, have undergone complete transformation. On what ground, then, can we claim to have reached the definitive truth in those matters? Certainly not on the ground that the practical results are ideal. Let us take the country where modern principles have been allowed most freedom to develop unhampered by traditions—America. As the outgrowth of our conception of marriage we have the fact that the world over America is called the "land of divorce;" as the outgrowth of our conception of civil freedom we have "bossism." To accept as permanent a social system which yields such results would not be encouraging.[1]

[1] One might answer that these are not *necessary* results of modern conceptions. This is perhaps true; but then, let other social systems have the

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We allow liberty of thought in philosophical, in economic, and in scientific problems, to a certain extent in religious problems—why this exception in the case of moral problems? What if the idea of the sacredness of the moral code then in existence, had been successfully enforced in the time of Socrates, Buddha, Christ, Luther, Wesley, even of Emerson? The moralists who would forbid a perfectly free discussion of such topics as Mr. Bernard Shaw's plays deal with are concerned first of all with the welfare of modern democracy. They do not discuss literary art; they merely aim to defend democracy against a too free art.

Our conclusion is this: The Anglo-Saxon point of view is *right* in that it takes into consideration our modern social ideals, and *wrong* in that it does not take art into consideration. The problem is not solved; one of its elements is simply denied recognition.

We need not explain at length the Latin point of view, since it is exactly the reverse of the Anglo-Saxon. The French seems to care nothing, or very little, about the immediate consequences of theories expressed in works of art which are within reach of the general public. They act as if the mediocre-minded masses did not exist at all, or as if they ought to be at least wise enough to leave alone what they cannot understand. Therefore, if an author has some valuable idea to propose, whatever it may be, he expresses it regardless of consequences, the result being that it may do a great deal of harm; for some will twist ideas, or quote an author to justify their greed, their lust, their passions.

While the Anglo-Saxon point of view, as we have seen, safeguards public morality at the expense of freedom of art and of thought, the French point of view *vice versa,* safeguards freedom of thought, sometimes at the expense of public morality.

When once this truth has been fully grasped with its logi-

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benefit of this argument. The cruelty of masters, for instance, is not a necessary result of slavery; in fact everybody agrees that many slave-owners were excellent masters. Yet even though they were all good masters, no one would be in favor of slavery again. The same holds good in other cases.

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cal consequences in practical life, the contention made in our introductory remarks can hardly be denied, namely, that the two points of view are irreducible, at least as long as the supporters of either remain consistent; for, either you take the ground that views which are socially dangerous should be suppressed, or you recognize the rights of free thought as more important than any moral harm which may result from the expression of such views. In the former case you necessarily limit the freedom of literature, in the latter you disregard the welfare of modern democracy.

But why is it so? How is it that two countries should adopt such widely different attitudes in their conception of art?

The kind of literature produced will depend greatly, as we have seen, upon what the reading public want; and where there are wide contrasts in culture, education and social conditions, the public must be different. It is futile to criticize authors from an abstract point of view; their works should be judged with reference to the special public for which they were written.

Now in comparing, for instance, two countries like America and France, one will be struck by this essential difference: in America there is held to be only one general public, while in France this unity does not exist; there is more than one public. It is true that before the Revolution there was only one public for literature, namely, the cultivated public; the mass of the people did not even know how to read or write. But after the Revolution conditions changed; democracy soon created a demand for popular literature and it was supplied. At the same time many authors (Stendthal, Mérimée and others) objected to lowering literature to the level of social democracy, keeping up the traditions of a literature for an intellectual aristocracy. The struggle continued all through the nineteenth century (think of men like Baudelaire, Barbey d'Aurevilly, Flaubert, Leconte de l'Isle, Villiers de l'Isle Adam). Even after the democratic ideals had conquered in political and social life, a strong protest was made against their acceptance in literature, the group of authors known as "Symbolists" proving especially fierce in their attacks against the in-

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vasion of the *bourgeois* spirit. Their efforts have not been in vain; as a consequence, there are still in France two literatures: the old, traditional, artistic literature which requires culture on the part of the reader; and popular literature.[2] Writers are not compelled to strike the unhappy medium of mediocrity and remain within the reach of all classes in order to find readers. They generally choose at the beginning of their careers either to write "up" or "down." A sufficient amount of literature is supplied fitted for the masses (exciting slum stories like de Kock's, fighting stories like "The Three Musketeers," love stories like "L'Abbé Constantin"); and others who approach a subject seriously and treat it thoroughly have another public that understands them:—of course, a rather small public, the truly educated public.

There are a few sporadic cases of authors of the higher type who are read also by the general public, as *e. g.* Zola and Maupassant, whose art in telling stories can be thoroughly enjoyed by people who do not in the least care for, or understand their philosophy, just as the fables of LaFontaine are enjoyed both by children and by the deepest thinkers. Another exceptional case is Victor Hugo; on the one hand his philosophy is commonplace, and on this account he is very popular with the masses while very much despised by professional critics; but on the other hand his admirable mastery of the French tongue wins praise even from the most exacting readers.

If one comes to look at things from this standpoint, and regards the public, not as a kind of neutral entity, but as a living agent which responds to literature and art according to different degrees of culture and intellectual attainment, the whole problem is transformed. The question cannot be settled once for all from a merely theoretical point of view and *sub specie aeternatis;* the truth is that a work of art—novel, drama, painting, etc.—may be considered excellent in one country and bad in another, and may be judged in like manner with reference to two different publics in the same country. The

[2] I have given a short sketch of the history of this struggle between the two literatures in France since the time of the French Revolution up to our own day in an article in *The Bookman,* November, 1902.

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famous words of Pascal: "Vérité en decà des Pyrénées, erreur au delà" cannot yet be used in a purely ironical sense; they express actual condition.

We are not then surprised at the attitude taken in regard to French literature or to the writings of Bernard Shaw by the majority of moralists in America; they read French authors and judge them bad because their books are not suited for the general American public, especially for the masses. But in France the educated portion of society form a separate circle which allows not only the treatment of topics that would be objectionable for the masses, but a treatment of them from another than the conventional point of view.

When one remembers that nearly all the orthodox views of to-day were once heterodox, it may easily follow that the moral standards held at present will in time give place to others. New conceptions work slowly; but ideas advanced by the educated strata of society gradually filter down to the uneducated. Therefore, in the writer's opinion, an "aristocratie intellectuelle" is necessary, and in the long run will contribute to the general welfare.

The Anglo-Saxons, in trying to keep from the masses ideas which are not easily understood, admit the existence of a sphere of thought above the comprehension of the general public. They thereby concede the value of an independent *élite*. It is remarkable that they pay special attention to the higher literature in France, and write about it in papers and periodicals. But an unexpected result is that in this way, the literature for the *élite* in France is brought before the general public in America—for which it was not intended and is not suitable. Hence the severe judgments, from a moral point of view, which are passed upon products of French literature. Such criticisms would be right only if these works had been meant for the general public.

From what has been said, it appears that really good writers in France, because of their freedom to deal with all subjects—even with those that touch the most questionable social relations, are because of their freedom, in an unusually favorable position as compared with writers of some other countries.

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Among American authors, for instance, literary art, to its disadvantage, is confined to narrower limits. But can it be expected that the favorable conditions that prevail in France will continue? French authors have been complaining bitterly in recent years of the forced "democratization" of literature and art—but especially of literature—that is following closely upon the triumph of democracy in social life. Many have gone so far as to deny the blessings of democracy because they see in the modern conceptions of life the doom of their artistic ideals, and they are unwilling to pay that price for social progress. To them there is a real incompatibility between art and democracy. In the writer's opinion, however, these protests are useless; to try and stop the formidable wave of democracy is to build a wall of sand against the tides of the ocean. Renan, who was much concerned with this problem, struck what seems to be the most reasonable attitude. He pointed out how idle was the attempt to oppose the inevitable. He thought that the modern social evolution should be allowed to pursue its course without interference. As for the few incorrigible social dreamers and literary idealists, he said they should try to be content without endeavoring to convert the world to their views. If they would leave the world alone, they would be left alone in their turn, and might be much happier in their solitude than they think.

In this resignation advocated by Renan there is, no doubt, a note of deep pessimism. One may nevertheless take a more hopeful view. Alongside of the growth of democracy, another tendency, directly springing from it, is gaining ground every day, namely, cosmopolitanism, and the effects of this tendency will surely be felt in the higher spheres of life as elsewhere. The educated classes of different countries instead of each remaining almost completely isolated should come into closer relations and understanding and assert their vitality and permanence in the moral leadership of the world. In fact, signs are not lacking which indicate a slow movement in that direction.

BRYN MAWR COLLEGE. A. SCHINZ.

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PATRIOTISM: A PRIMITIVE IDEAL.

Patriotism sits in a precarious seat among the virtues. It is now even maintained in certain quarters that she is a fault decked out in flouncing garments, that she comes of the blood of egoism, injustice, and self-aggrandizement. The fact that this accusation is made by complainers not against the moral culture but against the political science of our time, makes it the more formidable to our pragmatic minds, and we find even the men-of-affairs, who are commonly supposed to shun wisdom, giving their attention to this problem in pure dialectics. Not only Tolstoi and Kropotkin, not only the great men whose priesthood is the marriage of theory with practice, but the little actual men of the Chambre in Paris are wrought up over this. M. Deschanel, in a debate with M. Jaurès of the socialist party, makes this startling outcry:

"I demand that inside the University there be taught to pupils and masters patriotism! That those hideous sophisms by which their spirit is perverted be renounced, and that disciplinary penalties be inflicted upon those who preach disobedience to the laws!"

On the other hand, and with some show of reflection, M. Jaurès has this to say:

"There is no idea, not even the idea of the nation, that is unapproachable, that escapes all discussion. . . . The laboring class will defend the liberty of the nation, but it will not be the dupe of those who wish to exploit against it the idea of the nation."

Yet it is not only a rapt contemplation of the misery of "villeins" under the plutocracy that suggests hollowness in the motive of our patriots; it is the turbulent re-awakening of Christianity in the pages of Tolstoi—Christianity as ethical truth—that gives strength to the political heretic. A doubt purports to come from heaven. Therefore it behooves us to weigh the whole question, looking toward the future, and not thinking that politics is other than ethics. For it is a pity if for any reason patriotism, once confessedly degenerate from the

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noble stock, must continue to flaunt her antique garments among our court virtues.

The word "patriot" tolls us back to Athens; it is like strong white statuary in the midst of our industry. For these two things, sculpture and patriotism, had their highest development in pagan days. Such yearning after a graven image and renouncing all for the kingdoms of this world, are beauties that must fade before the unimaginable God and his kingdom that is within you. This was the first attitude of the Christian believers, and however sculpture and patriotism may have recovered, we know them to be the bloom of the Acropolis. Theseus, Harmodius, Aristides—the story of Greece is jewelled with such characters. And Socrates is the supreme patriot in history, because he did not die for the state, crowned by her applause; he died in dishonor at the hands of the state, refusing the offer of escape, because to accept it would be disloyal to her laws who had unjustly condemned him. But it is not their practice of this art that we need dwell on, aside from their theory of it. In the lessons of the Academy we shall find gathered the intellectual food upon which these patriots were fed, and by comparing this scripture with subsequent heresy upon the same subject we shall evenly approach the ethical problem.

Plato did not separate his philosophy of what ought to be (politics) from his philosophy of what we ought to do (ethics). After some inconsequential effort to define *justice* as it appears in individuals, he makes Socrates say to the listeners:

"Since then, we are not very expert, it seems proper to make such an investigation of it, as if a person should order persons not very sharp-sighted to read small letters at a distance, and then find out that the same letters are rather larger elsewhere, and in a larger field . . .

"But what analogy do you perceive, Socrates, in the inquiry about justice?

"I will tell you. Do we not say that justice affects an individual and an entire state also?

"Certainly.

"Is not a state a greater object than an individual?

"Greater.

"Perhaps then justice will be more fully developed in what is greater, and also more easily intelligible."

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Now justice in a state he finds to consist in a proper coördination and subordination of the parts. The wisest should be rulers, the courageous should be defenders and executives, the common people should be producers (farmers and artisans), and each should carry out perfectly his own function. To this end the commons must be controlled by the military, and the military must obey the rulers; and with this perfect division of function and ultimate subordination of all to wisdom, the state becomes perfect in virtue, an aristocracy in the true sense.

But in order to attain this perfection of function and obedience must not every man be perfect? So we remove the magnifying glass and discover virtue[1], although written smaller in the individual, to be the same thing—a proper coördination of the parts and subordination of all to wisdom. Sensory impulse (the commons) must be controlled by will (the military) which must obey reason (the ruler). We find often enough within ourselves, mob-rule, oligarchy, tyranny, but we acknowledge aristocracy, or what we call self-control, to be the ideal.

Now our modern interpretation of this would be, and often has been, that Plato illustrates virtue in the individual by means of a ramshackle analogy with the state; but that is as un-Greek as it is careless. "Justice will be more fully developed in the greater," he said. And when he has sketched his ideal republic, thereby clarifying the idea of virtue as it is manifest in the state, he turns to the individual where he expects to find the same idea manifest in other particulars. He does find it so, and we must try to think with him for the time that the thing itself, *virtue,* is the same in one and in the other. Thus he transcends the idea that the individual is a means to the making of a state so far as to discover virtue itself, as an end, in the individual as well as in the state. But in order that the virtue of the individual may become efficient, the reason which rules him must in turn subordinate itself to the rulers of the state, for they

[1] For brevity in the effort to transmit Platonic thought through American modes of thinking I have not tried to perserve a distinction between *justice* and *virtue,* but have used them synonymously here as Plato seems to do in certain places.

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are the wisest of all and the essence of his ideal is that wisdom shall rule throughout. Thus he would not disagree with Socrates himself, whom Xenophon reports as saying that piety consists in acting in agreement with the laws of one's country. In brief, Plato's very method of transcending it, shows that the usual ethical contemplation of the Greeks regarded the state as a considerable organism of which the individual is an inconsiderable organ.

Plato was not unaware that the value of a good state lies in that it reacts to the good of individuals, and his virtue of obedience to the rulers was certainly a glimpse of altruism, whose logical outcome would have carried him beyond the gates of the city-state; but he never recognized that. The subject may be summed up in this way: Virtue in a man demands that bodily desires sacrifice themselves to the purposes of reason; virtue in a state demands that lesser men go out to death or anywhere else at the bidding of the rulers. But a man who had not himself in control would be doubly unable to serve the state, so that virtue culminates in patriotism. Good men without patriotism will not produce a good state, and a good state without patriotic citizens will not hold together; patriotism is therefore an arch uniting and including these two goods. And it is with such thoughts in his heart that Socrates refuses to escape after trial, but sits calmly in his chains awaiting the poison. It is for the same reason, he explains, that he stood firm to his post in the battle of Plataea facing death, namely, that the good man obeys the laws of his fatherland.

The Hebrews were not without national vainglory, as the identification of the history of their government with the history of God's dealings among men would show. They had even less apprehension, indeed, of the possible dignity of a Barbarian before God than did some of the Greeks, notably Socrates. When the hosts of Israel were defeated it meant that God was punishing his people, but when the Greeks fell it meant that God was on the other side. The Greeks were not nobler but more logical. In the service of the God of love and mercy the Israelites had to slaughter the heathen to whom he had not revealed himself. But this was not an unnatural in-

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consistency, for it was but a unification of religion with the moral law as they apprehended it. Early morals demand patriotic service everywhere, and inevitably that demand enters into any conception of the divine will. For Greek and Hebrew alike, then, duty to the moral God and duty to the fatherland are not separate; and the evolution of morality as coincidental with the family, tribe, and race consciousness largely explains the lack of differentiation.

But the ethics of Jesus was revolutionary. He was the first cosmopolitan. Not only did he make no mention of patriot or hero, no demand for military or governmental service, no promise of victorious rebellion ever—not only this, but the very heart of his teaching denies the value of government and state unity.

"Resist not evil, but overcome evil with good."

"The kingdom of God cometh not with observation: neither shall they say Lo here! or Lo there! for, behold, the kingdom of God is within you."

"There is no man that hath left house, or parents, or brethren, or wife, or children for the kingdom of God's sake, who shall not receive manifold more in this present time, and in the world to come life everlasting."

"My kingdom is not of this world: if my kingdom were of this world, then would my servants fight that I should not be delivered to the Jews."

This is the politics of the New Testament. And this is the disappointment of the Jews, who would have had him come in gold and purple glory, vanquishing those kingdoms with fury and with shiny armour. But to perfect a hero you must strip him of the very glory which would invite your worship, and so his heroism made perfect by disgrace has conquered their patriotic scorn.

But greater than this recognition gained is the fact that his method of government proved efficient—so long as it was enacted, and since then wherever it has been enacted. By love and unresistance the first believers vanquished men's minds, so that this gentle teaching crept noiselessly in under the pomp and brag of empire, and by its presence might finally have stifled the heart of such enthusiasm. But pride is too rooted in men. The church had to arise as an embodiment of the opposition of the kingdom of heaven to the kingdoms of this world, although by that very embodiment turning the king-

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dom of heaven, which is bodiless, into a kingdom of this world, and binding upon it the necessity of resistance, chicanery, rivalry in earthly splendor, and upon its subjects the duty of patriotic fealty to an organization as a good in itself, regardless of whether its decrees be cognizant of the moral law or not. In this way the political ethics of Jesus died and the political ethics of Plato survived, because Plato did not so far transcend the nature of earth's citizens.

Thus among the eddies made by the confluence of Greek and Christian ideals which have gone whirling on down to our own time, is this incongruity, that we applaud our nation's hero for valorous murder, while avowing our allegiance to the kingdom of heaven which is betrayed by the deed. And it is at this point in the history of it—if I may call what we have finished a historical sketch—that a singularly rugged unquenchable prophet arises, points with iron logic to the fault, and cries:

"Patriotism or Christianity?"

"The complication which in our time involves the nations: exalting patriotism as they do, educating the young generation in that superstition, and at the same time shirking that inevitable consequence of patrotism —was, has, it seems to me, reached that last degree at which the very simplest consideration, such as suggests itself to every unbiased person, may suffice to show to men the extreme contradiction in which they are placed."

"The salvation of Europe, of the whole Christian world, comes not by being girt with swords, like brigands, as in Wilhelm's picture; not by rushing across seas to kill our brethern: but, oppositely, by casting off that survival of barbarism, patriotism; and having renounced it by disarming; showing the oriental nations an example, not of savage patriotism and ferocity, but that one of brotherly life which has been taught to us by Christ."

We are more orthodox in our creeds than we are in our deeds. We would vault out of our pews and run to the street corner at the noise of a fife if we dared, not because pageantry seduces us from a godlier communion, but because the very god in each of us rises to this tune, announcing in the face of testament, creed, and sermon that something noble is about to be *done*. Aye, and this is our certainty that God made us individuals to a purpose, that the very slaves of custom, the sheep after sheep, do achieve inconsistency, and at cer-

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tain unguarded moments speak and act as though they were separate persons. Our first answer to Tolstoi comes in this irrational and unorthodox form. We cannot spare Leonidas and Wiliam Tell; we cannot have all the Give me Liberty or Give me death wiped out of our own character. Yet on the following Sunday, shall we not find ourselves in our pews again, listening to the quiet story of the world's hero? "If my kingdom were of this world then would my servants fight." And we are perplexed, not because we are worldly, but because we are choked with ideals.

The task of the rest of this essay is not to sustain tradition or orthodoxy as such, but to clarify our ideas, cut away the tangle of particulars, and know, as Plato would, the essence of this contradiction, and the judgment of the highest ethical thought upon it. And, to deprecate the prejudice of tradition, we must first isolate the essence of virtue, or "nobility," as we applaud it in a patriotic death. Does dying in the interest of one's state necessarily constitute a virtue? Surely not, for every traitor and rebel who boasts an organization could give claim to this: John Wilkes Booth gave claim to it, but all hated him. He should have been withheld, you say, by a higher ideal. Then, dying for one's ideal—is that the essence of the thing? But every leaping anarchist can rank himself with Curtius on this basis. No, but their ideals are wrong, you answer, and there is no excuse for it in this age and nation. Then we are brought to the conclusion, are we not, that serving his state will not make any man noble, but serving his ideals, and not only serving these either but assiduously cultivating them, seeing to it they are the best he is capable of? We are to believe as greatly as we can, I think, and then die for our belief.

Curtius was pure gold because he died for the highest ideal of his time, but his death does not sum the morals for posterity. For the race that is set before us is twofold; first it is to be good, and second it is to fire up our idea of the good. The Athenian boys had a running match at their games in which they carried torches, and it was no victory to cross the mark with the torch gone out. This we in America, who have about

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tossed up the contemplative life, may well remember, for no amount of strenuousness with the legs will keep a flame burning while you run.

And on the other hand, in our judgments both of historic and contemporary characters we must keep the distinction between the ideals we can reasonably expect of them, and their virtue in living out these ideals. Heroism is the victory of moral conviction over instinct. So as I have said Harmodius, the tyrannicide, was a hero fit for our worship. I dare say the Russian peasant was a hero, who after throwing his bomb at Alexander, ran to him and threw his arms around him, seeking to support him a while ere they should both be carried off to death. Coming of a sluggish race he conceived morals in the form of a goad and not of a bridle, and with no natural murder, but rather love in his heart, he moved forward on his bloody duty. Certainly death waved him back. We owe a kind of homage to this man, and to a great many who are not of our church.

And under this topic comes the right criticism of Tolstoi, who is a prophet without joy, simply because he does not mark clearly between the evolution of moral ideals and the evolution of virtue. He does not hold out a warm hand to those who are doing their best on a wrong track, nor in his attacks upon our unlovingness do we feel much of the love for which he reasons so strongly. We must not shrink from his logic on that account, however, but guard against a like error, seeing that our question about patriotism is a question of moral culture, of whether patriotism is an ultimate good according to our best standard, so that we are not deciding the virtue or unvirtue of a man who dies for his country either to-day or to-morrow, but whether or not if he had the very highest light he would stay home and work for his family. We shall not smirch our heroes; it is they who demand this of us. If we have not attained a higher ideal than Curtius died for, we have not fulfilled the promise of his death.

The quality involved in patriotism is loyalty, and we would indifferently define it as loyalty to a state. But on reflection Benedict Arnold and every rebel antipatriot is loyal to a state

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of some sort or other, and does his best for it. But he is loyal to the wrong state, you will answer, the *other* state. That is to say, patriotism is loyalty to one's own state. But by "one's own state," do we mean the state in which one was born? Surely not, for one of our foremost patriots was not born here, and do we not boast of the fighting Irish in our armies, and of how we *make* Americans, and of how those made are among the staunchest color-sergeants? There is nothing anti-patriotic, then, in changing one's allegiance from one state to another, provided it is not done in cowardice or greed, for if we boast of our converted immigrants we cannot decry an American who goes British for love of a mild aristocracy, or an heiress, or another London good. Therefore, lest the idea vanish in a haze of inconsistent particulars, we have to define it as *loyalty to the state with which one identifies himself.*

Now loyalty does not become a virtue until it is tested, nor do we proclaim it until we have sacrificed a good to the object of our loyalty. So let us suppose, for an example, one of these continental bickerings to have grown up into an adult war, and some loyal son of France to have gone to the front and got shot to death, leaving three thin children to make their way out of the nursery into the world without youth. And let us assume, for an extreme case of heroism, that he was a peasant living at a distance, to whose worldly status it mattered little whether France was in the hands of a French politician or a German emperor. Meeting this hero in paradise, we ask him:

"Why did you die?"

"I died for France."

"Why should *you* die for France, and not Germany?"

"Because I identify myself with France."

"Why did you not live for your three children instead of dying for France?"

"Because I do not identify myself with them."

You will pronounce such undoubted heroism a mistake, and yet you will see upon reflection that I have not taken a unique case, except that I have taken the *essence* of patriotism (separating it, that is, from various acknowledged goods which are likely to be involved with it) and simply pictured an

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acknowledged good giving way to it. But the superior authority of that good is rooted in altruism, while patriotism draws its tremendous sap from egoism. Savages are loyal to themselves, and patriotism, however much better and more opportune for virtue, belongs in the same column with that loyalty. Dr. Holmes said something of this kind, "What ever church he belongs to, Jones will always be a Jonesite and Smith will always be a Smithite"—an epigram which points very deep.

I suppose Leonidas has initiated many a neophyte into the mysteries of hero worship, because he chose death rather than dishonor; but no doubt if we look around we shall hit upon a still finer heroism. Dispensing with any *ethnic* warrant for it, we can figure a greater hearted Spartan, on whom the light of altruism dawns. Having marshalled his troops for a battle with Athens, while waiting he seems to stand above Greece for a moment on Olympus, seeing the little cause and little outcome of their fight. After all he is neither Spartan nor Athenian, but a son of Jove and a citizen of his world. He walks around a while with these larger thoughts on his brow—no stained-glass-window saint, but a big, genuine wolf-eaten Spartan of the old school, hero enough to laugh. He tells them they are fools to go into battle over nothing, laughs at them, strips off his armor, conquers victory, and goes home. They then come with their fell Spartan laws, try him, condemn him to death, and he dies scorning them. However offensive this is to a historian, it is valuable because it shows that the military attitude of soul is dying in us, not because we fight less, but because we restrict our idea of heroism to primitive deeds, for which culture tends to undermine our enthusiasm.

But virtue dissolves in indiscriminate altruism, and the balancer of sympathy is justice. Justice is above the distinction of ego and alter, above the distinction of earth and mars, and enters from the sky into human society, as anarchy, oligarchy, and tyranny withdraw. It appeared first as temperance in the individual, then as law in the family, then in the tribe, then in the state and nation—a distributing to individuals or units of their rights regardless of their power to seize them, and a right

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valuation of their worth made without compulsion from them. This was achieved socially as lesser units of authority acknowledged themselves *equal* parts of a greater unit; and thus far the greatest unit is the nation. Theoretically then, social justice reigns within the civilized nations, but these larger units still live together in a state of anarchy verging towards tyrannic oligarchy. The custom of just thinking has begot international law, but the civilized world has not a social self, so that there is no executive. Until every nation subscribes itself a unit in the constituted government of the world, social justice will not reign even theoretically here, unless progress takes departure in a new direction.

But individuals can transcend the social structure. Universal justice is in the power of every single man. He can count himself at first hand a citizen of the world, and only secondarily by force of social circumstance, a citizen of any country. Then in his judgments and so far as he is efficient in his actions, he will embody justice and be of the nature of the conceived God. But if he counts himself first a citizen of his country, and zealous for her more than in so far as she represents the true and the good, his ethics will be like the geography of one who never saw a map but takes his judgments from the little valley where fortune dropped him.

It will be held I know that true patriotism exalts only what is good in the nation with which one identifies oneself, and that what I call unjust is not patriotism but "pseudo-patriotism." This is one answer made to Tolstoi, and as an answer it is absurd for two reasons. First, because if one were loyal to one's nation only in so far as it was true and good, and loyal in judgment and action to an opposing nation when that was on the truer and better side, one would not be loyal to any nation, but to truth and goodness. That is, there would not be any content for the idea of patriotism, it would have no place either in our dictionaries or our lives. It is this misapplication of the word patriot to a man who serves the people of his country, *within* the country, by seeking to penetrate into their system of government with his moral ideals intact, which causes a large part of the confusion. He is not serving a fortuitous father-

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land of *his,* which owes its existence as a unit to its contrast with other people's fatherlands, but he is serving a certain definite body of individuals among whom fortune has placed him, and who, for the furtherance of justice, are constituted a state. He is not a patriot, but a good man and a servant of men. But again the answer is absurd, because if we are to extol a patriot above one who is not a patriot, his patriotism must have some consequence in his belief or conduct. A good man will always be loyal to what is good, and unloyal to what is bad—but a patriot is to have some quality further than that of a good man who is not a patriot. And in fact he does exhibit this quality, namely, of always being prejudiced in his judgment of what is good and what is bad in favor of the nation with which he identifies himself. Patriotism therefore gives an additional quality to a good man, and that quality is injustice.

Another hysterical reply is this, "Does not a man owe a debt of gratitude to the nation that protects him?" But every child knows that gratitude implies personality, that one cannot be grateful to a stick or a stone or an abstraction. Man cannot be grateful to the state. To what person in the state does he owe this debt of gratitude? Shall it be the statesman to whom he gave his vote, or the politician who corrupted him to get it? The people in general, you answer. But, will not a man do the greatest service to the people of his nation, as well as to the people of other nations, by being good and just, which is in its highest analysis to be a cosmopolitan? A good man owes nothing, for he has paid all these debts in advance; nor, if there is a moral order, will he ever be required to pay any debt by subtracting from the size of his goodness.

But perhaps in comparing patriotism with absolute justice the contrast is written almost too large for our microcosmic minds. A just man identifies himself with the universe, and that is not easy. Let us assume that patriotism is the widest virtue we know, and contrast that with a narrower circle—"party loyalty." The idea comprised in these words constitutes the sentimental part of a politician, an hereditary decay in him which prevents his seeing with the eyes of a statesman. A little reflection upon the nature of a political party suffices to

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show that party loyalty separately continued involves disloyalty to the welfare of the nation. Every party many times opposes its own phantom in the flesh and blood of its opponent. It is thus inconsistent with patriotism to boast of party loyalty; one must be loyal to what platform speaks for the welfare of the nation, and there must be no other considerations. The popular custom of calling "Turn-coat" to a man who bolts his party, the praise and denunciation which are effective in our conventions as to whether a man has been a "stanch Republican" or a "stanch Democrat," are signs of a sickened patriotism. For if a man be a stanch American, it is highly improbable that he has been either a stanch Republican or a stanch Democrat. Where party loyalty acquires a meaning over and above loyalty to one's convictions, it begins to be anti-patriotic; and where patriotism acquires a meaning over and above loyalty to the right it begins to be unjust. The idea of patriotism therefore, which must be a separate idea, stands counter to the real ethical sense of the times, as egoism and injustice. It is not noble to die merely for one's country, after one has seen that it is extravagant; and to shout for one's country in the face of others that stand equal, is to sell for sentiment one's birth-right to the universal judgment.

The awkwardness of our position in protesting loyalty both to reason and tradition on this point is exemplified in those Paris debates, where the left applauds all eloquence both upon France and upon ethical principles, but where the right in its zeal for France and fear of the anti-militarists is becoming more and more sparse in recognition of Christianity. The Church, I believe, occupies the extreme right. This naivete of the modern world of nations is not unlike the blunder of the Americans, who imitate the English in their custom of driving from the right, while they no longer turn to the left, which furnished a reason for doing it. We still deify an international murderer, although we have long since repudiated the reasoning of the Greeks in support of this predacious virtue. The anti-military propaganda so denounced in the Chambre, whatever their method, have both reason and morals for their pre-

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mises; and it is well they have, for they fight an unequal fight with Custom.

But we need not travel to France for an incongruity. Jacob Riis and his book, "The Making of an American," furnish a rare illustration. The theme of his book is this: that there is a higher good than patriotism, which demands that we sever the ties of fatherland, and stand out for what is best and what we believe in, whether it be in our land or in our enemy's. Mr. Riis abandoned his native hills, and went where he could do the Lord's work better for some reason than he could do it there. But this gracious conduct and philosophy was misnamed by him, cramped into the corset of Patriotism, and exhibited to stir our national pride—which it did, because we are egotists and we are not artists. In this form how unbeautiful it must have seemed to the inhabitants of the crags and peaks of Scandinavia! But strip it of these silks and stays of sentimentality, name it "The Making of a Cosmopolitan," and they need not be hurt with envy, nor, what is more necessary, need we be hurt with pride. It becomes then a forward move, a breaking of those boundaries of nations, which were set at the caprice of history, in the interests of a more permanent principle. As an example, however, of labored loyalty to the tradition of patriotism after the reason has flown higher, it is hollow and like an empty cocoon. Patriotism is a virtue in the childhood of nations, as pride is a virtue in children, a prerequisite of growth.

Yet I am not sure that dialetics ever convinced anybody of anything, and I would refer you to the pages of Tolstoi, who never bothers with these *a priori* considerations, but points outward like a poet to the unbearable bloody results of this predatory survival. His vision gives my meditation reason for being.

"Whether people wish it or do not wish it, the question stands clear to mankind, How can this patriotism, whence come human sufferings, sufferings both physical and moral, be necessary and be a virtue? . . . Why are Armenians and Turks now agitated, being massacred, becoming like wild beasts? Why are England and Russia, each anxious for its own share of the inheritance from Turkey, waiting upon, and not ending, these butcheries of Armenians? Why are Abyssinians and Italians being massacred? Why was a terrible war within an ace of outbreak over Venezuela, and since, another over the Transvaal? And the Chino-Japanese war, the Russo-Turkish, the Franco-German? And the bitterness of conquered nations:

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Armenians, Poles, Irish? And the preparations for a war of all nations? All this is the fruit of patriotism. Seas of blood have been shed over this passion; and will yet be shed for it, unless people free themselves of this obsolete relic of antiquity."

Or you may turn the leaves of history and see for yourself how many men have lied and slaughtered and died, not for liberty, not for land, not for their honor even, but for a silk and an abstraction. Glorious and heroic it is to look back upon, but the men of the future will not feel their blood leap up to the sound of a name that has nothing further for them than the music of its syllables. Naturally the laboring classes have found this out soonest, for it is scorched into their comprehension that the state is not a good in itself; its militia has not, as Plato dared advise, kept off the two first enemies, riches and poverty. But it is the duty of the rest of us to find out that so long as we identify ourselves with a nation further than service to the good demands, while the nations live together under anarchy, we shall be stained as they are. The few Lafayettes of the past demand something nobler of us.

It is the subject of much conciliation oratory between politics and ethics that good men must enter the government even at the price of certain corners and fringes of their goodness, for otherwise our country will not survive. And the answer is rarely made that our country is not worth a compromise. Socrates prayed for "the good," and if we can adopt his wisdom there, we shall not be eager to preserve our country and its evil at the price of the first good to hand—a good man. Repelled by politics we shall turn to other ways of service, knowing that there are governments within governments, and hopes within hopes.

Nor does strength die out of the world as duelling and patriotism wane. At the death of this distorter of history, and the ferine mind she fosters, a new militia is born to carry a starry banner. For, if we can venture a quantitative judgment, it takes more solitary courage to live and die a world heretic like George Fox or Tolstoi, than it does to risk an emblazoned death amid a nation's applause.

WILLIAMS COLLEGE. MAX FORRESTER EASTMAN.

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THE SPORTSMAN AT BAY.

Every one knows the old story of the Wildgrave, that spectral huntsman who, for the wrongs done by him in the past to his suffering fellow-creatures, was doomed to provide nightly sport for a troop of ghostly pursuers.

> The Wildgrave flies o'er bush and thorn,
> With many a shriek of helpless woe;
> Behind him hound, and horse, and horn,
> And "hark away," and "holla ho!"

If we may judge by the signs of the times, a similar fate has now overtaken the modern Sportsman, who finds to his dismay that his proud vocation no longer goes unchallenged, but that he is compelled to stand on his defence before the force of ethical opinion, and to play the part less of the pursuer than of the pursued. Nowadays it is the Humanitarian who, in the intellectual discussion of sport, derives keen enjoyment from the "pleasures of the chase," and having "broken up" the Royal Buckhounds, after a ten years' run, is hunting the Sportsman from cover to cover, from argument to argument, in his exposure of the cruelties of that "amateur butchery" which seeks a selfish pleasure in the infliction of pain and death.

The sportsman, in fact, is now himself standing "at bay;" and it may be worth while to consider what value, if any, attaches to the excuses commonly put forward by him in justification of his favorite pastime. On what moral grounds are we asked to approve, in this twentieth century, such seemingly barbarous practices as the hunting to death of stags, foxes, and hares; the worrying of otters and rabbits; or the shooting of vast numbers of game birds in the *battue?* The hunted fox, as we know, has many wily resources for throwing his pursuers off the scent. What are the corresponding shifts and wiles of the hunted sportsmen?

The first, perhaps, that demands notice is the frequent appeal to "Nature," and even (when the hunter happens to be a man of marked piety) to the savage instincts which the Creator, it is assumed, has implanted. "Were not otter-hounds created

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to hunt and kill otters?" asked a devout correspondent of the *Newcastle Daily Journal* in a recent discussion. "Therefore," he continued, "let me ask these persons (the opponents of sport) what right they have to place their own peculiar faddism against the wisdom of the Creator?" In like manner a distinguished hunter of big game, Mr. H. W. Seton-Karr, has defended himself as follows in the *Daily Chronicle:*

"If a person experiences pleasure in the chase, such as in fox-hunting or deer-stalking, or even in lion-hunting, the rights and wrongs of that natural instinct are a personal matter between that man and his God. That in common with all carnivorous creatures we do possess God-planted instincts of the chase, is a fact. Why did Almighty God create lions to prey nightly on harmless animals? And should we not, even at the expense of a donkey as a bait, be justified in reducing their number, sacrificing one for the good of many?"

The answer to all this pious verbiage is, of course, very simple. In view of the fact that the sportsman of the present day professes to be *civilized,* and is at any rate nominally a member of a civilized state, it is quite irrelevant to plead that the prepensity to hunt is natural to the *savage* man. We are continually striving in other departments of life to get rid of ferocious instincts, an inheritance from a savage past, which may, or may not, be "God-planted," but are certainly very much out of place in a society which regards itself as humane. Why, then, should it be assumed that an exception is to be made in favor of the hunting instinct? The charge against modern blood-sports is that they are an anachronism, a survival of a barbarous habit into a civilized age; nor can it possibly be any justification of them to show that nature herself is cruel, for as we do not make savage nature our exemplar in other respects, there is no obvious reason why we should do so in this. And as for the statement that a man's treatment of the lower animals is a "personal" affair "between that man and his God," it can only provoke a smile. For man is a social being, and not even the sportsman, belated barbarian though he may be, can be allowed the privilege of thus evading the responsibility which he owes to his fellow-citizens in a matter affecting the common conscience of the race.

But the wild animals, it is argued, put themselves outside

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the pale of consideration because they prey on one another. One searches in vain for justice and mercy among the lower animals—such is the strange reason advanced by Sir Herbert Maxwell as an excuse for showing no justice or mercy to *them*.[1] But, in the first place, it is not a fact that these qualities are non-existent in the lower races, where co-operation is as much a law of life as competition; and secondly, if it were a fact, it would have no bearing whatever on the morality of sport. For why should we base human ethics on animal conduct? Still more, why should we imitate the predatory animals rather than the sociable? And finally, why, because some animals kill for food, should *we* kill for pleasure? The cruelty of Nature can afford no possible justification for the cruelty of Man, for as Leigh Hunt wrote in that trenchant couplet which may be commended to the notice of the sportsmen:

> That there is pain and evil, is no rule
> That I should make a greater, like a fool.

Next we come to the kindred sophism drawn from "the necessity of taking life." To kill, we are reminded, is unavoidable; for wild animals must be "kept down" or the balance of nature would be deranged. That, of course, is undeniable; but unfortunately for the sportsman's argument, it is a fact that the breed of foxes, rabbits, pheasants, and other victims of sport, is artificially kept up, not down, in order that there may be plenty of hunting and shooting for the idle classes to amuse themselves with. So far from securing the effective destruction of noxious animals, sport indirectly prevents it; more than that, it causes the killing to be done not only ineffectively, but in the most demoralizing way, by making a pastime out of what, if done at all, should be done as a disagreeable duty. But here we must in justice mention a new and ingenious excuse for blood-sports which (to add to its zest) was put forward by a clergyman. It is necessary to take life, he argued, and what is necessary is a duty; and it is right, as far as possible, to make a pleasure of one's duties, and therefore—but the conclusion is plain! Presumably the reverend gentleman, had

[1] *Blackwood's Magazine*, August, 1899.

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he lived a century back, would have found the same pious justification for the practice of making up pleasure parties to see felons hanged.

Speaking generally, we may class the sportsman's remaining arguments under two heads—those which aim at showing that sport is of benefit to mankind, and those which actually discover it to be a blessing to the animals themselves. In the former and more prosaic category must be placed the queer assertion that sport "adds to the food supply" of the nation. We have all read how, after some aristocratic "shoot," a number of pheasants or other palatable game were presented to the local hospital. Sport, it is seen, goes hand in hand with the charitable and the philanthropic—truly a touching picture! But the fact remains that the cost of the animals who are thus reared primarily for sport, and secondarily for the table, is far in excess of their market value as food, and this at once knocks the bottom out of the sportsman's patriotic contention. Every stag that is stalked, every pheasant that is mown down in the *battue* and every hare or rabbit that is knocked over in covert-shooting, has cost the country much more to produce than it is worth when butchered; and the game-preserver, far from being helpful to the community in this respect, is a positive incumbrance to it, as wasting labor in the production of what is not a food, but a luxury. Game is reared not for the benefit of the many, but at the cost of the many, to gratify the idle and cruel instincts of the few.

Not less illusory is the plea so frequently made in sporting journals, as a justification of sport, that hunting and shooting "give employment" to a large number of people. "Do these hyper-humane faddists," asks the *Irish Field,* "ever consider how, by doing away with many of what they are pleased to call spurious sports, they would be taking the actual bread and butter out of the mouths of thousands of men and their families? Hunting, shooting, and other sports give employment to such a vast number of people, directly and indirectly, that it would be nothing short of a national calamity if they were discontinued for any cause."

In like manner, the author of a pamphlet entitled, "Sport

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a National Benefactor," has calculated that fourteen millions of money are expended annually in Great Britain on hunting, shooting, and fishing, and jumps to the conclusion that these pastimes are a national benefit on that account. What is really proved by such statistics is that blood-sports are a terrible drain on the resources of the nation, and that fourteen millions are annually diverted from productive labors to be employed on the silliest form of luxury—the killing of animals for the mere amusement of rich people. It is the old fallacy of supposing that all expenditure of money, without regard to the nature of the commodities produced, is beneficial to the community at large.

Then there is the much-vaunted "manliness" of sport, so important a quality, we are told, in an imperial and military nation. Yet what could be more flagrantly and miserably *un*manly than for a crowd of men to sally forth, in perfect security themselves, armed or mounted, with every advantage of power and skill on their side, to do to death with dogs or guns some poor, skulking, terrified little habitant of woodside or hedgerow? This is what Sir Henry Seton-Karr has to say on this point:—

"Only those who have experienced it can realize the strength of the hunter's lust to kill the hunted, though they may find it difficult to explain. It is certain that no race of men possess this desire more strongly than the Anglo-Saxons. . . . . Let us take it that in our case this passion is an inherited instinct—which civilization cannot eradicate—of a virile and dominant race, and that it forms a healthy natural antidote to the enervating refinements of modern life."

The obvious answer to this claim is that civilization *is* eradicating the destructive instincts of sport—with extreme slowness, no doubt, as in the case of all barbarous inherited tendencies, but surely and certainly, nevertheless; and the fact that blood-sports are already condemned by the majority of thoughtful people is a clear indication of what verdict the future will pass on the profession of killing for "fun." That good physical exercise is provided by field sports, none will deny; but it is just as undeniable that such exercise can be as well or better

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provided in other ways—by the equally healthful and far more manly sports of the gymnasium and the playing-field, which, be it noted, are capable of being utilized by a much larger number of people than the privileged pastimes of the crack huntsman and "shot." There is no reason why the mass of the population should not, under a juster social system, have leisure to derive benefit from cricket, football, boating, hockey, and the other rational sports; but it is very evident that only a very few can ever find recreation in those blood-sports which are absurdly called "national." The rational and humane sports may be for the many; the "national" and cruel sports must be for the few; that is not the least of the striking differences that distinguish them.

And as for the justification of sport as a training for war, the question arises what *kind* of sport and what *kind* of training are intended? Training is either physical or mental. As far as physical training is concerned, blood-sports are no better preparation for war than ordinary athletics, but if it is mental and moral training that our patriots have in mind, it may be granted that there is nothing so efficacious as blood-sports as a school for one quality—callousness. It all depends on what is the type of character that we desire to produce. If we wish our country to be a peaceful, sympathetic, and considerate member of the family of nations, then assuredly it is not wise to encourage its youths in the practice of blood-sports. To break up hares, to worry stags, to shoot pigeons from traps, to dig foxes out of their holes, and to course bagged rabbits—such sports as these cannot possibly conduce to generosity of character or to that much misunderstood quality which is called "manliness." And finally, if the Japanese have become a great military nation without the practice of field-sports, what can be the sensc of repeating—in the face of experience no less than of reason—that hunting and shooting are an essential training for war?

But it is when he is demonstrating that sport comes as a boon and a blessing to the non-human races which are the victims of it, that the sportsman is most entertaining. "They like it," he asserts, when any pity is expressed for the hunted fox

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or stag. This love, on the part of certain animals, for being hunted to death is surely one of the most curious facts in natural history, and makes it seem almost an injustice to horses, cows, pigs, and other domestic creatures, that they are denied a privilege which is so freely accorded to their wilder brethren. Why should deer, for instance, be specially favored in this respect? The stag, as Lord Ruthven once remarked at the meeting of the Sporting League is "a most pampered animal." "When he was going to be hunted he was carried to the meet in a comfortable cart. When set down, the first thing he did was to crop the grass. When the hounds got too near, they were stopped. By and by he lay down, and was wheeled back to his comfortable home. It was a life that many would like to live." It appears, therefore, that it is a loss, a deprivation, not to be hunted over a country full of barbed wire and broken bottles by a pack of staghounds. Life is mean and poor without it; for to humans and non-humans alike, sport, as Lord Ruthven expressed it, is "the gift of God."

But the sportsman can be considerably more "slim" than this, when hard pressed in controversy by his implacable pursuers, and among his many devices for confusing the issue, the most subtle, perhaps, is the metaphysical argument which pleads that it is better for the animals to be bred and killed in sport than not to be bred at all, and that it is to the "preservation" which sport affords that certain species owe their escape from extinction. When a bill was introduced in parliament in 1883, for the prohibition of the cruel sport of Pigeon Shooting, it was opposed by Sir Herbert Maxwell on the ground that a pigeon would rather accept life, "under the condition of his life being a short and happy one, violently terminated," than not be brought into existence; and the same sportsman has since stated, as a "salient paradox," that one who takes delight in pursuing and slaying wild animals may claim to rank among their best friends. It escaped Sir Herbert Maxwell's notice, as it escapes the notice of all who seek refuge in this amusing piece of sophistry, that it is beyond our power to ascertain the feelings or the preferences of a pigeon, or of any other being,

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before he is in existence; what we have to deal with is the sentience of animals that *already* exist.

And as for the contention that animals are "preserved" by sport, it is sufficient to point out that it rests on a mental confusion between the individual animal and the species. It would be little comfort to the individual fox who is torn to pieces by the hounds to know, if he could know, that his species is preserved by his tormenters, and that the same process of death-dealing will thus be perpetuated. When Sir Herbert Maxwell asserts that, but for fox-hunting, the fox would have been exterminated in England, like the wolf, the answer, of course, is that of the two methods extermination is far the more merciful. Can it be pretended that it would have been kinder to wolves to keep a number of them alive in order that sportsmen might for ever pursue and break them up?

And really, if it is so kind to animals to preserve them that they may be worried with hounds, we ought to feel some compunction at having allowed the humane old sport of bear-baiting to be abolished, for according to the same "salient paradox" the bear-baiter was Bruin's best friend. It is sad to think that there used to be bears in many an English village where now they are never seen! Yet, strange to say, Sir H. Maxwell refers to bear-baiting as "rightly relegated by law to the catalogue of outrage," forgetting that his sporting predecessors defended *their* brutal pastimes by the same fallacies as those in which the modern sportsman confides.

It is for the fox, perhaps, that the sportsman's solicitude is most touching and most characteristic. "If we stay fox-hunting," it has been said, "foxes will die far more brutal deaths in cruel vermin traps, until there are none left to die." How tender, how considerate, is this disinterested regard for the welfare of the hunted animal! The merciful sportsman steps in, to save a noxious species from extinction, and in return for such "preservation" demands that the grateful fox shall be hunted and worried and dismembered for the amusement of his gentle benefactor. But are not our fox-hunting friends just a trifle too clever in making, at one and the same time, two quite incompatible and contradictory claims for their beloved profes-

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sion—first, that it saves the fox from extermination, and secondly, that it rids the countryside of a very mischievous animal? "For six good months," says the *Sportsman*, "he is allowed to frolic at his ease, with all his poultry bills paid for him." The argument here is that there can be no cruelty in fox-hunting, because the fox is preserved. But in that case what about the following defence of fox-hunting by the editor of the "Badminton Library?" "The sentimentalist," he says, "does not consider those other tragedies for which the fox is responsible, the rabbits, leverets, poultry, and game birds that he devours daily. The death of a fox is indeed the salvation of much life."

So the farmer is to be grateful to the fox-hunter because the fox is killed, and the fox himself is to be grateful to the same person because he is *not* killed! It is obvious that the sporting folk cannot have it both ways; they cannot take credit for the destruction of a pest, and also for preventing that pest being exterminated by the injured farmer. Let them choose one of the alternative arguments, and keep to it.

The more one considers it, one cannot but smile at the sportsman's "love" for the animals whom he so persecutes and worries. Tom Tulliver, we remember, was described by George Eliot as "fond of animals—fond, that is, of throwing stones at them;" and so it is with this affection of the sportsman's. "What name should we bestow," says an old writer, "on a superior being who, without provocation or advantage, should continue from day to day, void of all pity or remorse, to torment mankind for diversion, and at the same time endeavor with the utmost care to preserve their lives and to propagate their species, in order to increase the number of victims devoted to his malevolence, and be delighted in proportion to the miseries which he occasioned? I say, what name detestable enough could we find for such a being? Yet, if we impartially consider the case, we must acknowledge that, with regard to the inferior animals, just such a being is the sportsman."[2]

Such, then, are the arguments which are advanced in all seriousness, and without a suspicion or twinkle of humor, to prove that blood-sports are a benefit to mankind and to the lower

[2] Soame Jenyns, 1782.

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races alike. But, before concluding, I must mention one other piece of reasoning which is as amusing as any specimen of sportsman's logic—the "trust the specialist" fallacy, which asserts that none but sportsmen can fairly pass judgment on sport. For example, when a memorial was presented to a former Prime Minister against the Royal Buckhounds, a certain paper gravely remarked that "what proportion of the protesting gentlemen had ever been on horseback, it was not easy to determine." The assumption, it will be seen, is that when any cruel practice is arraigned before public opinion, we are not merely to trust the specialist on technical matters that rightly lie within his ken, but we are to let him decide the wider *ethical* issues on which, being no more than human, he is certain to have the strongest professional prejudice. It is an argument worthy of the Sublime Porte itself.

In like manner Lord Ribblesdale, when defending stag-hunting in his book on "The Queen's Hounds" expressed the sportsman's case as follows: "Most people will agree that conclusions founded on practice must always have a slight pull when placed in the scales with conclusions based upon theory, hearsay, or conjecture—even granting the fullest credit for sincerity and *bona fides* to the opponents of stag-hunting."

Now it is, of course, absurd to represent the ethical objections to sport as "based upon theory, hearsay, or conjecture," for the methods of sportsmen are well known and beyond dispute, and many of those who most strongly condemn such practices have been sportsmen themselves and are thoroughly conversant with the facts. But what I wish to point out is that Lord Ribblesdale's description of the sportsman's defence of sport as "a conclusion founded on practice" might be just as logically applied to the criminal's defence of crime. To invoke the judgment of an expert, on the morality of a practice in which he is professionally interested, is an error similar to that of setting the cat to watch the cream.

On the whole, it is not surprising that the Sportsman, who can devise no cleverer modes of escape from his humanitarian pursuers than the sophisms above mentioned, is already being brought to bay, and stands in imminent danger of being, con-

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troversially, "broken up." Indeed, considering the nature of the arguments adduced in its favor, one is inclined to think that sport must be not only cruel to the victims of the chase, but ruinous to the mental capacity of the gentlemen who indulge in it. It can hardly be doubted that the ludicrous aspect of modern sport will more and more present itself to those who possess the sense of humor; and we may even hope that the poverty-stricken caricaturists of our comic papers will some day relinquish their threadbare jokes over the blunders of the hunting-field and the shooting-box, to discover that the subject of sport is rich in another kind of comedy—the essential silliness of the habit of sport itself, and the crass absurdity of the arguments put forward by its apologists.

HENRY S. SALT.

HUMANITARIAN LEAGUE, LONDON.



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BOOK REVIEWS.

STUDIES IN THE SERMON ON THE MOUNT. By Rev. The Hon. E. Lyttleton, M. A. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1905. Pp. 392.

It is a pleasure to be able to welcome a really good book on the Sermon on the Mount. These studies are the work of a clear, strong thinker, who is in deep sympathy with his subject.

The book, as Mr. Lyttleton tells us in the Preface, is not a complete work; for it only deals with the actual precepts recorded in the three chapters of St. Matthew's Gospel. Scarcely anything is said about such controversional subjects as the relation between the Matthœan and Lukan reports; nor does it touch on critical and textual questions except when they seem to be bound up with the interpretation of the words. It is "intended for those thoughtful students who wish to get hold of the meaning of the words as they are handed down."

The starting point of these studies was the spontaneous and unstinted admiration professed far and wide for the Sermon on the Mount. The admiration, the author believes, depends, whether consciously or unconsciously, on the main idea of the Sermon. In the Introduction he inquires what that idea is.

The Sermon is not admired because it satisfies human desire for exhaustive and simple directions to guide them in the conduct of life. Its precepts are not exhaustive. They are not intended to be: there are whole tracts of human life on which, apparently, the words of Jesus shed no ray of light. Nor are they simple. Many of them are paradoxical. They do not save us the trouble of thinking, but on the contrary powerfully stimulate thought. "Almost the first principle which a young student lays down for himself in interpreting the precepts is that a literal obedience is not required: we must obey them in *spirit.*" But obedience in spirit is more difficult than literal obedience. It is easier and more simple to turn the cheek to the smiter than to act on the principle—Don't retaliate. In the interest of the smiter it is well sometimes to hit back. And the complex significance of actions must be considered in determining their character. Life is not simple, consequently it cannot be guided by simple rules.

The precepts of the Discourse are obviously not simple and

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exhaustive. But they have one prevailing characteristic. They are all based ultimately on a certain view of God's relation to man, namely, that we are the children of a Heavenly Father, who cares for us and guides our lives. This idea is "so deeply stamped on every phrase and so determines the treatment of every topic, that the admiration stirred among men by the whole Discourse must be largely and mainly due to this characteristic." Man has an instinctive yearning belief in a God who cares how we fare in this life of ours. And Christ's teaching throughout appeals to it. Unless this be so, it is impossible to explain the high estimate in which these words are held. For they advocate aims, motives, and ideas which are independent of and often antagonistic to those most urgently suggested by ordinary human life. In the Beatitudes *e. g.* the speaker goes clean contrary to the maxims and ideas of life which prevail and always have prevailed among mankind. Blessedness is to be obtained by a simple trust in our Father in Heaven, who is ever ready to give good things to them that ask Him. A consciousness of sonship is "completely sufficient to give all needful encouragement to control our waywardness, to clear our vision for the true prospective and to quicken us with an infinite inspiration—fresh, buoyant, and eternal." Guided by this idea, Mr. Lyttleton unfolds the significance of the various precepts with great insight and freshness. He makes us feel vividly and powerfully the appeal of the words of the Master. In explaining the *admiration* of men for Christ's teaching, he does not attach sufficient importance to the setting of the Sermon. It cannot be separated from the rest of the gospel narratives. The singular attractiveness of the whole life and teaching of Jesus is associated in our minds with all His words. Also Mr. Lyttleton lays, perhaps, too much emphasis on the consciousness of sonship as distinguished from the fact of sonship. As a son of the Father, 'man is made in the image of God, and whether we have an instinctive yearning belief in a God who cares how we fare in this life of ours, or not, the words of One who was conscious of His sonship must appeal to what is deepest and truest in our natures. We recognize our native language, and respond instinctively to an expression which appeals to the family dignity. How far we will try to carry out these precepts without faith in a God who cares is another question. The only adequate motive seems to be belief in the Fatherhood of God.

In a chapter (xxxii) on the meaning of Christian, it is pointed

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out that the same prominence of the idea of Fatherhood is observable in the life of Jesus as in His teaching. Hence, the prevailing popular conception of Christianity as a revelation of conduct only, is false. "To imitate Christ is to imitate One who first and foremost was religious: that is, whose life was essentially and perpetually a life of prayer." Prayerfulness was not in His case a "separable adjunct of a life of lofty morality," but its central characteristic. Further, of all Christ's activities the only one adopted for imitation is prayer. His "actions refuse to be classified into categories or described according to any system, and seem almost designed to warn us against imitation except in the one particular that He spent time in prayer to His Heavenly Father." To think that we could live His life without access to the source of His inspiration would be folly. The strenuous and uninterrupted prayerfulness of Jesus may even be taken as "explaining to some extent the utter mystery of such a character appearing in the history of mankind." Because praying is a receiving of divine life and strength, and with it "the character, though adorable in its spotless excellence, becomes to some extent intelligible."

David Phillips.

Radyr, Cardiff, Wales.

Sokrates und die Ethik. Von Hermann Nohl. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1904.

Nietzsche in an aphorism in "Die Fröhliche Wissenschaft," has commented in his strange ironical way in the last words of Socrates as recorded in the Phaedo, "I owe a cock to Æsculapius," and marked it as a sign of the deep hidden pessimism of Socrates, of his conviction that life was really a disease. As we read those words in Nietzsche, we can take them, as we must take so much in "Die Fröhliche Wissenschaft," as suggestive, disquieting, enlightening, but as on the whole misleading and untrue. It is characteristic of the standpoint from which Herr Nohl regards Socrates, that he quite simply and seriously takes these words as indicative of the deepest feelings and sentiments of Socrates. They show that at death "he felt himself released from the illness of this life." This is a book on Socrates written from the standpoint of that modern individualism and scepticism which finds in Nietschze its chief exponent. "The conviction of the irrationality

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of life and the impossibility of comprehending in concept men's ethical relations has given me the light which has guided me through the labyrinth of the Socratic question." So Herr Nohl prefaces his book. For him the great fact about Socrates is his failure. He tried, as no other man had tried, to reduce life to reason, and he ended in a confession of complete ignorance. If we are wise we shall learn from his failure that he had attempted an impossible task.

This is perhaps a new view of Socrates, but Herr Nohl gives us a very striking and admirable picture of the man. He brings vividly before us the impression which Socrates must have made upon his contemporaries. Very suggestive *e. g.* is the remark that Socrates' disciples felt that they could only give an account of their teacher in artistic form. What they had to convey was no positive or formulated teaching, but the living impression of a life. Herr Nohl indeed insists in talking of the irrationality of art and contrasting it in this respect with thought. Of course, if we choose to identify scientific method with reason, and art with irrationality, it is easy to depict the failure of Socrates to reduce virtue to a science as the failure of reason and the triumph of irrationality. But this curious point of view affects only the philosophical moral which the author draws from his account of Socrates' life, not the vigor and the essential truth of his description.

Herr Nohl finds the origin of the Socratic method, and the explanation of the doctrine that virtue is knowledge, in the relation of Socrates to Hippocrates and the Greek school of scientific medicine. This chapter is very suggestive and is, we think, a real contribution to the subject. Socrates' logic is too often viewed in the light of the metaphysical system which Plato constructed out of it, and far too little in the light of its origin.

Less convincing is the author's account of Socrates' attitude to religion. It is possible that Socrates ought to have held the views on that subject which the author attributes to him, but almost certain that he actually did not. We think, too, that this author exaggerates Socrates' skepticism. It is very doubtful whether the early Platonic dialogues with their negative conclusions are as historically true as Xenophon's account of the positive definitions of justice and piety, e. g., which he attributes to Socrates.

But though there are many points in the book where the author's

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arguments are hardly convincing, the book as a whole is the most suggestive and stimulating account of Socrates we have read.

A. D. LINDSAY.

Balliol College, Oxford.

COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION: By Paul S. Reinsch (The Citizen's Library of Economics, Politics and Sociology), The MacMillan Company, New York, 1905. Pp. VIII, 422.

The two works of Professor Reinsch—"Colonial Government," which appeared several years ago, and "Colonial Administration," now under review—serve to bring out clearly the two-fold character of the problems to which the acquisition of over-sea dependencies give rise—that of the endowment of each dependency with a government adapted to its needs, and that of the working and of the special problems, educational, economic and social, that exist in each such territory. The former of these two works related to the first of these classes of problems. In the present work, relating to the second class, the author has not attempted to present a solution of any of these special problems as they present themselves in the insular dependencies of the United States, but instead has sought, in a series of interesting chapters entitled "Education and General Social Improvement," "Colonial Finance," "Currency, Banking and Credit," etc., to give us a comprehensive, though necessarily summary, sketch of the character of these various problems and the manner in which their solution has been attempted in the colonies of European governments, and to some extent in the insular dependencies of the United States.

These chapters appeal more particularly to those who are actively engaged in colonial work, or are making a detailed study of colonial problems. The general reader will be chiefly interested in the author's introductory chapter, in which, as a result of his studies, he gives his own conclusions regarding what may be called the general phases of the colonial question—that is, the extent to which the policy of one government acquiring and holding other territory in a condition of dependency can be justified on ethical grounds or has been vindicated by practical results.

Generally speaking, Professor Reinsch must be included among those who doubt the wisdom of the policy of expansion, not only in so far as the United States is concerned, but as regards other

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countries as well. He thus questions seriously the very foundation of such a policy—the attempt on the part of one country to determine the character of the Institutions that shall prevail in another. He points out that even those institutions and lines of action, concerning the good results of which in countries of an advanced civilization there is an unanimity of opinion, may give quite contrary results in another country having a different or lower degree of advancement. In this connection he specially cities the experience of Great Britain in India. Thus, he writes:

"Experience seems to show that even those institutions which are by us considered the very foundation of good government may have harmful results when introduced into another society. The most striking example of this is found in the experience of Great Britain in India.....Thus, who would not agree that the impartial enforcement of contracts, the system of judicial appeals, representative government, the institution of the jury system, a free press, and liberal education are things about the usefulness of which among us there can be no two opinions. The British introduced these institutions into India with the best of intentions and yet with such results that their opponents can now plausibly argue that they must have been animated with the sinister purpose of disrupting and undermining Indian society. The most unfortunate consequences have resulted. Through the rigid enforcement of contracts the vast agricultural debtor class has been gradually enslaved to the money-lenders and is being ousted from its ancestral holdings. The scientific method of appeals favors the machinations of the unscrupulous native leaders, who gain a livelihood by stirring up litigation and making the most of judicial delay with the result that the confidence of the English population in the justice and efficiency of the law has been impaired."

In another place after describing the educational system that Great Britain has introduced into India, he concludes:

"The system has in general had a most unfortunate effect upon the intelligent life of India, introducing elements entirely alien to Indian culture which have turned the mind of Indian educated men away from the development of their inherited philosophical and literary civilization."

Thus, generalizing, he says that whenever the ideal of a literary training has been followed in colonies disastrous results have been produced; that the natives have been given aspirations which

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cannot possibly be satisfied; that a class has been educated whose sole aim is the securing of governmental positions; and that just to the extent to which education has been extended the people have shown a disinclination to engage in purely industrial work,—in a word, that the system of education which gives only good results in Europe and the United States has failed to benefit, if it has not worked an actual injury, to the less advanced countries into which the attempt has been made to introduce it.

It is not necessary at this time to attempt to pass judgment upon the correctness of these and other conclusions arrived at by Professor Reinsch. It needs scarcely to be said that there are many who, while admitting that mistakes in colonial policy have been made in the past, and will continue to be made in the future, nevertheless hold that the advancement of civilization that has resulted from the colonial policy of European nations and the United States has more than justified its adoption. All that it is desired to do here is to point out that Professor Reinsch has given us a work that not only shows wide reading, but presents a careful study of the ultimate as well as the immediately practical character of the problems to which a colonial policy give rise. As a general introduction to the study of colonial administration, and as a work stimulating thought regarding the fundamental considerations involved, Professor Reinsch's latest contribution constitutes a welcome addition to the growing American literature regarding colonial affairs.

W. F. Willoughby.

San Juan, Porto Rico.

Die Sexuelle Frage. Von Professor Dr. August Forel. Muenchen: E. Reinhardt. 1905.

Professor Forel is a medical man and was formerly superintendent of the Zurich lunatic asylum and professor of Psychiatry at the university of Zurich. He has published several works of a sociological character from a medical point of view, and the present volume, although larger in scope than any of its predecessors, deals with its subject from substantially the same standpoint. In a sub-title he describes the present work as a study of the sex question for educated people on the basis of natural science, psychology, hygiene and sociology.

It is an extensive field which Dr. Forel attempts to explore, and

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although he is able to provide the student with a considerable amount of information at first hand as the fruit of his experiences among lunatics, a good deal of what he has to say is a summary of the opinions of others. The sixth chapter on the history and development of marriage is a reproduction of the investigations of Westermarck, and the chapter on sexual pathology owes a great deal to the publications of Kraft-Ebing on the same subject. Dr. Forel candidly admits his obligations to the labors of others, and his object is not so much to enrich the subject with original results of his own as to bring all our existing knowledge relating to the question of sex to a focus, and to show us what science and history teach us regarding this all-important problem. In the first seven chapters Dr. Forel discusses the history and psychology of sex life, in the seventh chapter we have a discussion of the diseases of sex life; the remaining chapters are of a sociological character and attempt to define the relations which exist between sexual characteristics and the general social life of man.

According to Dr. Forel the fundamental principle in the sex question is the fact that with man as with every other living creature the immanent object of all sex characteristics, including the sentiment of love, is the continuation of the species. It follows from this that all arrangements between the sexes must be of such a nature as will lead to the production of a higher type of humanity, both physical and mental. The production from generation to generation of a higher type of man is the only permanent security we possess for the progress of the world. Social laws and social customs of whatever kind which hinder the production of the best type of manhood are inimical to the march of civilization and the happiness of the race. The supreme object of all who care for social advance should be the creation of a social conscience of such overwhelming power as would prevent the perpetuation of degenerate human types. It will be seen that Dr. Forel takes very much the same view of sex relationships as Mr. Francis Galton. Like Mr. Galton, he would subordinate everything to the one central and supreme purpose of improving the quality of the race. When we look at the average man and the deep-seated customs of society it must be admitted that Dr. Forel sets a colossal task before humanity, perhaps some will say a utopian task. But if we look back at the transformations which have taken place in human opinion in the past it is not at all impossible that a time may come when sex relationships may

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be dominated by an altogether higher standard than exists among us at the present day.

Some of the remedies which Dr. Forel proposes for the defects of our existing matrimonial customs are hardly likely to commend themselves to the social or ethical reformer. He expresses himself in favor of concubinage in cases where marriages are sterile, and seems to overlook all the difficulties and miseries which have been inseparable from this institution in the past. In fact the book is stronger on its medical than on its social side and although it is addressed to the educated public, it is to a large extent a medical book, dealing in many instances with medical details which are more suited to the expert than to the general public. But the whole question of sex relationships is an exceedingly delicate and difficult one and it is most useful to have the opinions of a man of so much expert experience on certain branches of the subject as Dr. Forel.

W. D. Morrison.

London, England.

Let Youth But Know. A plea for reason in education. By Kappa. London: Methuen & Co., 1905.

The Garden of Childhood. Stories for Little Folk at School and At Home. By Alice M. Chesterton. With illustrations by Gertrude M. Bradley, London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1905.

Under the first of these titles, a series of papers originally published in the *Westminster Gazette,* are collected and given to the world in book form. As these papers appeared one after another, they attracted considerable attention and reached a wider audience than any book on education can hope to touch.

Intended mainly as criticism of public-school education, they at the same time and perhaps necessarily dealt with the fundamental problems of all education and so could be read with interest by the ordinary reader as well as by the expert. The author tells us in his introduction to this reprint, that the articles were written before he had made the acquaintance of any authorities on education and no doubt much of their charm and freshness is due to this circumstance. The delightful *naïveté,* with which the well worn themes—the importance of science (or perhaps what would now be rather called Nature Study), the neglect of history, the de-

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fects of a classical curriculum—are presented and discussed without reference to any authorities more professional than Aladdin and Sinbad, Wordsworth and Heine, would have been impossible had the author studied beforehand all the books he names in his introduction and notes or from which he quotes in the appendix. We doubt very much, however, whether these additions constitute any real improvement of the original plan. They seem rather to emphasize the scrappiness and lack of organic unity which are the seroius, although perhaps unavoidable, defects of a book so compiled. Perhaps the most striking and valuable connection between the chapters is to be found in the constant insistence on the importance of the end of education as "the intimate realization of the wonders of nature and of the human lot." The man who has this realization, who attains "a religion of the intellect" is the truly moral man and "by its ethical influence a system of education must stand or fall."

While the first of these books advocates that the teaching of morality, although all important, should be done indirectly through science, history, and literature, rather than by set lessons, the second book is intended to be used in connection with a syllabus of direct moral instruction issued by the Moral Instruction League.

"The Garden of Childhood" is a collection of stories written to illustrate for little children, the lessons on "cleanliness," "manners," "courage," "perseverance," etc., outlined in the syllabus of moral instruction. In the short preface the authoress urges that the moral of each story should be felt by the children rather than emphasized by the teacher.

The stories certainly appear to be so clear and interesting that they should morally explain themselves, but the above suggestion points to one of the chief difficulties which many feel to lie in the way of direct moral instruction. Can children be interested directly in questions of morality? or do they feel a natural, instinctive recoil from all direct teaching of the kind and if so, can and should this be overcome?

The need for moral training of children becomes ever more pressing, and we shall look with anxious interest to the results of the experience of those teachers who are trying to carry out this course of ethical teaching.

MILLICENT MACKENZIE.

University College, Cardiff.

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IN PERIL OF CHANCE. By C. F. G. Masterman, M. A., New York: B. W. Huebsch.

Mr. Masterman, who occupies the position of Literary Editor of the London *Times,* and who with others of the young Liberal Party has been carried into Parliament by the recent movement in English politics has "written in time of tranquillity," some essays of more than passing note.

These essays first appearing in substance, in the *Contemporary Review,* the *Independent Review,* the *Commonwealth,* the *Speaker,* the *Pilot* and the *Daily News,* are now fortunately collected in a book, the form and finish of which is worthy of the rare contents.

The theme of the various essays is sociological, in the fullest meaning of the term. It is a study of ideals, one might say of the passing of the Ideal, and of the relation of present day feeling to the problems of society. Political, social, religious and industrial conditions are vividly portrayed, although after the method of the impressionist; but through these conditions the author is seeking the motives and impulses which now animate society.

Literature is treated from the point of view of its social content, and the treatment given to Henley, Gissing, Meyers, Chesterton, Bernard Shaw, Wells and others, is such as to lay bare their deeper hearts, especially as they relate to the social problem of the age.

Religion also is considered from the standpoint of social need, and the work of Spencer and others of "The New Revolution," and Gladstone, Temple, Wescott, Creighton and Dolling of the older faith, is reviewed in the earnest effort to find what of religious faith yet remains of value to society. The note of despair is frequently struck as Mr. Masterman views the passing of spiritual certainties. This comes more forcefully to view when he studies the statistics of church attendance in London, in the essay on "The Religion of the City." He sees the majority of city dwellers sinking into a weary, unillumined and utterly barren existence, with no horizon beyond the narrow round of toil.

But if there is despair, there is the energy of despair; or something rising out of despair which challenges effort. Condemning Mr. Chesterton's "Blasphemy of Optimism," the author does not turn to pessimism, but rather to melioration. The time of tranquility shall pass. A new day of real social progress is foretold,

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although there is no clear presentation of what that day shall bring, or how it shall come.

This study of present social conditions and ideals through the writings and work of others, is admirably seconded by direct observation on the part of the author; and the essays which will leave the strongest impression on the mind of the reader are those entitled, "June in England," and "In Dejection near Tooting," in which, with concentrated power, he gives a picture of the changes which an age of industrialism is working in the social life.

The scenes described, the personalities studied, and the issues characterized in this book are all English; but the forces seen at work in the inner life of society, as in the outward economic changes going forward, are also to be found in America, and this study of the deeper life of England will throw much light upon our problems in America.

The student of literature, the student of religious life, and the student of sociology will find equal satisfaction in the careful perusal of this book, from which one can but turn away with the feeling that he has spent profitable hours in the presence of a master mind, and with a spirit thrilled with profound and ennobling emotions.

The fineness and finish of the English used, will also prove no small delight to the lover of good prose.

LESLIE WILLIS SPRAGUE.

NEW YORK.

SOCIALISM AND POSITIVE SCIENCE. By Enrico Ferri, London. Independent Labor Party, 1905. Pp. 174.

SOCIALISM AND SOCIETY. By J. Ramsay Macdonald, London. Independent Labor Party, 1905. Pp. 184.

It is interesting at the moment when the British Parliament is regarding its Labor members with the respect due to a new political force to find the Independent Labor Party undertaking the issue of a Socialist's library as a medium for the expression of its teaching. Under the general editorship of Mr. Macdonald there will be produced a series of volumes aiming at an exposition of political philosophy and social economics from the standpoint of Socialism. Such an attempt should be warmly welcomed. Hitherto Socialists have in the main contented themselves with undiscriminating attacks upon existing society and with appeals to sen-

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timent in place of constructive thinking. With the opportunity for action will come a better understanding of what is possible. This is well exemplified by comparing the volumes under review. Professor Ferri, writing primarily for Italian readers, far behind our own in political emancipation and social wellbeing, adheres more closely to the phrases around which has gathered an imaginary glory, and of which vagueness is the chief virtue. "Each has a right to equal reward;" "All men ought to give themselves up to the work that best corresponds to their ability;" are abstract statements that need serious qualification if applied to the actual world. The crude law of surplus value; the existence of only two classes in society, the workers and the owners of property; the purely economic interpretation of history; these are accepted in a way that removes all faith in the author's discrimination. Mr. Macdonald on the other hand, expressly dissociates himself from these crudities. For him Socialism stands for organization. He sees in the present system a failure to achieve an equitable distribution of wealth. The moral character developed in a world directed by self-interest is essentially mean and degraded. Many needs, the satisfaction of which cannot be made the source of individual profit, go unsatisfied. Socialism alone will remedy these evils, thinks Mr. Macdonald. He agrees with Professor Ferri, however, in advocating the support of a strong Labor representation in parliament, dissociated from any other party, which shall devote its whole energies to extending the sphere of state administration. It is here, of course, that individualists disagree. They are as anxious as Mr. Macdonald for the elimination of conflicting interests; for selfishness to give way to the desire for common good. But they ask for a guarantee that a Labor Party will not be as much a representative of a sectional interest as any other. They doubt the ability of administrative Socialism to organize production as efficiently as under a system of individual liberty. This objection is rendered the stronger by the complete failure of the present writers to do justice to the exceeding complexity of the existing industrial organization and to the measure of its success. Instead, by a circular definition, Socialism is always assumed to be synonymous with the end to be gained, namely, perfect organization, animated by a completely ethical spirit. The chief argument in support is the analogy, entirely unscientific, between the State and an Organism. An Organism develops a system of unified control. Hence the life of the society, being an organism,

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must have its affairs directed by the State. Natural selection secures the survival of the fittest. Hence the Darwinian theory, the great scientific law of development in the modern world, guarantees the eventual prevalence of Socialism, which, by definition, is made to coincide with the most efficient system of social relations.

These fallacies are only pointed out because we cannot but feel that the strength of the Socialist position, in many ways so forcibly here stated, is seriously weakened by reliance on a series of false analogies so calculated to do harm if accepted as the basis of constructive political action.

C. J. HAMILTON.

London.

OUT OF WORK. A STUDY OF EMPLOYMENT AGENCIES. By Frances A. Kellor. New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1904. Pp. IX. 292.

This volume, divided into two parts, deals with Intelligence Offices under seven chapters, which state the problem, describe places, give business methods and conditions connected with offices; raise the question of responsibility for attendant immorality; show the difficulties from the point of view of the office, and finally, with recent developments, suggest remedies.

Part II, in three chapters, deals with Employment Agencies; Agencies for Men; Professional, Commercial Agencies, Free Employment Bureaus and finally State Municipal Laws.

As the title suggests, the out-of-work problem is thus covered. The volume has the first clear advantage of depending chiefly upon personal investigation rather than upon statistical tables of questionable value. Miss Kellor writes for those who go to these agencies for helpers rather than for students, but her assistance to students is all the more effective for that reason. She looks rather to patrons and officials for improvements, to "the home makers and practical business men."

The author visited 732 agencies for which she has trustworthy documentary evidence.

It is one of the signs of competence in this investigation that, as suggested in the preface, Miss Kellor keeps a saving sympathy with the object of her criticism. There is no better test of good social work of this character.

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The second value is the distinctly *social* note which the reader everywhere feels. This is indeed a result of the sympathy for the difficulties of the agencies which the author never forgets.

It is a pleasure to recommend a book with such confidence as this volume inspires.

JOHN GRAHAM BROOKS.

CAMBRIDGE, MASS.

DA SOCRATE A HEGEL. Di Bertrando Spaventa. Nuovi Saggi di critica filosofica a cura di Giovanni Gentile. Laterga e figli. Bari: Pp. xvi, 432, 1905.

PROBLEMI DEL MONDO MORALE. Di Igino Petrone. Remo Sandron: Milano, Palermo, Napoli. Pp. iv, 334, 1905.

I PRESUPPOSTI FILOSOFICI DELLA NOZIONE DEL DIRITTO. Di Prof. Giorgio del Vecchio, Bologna: Zanichelli. Pp. xii, 192, 1905.

The title of "Da Socrate a Hegel" is likely to raise false expectations: the book itself is nothing more than a miscellany of articles by Bertrando Spaventa unearthed from old and scarce reviews by the pious industry of an admiring disciple, and arranged in the order of time covered by the subject in question. Thus, the volume begins with a discussion of the doctrine of Socrates, (in the form of a review of an essay by Prof. Bertini), and ends with a discussion of psychological naturalism from a Hegelian point of view. The intervening essays cover a variety of ground, but, interesting as they are in themselves, they have no special significance for students of ethics.

Professor Petrone's essays on the other hand, are nothing if not ethical. The polemic against Nietzsche tends to be monotonous; and the essays generally may be said to be different variations of the theme that ethics considered as the philosophy of action is at once a science of morals and a doctrine of the world. Ethics is the key to a true metaphysics in which the speculative and practical reason find conciliation.

Professor Vecchio's book is a vindication of a philosophy as distinct from a descriptive science or history of "Right." The recognition of the objectivity and logical priority of "the form of right" is the methodological foundation for the theory of right in general. This thesis is maintained in a familiar, if somewhat scholastic fashion, the argument being perhaps more effective

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on its polemical than on its constructive side. The same author's "Il Communismo Giurdico del Fichte" is an appreciative review of Professor Petrone's dissertation on the same subject. Both professors maintain the standpoint of a robust and genial idealism and both are effective critics of an uncritical naturalism.

SIDNEY BALL.

ST. JOHN'S COLLEGE, OXFORD.

MUTTER ERDE: EIN VERSUCH ÜBER VOLKSRELIGION. Von Albrecht Dieterich. Leipzig & Berlin: B. C. Tuebner, 1905. Pp. 121.

Few German scholars have done so much for the real understanding of Greek religion and especially of Greek Mysteries as Dr. Albrecht Dieterich. The book before us extends however far beyond the sphere of classical religion. Its two first chapters are in their main substance reprinted from the *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft* (viii, 1905)—an excellent publication, not as widely known in England as it deserves—and these two chapters were planned as part of a larger work on certain fundamental conceptions in religious thought. The two chapters on "Mother Earth," have grown to seven, and their importance certainly justifies their separate publication.

The religious rites which are at once most familiar and most permanent are those connected with the three great facts and mysteries of human life—birth, marriage, and death; and the ritual of these three mysteries is all connected with a belief surviving to-day among the uneducated in the magic of the motherhood of the earth. The new-born child among the Romans of Varro's day was placed upon the earth, whence the father, if he recognized its legitimacy, lifted it *(tollere et suscipere);* but the rule of placing the child on the earth, preceded any question of legitimacy, and it is still practised to-day. Among the peasants of the Abruzzi (p. 7) *lavato e infasciato il neonato la levatrice lo posa in terra;* in Sicily, *il neonato va deposto subito sul pavimento, altremente morrà al ospedale:* the child is put in touch with earth, the mother of all. Children come out of the earth: the Central Australians knew of a stone with a hole in it, out of which come the spirits of children, and to it women who desire children make pilgrimages.

Again, according to a wide-spread custom, even where cremation prevails, very young children must be buried, not burnt, that

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their souls may be reborn in the next generation. "Dust thou art, and unto dust thou shalt return," has the cheering corollary "out of dust thou shalt be reborn." This is the primitive "cycle of births" (κύκλος γενέσεων) of which Aeschylus writes:

> "And Earth herself who all things brings to birth
> And of her nurture back receives the germ;"

and this primitive re-birth lent its symbolism to the Orphic mysteries in which the initiate man avowed: "I have passed 'neath the bosom of the under-world, Queen Despoina."

The religion of Mother Earth lies deep down in the bed-rock of human nature. Greece proper, Crete, Asia Minor, Babylonia show in the earlier strata of their religions a supreme mother-goodness with male attendants rather than a supreme male god with a throng of worshipping women. But with the advance of civilization, the development of patriarchal institutions and, it may be, the spread of Semitic religion, we come to a phase in which the divine is expressed as man rather than as woman, as Zeus and Jahveh rather than as Demeter and Ishtar. But so curiously persistent and tenacious is the cult of the "Mother" that though the last word in religion at present is "Our Father" the Father worshipped is worshipped for his characteristics of motherhood. In the Aramaic gospel in use among the Ebionites, the Holy Ghost is addressed as "my mother;" and half of Christendom to this day bows at the shrine of Mary the Mother.

Jane E. Harrison.

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Die Realität der Gottesidee. Von Dr. Gustav Class. München: C. H. Becksche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1904. Pp. 94.

This little work is written by an honored German teacher, who is conspicuous among those who derive the essentials of their system from Kant, not indirectly through the latter German idealists, but directly from the master himself. Characteristic of this group of thinkers is the classifying of the normative functions of the human soul under the general name of "Spiritual," *"Pneumatologie"* being a name repeatedly used by Dr. Class to distinguish the scope of his inquiries from Psychology. This distinction is, in my opinion, relatively useful and even necessary, though the reader may protest against adding to the already too cumbrous and intricate Kantian terminology. The author accepts the

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epistemological and ethical results of Kant, but seeks to fill out the well-known gaps of the system, to bring *Phenomena* and *Noumena, the categories of the understanding, the Ideas of Reason, the categorical imperative,* and *the Postulates of Practical Reason* into closer or more explicit relation. Like Kant, he distinguishes between the data of outer and inner sense, constituting the world or nature, and the universal and normative principles which in knowledge, art, and moral action, operate upon the given, reducing it into order and harmony and into subservience to spiritual purposes. In all three spheres, we may recognize the appropriate categorical imperative, namely, to reduce to conformity with Spirit, the brute, and ostensibly unspiritual facts of experience.

Now the various categorical imperatives give the validity of the Idea of God, but they do not reveal his existence. God as the absolute spirit, which is lord over nature as well as over our spirits is revealed to us as surely existing by a *categorical indicative:* namely a promise or assurance *Zusage;* that the ideals which the universal spirit within us commands us to follow cannot fail to be realized. *"Es wird gehen"* is the substance of this promise and it constitutes the non-historical revelation of God. This revelation is supplemented by an historical revelation, that is by the manifest intervention of the absolute spirit in human affairs; personalities appear from time to time in the world's history whose spiritual strength and insight physical and psychical antecedents can in no wise explain. This historical revelation of God reached its culminating point in the life and teaching of Christ.

So brief and fragmentary a treatment of so vast a theme must leave painful gaps in the mind of a reader who is not already pretty familiar with the line of thought represented by this book. And those who do not recognize that Kant made a new and most fruitful beginning in all departments of philosophy will not, without much labor, be able to assimilate the results indicated rather than demonstrated by Dr. Class. Few persons would, I imagine, read a modern book of German or any other philosophy for pure literary pleasure; but this book is in its way as regardless of literary form and arrangement, as abrupt, as rugged, as wayward and full of surprises as Kant himself. I would rejoice if from Dr. Class or some other thinker, the lines of thought indicated in this book received a more logical, critical, and continuous exposition.

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La Filosofia di Schopenhauer. Di Giuseppe Melli. Firenze: Bernardo Seeber, Libraio Editore, 1905. Pp. 320.

The chief aim of this delightful book seems to be to offer a clear and appreciative introduction to Schopenhauer's works, rather than a criticism of them. This may be inferred from the fact that the first nine out of the eleven chapters which the book contains, give hardly an indication of any possible divergence between the author's views and those of his subject. He writes with the intimate knowledge and the enthusiasm of a man who has been, if he is no longer, wholly dominated by the power and the eloquence of a master. These nine chapters are, in their own way, of a degree of excellence seldom approached. No better means than the reading of this book could be devised for the purpose of kindling the desire of the enjoyment which only the study of classics in every department of thought can supply.

The last chapter is the most critical and, though too brief, is, in its way, most admirable. It endeavors not only to indicate Schopenhauer's place in the sequence of philosophic thought, but to trace the author's peculiar and personal views to their sources in his disposition and education. We are told (p. 318), that he lacks the constructive or speculative faculty and his negative account of virtue and happiness is thus explained. "His vision is vivid rather than wide; certain aspects of human reality escape him or fail to excite his interest." The closing pages contain a very just estimate of Schopenhauer's influence and importance, and the purely negative criticism of him as a pessimist is warmly repudiated. "He who possessed in so slight measure the sense of the life of history has rendered one of the greatest services to the comprehension of human history; he has reinstated in philosophy the sense of wonder."

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Die Metaphysischen Grundlagen der Aristotelischen Ethik. By Dr. Emil Arleth. Prag: J. G. Calvesche Buchlandlung, 1903. Pp. 69.

Dr. Arleth's little treatise was, he tells us, written as part of a more extensive work on Aristotelian ethics, and accordingly confines itself to an examination of the Aristotelian idea of

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"good" in its relation to the "real" and the "one" and its bearing on ethics. Dr. Arleth rightly points out that the practical and intelligible character of the Aristotelian ethics is largely delusive and that Aristotle everywhere builds on his peculiar metaphysical foundations. But he hardly raises the question whether this procedure is not more or less characteristic of every systematic thinker. For the rest, Dr. Arleth is a sound, competent and learned guide to the intricacies of Aristotelian thought, but for this very reason he does not arrive at any very startling novelties in his conclusions. The ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθον he finds is determined by the εἶδος of man, his cosmic function, as it were. But he also recognizes that this conception dogmatically presupposes a knowledge of an immutable system of concepts, and has no answer to a questioner who doubts these assumptions.

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THE INTERPRETATION OF NATURE. By C. Lloyd Morgan, LL. D., F. R. S. London: The Macmillan Co., 1905.

This little book is an extension of an article which appeared in the *Contemporary Review* of May, 1905. It deals with the scientific and teleological aspects of the interpretation of nature, the aim of the book being, in the author's words, to show that a belief in purpose as the causal reality of which nature is an expression is not inconsistent with a full and whole-hearted acceptance of the explanations of naturalism within their appropriate sphere.

Commencing with a brief sketch of the development of the two modes of interpretation, Principal Morgan proceeds to expound and discuss the principles of naturalism. There is an admirably clear section dealing with the methods of physics, which employs simplified ideal constructions, instead of dealing with the complicated actual cases. What this means is made plain by some well-chosen illustrations from dynamics and astronomy. Equally clear is the discussion of the difference between the scientific and metaphysical uses of the words cause and effect, which in science might be replaced by the words antecedent and consequent.

The seventh section contains some considerations on the origin of life, and the question of the possibility of the interference of mind with matter. The author regards as fictitious the cogency

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of an argument of which much has recently been made, viz.: that Vital Force is directive and can interfere with a material system without presenting any phenomena which contradict the laws of mechanics. According to naturalism the present configuration of the material system is determined only by its previous, and determines its future states. If, then, interference is possible, it makes an end of this basal law of dynamics.

Well, it seems that such a law will have to go, but not dynamics with it, and after all it is that which is the important thing to keep. From the problems of dynamics, human interference is expressly precluded, so that they are not to be affected by the decision of the question under discussion.

The examination of naturalism, the chain of antecedents and consequents, convinces the author that it is not inconsistent with his belief in purpose. The conclusion is put several times, somewhat hesitatingly, in the form of a question, the argument being that the inquiring human mind cannot rest satisfied with a record of antecedents and consequents, so that naturalism fails to satisfy. If man "feels justified in believing that, in the purpose which unifies, directs, and determines the course of his own experience, there is real causal agency, he cannot escape the conviction that it is in constant relation to a wider purpose, *of the same order of being,* but free from his own petty limitations and imperfections." Again, "Determinism, whether in external nature or in human life, is the expression of purpose; purpose is that which finds expression in determinate sequence."

We are not altogether satisfied with the amiable solution that both sides are right. We are not quite convinced that the rivals are looking at opposite sides of the same shield. Determinism may not be inconsistent with the wider purpose of which our author speaks, but it seems to render our human purposes illusory.

The book is enriched with extremely well selected examples, which serve to make clear and precise the author's meaning and to make the book intelligible and interesting to the general reader.

C. T. Preece.

University of Birmingham.

An Analysis of Human Motive. By F. Carrel. London: Simpkin, Marshall, Hamilton, Kent & Co., Ltd., 1905. Pp. 222.

"Motives may be defined as volitional impulses determining the

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performance of acts conducive to the satisfaction of fundamental needs, desires, or aspirations, and, by extension, the mental inhibitions causing forbearance from such acts." The fundamental motives, or the motives under the influence of which the greatest numbers of human acts are performed are: Sustenance, Sex, Pleasure, Self-love, Sympathy, Religion. They are arranged according to their importance in the general plan of conduct. This order is, however, liable to be "interverted" in individual cases; *e.g.* the religous motive, although "supplementary and contingent," may become all-pervading.

The division of motives into a series of six does not seem to be based on any principle. Mr. Carrel admits, indeed, that it is arbitrary but thinks it will stand the test of experience. The order in which the motives are placed appears arbitrary also. For Pleasure is put third on the above list, and yet it is said that "all actions converge towards the satisfaction of the pleasure motive."

The author's chief purpose is ethical. He analyzes motives and traces their influences on conduct in order to determine the ultimate end to which they tend, and the means by which the best conditions of that end may be produced.

The treatment is popular and somewhat superficial. But the book is not without interest. A noteworthy feature is the discussion of the motives which influence women.

DAVID PHILLIPS.

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SKIZZE EINES MORALSYSTEMS ALS PRAKTISCHE GRUNDLAGE DER KÜNFTIGEN WELTRELIGION. Von Th. Rudert. Leipzig: Th. Knaur, 1905. Pp. 41.

The philosophic system of the author of this little book I conjecture to be a mentalistic monism, in which human actions are a progressive development from a lower grade of mental activity to a higher, the lower including and presupposing the higher, and so on. From the right insight into moral action the author expects the replacement of Christian dogmas by a species of mentalist pantheism, and the general prevalence of tolerance and sympathy. Reference is made on the title page and elsewhere to another work by Herr Rudert "Das letzte Wort der Philosophie," which I should read with much curiosity. Without more knowledge of the author's philosophic position, it is very difficult to un-

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derstand the allusive and laboredly schematic style of the present work. The author seems to me well-qualified to treat moral phenomena and ethical theories discursively and exhaustively; and I can only regret that he has not done so in this case.

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Articles by writers in Great Britain, and books to be reviewed, except those published in the United States, should be sent to Prof. J. S. Mackenzie, University College, Cardiff, Wales.

All other articles, and books to be reviewed published in the United States, should be sent to INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, 1415 Locust Street, Philadelphia.



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